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THREE CONCEPTIONS OF MODAL REALISM:
(SUMMARY)
The thesis is divided into three sections. The first of these is a critique of the 
conceptions of modal realism due to Lewis; the second, a critique of that due to 
McGinn. The third section comprises the development and initial evaluation of a 
third conception of moral realism which I term secondary modal realism.
In Section One of the thesis [Ch.1- Ch.5] I argue against the acceptability of the 
objectual modal realism of David Lewis and I argue (tentatively) for one theory 
of the meaning of possible world statements which is consistent with this denial 
of the existence of possible worlds. Chapters 1- 4 concern the former argument, 
Ch.5 concerns the latter.
In Ch.1, I argue that there is no genuine semantic utility afforded by the adoption 
of realism about possible worlds. The case is (i) that the genuine semantical 
utility which does accrue via the ontological commitment to possible worlds can 
be had without that ontological commitmment and (ii) that other claims to 
semanti utility which are associated with possible world semantics do not reflect 
legitimate semantic-explanatory interests. The main part of the discussion of 
objectual realism - constituted by Chapters 2, 3 & 4 - takes a different turn. 
Since Lewis is fond of comparing his modal realism to realism about the entities 
of mathematics, I attempt to show that, on both epistemological and 
metaphysical grounds, the comparison is quite unfavourable for objectual 
modal realism. In Ch.2, I defend the objectual modal realist's right to an a priori 
epistemology of modality in face of Benaceraffs dilemma, but, it is argued in 
Ch.3, even granted a priority, there is still a serious epistemological difficulty 
since the internal epistemology of modal realism which is proposed by Lewis is 
seriously flawed. In Ch.4, it is argued that there is at least one important 
metaphysical consideration which militates against an ontological commitment 
to worlds but which does not appear to have the same impact re. mathematical 
ontology, viz: that the mooted possible worlds are identification- transcendent. 
Having made the case for anti-realism about possible worlds I am concerned in 
Ch.5 with the outline of a theory of the meaning of possible world statements 
which is consistent with this ontological position. I argue for the unacceptability 
of a theory, outlined by Forbes, which depends upon the claim that possible 
world statements do not mean what they appear to mean. I then counterpose 
the options of an error theory and a metaphor theory of world-talk arguing that 
while both of these are prima facie tenable, the latter is preferable.
In Section Two of the thesis [Ch.6 - Ch.9] I deal with the non-objectual modal 
realism of McGinn. Having set out the salient theses of McGinn's conception of 
modal realism [Ch.6], the critique of this conception follows.
Ch. 6: the variety and resources of anti-realisms about modality are seriously 
underestimated by McGinn. In particular the option of anti-realism based on 
the strategy of proposing a sceptical solution as a response to a sceptical 
paradox is ignored. Ch.7: McGinn proposes that the only defensible form of 
modal realism consists in endorsing the thesis of supervenience (without 
reduction) of the modal on the actual. However, the discussion of 
supervenience fails to acknowledge many of the difficulties associated with the
application of supervenience and related theses in the modal case. 
Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that acceptance of modal/actual 
supervenience involves no commitment to modal realism. Ch.8: consideration 
of the issues that flow from the discussion of the thesis of supervenience should 
point towards a central question of modal epistemology i.e. whether modal 
knowledge is attainable by conceptual means alone. However, McGinn's 
discussion of supervenience leads him away from this central question and as a 
result he mislocates the problematic nature of modal epistemology in the claim 
that we cannot represent modal facts as causally explaining our knowledge of 
them. Ch.9:The modal realism that McGinn offers is wholly unacceptable since 
it provides neither a clear conception of the truth-conditions of modal statements 
nor any account of how we detect modalities. The realism he offers is redolent 
of sceptical paradox and seems ripe for an anti-realist treatment in the form of a 
sceptical solution.
Hence, the upshot of the first two sections is that the existing conceptions of 
modal realism, i.e. those of Lewis and of McGinn respectively, are indefensible. 
In Section Three of the thesis [Ch.10 - Ch. 12] the aim is to characterize and 
evaluate a third conception of modal realism - secondary modal realism. This 
project is inspired by (i) McDowell's secondary quality conception of moral 
reality and (ii) the observation of crucial similarities between the failings of 
more traditional conceptions of moral realism and those conceptions of modal 
realisms dealt with above.
In Ch.10, I argue that anthropocentricity as opposed to perceptibility is the 
feature of paradigmatic secondary properties which is an appropriately 
generalizable feature of secondary realism and that a proper conception of the 
standard of correctness for secondary property judgments facilitates the 
extrapolation of that standard to the cases of moral and modal judgement. In 
Ch.11, I argue that statements of metaphysical necessity - like statements of 
logical necessity and statements of moral evaluation - are statements which 
have an expressive role and whose acceptance is related constitutively to 
certain courses of conduct. Following an attempt to outline the nature of the 
commitment that is expressed in a claim of metaphysical necessity, I argue that 
the only recourse for modal realism is to accept the descriptive/ non-descriptive 
duality of the role of these modal claims. In Ch. 12, I gauge the degree of 
departure from more traditional realist themes to which the secondary modal 
realist is committed while emphasizing the contrast between secondary modal 
realism and sophisticated anti-realism in the form of Blackburn's quasi-realistic 
projectivism. I argue that modal parallels of those arguments which Blackburn 
deploys in an attempt to establish the superiority of projectivism over realism in 
the moral case either fail outright, or succeed against the target they 
characterize but remain irrelevant to secondary modal realism as developed 
here. Finally, I attempt to chart the course for further work by, first, noting a 
lacuna in McDowell's case for his favoured explanatory test for reality and then 
indicating how this might be filled to yield a (sketch of a) transcendental 
argument for modal reality
1PREFACE
It is twenty years since Saul Kripke gave the lectures that made up his "Naming 
and Necessity" and so twenty years since the birth, or re-birth, of the concept of 
metaphysical necessity that features throughout contemporary discussions of 
metaphysics and modality. As such the concept of metaphysical necessity has 
flourished alongside, but with a surprising degree of independence from, the 
most recent attempts to characterize objectivity in what is commonly known as 
the realism/anti-realistm debate. This thesis is an attempt to integrate these two 
regions of contemporary philosophical interest with a view to establishing 
whether some conception of metaphysical necessity which is recognizably 
realist might emerge as tenable.
Before that can be pursued with good conscience, it is necessary, in my 
judgement, to attempt to "settle accounts" on two scores pertaining to possible 
worlds- henceSection One The first matter is the objectual modal realism 
proposed by David Lewis (i.e. the assertion of the existence of other possible 
worlds) and the second is the use of possible world talk. The compulsion to 
engage in David Lewis's challenging and sometimes infuriating dialectic was 
borne from a conviction that his objectual modal realism was for the most part 
attacked on inappropriate (generallynominalistic) grounds.The desire to provide 
a theory of the use of possible world-talk was borne out of a dissatisfaction with 
the degree of exposure that the issue has enjoyed hitherto, and with the 
atmosphere of complacency in which denial of the existence of worlds is not 
disturbed overmuch by the ubiquity of world talk.
In pursuing the integration of modal matters with the wider realism/anti-realism 
debate, of this cause I have drawn upon Colin McGinn's lengthy and important 
paper "Modal Reality" to the extent that one third of the thesis, Section Two, is 
concerned directly with the ideas contained with that paper. Although I find 
myself in extensive disagreement with many of the proposals and strategies 
which McGinn advances, I would be happy to view this thesis as an attempt to 
follow, one decade on, the path of investigation of modal realism that was first 
tread in "Modal Reality". My alternative to McGinn's modal realist problematic is 
offered in the final section of the thesis and it is less conclusive than I would 
have liked it to have been. However, the direction of theorizing which is 
suggested in that section - i.e. the construction of modal realism in the style of a 
more developed moral counterpart - strikes me as a genuinely promising 
strategy which will repay further work. If that strategy should strike the reader as 
less than promising, it is to be hoped that its airing will at least prompt superior 
alternatives in the modal realist/anti- realist debate which Simon Blackburn has 
characterized appropriately as an "infant industry".
2INTRODUCTION TO SECTION ONE :
LEWIS'S OBJECTUAL MODAL REALISM - THE ARGUMENT FROM UTILITY
David Lewis is an objectual realist about modality. By the term "modal realism" 
he intends an ontological, existential thesis which affirms the reality of modal 
objects i.e. non-actual possible worlds (and their contents).1 Lewis describes 
his own view as genuine modal realism since he conceives of the worlds 
whose existence he affirms as sui generis entities and he contrasts this view 
with ersatz modal realism, according to which possible worlds are constructs of 
entities of a more familiar kind such as propositions or imaginative acts.2 The 
definitive statement of the case for genuine modal realism is as follows:
" If  we want the theoretical benefits that talk of possibilia brings, 
themost straightforward way to gain honest title to them is to accept 
such talk as the literal truth. It is my view that the price is right, if 
less spectacularly so than in the mathematical parallel.The benefits 
are worth the ontological cost. Modal realism is fruitful; that gives 
us good reason to believe that it is true.
Good reason; I do not say it is conclusive. Maybe the 
theoretical benefits to be gained are illusory, because the analyses 
that use possibilia do not succeed in their own terms. Maybe the 
price is higher than it seems, because modal realism has 
unacceptable hidden implications. Maybe the price is not right; 
even if  I am right about what theoretical benefits can be had for 
what ontological cost, maybe the very idea of accepting  
controversial ontology for the sake of theoretical benefits is 
misguided. Maybe - and this is the doubt that most interests me - 
the benefits are not worth the cost because they can be had more 
cheaply elsewhere. "3
Anti-realism about worlds - the position that I wish to defend - has it that there 
are no (non-actual) possible worlds genuineor ersatz. The anti-realism on offer 
here will be articulated as a challenge to Lewis's argument from utility (outlined 
above). My discussion of objectual realism breaks into three parts.
The first part is constituted by Chapter 1, in which I argue that there is no 
genuine semantic utility afforded by the adoption of realism about possible
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3worlds. The second part of the discussion of objectual realism - constituted by 
Chapters 2, 3 & 4 - takes a different turn. Since Lewis is fond of comparing his 
modal realism to realism about the entities of mathematics, I will evaluate this 
comparison and argue that the comparison is quite unfavourable for objectual 
modal realism. I will argue that even if we acknowledge that possible worlds 
and the abstract objects of mathematics give rise to a common epistemological 
problem (and solution) there are both epistemological and non-epistemoloaical 
considerations that render realism about possible worlds far less attractive than 
realism about mathematical entities. In the third part, i.e. CH.5, I will classify a 
variety of ways of being an anti-realist about possible worlds and I will argue 
that the best of these is based upon treating possible world talk as metaphorical 
in nature.
Throughout this first section, when the terms "realism" and "anti-realism" are 
used without qualification, and where context does not indicate otherwise, they 
are intended as referring to the theses of the affirmation of the existence of 
possible worlds and the denial of the existence of possible worlds respectively.
3
4CHAPTER 1
THE PURPORTED SEMANTIC UTILITY OF POSSIBLE WORLDS
(1.0) .INTRODUCTION
Recent interest in possible worlds began in the metalogical province of the 
semantical analysis of modal logic1 and it has been further commented that the 
formal utility of possible world semantics has been largely responsible for 
promoting the popularity of a philosophically unattractive ontology.2 The  
purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the semantic utility of possible world 
semantics with a view to assessing the relevance of this utility to the general 
case for modal realism.
I consider three areas in which the assumption that there are possible worlds 
might be held to yield semantic utility viz :
(i) The characterization of validity for modal operator arguments.
[(1-10) - ( 1-12)]
(ii) The definition of truth for modal operator languages.
[(1.2), APPENDIX A.]
(iii) The explanation of the validity of modal operator arguments.
[(1.30)-(1.43)]
Regarding the characterization of validity and the definition of truth, I argue that 
the same results are to be had without the ontological cost. Regarding the 
explanation of Lm validity, I argue that no semantic utility arises from the 
purported explanation of validity since the validity of the arguments is not (in the 
relevant sense) explicable.
(1.10) THE NEED FOR A FORMAL SEMANTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF 
VALIDITY FOR MODAL ARGUMENTS DOES NOT SUPPORT REALISM 
ABOUT WORLDS.
Let us confine our attention initially to the semantical tasks which press upon 
logicians in respect of the characterization of validity for systems of modal 
logic. In point of fact model-theoretic approaches have most frequently been 
exploited for this purpose.3 The model-theoretic characterization of validity for 
modal logics proceeds via the apparatus of Relational Frames . A relational 
frame consists in a set of indices and a binary relation R defined over the
4
5indices. A valuation for the modal language specifies a truth-value (over a 
frame) for every sentence of the language at every index in accordance with 
standard rules for the truth-functional connectives and modal operators. A 
frame is then said to validate a sentence if! every valuation over the frame 
makes the sentence true at every index, and validates a logic iff it validates 
every theorem of that logic. Beyond this concommittant definitions of 
completeness and logical consequence are available.
It would appear that no one is concerned to dispute the point that for these 
purposes, construed in a limited algebraic context, we need not engage the 
apparatus of possible worlds. Lewis writes that the indices of the frames....
" ..... 'may be regarded as ' possible worlds, but in truth may be
anything you please . " 4
However, this constitutes no decisive victory for the anti-realist about possible 
worlds.
<1.111 AN ARGUMENT FOR REALISM BASED ON THE APPLICATION  OF 
THE METALOGICAL RESULTS 
It may be argued that while realism about possible worlds is not, strictly 
speaking, indispensible for these most limited of purposes, it facilitates the 
prospects of relevant application of the metalogical results. Lewis makes a 
case along the following lines.5
The model-theoretic results in respect of modal logics only become available if 
we accept the interpretation of the operators as quantifiers over indices. Now 
we face a kind of dilemma. If we interpret the domain of quantification as some 
arbitrary set of individuals (towns or whatever) then we get the required 
characterization of validity for the logic (construed as a syntactic system) but 
only at the cost of making the whole enterprise thoroughly irrelevant to modality 
i.e. these are instances in which misinterpretations validate the logic. On the 
other hand, if we are after a genuinely modal interpretation of the logic, we gain 
access to the metalogical results but only at the price of accepting the analysis 
of the operators as quantifiers. So, however we approach the issue, the only 
procedure which does justice to both our modal and metalogical concerns is 
one which entails the treatment of the operators as quantifiers over modal 
objects. While, as Lewis acknowledges, this is an argument for ersatz modal
5
6realism as much as for the genuine modal realism he espouses, the point 
remains that it presents a serious challenge to outright anti-realism  about 
worlds.6
(1.12) REPLY; THERE ARESUBSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO MODEL- 
THEORETIC SEMANTICS.
The anti-realist can respond by undermining the importance, or at least the 
centrality, of the model-theoretic semantic approach by promoting the cause of 
alternative semantic methods. We have no need of model-theoretic techniques 
in order to provide a genuinely modal interpretation of apparently modal 
arguments for, it would appear, substitutional methods will do just as well. The 
substitutional alternative proceeds by defining validity for a schema in terms of 
restrictions on the truth values of premises and conclusions in substituends of 
these schemas.7 In the terms of the utility argument, then, this reply should be 
categorized as a claim that the benefits in question - in this instance the 
semantic benefits - can be had more cheaply than at the cost of quantification 
over worlds.
(1.2) THE NEED FOR A SEMANTICAL THEORY OF TRUTH FOR MODAL 
OPERATOR LANGUAGES DOES NOT SUPPORT REALISM ABOUT 
WORLDS.
A further "formal" semantic consideration may be brought forth in order to boost 
the semantic utility case for realism about worlds. This consideration relates to 
theories of truth for languages containing modal operators.
The provision of truth-definitions for formal languages may be attempted either 
model-theoretically (where definitions proceed by relativizing truth to a model) 
or via theories of absolute truth such as Tarski's.8 While philosophical attention 
has centred upon theories of absolute truth on the grounds that these better 
match the requirements of empirical theories of meaning,9 both types of theory 
have a claim to displaying semantic structure.10 If both types of theory are 
tenable then the objectual anti-realist will again be in a position to argue that 
quantification over worlds was unduly expensive in view of the availability of a 
non-quantificational alternative that is, at least, equally viable. However, since it 
has been argued that one cannot provide an adequate theory of (absolute)
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7truth for languages containing standard modal operators11, we are faced with 
the prospect that only the model-theoretic approach may be tenable, and 
consequently that quantification over worlds has unrivalled utility in this respect. 
Consequently, it is important that the opponent of objectual modal realism 
should be able to meet the challenge mounted against the viability of a theory of 
absolute truth for languages containing modal operators.
I deal with this matter further in Appendix A where I argue that adequate 
theories of truth for modal operator languages are available. On the basis of that 
conclusion, I take the view that the objectual anti-realist should respond that 
truth definitions for modal operator languages are available more cheaply than 
at the cost of construing modal operators as (disguised) quantifiers over a 
domain of possible worlds.
I will now broaden the conception of semantic utility that may be associated with 
the acceptance of an ontology of possible worlds to take into account an 
argument that is presented by Forbes.12 This argument attempts to establish 
the added utility of realism about worlds on the grounds that realism about 
worlds funds an explanation of the validity of modal arguments.
(1.30) A SEMANTIC-EXPLANATORY ARGUMENT FOR OBJECTUAL REALISM 
STATED.
In what follows I will make use of Forbes'13 notation in formulating a possible 
worlds language,"Lw", and a 'parallel' modal operator language,"Lm". Briefly, 
their salient structures and items of vocabulary are these: Lw is a first order 
language with world variables ("w","u" etc.) and a constant, "w*", denoting the 
actual world; Lm is a propositional modal language containing the sentential 
operators " □  " and "<>"• A syntactic translation scheme takes each sentence of 
Lm into an Lw "rendering" e.g 
TRANS ("OP ") = "(3w)(Pw)",
TRANS ( '0 (P  & Q)") = "(Vw)(Pw & Qw)".
Forbes presents the following semantic case on behalf of the realist about 
worlds.14
Acknowledging the dispensability of worlds in the light of other algebraic 
interpretations of the indices of quantification, this realist goes on to claim that 
quantification over worlds has the advantage that this, and only this, can found
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8an explanation of the validity or invalidity of operator inferences, as opposed to 
merely pronouncing on the question of whether any such inference is valid. 
The structure of the case is as follows:
(i) Each Lm sentence is synonymous with its Lw 'rendering'.
(ii) The Lw renderings are prior to (give the real meanings of) the Lm 
sentences they render.
(iii) This combination of synonymy and Lw priority means that the 
(in)validity of Lm inferences can be explained via their Lw mappings just 
as the (in)validity of inferences involving sentences containing definite 
descriptions can be explained via Russellian renderings of these 
sentences.
If successful, this case apparently establishes an impressive semantic utility for 
possible worlds - they explain the validity of modal operator inferences - and so 
contributes to the broader case for realism about possible worlds.
(1.31) FORBES' CONCEPTION OF A RUSSELLIAN EXPLANATION OF 
VALIDITY
Forbes offers the following account of how inferences involving sentences 
containing definite descriptions can be explained via Russell's renderings of 
these sentences.15
The sentence (3) is said to have the 'real meaning' (4) :
(3) The girl next door is blonde.
(4) There is exactly one girl next door and she is blonde.
These sentences are formalized according to their respective surface structures 
thus:
(5) B [(/ x) Gx] (6) (3x) (Gx & (Vy)(Gy ~> y=x) & Bx)
This two-fold process grounds the claim that we have explained the logical 
powers of the operator,"/" , and, by the same token, that we have explained the 
validity of the inference from (3) to (7) viz:
(3) The girl next door is blonde |= (7) There is a girl next door 
Finally, the central point:
"The suggestion is then that possible world semantics explains 
validity and invalidity in the same way; that is, the relationship 
between (1) and (2) [ these being (1 )O P  and (2) (3w)(Pw) -  J.D.]
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9is the same as that between (5) and (6). "16
It is worth pausing to distinguish the three salient types of relation that feature in 
Forbes' version of the Russellian story: (a)The real meaning relation which 
obtains between sentences of a natural language and which captures both 
synonymy and priority; (b)The regimentation relation which obtains between 
English sentences and canonical descriptions of their surface structures and (c) 
The real logical form relation which obtains between canonical descriptions. 
It is then claimed that
(6) (3x)(Gx & (Vy) (Gy --> y=x) & Bx)
is the real logical form of
(5) B [(/ x) Gx].
According to Forbes:
” (6) shows that (5) does not really contain a subject term ..." 17 
and thereby we attribute the logical form of (6) to (5).18 The upshot is that the 
explanation of the validity of the inference from (3) to (7) viz:
(3) The girl next door is blonde . |= (7) There is a girl next door. 
depends on portraying (6) as the real logical form of (5) :
(6) (3x)(Gx & (Vy)(Gy --> y=x) & Bx)
(5) B[(/ x) Gx]
and on the role of (5) as the regimentation of (3 ):
(3) The girl next door is blonde.
All that remains then is to regiment (7) as (8) :
(7) There is a girl next door.
(8) (3x )(G x )
and, finally, to appeal to our acceptance of the inference (6) l= (8):
(6) (3x)(Gx & (Vy) (Gy ~> y=x) & Bx) |= (8) (3x )(G x).
Ultimately, the substantive claim that sustains the purported explanatory force of 
this account is that (6) is the real logical form of (5) and the claim is supported 
by the following argument19 :
(4) gives/is the real meaning of (3).
(5) regiments (3)
(6) regiments (4)
(6) is the real logical form of (5)
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(1.32) AN INITIAL OBJECTION TO THE APPLICABILITY OF A RUSSELLIAN 
EXPLANATION OF THE VALIDITY OF Lm ARGUMENTS 
We are being asked to entertain the proposal that possible world semantics 
"explains validity and invalidity in the same way".20 Hereafter, I will refer to this 
proposal as the Russellian explanation of Lm validity.
Forbes uses the arguments (A) and (B) :
(A) OP, OQ 1= 0 (P  & Q)
(B) (3w)Pw, (3w) Qw 1= (3w) (Pw & Qw)
to exemplify the purportedly Russellian relationship between Lm inferences and 
Lw inferences i.e. the invalidity of (B) is being supposed to explain the invalidity 
of (A). This is supported by an appeal to the intuitive invalidity of (B) and the 
substantive claim that (2) is the real logical form of (1) :
(1) OP- (2) (3w)(Pw)
But is this claim supportable in the same way as the (supposedly) parallel claim 
that (6) is the real logical form of (5)?
If the answer to that question is to be affirmative, we must be satisfied that there 
are sentences of our natural language for which (1) and (2) stand as adequate 
regimentations. To allow that matters might be otherwise would be to admit the 
possibility that there might be some kind of relation which could determine, 
quite independently of our natural linguistic practice, a non-arbitrary logical 
priority of one string of notation over another. Claims pertaining to these 
regimentations concerning synonymy and real logical form must surely be 
grounded, if at all, in facts about the use of sentences which the regimentations 
have been invoked to regiment.
But now we are in a position to propose an objection against the application of 
Russellian explanation to the case of Lm validity, for it has been claimed, by 
M cG inn21, that in effect there is no natural language analogue of the 
'regimentation' (2) and if this is correct, then there is a fortiori no natural 
language analogue of the regimentation (2) available to facilitate the inference 
to the claim that (2) is/gives the real logical form of (1). If McGinn's claim can 
be sustained, it will entail that there is no basis in natural language use for the 
claim of synonymy-priority of (2) over (1). The objection that emerges, then, is 
that the purported Russellian explanation of validity in the modal case has no 




There are two obvious strategies of response to this rejection. According to the 
first, (1.33), one might simply accept that there are no such sentences but argue 
that this fact does not constitute a decisive objection against the applicability of 
Russellian explanation. According to the second, (1.34) & (1.35), one might 
argue, contrary to the hypothesis, that there are such sentences and, 
consequently, that the objection to the applicability of Russellian explanation in 
the modal case is inappropriate.
(1.33) McGINN'S LINGUISTIC CONSRAINT ENDORSED.
McGinn makes the claim about the absence of possible world statements from 
English against the background of a "linguistic constraint" on the imputation of 
ontology to object language sentences for the purposes of giving their 
tru th -c o n d itio n s .22 As such, he is not directly concerned with the 
synonomy-priority issue which occupies us here. However, there are obvious 
implications in our region of concern for the position he adopts. If the linguistic 
constraint is appropriate, it counters the strategy which is based on acceptance 
of the absence of possible world sentences in natural language. He spells out 
the constraint thus :
"... if a semantic theorist imputes a certain kind of ontology to a 
range of sentences not superficially committed to such an ontology, 
then he is under a prima facie obligation either to point to other 
expressions in the language explicitly so committed, or to explain 
why it is that the ontology in question never surfaces. The motive 
behind this is to regulate and control departures from surface 
syntax. For it would seem implausable to discern reference to 
entities of a given kind if speakers were never found invoking those 
entities explicitly. "23
I take the view that we have no option but to accept this constraint (or something 
very much akin to it) if any control on departures from "surface syntax" is to be 
exerted in linguistic theorizing. The linguistic constraint constitutes a principled 
basis upon which we can oppose the proposal to accept that possible world 




gives the real meaning, and, a fortiori the real logical form of
(1) OP.
Moreover, if the foregoing remarks are correct it is qqI  open to the proponent of 
a Russellian explanation of the validity of modal operator inferences to argue 
along the following lines.
Agreed - there are no sentences which explicitly quantify over worlds but that 
is no bar to our representing prima facie non-quantificational modal idioms as 
really having quantificational structure. For we can defend the view that modal 
idioms are implicitly quantificational by citing the presence in use of the natural 
language (intuitive) synonyms (9) and (10) :
(9) There are ways the world might have been other than the way 
it actually is.
(10) It might have been the case that the world differed from 
the way it actually is.
to vindicate the synonomy of (2) and (1). (9) will suffice as a sentence in use 
corresponding to (2) which is capable of supporting a synonymy claim between 
(9) and (10) even though it does not explicitly quantify over possible worlds. 
This reasoning from implicitness constitutes a departure from a strict analogy 
with the Russellian case, for a strict analogy clearly requires that the 
regimentation (2) :
(2) (3w )(P w )
should stand in the relation of canonical description of surface structure to a 
natural language sentence. In any event, the reasoning from implicitness won't 
do since the point arising from the linguistic constraint remains. The departure 
from surface grammar that is involved in regimenting (9) a' la (2) - there is no 
explicit quantification over possible worlds in (9) - stands in need of an 
explanation given that there is never explicit quantification over worlds in 
natural language use. In the absence of such an explanation, there is no 
warrant for the procedure for using Lw formulae to provide canonical 
descriptions of the natural language sentences. But how might such an 
explanation proceed?
It is reasonable to expect that the technical medium of the explanation will be 
transformational grammar. More specifically, the explanation will depend upon 
the definition of appropriate deletion transformations which will operate on
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deep-structural Lw formulae in such a way as to yield surface structures in 
which no quantification over worlds is discernible. (Davidson24 proposes an 
explanation of this nature in connection with his own semantic theory of 
adverbial modification as implicit quantification over events.)
Now, even if it is possible to define appropriate transformations over Lw and an 
appropriate class of modal idioms of English, this, in itself, is quite inert. Given 
transformational grammar, the question would be : why do all transformational 
operations result in a deletion of world variables, names of worlds, etc? 
Davidson's transformational account of adverbial modification gains purchase 
precisely because there are reasonably straightforward references to events in 
a variety of natural language locutions.
In short, there seems to be no warrant for reading into sentences an ontology 
which never surfaces in the language nor , equivalently, for venturing a 
canonical description of the sentences which has intended ontological import 
of that kind. Consequently, I do not find intelligible a position which accepts that 
the ontology of worlds never surfaces while claiming that reference 
to/quantification over worlds is a proper feature of canonical descriptions of 
sentences of the natural language. It is not surprising that no defence of such a 
position is forthcoming. The option of arguing that the ontology does surface 
proves more plausible and I now turn to consider this second strategy.
(1.34) LEWIS'S CASE FOR THE PRESENCE (IN ENGLISH) OF 
QUANTIFICATION OVER WORLDS 
Many of the remarks of the last section presuppose agreement with McGinn's 
view that no quantification over objects is involved in (9 ):
(9) There are ways the world might have been other than the 
way it actually is.
Famously, Lewis expresses disagreement with this view and argues that there 
is explicit quantification over ways-the-world-might-have-been and that making 
the shift to call these "possible worlds" is a mere facon de parler. 25 McGinn 
responds by alleging that Lewis's quantificational regimentation of the sentence 
is neither obligatory nor natural. He adds:
what Lewis has encouraged us to do with individual variables 
over worlds...(3x)(x is a world & ~ (x= the actual world))... we can
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do, and do naturally, using second order quantification combined 
with modal operators...(Bx)(<>F(things) & ~ Actually F  (things)) 26
Now, l agree with McGinn that Lewis does not give an argument which forces 
us to construe the ways-the-world-might-have-been sentence in terms of 
(first-order) quantification. But what could forcing amount to here? We are not, 
surely, forced to view matters in the way McGinn suggests either. When Lewis 
offered what appears to be a linguistic argument for realism about possible 
worlds based on the evidence of ways-the-world -might-have-been sentences 
(such as (9)) he prefaced it with the remark :
" /  believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we 
happen to inhabit. If an argument is wanted it is this. "27 
(My emphasis.- J.D.)
This remark is, to say the least, puzzling. It seems to suggest that the ontological 
thesis stands in no need of support - as if it were not controversial \ 
Furthermore, it prefaces what many, including McGinn, have seen as a 
thoroughly unconvincing argument.28
What I want to suggest is that we can improve understanding by reading Lewis 
charitably and in the context of the problematic of the linguistic constraint. 
Lewis's 'linguistic argument', construed as an attempt to force us into accepting 
quantification over possible worlds is indeed, by itself, quite unconvincing. If this 
argument were convincing, we would have even better grounds for being 
objectual realists about values given the availability of locutions such as (11) 
and (12) :
(11) There are values which this society has come to disregard.
(1 2 )  Among those values which ought to be promoted more 
vigorously are integrity and trust.
Values, in this regard, do much better than possible worlds! Like places, times 
and certain other controversial entities, purported reference to (objectual) 
values is executed through a "matrix of ontological locutions"29 i.e. a variety of 
names, descriptive singular terms, demonstrative functors etc. So there is a rich 
variety of idioms wherein the purported ontology surfaces . But no-one, surely, 
is in the business of arguing that such considerations of themselves compel 
ontological commitment. (That would be a position which deserved the title 
"naive realism".) The whole drift of ontological concern flows in the opposite
1 4
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direction. The dominant question is -which are considerations that allow us to 
economize on ontological commitment in the face of matrices of ontological 
locutions of various sorts ?
The force of Lewis's point can be construed as an attempt to meet (anticipate) 
the negative point made by McGinn. McGinn's claim is that there is no 
surface-structural evidence of quantificational worldly vernacular in natural 
languages and Lewis can be viewed as offering a gesture to the effect that 
there is some such evidence . Were there none, perhaps that would be an 
overwhelming difficulty for the realist about worlds. But given that there is such 
prima facie evidence, and given how reluctant we are to be forced in these 
matters, we should say that the linguistic evidence that is to be gleaned from 
the existence of the ways-the-world-might-have-been sentences is 
inconclusive.
(1.35) THE CLAIM THAT THERE IS NO EXPLICIT QUANTIFICATION OVER 
POSSIBLE WORLDS IN ENGLISH REFUTED 
An argument from the blatantly obvious concludes, contra McGinn and contra 
the critic of the Russellian analogy, that natural language use of possible world 
talk is alive, well and as explicit as you like. This thesis as well as the writings of 
Lewis, Forbes, McGinn etc. bears out that claim, for we all use possible world 
talk and herein we have the surfacing of quantification over worlds. It is 
predictable that this response will provoke a great deal of consternation. But on 
what grounds might it be rejected?
Is it that McGinn's claim should be taken as pertaining only to 'ordinary 
language' and not philosophical discourse? If so, the appropriate reply is that 
no portion of our language can very comfortably be styled 'ordinary' in the face 
of the complexity of our speech communities.30 If ordinary language is the 
intersection of the discourse across a whole speech community it is a corpus 
which is no longer recognizably ordinary. Arguably, it is of the essence of 
linguistic communities that they diversify in such a way that the union of use 
should outstrip the intersection. Consider, for example the theoretical terms of 
science. Do they feature in ordinary language? Perhaps every competent 
speaker (ceteris paribus) is acquainted with, or has some facility in the use of, 
terms such as 'atom', 'plant', and 'insect' - do these count on grounds of
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intersection? We are due an account of such matters if the concept of ordinary 
language, is going to be doing any work in the present context.
Could it be that it is not that possible world talk fails to be ordinary but that it 
succeeds in being philosophical and it is non-philosophical discourse that is 
devoid of worldly idioms?
Perhaps so, but why should this be accepted as a reasonably motivated way of 
placing possible world discourse outside of language proper? It is true that 
philosophical vocabulary (including world talk) is invoked for the purposes of 
"theory". It is also true that such vocabulary is artificial in that it is consciously 
invented and introduced into our language. But can these or any other 
considerations of a suitably general - i.e. non ad hoc - nature be expected to 
exclude possible world talk without also excluding much of our linguistic 
invention, creativity and variety. Perhaps another of McGinn's points can be 
borrowed for the purpose of undermining this direct defence of world talk.
(1.361 RESPONSE : THE ARTIFICIAL NATURE OF WORLD TALK IS SHOWN 
BY THE ABSENCE OF AN APPROPRIATE VARIETY OF REFERENTIAL 
LOCUTIONS.
A fallback position might have it that while reference to possible worlds may be 
explicit in our usage, it can be excluded from the sphere of proper ontological 
consideration on the grounds that the relevant linguistic evidence does not 
exhibit sufficient variety .31 There is no matrix of worldly locutions in which the 
explicit quantification is embedded. Even if it is granted that we do use 
locutions of the type, "There are possible worlds such th a t...", this is shown to 
be artificial, or otherwise unacceptable, by the absence of proper names for 
worlds (other than the actual world) and the absence of related worldly functors 
and demonstratives. We must acknowledge this absence of referential variety in 
world talk but there is a rejoinder available which depends upon a peculiarity of 
worlds, and, indeed, ih£ world.
It is arguable that we cannot deny that a possible world exists when this claim 
is made in the context of the claim that the possibifia which are its contents 
exist. It is surely not the case that God creates all that there is except a world 
and then create a world to contain it.32 Think of the (actual) world and its 
contents! Why not say that worlds are ontological, (perhaps mereological )
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constructs out of the entities that comprise them? Then we can say that while 
there is no matrix of ontological locutions referring to non-actual worlds per se, 
there is a rich matrix of locutions (apparently) involving reference to their 
possibilia. For example, while the introduction of names of persons who might 
or would have existed is not an entirely straightforward affair, but the practice 
enjoys prima facie viability. In fact, the proponents of the view that such names 
can properly be introduced have been known to argue that the names in 
question may be introduced by way of descriptions involving certain 
counterfactual functors. Peacocke gives the example of a proper name "a" 
whose referent does not actually exist but is nonetheless "introduced" by way 
of the description (13):
(13) The person who would result if gametes b and c combined and
developed into a person. 33
and claims that relative to such a "convention" such sentences as (14):
(1 4 ) a would have had blue eyes . 
need not be deprived of truth conditions.
Demonstratives are probably the most problematic referential constructions in 
this respect (see Ch.4) and on well known grounds direct quantification over 
possibilia is beset with difficulties.34 Again, Lewis or a like-minded theorist, 
would not say that a possibilist semantics of such referential apparatus is forced 
on us but merely that the surface presence of such phenomena belies the claim 
that there is n£ sufficiently varied network of locutions re possibilia .
There is ample reason to conclude, then, that the objection to the applicability 
of Russellian explanation to Lm validity which was introduced in (1.32) does 
not succeed. It has ngl been established that the Russellian explanation of Lm 
validity in terms of Lw validity lacks a warrant in the form of natural language 
use of possible world talk. The canonical notation Lw does describe the 
surface-structure grammar of sentences in use and, therefore, if the Russellian 
explanation of validity is to be found wanting, it must be on other grounds. 
Providing such grounds will be the business of the following sections. However 
it is worth noting at this juncture that the acceptance of possible world talk as a 
"legitimate" part of natural language use bequeaths the problem of providing an 
account of the meaning of possible world statements. This problem will be 
picked up in Chapter 5, but for the moment I will return to the matter of the
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Russellian explanation of Lm validity in terms of Lw validity.
(1.40) THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE AGAINST THE RUSSELLIAN 
EXPLANATION OF Lm VALIDITY
My case is that the Russellian explanation of the validity of modal inferences 
and the conception of the real meaning of a statement upon which it depends 
are indefensible in virtue of the fact that neither is sustained by an appropriate 
warrant in the use of modal language. In the first instance I will outline a modest 
conception of the explanation of validity which is gleaned from what I find 
acceptable in the idea of explaining the validity of inferences by way of the real 
meaning of statements that feature in those inferences. I will then proceed to 
discuss the Russellian explanation of the validity of inferences containing 
descriptive singular terms, concluding that the pattern of explanation is 
acceptable in this case since it can be construed modestly. My final and central 
point is that the purported Russellian explanation of the validity of modal 
inferences is not acceptable since it is not susceptible to modest construal.
(1.41) MODEST EXPLANATIONS OF VALIDITY AND FIRST-ORDER 
SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION.
The proponent of the Russellian explanation of validity in the modal case is 
claiming that (2) gives the real meaning and the real logical form of (1):
(1) OP (2) (3w)(Pw)
Now, either the warrant for this claim derives from aspects of the use of the 
statements that these regimentations regiment or the claim has no warrant. 
Embracing the former commits the proponent of Russellian explanation to 
claiming with respect to the English sentences (13) and (14) :
(1 5 ) It is possible that Socrates is a woman.
(1 6 ) There is a possible world at which Socrates is a woman.
that (16) is the real meaning of (15) and, moreover, that (15) really contains 
an existential quantifier. But in what sense is this strange claim warranted? I will 
argue in the context of concerns pertaining to the explanation of validity that we 
can allow a sense in which a claim of this kind, while not very happily 
expressed, may in fact be warranted.
The key to the issue is to enquire after aspects of the use of statements that
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might lead us to postulate non-obvious semantic structures for them. In 
particular, why might we seek to regiment in first-order notation (for the 
purposes of semantic representation) a class of sentences of our language that 
do not have their purported quantificational content stamped on their faces? I 
suggest that motivation to proceed in this way may take the form of a (legitimate) 
desire to represent semantic structure as being in line with use i.e use qua 
inferential practice. What I have in mind is a case of the following type.
There may arise in our inferential practices instances of forms of argument that 
are clearly and unreservedly endorsed as semantically valid arguments by the 
members of the language-speaking community but whose semantic validity 
cannot be clearly displayed. This is to say that in semantic representation, 
unless we depart to some extent from the natural (prima facie  
non-quantificational) syntax of the sentences that feature in those arguments, 
we cannot reflect the semantic validity of the arguments in the form of syntactic 
validity . My two-fold claim is (i) that we should allow that the aim of displaying 
as syntactically valid those inferences that the linguistic community clearly 
endorses as semantically valid serves a kind of explanatory interest that we 
have - this is what I call a modest explanation of validity - and (ii) that to 
represent one kind of statement in use, Sj , as giving the real meaning of 
another kind of statement in use, S j , is justifiable only insofar as this enables us 
to explain aspects of the use of the Sj that are not explicable by reference to 
semantic and syntactic properties that would obviously be associated with the
s i-
The now standard first-order (Fregean) regimentation of a sentence such as 
(17) :
(17) Something is green.
exemplifies very clearly the kind of warrant that a real meaning claim may have 
in the context of a modest explanation of validity. Say we claim that (17) has 
the real meaning (18):
(18) There is a thing that is green.
and consequently that the real logical form of (17) is given by (19) rather than
(20):
(19) (3x) Gx (20) Gs
The claim that (17) has the real meaning (18) may be held to be warranted on
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the grounds that regimentation in the style of (19) allows the representation of 
inferences that are (uncontroversially) semantically invalid as syntactically 
invalid inferences. Regimentations in the style of (19) square with our 
treatment of the inference (C) as invalid :
(C) Something is green. Something is invisible.
I= Something is green and invisible. 
whereas regimentations in the style of (20) do not.
It follows from this that we ought to be prepared to allow that we can justify the 
claim that a certain class of explicitly quantificational statements give the real 
meaning of their prima facie non-quantificational "counterparts" in terms of the 
advantage gained in satisfying our broadly explanatory interest in representing 
as syntactically valid those inferences that the community's inferential practice 
endorses as semantically valid. This is to do no more than to make room for this 
kind of justification. It is clear that much more will have to be supplied in the way 
of constraints in order to characterize what is tolerable in semantic 
regimentation with respect to the kind and extent of departure from the syntax 
that we would naturally discern within our sentences. (For example, we must 
require that semantic representation should be systematic since it is not 
acceptable to suppose that just any ad hoc mapping of a (one-off) semantically 
valid inference that relates it to a syntactically valid inference can serve the 
purposes of a meaning based explanation of validity.)
I accept fully that the foregoing represents no more than a sketch of a
justification of a modest conception of the explanation of validity. However,
there is enough in this outline to enable us to appreciate that the case of 
first-order regimentation of (prima facie ) modal operator sentences compares 
unfavourably - by the lights of the considerations that inform the modest 
conception - with that of the regimentation of sentences containing descriptive 
singular terms.
(1.42) THE RUSSELLIAN EXPLANATION OF VALIDITY FOR INFERENCES 
INVOLVING DESCRIPTIVE SINGULAR TERMS: A MODEST 
INTERPRETATION DEFENDED : A FULL-BLOODED INTERPRETATION 
REJECTED
Just exactly what significance ought to be attached to Russell's analysis of
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sentences containing descriptive singular terms seems to be clearly a matter of 
dispute. On this basis I must take issue with Forbes who writes:
"The significance of the quantifier treatment of modal operators is 
akin to the significance which philosophers have generally  
attributed to regimentations of problematic sentences in standard 
first-order logic. ”35 (My emphasis J.D.)
This comment incorporates the quite implausible assumption that there is a 
generally accepted account of the significance of such regimentations. The 
assumption lacks plausibility since there are clearly distinguishable kinds of 
motivation for framing first-order regimentations of natural language sentences 
for semantic purposes.
It is my view that the real meaning relation that is purportedly instantiated by 
Russell's first-order regimentations is acceptable, if at all, in terms of the modest 
conception of the explanation of the validity of inferences involving descriptive 
singular terms. First of all let it be noted that there are clearly unacceptable 
grounds which stand as purported sources of justification of the real meaning 
claims.
It is clear that the significance of the analysis of sentences containing (prima 
facie ) descriptive singular terms was held by Russell to arise from 
epistemological considerations i.e. the conception of the significance of the 
semantic analysis is articulated in the context of the precepts of logical atomism. 
For Russell, the claim that (6) gives the real meaning (and the real logical form) 
of (5):
(5) B[(ix)Gx] (6) (3x)(Gx & (Vy)(Gy-->y=x) & Bx)
is supported in terms of the relative proximity of (6) to the terminus of analysis 
i.e. to an atomic sentence containing the logically proper names whose 
referents are the items of acquaintance.36 Now it seems clear that we can no 
longer accept that the value of the theory of descriptive singular terms can be 
sustained via reference to its logical-atomistic utility, for no-one is in the market 
for logical atomism. But how other than in terms of the modest conception of 
semantic explanation that has been proposed might the real meaning claims be 
sustained?
What I will call a full-blooded conception of semantic explanation is sustained 
by an equally full-blooded conception of the real meaning claims. In this
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conception Russell's analysis reveals something of the semantic (ultimately 
psychological) deep structure of our language and is akin to a discovery of a 
semantic fact whose obtaining explains our use of the statements in question 
and, in particular, our recognition of semantic validity in inferences involving 
these statements. My suspicion is that the original (realist) claim that possible 
world semantics has utility in the explanation of the validity of modal arguments 
is made with this conception of semantic explanation in mind. Be this as it may, 
the conception of semantic explanation is, in any case, quite unacceptable.
It is a familiar but crucial point that an account of the meaning of our statements 
must be grounded in facts about the use of those statements and the practices 
to which the use of the statements is aligned. In the context of purported 
explanations of validity I take this slogan to have the following force. An 
explanation of validity must be, as it were, use-driven . The semantic structures 
of our sentences must be viewed as arising from the patterns of semantic 
relation that they exhibit in use. As such, where we have evidence of the 
community's treating as valid a given class of inferences we have a warrant for 
representing the sentences that they contain as having semantic structure that 
reflects or displays validity. The degree of stucture we may attribute and the 
degree of departure that may be sanctioned from what we take to be the natural 
syntax of the sentences in question are important matters. But my immediate 
point concerns the appropriate conception of the direction of semantic 
explanation and it is simply that, ultimately, it is "surface" use that warrants the 
attribution of semantic structure.37 If we try to view our inferential practices as 
being susceptible to "deep" semantic explanation, this is to open up the 
possibility that we ought to regard our inferential practices as subject to revision 
in the light of what we might discover in deep semantic reality. That is to say, if 
the real meaning of a sentence is to be thought of as determined by or 
consisting in a semantic fact that is not determined by use then this appears to 
give rise to the possibility that we may be mistaking what the real meaning of a 
sentence requires of us in the way of use. It has, of course, been argued that 
these are no real possibilities at all.38
I will settle for indicating my sympathy with this familiar line of thought rather 
than attempt any further development of it. Suffice it to say that herein lie my 
reasons for objecting to the full-blooded conception of meaning and semantic
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explanation and, therefore, to the proposal that we should view Russellian 
claims of real meaning as being justifiable in that way.
Finally I want to claim, tentatively, that we can retain the form of the Russellian 
explanation of the validity of inferences containing (prima facie ) descriptive 
singular terms if we are prepared to construe this form of explanation as 
operating under the use-driven constraints outlined in connection with the 
modest conception of the explanation of validity. This is to claim no more than 
that Russell's "theory of descriptions" has a reasonably strong claim to being 
able to satisfy the modest criteria that were adumbrated earlier. The mapping of 
"description sentences" onto their first-order Russellian renderings has strong 
claim to being a systematic meaning-preserving representation of the semantic 
structure of the description sentences because the shift to first-order 
representation secures the display of semantically valid inferences in the form 
of syntyactic validity.
(1.43) THE RUSSELLIAN EXPLANATION OF l_m VALIDITY DOES NOT HAVE 
A MODEST (ACCEPTABLE^ INTERPRETATION.
The case of first-order regimentation of (prima facie) modal operator sentences 
is extremely weak by the lights of the considerations that inform the modest 
conception of the explanation of validity.
(i) I have argued that we ought to be prepared to attribute primacy to the 
first-order regimentations if there were some aspect of our inferential practice 
that the non-first-order regimentation fails to reflect. However the Lm/Lw case 
does not seem to be of this kind, for there are no semantically (in)valid modal 
inferences whose syntactic (in)validity is represented in their Lw rendering but 
not their Lm rendering. So we certainly do not have as compelling a case for 
quantificational regimentation as we do in the case of the likes of "something" 
and "nothing".
(ii) In "central"cases39 such as (D ) :
(D) It is possible that Socrates has exactly one leg.
It is possible that Socrates has more than one leg.
1= It is possible that Socrates has exactly one leg and Socrates 
has more than one leg.
semantic invalidity is in no way obscured by the (natural) syntax of the operator
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regimentation of its premises and conclusion i.e.
(A) O P, OQ 1= <0(P & Q)
There is no apparent reason for claiming that the first-order regimentation of
(D ) , i.e. (B) :
(B) (3w)Pw, (3w)Qw 1= (3w)(Pw & Qw)
serves better than (A) the avowed goal of displaying semantic (in)validity as 
syntactic (in)validity. Indeed the only grounds which come to mind as a basis for 
such a comparative claim involve the concept of one regimentation being 
syntactically more complex and therefore potentially more structure-revealing 
than another. Notwithstanding the general conceptual difficulty with the notion 
of framing a sufficiently non-arbitrary and generalizable notion of syntactic 
complexity, there is no intuitive pull to the idea that (B) is syntactically more 
complex and therefore potentially more (semantic) structure-revealing than (A). 
Given the rather bizarre nature of the claim for which motivation is being sought 
i.e. that sentences such as (15) :
(15) It is possible that Socrates is a woman.
really contain a quantifier over possible worlds, the absence of the 
antecedently familiar sources of motivation (as registered in points (i) and (ii)) 
emerges as a consideration that is extremely damaging to the applicability to 
Lm validity of a modest explanation. My contention, then, is that since there is 
no motivation to seek modest explanations of Lm validity in Lw terms, there is 
no justification arising from this source for making the implausible claim that the 
sentences of Lw give the real meaning of the sentences of Lm which they (are 
supposed to) regiment.
The original proposition was that realism about possible worlds could generate 
semantic utility by providing explanations of the validity of Lm inferences. I have 
argued that the explanation of validity must be use-driven and that in light of that 
constraint we can endorse only modest explanations of validity. However, there 
is no evidence to the effect that the structure that can be revealed by Lm syntax 
falls short of that required to represent as syntactically valid those inferences 
that involve sentences containing prima facie modal operators and whose 
semantic validity is endorsed in our inferential practice. Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to hold that the validity of Lm inferences is modestly explicable. 
Since modest explanation was being held to be the only kind of
2 4
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semantic-transformational explanation of Lm validity that could be legitimate, I 
am now bound to conclude that Lm validity is not subject to 
semantic-transformational explanation 40 Finally, since Lm validity is not 
subject to such explanation, no utility should be accorded to realism about 
possible worlds on the grounds that it generates explanations (of this kind) of 
Lm validity.
(1.440) A REMARK ON THE COMPARATIVE EXPLANATORY UTILITY OF 
RIVAL ONTOLOGIES
There is a moral to be drawn from the present case which is of relevance to the 
broader matter of arguments for ontological commitment based on explanatory 
utility.
While Lewis does not propose the semantic argument that I have discussed, he 
does claim that the modal theorist who accepts (his genuine, objectual) modal 
realism enjoys the advantage of being able to provide analyses and 
explanations where "the friend of diamonds and boxes"41 (as he refers to the 
modal theorist who opposes objectual realism) cannot do so 42 The "analysis" 
of the modal operators as disguised quantifiers (c.f. the real meaning relation) 
and the attendant explanation of the validity of the inferences in which the latter 
feature, stand as examples of the relatively large analytic and explanatory 
scope that the objectual realist claims. But this relatively large fund of 
"explanations" need not of itself constitute an advantage over a rival theory that 
purports less analysis and less explanation, for analysis and explanation are 
not always appropriate. My view is that the modal operators are semantically 
primitive i.e. the modal operators are not analysable and that the validity of 
arguments in which they feature is not (semantically) explicable.
The moral regarding the meaning of statements containing modal operators 
and the purported explanation of the validity of the arguments in which they 
feature is - as Hilary Putnam might have remarked - if it ain't broke, don't fix i t !
(1.441) THE THESIS THAT ALL MODALITY COMES PACKAGED IN 
DIAMONDS AND BOXES REPUDIATED
This is an appropriate point at which to clarify the issue of primitiveness and the 
related claims which are being made throughout this thesis on the behalf of
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"diamonds and boxes". Lewis casts the interpretative dispute concerning 
sentential modal operators as obtaining between the proponents of possible 
world analysis (such as himself) and those who take the view that all of modality 
comes packaged in diamonds and boxes.43 However, there is no need for the 
opponent of possible world analysis to adopt the latter, untenable, position. 
What characterizes the present opposition to possible world analysis is 
precisely the view that the sentential modal operators are not analysable in 
terms of possible world interpretations. This position can sit quite consistently 
with the prospect of our discerning a vast inventory of complex modal 
constructions that outstrip the resources of a grammar whose modal resources 
are restricted to dual sentential modal operators. Lewis is certainly right to make 
the, now familiar, point that the dual modal operators must at least be 
augmented with resources sufficient to represent (and to locate the scope of) 
"actually" and cognate items 44 Also, Wiggins has made a compelling case for 
our recognizing in the context of semantic theory the natural interpretation of 
modal adverbs as predicate modifiers in such essentialist claims as (21):
(2 1 ) Socrates is necessarily human.45
No doubt this is only to scratch the surface of our rich fund of semantically 
significant modal idioms. The position which is defended here is simply that the 
sentential modal operators, as well as the other recognized and prima facie 
non-objectual modal idioms which have been mentioned need not and should 
not be given possible world analyses. The decision to emphasize sentential 
modal operators among non-objectual modal idioms is grounded in 
considerations of convenience given their relative logical and semantic 
familiarity.
M .51 SUMMARY
The conclusions of (1.1) and (1.2) are that there are available successful 
non-quantificational semantic approaches to both the characterization of validity 
of modal arguments and the definition of truth for languages containing (prima 
facie ) modal operators. On both counts we are in a position to counter the 
objectual realist in terms that Lewis considers appropriate in claiming that the 
semantic benefits that ensue on the basis of acceptance of an ontology of 
possible worlds are to be had without accepting this ontology. The conclusion
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of (1.4) is that since the validity of Lm inferences is not in any acceptable sense 
explicable in terms of Lw validity and the real meaning relation, the Russellian 
explanation of the validity of Lm inferences does not in fact generate the 
semantic utility that the objectual realist purports that it does. Therefore, realism 





WORLDS. ABSTRACTNESS. CAUSATION AND A PRIORITY
(2.0) THE_SCOPE OF THE PRESENT CRITIQUE OF LEWIS'S MODAL 
REALISM
The critique of modal realism to be offered here involves no attempt to 
summarize the widespread criticisms of realism about worlds that have been 
made in the literature. Rather what is offered in these chapters (Ch.2, 3, 4) is 
one line of response to Lewis's most recent and comprehensive statement and 
defence of his position.1 This chapter is intended as supplying the context in 
which the epistemological and metaphysical objections to objectual modal 
realism (proposed in Chapters 3 & 4) are to be understood. The scope of the 
present critique is limited by an important assumption that Lewis and I share i.e. 
that there is good reason to accept the ontological thesis of objectual realism in 
the mathematical case. Lewis does not offer any detailed defence, or even any 
detailed conception , of objectual realism about mathematics in order to make 
his case for their parallel justification. Nor do I intend to enter into such detail in 
framing an unfavourable comparison of objectual realism about modality with its 
mathematical counterpart. For my purposes, there is no need for any more 
delicate an instrument than a broad brush in the characterization of realism 
about mathematical entities and in this respect Lewis and I are on an equal 
footing.
In the present chapter I will indicate the extent to which I am prepared to go 
along with Lewis in his handling of the charge that possible worlds are abstract 
objects and the comparison of modal with mathematical epistemology to which 
this gives rise. Lewis argues that while there are various bases upon which the 
abstract/concrete distinction might be drawn, it turns out that possible worlds, 
as the genuine modal realist construes them, in fact warrant uniform 
categorization (minor reservations notwithstanding) as concrete entities relative 
to all of the "ways" he invokes to draw the distinction.2 My response is that 
Lewis's discussion of the abstractness of possible worlds in relation to causal 
criteria of abstractness [(2.10)-(2.12)] is susceptible to the complaint that he is 
somewhat disingenuous in his classification of worlds as concrete relative to the 
causal criteria since the main difficulty that is associated with ontological
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commitment to abstract objects clearly arises for possible worlds. Indeed, 
whether the worlds ought to be classified as abstract or not is, in a sense, 
neither here nor there given that, as Lewis and I agree, this central difficulty 
arises for the genuine objectual modal realist. [(2.13)] My epistemological 
objections to Lewis's realism involve no quibble with his reaction to this central 
difficulty (i.e. his repudiation of a general minimal, purportedly necessary 
causal condition on knowledge [(2.20)]) and I argue for his prima facie 
entitlement to an a priori epistemology of modality [(2.21) - (2.3)].
(2.10) WORLDS. ABSTRACTNESS AND CAUSATION
The most important question with which Lewis deals in his discussion of the 
abstractness of worlds is whether possible worlds are abstract relative to 
causal criteria of abstractness. According to the third of Lewis's "Negative Ways" 
(of characterizing abstractness) abstract entities are those which are incapable 
of causal interaction.3 His claim is that possible worlds are best viewed as 
concrete relative to this negative causal condition and argues this via two 
intermediate steps. Firstly, special features of worlds should lead us to apply 
the condition to worlds indirectly applying it directly to parts of worlds and 
secondly, "the" causal condition has to be disambiguated. I will deal with these 
steps in (2.11) and (2.12) respectively.
(2.11) WORLDS ARE A SPECIAL CASE: AN INDIRECT APPLICATION OF 
CAUSAL CONDITIONS IS WARRANTED.
The kind of consideration that is raised in the first step of the case is already 
familiar since we have already had cause to remark that it seems rather strange 
to treat a world as if it were something over and above its constituent parts.4 In 
general, it seems that it is appropriate to avoid such absolutism about worlds in 
order to avoid rather degenerate questions. In relation to present concerns, if 
we enquire whether a world stands in causal relations to its own parts, neither a 
positive nor a negative response is entirely comfortable. The question presents 
itself as a bad lot. Perhaps on balance it is easier to accept Lewis's principle i.e. 
that no whole stands in such relations to its parts .5 Once we accept, as Lewis 
does, the additional claim that no world stands in any causal relation to any 
other world or other worldly parts it follows that possible worlds do not stand in
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causal relations to anything i.e. they turn out to be abstract on application of the 
present condition. Lewis, however, suggests that this approach is unduly 
literalistic and urges that we should be charitable and allow worlds to inherit 
concreteness from their parts (given of course the concreteness of the parts).6 A 
natural initial response would have it that this appeal to charity has the look of 
an ad hoc manouevre, however it is possible to supply ample and reasonable 
motivation for acceptance of this surrogate concreteness.
Consider the (actual) world. Whether or not it is in fact the only world, it will 
turn out to be abstract by direct application of the causal condition if we accept 
Lewis's not implausible principle that wholes do not stand in causal relations to 
their constituent parts. Although the guidance of intuition is weak here the 
consequence concerning the actual world is not easily acceptable. Surely the 
actual world (especially if, as the anti-realist should say, it is the world and not 
part of a tota lity of worlds) ought to be concrete? It is probably not so important 
to take a position on this rather strange question as it is to dispel a potential 
misunderstanding. It is a crucial and distinctive claim of the genuine modal 
realist that we should not succumb to the (characteristically ersatzist ) view that 
the other worlds are abstract and the actual world differs from them in being 
concrete. So from the viewpoint of the genuine modal realist it is arguably more 
important to emphasize the univocity of the totality of possible worlds than it is to 
arrive at a definitive position on the matter of which side of the abstract/concrete 
distinction it is on which (all) worlds fall.
The upshot is this. If we wish to apply the causal condition directly (and with 
allegedly undue literalism) to worlds, then we are bound to pronounce them 
abstract but then we may have to be prepared to accord the same treatment to 
the actual world. If we wish to avoid this way of proceeding we can apply the 
condition indirectly, i.e. to parts of worlds rather than to worlds themselves, and 
let worlds be concrete if some of their parts are. To opt for the latter seems 
preferable if only because it helps us to avoid the danger of crying wolf by 
taking issue with Lewis in the wrong place.
I now turn to the second stage of the case for the concreteness of worlds and 
the purported need to distinguish versions of "the" causal condition.
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(2.12) TWO CAUSAL THESES OF ABSTRACTNESS 
Lewis distinguishes two causal theses of abstractness:
(i) an entity is abstract iff it stands in no causal relations to us.
(ii) an entity is abstract iff it stands in no causal relations to anything.7
The point of drawing this distinction is that the theses deliver different verdicts 
with respect to the abstractness of worlds. Since, in the case of possible worlds, 
we are to apply criteria of abstractness to the parts of worlds rather than to the 
worlds themselves we must ask the appropriate questions of such entities as 
other worldly donkeys. Do these entities (c.f (i)) stand in any causal relation to 
us? The genuine modal realist holds that they do not and so by the lights of (i) 
they turn out to be abstract as, by surrogacy, do the worlds in which they exist. 
Do these entities (c.f. (ii)) stand in any causal relation to anything? The genuine 
modal realist holds that they do stand in causal relations to some things (viz. 
some of their world mates) and so by the lights of (ii) they turn out to be concrete 
as, by surrogacy, do the worlds in which they exist.8
Lewis argues for concreteness on the grounds that we ought to prefer thesis (ii) 
over thesis (i) given that the intended application of the abstract/concrete 
distinction is to mark a difference of a fundamental kind between entities. A 
difference which has, accordingly,..
"..no business being a symmetricai and relative affair ."9
Indeed, natural justice on the side of one who claims that hitherto the 
abstract/concrete distinction, inchoate as it may be, has not been thought to be 
sensitive to the relativization which now threatens to render non-actual worlds 
and their contents abstract. Moreover, one who argues for relativism in this 
regard must take on board the somewhat counter-intuitive consequences of 
symmetry in the form of our own impending abstractness relative to other 
worlds. Were there no further relevant considerations, it might well be that we 
would be forced to opt for the stronger principle of abstractness and thereby 
acknowledge the concreteness of Lewis's worlds. However there are such 
considerations.
In order to deal appropriately with Lewis's case for the concreteness of worlds it 
will help to stand back and consider what it is that is at stake in deeming 
possible worlds abstract or otherwise. What the discussion of abstractness has 
lacked until this point is a guiding conception of why abstractness matters. We
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can accept that Lewis does enough in proliferating "ways" of drawing the 
abstract/concrete distinction in order to convince us that we are ill-served by 
proceeding as though there is a uniquely correct characterization of the 
abstract/concrete distinction that it is our business to uncover. Given this 
concession, there are obvious advantages to be had if, in pursuit of our more 
fine grained purposes, we resolve to eschew inchoate talk of abstract objects in 
favour of talk of objects with this or that feature (aspatiality, sethood, acausality 
or whatever). We are now in a position to turn to the explanation of why a 
pronunciation of abstractness rather than concreteness is thought to matter.
(2.13) THE CENTRAL EPJSTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH 
ABSTRACT OBJECTS ARISE FOR WORLDS WHETHER THEY  ARE 
ABSTRACT OR NOT.
It is undeniable that salient among the concerns which have preoccupied 
philosophers of a "naturalistic bent" is the thought that abstractness threatens to 
bring in its wake epistemological catastrophe. In particular, as Benaceraff10 
has observed in the case of mathematics, when we construe the 
truth-conditions of a class of statements as implicating abstract objects, we 
generate a tension with our "paradigm" conception of knowledge wherein 
knowledge of a state of affairs requires causal contact with that state of affairs. 
Now, whether or not it is a mistake to think that the abstract/concrete distinction 
ought to be implicitly or explicitly us-relative, it surely is of the essence of any 
appropriate causal condition on knowledge that it should be us-relative. The 
point may be put in the following way.
Suppose we concede the strong condition of abstractness as being the right 
one - an object is abstract iff it stands in no causal relations to anything - so 
that we have thereby captured the sober, objective, metaphysical truth. It is not, 
primarily, abstractness so construed that generates the tension which 
Benaceraff notes, for the weaker condition which requires only that an entity 
does not stand in any causal relations to us is, if satisfied, quite sufficient to 
generate that tension. It is precisely this feature of other possible worlds - that 
they stand in no causal relations to us - that ensures that the truth-conditions of 
modal statements (construed as implicating worlds) will generate a tension with 
"our best conception of epistemology", whether or not, as Lewis argues, they, or
3 2
3 3
better, their contents, stand in causa! relations to other (non-actual) things. We 
need not articulate this epistemological difficulty concerning realistically 
construed possible worlds in terms of their abstractness. Non-actual worlds and 
their contents stand in no causal relation to us (human inhabitants of the actual 
world) and that creates a major problem regardless of whether there is a unique 
way of drawing the abstract/concrete distinction or whether abstractness can be 
a relativized concept. But what is the precise nature of the epistemological 
difficulty that is generated by this brand of causal isolation?
Benaceraff's widely disseminated view is that the causal theory of Knowledge 
stands as our best conception of knowledge and, that in interpreting number- 
theoretic statements as requiring for their truth certain states of affairs involving 
causally impotent objects, our best conception of semantics stands in a relation 
of intractable tension with our best conception of knowledge.11 The point 
applies with equal force to genuine modal realism given the assumptions: (a) 
that the best conception of semantics for modal statements is to assign them 
truth-conditions which invoke quantification over possible worlds, and (b) that 
complete absence of causal influence on us is sufficient to fall foul of the 
strictures of "the causal theory".
An obvious, and perhapsinevitable , way to proceed in the face of this tension 
is to resolve it by eschewing either the relevant conception of semantics or the 
relevant conception of epistemology. But this position cannot be regarded as 
compelling the acceptance of the epistemology. Indeed, many authors have 
urged that this position re mathematics should not be construed as pointing 
towards the abandonment of the abstract object invoking semantics.12 
Transposing this overview to the modal arena, we can say that a tension of the 
kind which Benaceraff discerns, arises with respect to non-actual possible 
worlds, but that this represents a (substantial) difficulty for modal realism rather 
than an immediately overwhelming case against it. However, given the 
dilemma, the modal realist seems committed to the rejection of a causal theory 
of knowledge on pain of abandoning realism.
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(2.20) IT IS A CONSEQUENCE OF GENUINE MODAL REALISM THAT MODAI 
KNOWLEDGE FAILS THE PURPORTEDLY NECESSARY CAUSAL 
CONDITION ON KNOWLEDGE.
The modern quest for a causal theory of knowledge13 arises in the context of 
Gettier's purported counter-examples to the thesis that knowledge is analysable 
as/constituted by justified true belief.14 Roughly speaking, Gettier examples 
seem to suggest that justified true belief can be induced in an appropriately 
placed agent fortuitously or accidentally, and that this feature disqualifies a 
proper claim to knowledge.The reaction can be viewed as an attempt to 
eliminate this element of the accidental by imposition of some (further) condition 
- or regulative constraint - formulated in terms of the causal connectedness of 
agent and the subject matter of the knowledge claim.
The difficulty is that while it is eminently possible to frame a conception of 
knowledge which captures naturalistic intuitions , it is notoriously difficult to 
improve on this initial declaration of intent to the extent of providing a theory . 
The spirit which motivates causal theorist might be captured in such 
formulations as:
"..Knowledge that P is an informational state induced in the mind 
of a sufficiently intelligent and perceptive, appropriately placed  
subject, by the very state of affairs that P. " 15
Yet this does not appear as the content of a theory , for it provides no detailed 
causal restrictions on knowledge, far less any aspiration to sufficient conditions 
for knowledge that P. Now at a later stage of the proceedings I will argue that 
there is a sense in which the very idea of a causal-explanatory theory of 
knowledge is ill-conceived.16 However, even if that argument succeeds it still 
leaves open the option of claiming that although causal-explanatory theories of 
knowledge are not to be pursued, we must still impose a necessary condition of 
naturalistic acceptability on knowledge. Call this weak necessary condition (W): 
(W) An agent A knows that P only if (A believes that P and) the 
subject matter of the proposition P causes A's belief that P.
It is clear that by these lights modal knowledge - given the genuine objectual 
modal realist's conception of the truth-conditions of modal statements - will fail 
to come up to scratch. Moreover, there is no joy to be had in the hope that 
modal knowledge (as construed by the genuine modal realist) might be
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brought within the fold of causal respectability via the imposition of an even 
weaker causal restriction on knowledge. This weaker condition can be viewed 
as a reaction to the recognition that there are certain claims to knowledge that 
cannot be accommodated within the strictures of (W) but which are redeemable 
if we shift the focus of the causal connectedness requirement from the (subject 
matter of the) knowledge claim itself to (that of) the relevant justifying  
statements. Statements concerning future events and those involving 
unrestricted universal generalization have subject matters which are unlikely 
causes of our beliefs - the former requiring backward causation, the latter being 
too disparate in spatio-temporal distribution to be a cause of anything - and so 
fall foul of the weak causal condition (W). But given the standard construal of 
the justifying statements for these - in the former case singular statements about 
the past, in the latter singular statements pertaining to local regions of 
space-time - the shift to justifying statements brings causal respectability by the 
lights of a new necessary condition (J):
(J ) An agent A knows that P only if (A believes that P and) A 
interacts causally with the subject matter of some justifying 
statement , J , of P .
Yet the retreat from (W) to (J) does not assist the campaign for the causal 
respectability of claims concerning the totality of possible worlds (claims of 
necessity) for it seems that the only basis on which the retreat to justifying 
statements could gain any purchase in the case of possible worlds is in the 
context of a conception of knowledge concerning all worlds as the product of 
an inference of enumerative or mathematical induction inference from a 
singular statement concerning the actual world and these options have been 
refuted.17 The modal realist cannot make knowledge of necessity causally 
respectable even by the lights of (J) and so it is, as Lewis recognizes, clear 
which horn of Benaceraff's dilemma that the modal realist should grasp.
(2.21) THE GENUINE MODAL REALISTS RETREAT TO A PRIORITY 
McGinn claims that the requirement that an agent knows that P only if there is 
some causal contact between the agent and the subject matter of some 
justifying statement of P is only properly applicable to, and is in fact constitutive 
of, knowledge that is a posteriori ,18 By these lights the appropriate strategy for
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defending as knowledge a kind of knowledge claim that does not meet the 
causal requirements relating to a posteriori knowledge is to argue that it is a 
priori knowledge. This is the strategy that Lewis adopts.
He takes our (supposedly) a priori knowledge of mathematics as a precedent 
that signals the limits of the proper domain of causal theories of knowledge and 
grasps the second horn of Benaceraffs dilemma.19 That is, we are to accept an 
interpretation of world statements that treats them as quantifying over objects 
(possible worlds) and we must acknowledge that the modal knowledge that we 
have is a priori. In particular, our modal knowledge is not in general the causal 
product of that which is known nor are there justifying statements of our 
knowledge claims to whose subject matter we stand in any causal relation.
To some, arrival at this juncture and the embracing of a priori knowledge so 
characterized will signal a reductio of the genuine modal realist position. 
However, that kind of objection to genuine modal realism will not be advanced 
here. Rather, I am concerned to pursue a critique of realism about possible 
worlds from the standpoint of one who is prepared to accept that mathematical 
- and indeed modal - knowledge is a priori in this sense. Thus, the case 
against possible worlds from this point forth will be essentially comparative. It 
will be argued that one who accepts genuine objectual realism about (some) 
mathematical entities and who also accepts an a priori mathematical 
epistemology is still well placed to maintain anti-realism about possible worlds. 
My intention is to show that there are many crucial respects in which Lewis's 
comparison of modal realism with (objectual) mathematical realism can be 
shown to be extremely unfavourable to modal realism and thereby to 
undermine the case for realism about possible worlds.
Before proceeding with the critical project, it is necessary to defend the prima 
facie entitlement of the genuine modal realist to the option of an a priori 
epistemology of modality in the light of foreseeable objections to this 
entitlement.
(2.3) CHALLENGES TO THE GENUINE MODAL REALIST'S RIGHT TO A 
PRIORITY REBUTTED: OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES.
The following line of argument merits consideration. The failure of modal 
knowledge (as conceived by the genuine modal realist) to comply with the
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causal conditions on knowing establishes by the realist's own admission that 
we do not have a posteriori knowledge of modality. However there is also 
good reason for claiming contra modal realism that we do not, indeed cannot, 
have a priori knowledge of modality either. So given both of these negative 
claims the modal realist will be left with no basis upon which to account for our 
modal knowledge.
The crux of this case is the availability or otherwise of support for the contention 
that there is good reason to hold that modal realism runs foul of appropriate 
strictures upon a priori knowledge. Lewis embraces a priority, but is he 
entitled to it? Is it the case that an a priori epistemology is compatible with the 
objectual realist's conception of the truth conditions of modal statements? In this 
section I will raise and evaluate a variety of objections against the a priority of 
modal knowledge in order to evaluate the force of the argument given above.
OBJECTION 1a
A priori knowledge must be of subject matter which is abstract, not concrete as 
Lewis proclaims his worlds to be, and so the right to a priority is compromised 
by this metaphysical claim.
REPLY
The objection as it stands appears susceptible to straightforward refutation on 
the grounds that there is no reason to hold that a priori knowledge must be of 
the abstract. Even if mathematics with its abstract objects is a central case of a 
priority, a little reflection shows that such truths as :
(a) No horse is a cow.
(b) If there are any books on my shelf which are red all over, they are not 
simultaneously green all over.
are excellent candidates for being about concrete objects and a priori. 
However, a rejoinder is available.
OBJECTION 1b
The examples given in response to the initial objection (1a) concern states of 
affairs which do not (easily) permit description as physical complexes (e.g. 
where are these states of affairs located?).20 Indeed, this goes some way to 
explaining their recalcitrance re the causal conditions on knowledge. However,
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at least some other worldly states of affairs like there being possible but 
non-actual donkeys do permit description as physical complexes. Given the 
nature of the state of affairs which constitutes the truth of such possiblities, 
knowledge of those possibilities should be a posteriori.
REPLY
The most promising strategy for the genuine modal realist is to argue that the 
plausibility of the objection derives from a misconstrual of the nature of our 
modal knowledge. It might be argued that the objection would be appropriate if 
our modal knowledge - that there could have been donkeys other than those 
which actually exist - depended on our ability to stand in some cognitive relation 
to any particular other-worldly donkey but that in fact the knowledge depends 
on no such thing. What is known is that in some other possible world there is a 
donkey. It is not that we know of any given world that it contains a donkey or that 
we have knowledge of some particular non-actual (for us) donkey. If our modal 
knowledge were so particularized there might be a case for holding that it 
should be a posteriori, but since our modal knowledge is not particularized the 
case does not stick.21
OBJECTION 2a
The realist about possible worlds embraces an a priori epistemology at the 
price of rescinding the (much vaunted) analogy with the reality of places and 
times.22 
REPLY
Certainly our knowledge of what is happening at time t in region r is not (in 
general) a priori. Arguably this is knowledge of particulars and on that basis as 
well as common sense it is no surprise that the knowledge depends on the 
application of a posteriori methods, paradigmatically,inspection of the 
appropriate spatio-temporal location. Moreover, there is, ex hypothesi, a priori 
and not a posteriori knowledge of modality. Yet a point of analogy with space 
and time can be secured when we reflect, again in Kantian mood, on the a priori 
status of certain general truths regarding space and time (e.g. the transitivity of 
the temporal precedence relation - x precedes y ). It is, as we saw in Reply 1b , 
equally open to the realist about worlds to endorse the view that our modal 
knowledge is, in the relevant sense, general and known a priori. Knowledge of
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what is actually the case may, in appropriate cases, require inspection; 
knowledge that some worlds are F or that all worlds are G requires reflection on 
the content of logical space.
OBJECTION 2b
While this reply may be successful it does not speak to the original source of 
disanalogy namely knowledge of what is the case at particular places and 
times.
REPLY
This is true but is unclear that this constitutes any but the most indirect of 
criticisms of modal realism. For the point is that the relationship mooted 
between logical space and physical space-time is only that of analogy. It is not 
any part of the modal realist's case that every aspect of the metaphysics or 
epistemology of space-time should find a mirror image in that of logical space. 
So the present point may be taken without the modal realist incurring any 
serious damage.
OBJECTION 3
This objection is due to McGinn whom I quote directly:
"It is very plausible that at least for strict modalities, knowledge of 
the modality of a given sentence is arrived at a priori...Thus it may 
be said that we do not gain knowledge of...modalised sentences by 
quasi-empirical inspection of the possible worlds in virtue of which 
the sentences are true: rather we come to know them by some sort 
of grasp of concepts ,"23
The modal realist is then asked to puzzle about the source of the modal 
knowledge being...
" ...located in a region of reality which is both quite distinct from, 
and inexplicably related to,the region whose condition the modal 
knowledge is knowledge of...[since]... the concepts onto which the 
modal faculty is directed presumably exist in the actual world ."24 
REPLY
Several points occur here. In the first place, there is obviously an assumption to 
the effect that a priori knowledge is knowledge given by some sort of grasp of
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concepts and it simply is not clear whether the objectual modal realist can or 
should accept this. Lewis denies that modal knowledge is the product of 
empirical or indeed quasi-empirical inspection of worlds and while he affirms a 
priority he gives no indication of whether grasp of concepts - as opposed to say 
a special modal faculty - is efficacious in our modal cognition. In the second 
place, and more importantly, McGinn's emergent conception of concepts is 
dubious in the extreme. There would, of course, be a problem about the source 
of knowledge being located in a region of reality distinct from that which the 
modal knowledge is knowledge o f . However there is a serious worry that 
McGinn's way of articulating the problem that arises from the conceptual source 
of modal knowledge encourages a distorted conception of the epistemology 
and ontology of concepts. As in the case of facts it seems appropriate to 
pursue relatively innocuous ways of construing talk which appears to commit 
us to the reification of concepts. But McGinn's usage points us in quite the 
opposite direction, for talk of concepts "existing in the actual world" and of 
concepts being "located in a region of reality" is redolent of an objectual 
metaphysic of concepts. Furthermore, such a metaphysical stance appears to 
lead inevitably to a vision of the epistemology of understanding which has the 
agent standing in a cognitive relation to an entity of some kind.25 The 
overwhelming difficulty here is that the present objection appears only to make 
sense if we entertain these metaphysical and epistemological precepts 
concerning concepts, but the precepts themselves seem quite indefensible. On 
this basis it is appropriate to rule that the objection does not succeed.
This draws to a close the initial evaluation of the entitlement of the genuine 
modal realist to the claim that modal knowledge is a priori.
(2.4) SUMMARY.
It has been argued that regardless of whether possible worlds ought to be 
considered concrete or abtract the modal realist is faced with the salient 
difficulty that is associated with abstractness i.e. Benaceraff's dilemma. Since it 
is clear that, causally isolated from us, non-actual worlds cannot meet even the 
weakest requirements of a causal "theory" of knowledge, it is clear that the 
modal realist must persevere with the ontology of possible worlds and reject the
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unrestricted generality of the causal theory of knowledge. The genuine modal 
realist's right to pursue (with mathematical realist precedent) an a priori 
epistemology was subject to challenge under a battery of initial objections but it 
has been argued that the stated objections do not stand as an obstacle to the 
prima facie right of the genuine modal realist to proceed in this way. Hence, 
Lewis is granted all that he asks up to this point but it will be argued that beyond 
this point the analogy with mathematical realism gives out to the detriment of 
genuine modal realism.
There are in fact two areas in which the campaign against objectual realism can 
be advanced. The first of these is in what we might call the "internal" 
epistemology of Lewis's modal realism i.e. the issues of the relationship 
between modal awareness and imagination, the standard of reliability of modal 
beliefs etc. The second area covers aspects of the metaphysics of possible 
worlds which give rise to difficulties other than the purported difficulties 
associated with abstractness per se. In Ch.3 I will deal with the internal 





THE INTERNAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF LEWIS’S MODAL REALISM.
(3.0) INTRODUCTION : THE SCOPE OF INTERNAL EPISTEMOLOGY.
It has been argued that regardless of whether possible worlds ought to be 
considered concrete or abstract the modal realist is faced with the salient 
difficulty that is associated with abstractness, i.e. Benaceraffs dilemma. Since it 
is clear that non-actual worlds that are causally isolated from us cannot meet 
even the weakest requirements of a causal "theory" of knowledge, it is clear that 
the modal realist must persevere with the ontology of possible worlds and reject 
the unrestricted generality of the causal theory of knowledge. The genuine 
modal realist's right to pursue (with mathematical realist precedent) an a priori 
epistemology was subject to challenge under a battery of initial objections but it 
has been argued that the stated objections do not stand as an obstacle to the 
prima facie right of the genuine modal realist to proceed in this way. Thus, 
Lewis is granted all that he asks concerning the epistemology of modality up to 
this point but it will be argued that beyond this point the analogy with 
mathematical realism gives out, to the detriment of genuine modal realism.
The dissatisfaction stated in this chapter concerns what we might call the 
"internal" epistemology of Lewis's modal realism. Internal epistemology is to be 
contrasted with the external epistemology. The latter is concerned with the 
nature of the connection between external fact and internal representation. The 
former is concerned with our processes of justification and inference that relate 
our beliefs one to another and the standard of reliability of our beliefs etc. Thus 
the external epistemology of mathematics is concerned with the nature of the 
connection between mathematical reality and the minds in which it is 
represented - is this process causal?; does it involve the operation of a special 
non-natural cognitive faculty of intuition? etc. The internal epistemology is 
oblivious of such issues and is concerned with such questions as the 
constitution of proof and the purported certainty of mathematical theorems. In 
the case of objectually construed modality internal epistemology is not 
concerned, as its external foil is, with the question of how we can have thoughts 
about other possible worlds at all, but rather with such matters as the methods 
whereby we come to form certain modal beliefs on the basis of others, and the
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reliability that is conferred on modal beliefs so delivered.
What we are entitled to expect in the internal epistemology of modality, and 
what is indeed forthcoming from Lewis, is an account, in some detail of the 
intellectual procedures - a priority granted - whereby we arrive at our specific 
modal beliefs. My central contention is that Lewis's internal epistemology of 
modal realism falls apart under the pressure that he imposes upon it by his 
insistence that the canonical method of establishing modal beliefs (i.e. the 
method of recombination) is - analagously to its mathematical counterpart (i.e. 
proof) - infallible. In the first place, the claim of infallibility, even when rendered 
remotely plausible by sympathetic interpretation [(3.3)], is inconsistent with other 
theses of his on the formation of our modal beliefs [(3.1) - (3.41)]. In the second 
place, even if Lewis can earn the right to resolve this inconsistency in a way that 
allows him to hold on to the method of recombination, the claim of infallibility is 
subject to an independent critique which shows the claim to be either trivial or 
false [(3.50) - (3.513)].
I feel obliged to give notice at the outset of this chapter that I find great difficulty 
in interpreting Lewis on recombination and that the interpretation that I propose 
is not a very charitable one. This combination of features cannot but raise one's 
own suspicions that misinterpretation has occured. In response to these 
suspicions, I will attempt to defend my interpretation wherever possible by direct 
appeal to textual evidence. To this measure I can add only the statement that I 
can see no better way of making sense of Lewis's material pertaining to the 
internal epistemological matters
(3.1) INTRODUCING AND INTERPRETING THE PRINCIPLE OF 
RFCOMBINATION.
The first step in the exposition of Lewis's internal epistemological views is to 
introduce the principle of recombination. Lewis holds th a t..
"..our everyday modal opinions are in large measure consequences 
of a principle of recombination."1
The inferential role of the principle of recombination is exemplified as follows: 
"To imagine a unicorn and infer its possibility is to reason that a 
unicorn is possible because a horse and a horn, which are possible 
because actual, might be juxtaposed in the imagined way. "2
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The principle of recombination, then, governs compossibility. The principle is 
viewed as articulating, with a measure of adjusted emphasis, the Humean 
denial of necessary connection between distinct existences.3 We are offered 
the following general sketch:
"Roughly speaking, the principle is that anything can co-exist with 
anything else, at least provided that they occupy distinct 
spatio-temporal positions. "4
There is clearly a need to clarify the structure of the reasoning and the role that 
is being attributed to imagination in this account of the formation of modal 
opinion. My view is that we should nol interpret Lewis as intending that the 
reasoning to the possibility that there are unicorns contains premises about any 
agent's imaginings. The principle of recombination is intended, I think, as a 
metaphysical principle; it speaks (recursively) of what is possible given what 
else is possible. Imagination guides us in synthesizing complex "states of 
affairs" from simpler components and so it grounds our appreciation of what the 
synthesis of possible states of affairs might yield. Consequently, I propose the 
following interpretation of the reasoning that is implicit in Lewis's unicorn 
example:
(1) It is possible that there is a horse. [Justification: P I- Poss P.]
12) It is possible that there is a horn.________  [Justification: P I- Poss P.]
(3) It is possible that there is a horse-horn. [Recombination (1),(2).]
The conclusion of the reasoning to this stage is not that it is possible that there 
is a unicorn. The formulation of the intermediate conclusion (3) reflects a rather 
open-ended presentation of the content of the synthesized, complex possibility 
inferred and this again appears to accord with Lewis's intentions.5 It follows, 
then, that a further sub-inference is required in reasoning to the possibility that 
there could be a unicorn i.e. the inference indicated above is to be 
supplemented with (3) l= (4):
(3) It is possible that there is a horse-horn.
(4) It is possible that there is a unicorn.
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(3.2) THREE THESES OF LEWIS ON MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY: THF 
INFALLIBILITY OF RECOMBINATION; THE DEPENDENCE OF 
BECQMBINATION ON IMAGINATION AND THE IMAGINABILITY OF THE 
IMPOSSIBLE.
In this section I will offer substantial textual evidence in order to attempt to 
obviate any suspicion that one or more of the theses (a)-(c) that I attribute to 
Lewis is not in fact advocated by him.
The analogy between modal epistemology and the epistemology of arithmetic is 
mooted in the context of an extended passage which issues in the claim that the 
method of recombination is an infallible, general method of arriving at modal 
beliefs :
" Finally I  can take the question how we know as a sceptical 
challenge: put this alleged knowledge on a firm foundation, show 
that it is derived by an infallible method. My first response would be 
to say that here as elsewhere, it is unreasonable to hope for firm 
foundations or infallible methods. But on second thought, it seems 
that infallible methods can be had and with the greatest of ease. 
Probably the right thing to say is that the demand for an infallible 
method does not make very good sense for knowledge of 
non-contingent matters, because it is too easily trivialised. For if it 
is a necessary truth that so and so then believing that so and so is 
an infallible method of being right. If what I believe is a necessary 
truth then there is no possibility of being wrong. That is so 
whatever the subject matter of the necessary truth and no matter 
how it came to be believed. So perhaps an infallible general 
method is what is demanded. But that too is suspiciously easy. How 
about the method of reasoning from certain specified premises 
which are themselves non-contingent? In the modal case the 
reasoning might be highly informal consisting mainly of imaginative 
experiments implicitly premised on a principle of recombination: in 
the mathematical case the reasoning might proceed more or less 
rigorously from axioms of iterative set theory or from the axioms of 
some limited branch of mathematics. Suppose for example that you 
accept every theorem that you can deduce from the Peano axioms
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within a certain deductive system. If  in fact the axioms are 
necessarily true (as they are), and the deductive system  
necessarily preserves truth then you cannot possibly go wrong. You 
are following a method of arriving at arithmetical opinions that is 
both infallible and general ."6
The clear claim that emerges is that the demand for an infallible and general 
method of arriving at modal beliefs can be met - and moreover with suspicious 
ease ! - with the citation of the method of reasoning from premises by means of 
imaginative experiments implicitly premised on the principle of recombination. 
Thus thesis (a):
(a) Imaginative experiment premised on the principle of
recombination is an infallible general method.
I will postpone discussion of this thesis and proceed to introduce two other 
theses that Lewis proposes.The first of these is (b):
(b ) The method of recombination is dependent on the 
conducting of imaginative experiments.
This thesis is distilled from such remarks as the following concerning the 
method of arriving at modal beliefs by reasoning from non-contingent premises: 
"In  the modal case the reasoning m ight be highly informal, 
consisting mainly of imaginative experiments implicitly premised on 
a principle of recombination. "7 (My emphasis -J.D.) 
and concerning the principle of recombination:
"(O )ne could imagine reasoning rigorously from a precise  
formulation of it but in fact our reasoning is more likely to take the 
form of imaginative experiments."8 (My emphasis - J.D.)
I have no wish to represent Lewis as claiming that our opinions about possibility 
or compossibility always involve the principle of recombination for this clearly is 
not his view.9 Nor do I wish to represent him as claiming that recombination is 
always dependent upon imaginative experiments. However, it emerges plainly 
that to a large extent, if not the most part, the method of recombination is 
dependent on the conducting of imaginative experiments and this is the precise 
way in which thesis (a) should be understood.




(c) It is possible to imagine that which is impossible.
In the following crucial passage the relationship between imagination and 
possibility is set out.
"We sometimes persuade ourselves that things are possible by 
experiments in imagination. We imagine a horse, imagine a horn on 
it, and thereby we are persuaded that a unicorn is possible. But 
imaginability is a poor criterion of possibility. We can imagine the 
impossible provided we do not imagine it in perfect detail or all at
once It is impossible to construct a regular polygon of nineteen
sides with ruler and compass; it is possible but very complicated to 
construct one of seventeen sides. In whatever sense I can imagine 
the possib le construction, I can im agine the im possible  
construction just as well. In both cases, I imagine a texture of arcs 
and lines with the polygon in the middle. I do not imagine it arc by
arc and line by line , which is how I fa il to notice the
imposssibility."10
It is now obvious that there is at least a threat of mutual inconsistency among
(a )-(c ). It appears to be the case that (b) and (c) jointly imply that the 
application of the method of re-combination may yield as output the belief that P 
where, because this belief is the product in part of imaginative experiments, we 
cannot rule out that the inferential/ imaginative output P is in fact a conception of 
an impossible state of affairs. This is surely to say that the method of 
recombination is fallible , but then this would be to conflict directly with (a) 
which claims the infallibility of the method of recombination.
If the theses (a)-(c) are mutually inconsistent then clearly Lewis is in serious 
difficulty and must face up to the charge that the epistemological component of 
his theory of modality "does not work on its own terms"- a charge that he 
recognizes in advance as an entirely appropriate response to his utilitarian 
argument for realism.11
(3.3) INFALLIBILITY AS ABSOLUTE JUSTIFICATION
Any attempt to reconcile the theses (a)-(c) is bound to centre upon the concept 
of infallibility . A favourable resolution of the "tension" between the theses will 
show that the method of reasoning from recombination is infallible (in M s
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sense)despite the possibility of imagining the impossible.
Lewis's comments on the epistemology of arithmetic suggest a starting point for 
the development of an appropriate concept of infallibility.The hallmarks of 
infallibility in the arithmetic case which are noted by Lewis are:
(i) That the premises should benecessarily true.
(ii) That the reasoning should be necessarily truth-preserving.
To these we should add - even if only for the purposes of emphasis :
(iii) That the steps of the reasoning should comprise a genuine proof.
We can then say that when all three conditions are met we have an absolute 
justification for our belief in the theorem.12 In speaking of a given argument 
"genuinely" being a proof one appeals implicitly to a standard which a 
purported proof must meet in order to be a proof. Let us make this standard 
explicit. Let us say, as a matter of fiat, that a publicly inspectable sequence of 
steps in a piece of mathematical reasoning is (genuinely) a proof if it is asserted 
to be so by appropriate members of the community (i.e competent judges) after 
arbitrarily many checks under optimal conditions of assessment.13 
Now ,any purported standard of genuine proof must be able to preserve the 
status of mathematical claims as judgements and this involves the preservation 
of a distinction between apparent and genuine proof.14 The proposed standard 
achieves this since it does not endorse as a (genuine, real) proof just whatever 
any one judge accepts as a proof on the basis of one inspection, and this is as 
it should be since it is uncontroversial that there may be errors of reasoning that 
survive that extent of verification undetected. In particular every conception of 
mathematical epistemology must be permitted to distance itself from the 
ridiculous claim that error cannot arise in the attem pt to apply a rule of 
inference and from the equally ridiculous claim that mathematical proof is 
infallible in the sense that it depends only upon rules which are (nobody knows 
how!) protected from the possibility of misapplication.
Now that we have to hand an explicit conception of the nature of absolute 
justification in mathematics, we can interpret infallibility as absolute justification 
and then proceed to investigate the consistency of the thesis of the infallibility 
(so interpreted) of the method of recombination with the thesis of the 
imaginability of the impossible.
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(3.40) RECOMBINATIVE REASONING DOES NOT HAVE THE STATUS 
OF ABSOLUTE JUSTIFICATION
Is the method of recombination a form of absolute justification? According to the 
concept of absolute justification that has been introduced there are three 
necessary conditions to consider. I have no quibble concerning the satisfaction 
of the first condition which requires that the premises of the reasoning are 
necessarily true. This condition is not of central concern and we can grant it to 
Lewis in the case of all premises which are governed by a possibility operator 
including (1),(2) and (3) of the example given at (3.1) above. It is a confusion 
to allege that these premises state possibilities and are not therefore - in 
general - necessities, for the relevant question is whether statements that are 
governed by possibility operators are, if true, necessary. The necessity of 
possibilities is guaranteed by the S5 principle:
(S 5 )  O P I= D O P
and for present purposes we should take this for granted.
I will argue that we cannot accept that recombinative reasoning has the status of 
absolute justification. Firstly, [(3.41)], because there is some reason to hold that 
the first sub-inferential step that is involved in recombinative reasoning is not 
necessarily truth-preserving. Moreover it is all but explicit in Lewis's 
epistemology that this is the case. Secondly, [(3.42)], because the claim that the 
second sub-inferential step is necessarily truth-preserving is quite untenable.
(3.41) NECESSARY TRUTH-PRESERVINGNESS CONFLICTS WITH 
THE IMAGINABILITY OF THE IMPOSSIBLE.
The second and third conditions on absolute justification - i.e. that the steps of 
the reasoning should be necessarily truth-preserving and that they should not 
constitute mis-applications of relevant "rules" - must be considered in 
conjunction . These must be considered in tandem because of the existence of 
a strategy for handling prima facie counterexamples to truth-preservingness. 
The strategy is applied in the case of deductive reasoning where it is natural to 
operate a policy of looking to explain prima facie counterexamples to 
truth-preservingness as misapplications of valid rules of inference.
There is, on the face of i t , no reason to think that what is given in recombinative 
imagination from possibilities must be possible and, moreover, this seems to
49
50
be a principal lesson of Lewis's polygon example. If we imagine drawing this 
line and then that one and so forth - synthesizing the image so that we come to 
imagine having constructed (by relevantly restricted means) a regular polygon 
of nineteen sides - a de facto impossibility, we are told, has been imagined. 
Hence the first sub-inferential step, represented in our example by (1), (2) l=
(3):
(1) It is possible that there is a horse.
(2) It is possible that there is a horn)
(3) It is possible that there is a horse-horn. [ Recombination (1),(2)]
is not necessarily truth-preserving despite its eminent plausibility in this
instance, where we are faced with no difficulty of perspective, detail or other 
complexity. The obvious way around this difficulty is to sacrifice the theoretical 
description of the polygon example as a case of imagining the impossible i.e. to 
give up the description of the process as a genuine imagining that P and to 
discount it as a case of seeming to imagine that P or a case in which one 
imagines a non-P-but-P-seeming state of affairs. It would be a natural 
consequence of adopting this policy that one should abandon the thesis (c) i.e. 
that it is possible (genuinely) to imagine the impossible.
Why does Lewis eschew this option? He is reluctant to say that the agent has 
not imagined a process of 19-agon construction, and understandably so, for it is 
far from obvious that we should say that one cannot really imagine the 
impossible. One might, for example, be inclined to take the view that ascriptions 
of imaginative content have what Putnam calls the appearance logic15 and so 
to endorse the validity of the inference (AL):
(A L) X THINKS THAT ( X IMAGINES THAT P) 
l= X IMAGINES THAT P 
The salient problem with taking the appearance logic position (in any case) is 
that it threatens to conflict head-on with the requirement of judgements that 
there should be a constitutive distinction between what is right and what seems 
to the judge to be right.16 In any event, it is unlikely that Lewis would take this 
view since he refuses to accept this conception of the "logic" of pain 
ascriptions17 - supposedly the paradigm case - and the retreat to the 
appearance logic is less promising in the case of imagination. Whatever one 
thinks of pain-ascriptions in this regard, the point is that the temptation to the
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appearance logic in the pain case is augmented by the lack of appeal that 
attends such discriminations as seeming to be in pain or being in a pain 
seeming state when these are counterposed to that of being in pain. Intuition 
suggests that there is nothing like so potent a case to be made for the claim that 
the parallel discriminations with respect to imagination are distinctions in the 
absence of difference. However, even if ascriptions of imaginative content 
ought to be contrasted with pain-ascriptions with respect to their susceptibility to 
an appearance logic treatment, they should also be contrasted with ascriptions 
of proof-possession, in which no-one will be found wanting to disavow the 
propriety of the distinctions between seeming to prove that P, proving a P-like 
theorem and proving that P .
The point is not that Lewis in opting for the thesis of the imaginability of the 
impossible is opting for a thesis that is obviously false, but rather that he is 
opting for a thesis that stands in opposition to a central requirement of his own 
modal epistemology, i.e. that recombinative reasoning should be necessarily 
truth-preserving. The situation is even more perplexing when we take into 
account the fact that Lewis clearly regards the phenomenon of imagining the 
impossible as a by-product of cognitive limitation as when he states (above) 
that we can imagine the impossible "provided that we do not imagine it in 
perfect detail or all at once". Why, given that he is prepared to go this far, does 
he not take the further step of classifying the imaginative process as involving 
errors and thereby facilitate a defence of the claim that recombinative reasoning 
is necessarily truth-preserving?
I will not attempt to pursue this question. Rather, I will settle for suggesting that 
Lewis makes a strategic error in attempting to maintain the thesis (c). As things 
stand, he holds inconsistently that it is possible to imagine the (logically) 
impossible, that reasoning from recombination is dependent upon imaginative 
experiments and that such reasoning constitutes an infallible method.
But what if this inconsistency were resolved by simply dropping the thesis (c)? 
After all (c) hardly seems essential to genuine modal realism per se and it has 
already been indicated that neither the assertion nor the denial of the 
imaginability of the logically impossible is glaringly false. If Lewis were to accept 
that the thesis (c) is false would there remain any barriers to the claim that 




The account that I offered of recombinative reasoning at (3.1) represented the 
modal conclusion a consequence of the two sub-inferences, (1), (2) l= (3) 
and (3)l= (4). The foregoing objection was that the purported possibility of 
imagining the impossible undermines the claim to necessary 
truth-preservingness of the inference (1), (2) l= (3). Even if the spectre of 
thesis (c) were to be exorcised along with any other doubts that might attend 
the necessary truth-preservingness of the first sub-inference, there is still the 
second sub-inference of recombinative reasoning to consider. If the inference
(3)l= (4) is not necessarily truth-preserving then neither is the inference
(1)l=(4) and the method of reasoning from recombination does not confer 
absolute justification on the conclusions that it generates.
(3.50) THE SUB-INFERENCE (3) l= (A): FROM HORSE-HORN TO UNICORN 
The second sub-inference is (3) 1= (4):
(3) It is possible that there is a horse-horn.
(4) It is possible that there is a unicorn.
The principle of recombination rules out failures of the plenitude of logical 
space for, as Lewis sees it, plenitude amounts to a re-iteration of the Humean 
thesis that any thing can exist with or without any other thing, and the principle 
of recombination is intended as an expression of this.18 So plenitude requires 
and recombination ensures that...
" ...(I)f there could be a talking head contiguous to the rest of a 
living human body but there couldn’t be a talking head separate 
from the rest of a human body, that...would be a failure of 
plenitude. " 19
In other words, it is an intended consequence of recombination that there could 
be a talking head separate from the rest of a human body since there could be a 
talking head contiguous to the rest of a human body and anything could exist
with(out) any other thing. Also, as we have already seen, it is an intended
consequence of the principle that there could be a unicorn.
It is of the utmost importance to separate out what is controversial and what is 
uncontroversial in Lewis's conception of the deliverances of recombination. 
No-onewould want to argue that there could not be entities consisting of a
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contiguity or juxtaposition of the horse-like with the horn-like. No-one would 
want to argue that there could not be unicorn-like entities, where it is 
understood that this description is neutral with respect to the issue of whether 
the entities in question would be unicorns or not. Now we are in a position to 
state that what is controversial in Lewis's deployment of recombination is his 
claim that these unicorn-like creatures would be unicorns. I say that this final 
claim depends upon a substantive inference from what imaginative 
recombination uncontroversially delivers and, furthermore, that Lewis has to 
show that the inferential passage in this and similar cases is necessarily 
truth-preserving, if the claim to absolute justification is to be sustained.
Naturally, Lewis accepts that we are faced with judgements concerning what is 
possible with respect to which our pictoral-imaginative powers are of no help. 
He accepts, for example, that the possible topographies of space-time cannot 
be settled via an appeal to imaginative re-combination.20 The need for 
recourse to methods other than imaginative recombination is not in the least 
surprising, for recombination is hard pushed to gain a foot-hold where we are 
dealing with elements that are not imaginable (in the pictorially oriented sense) 
in the first place. In the topography of space-time the pictoral conception cannot 
even get started. On the other hand, in the constructive geometry of n-sided 
polygons (at least for manageably small n) we have a case in which the pictoral 
conception of imagination and the (publicly manifestable) manipulation of 
pictorial elements is thoroughly relevant (if not decisive) with respect to 
judgements of possibility.
However, what must also be acknowledged is that there are cases of an 
intermediate type as well i.e. cases which do not defy picturing but in which 
there is no good reason to believe that our modal opinions ought to be settled in 
virtue of pictoral considerations. We have, in effect, a three-fold distinction of 
cases as far as the role of pictoral imagination is concerned. Cases in which 
the picturing is: (i) applicable and decisive; (ii) inapplicable; (iii) applicable and 
indecisive. Putative talking donkeys, unicorns and autonomous talking heads 
are all examples of the third kind, for in each case the suspicion that we are 
imagining the impossible is unmoved by the availability of an imaginative 
picture to be associated with the controversial possibility. It is not a picture that 
we lack in these cases: otherwise the possibility of a unicorn should not even be
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a matter of dispute, but a matter of dispute it certainly is.21 If one accepts that 
there are indeed cases of this third kind in which a picture is available but quite 
indecisive then one surely must accept that it is appropriate to present 
recombinative reasoning as constituted by two sub-inferential steps.To 
represent the recombinative reasoning in a truncated form (1), (2) l= (4) viz:
(1) It is possible that there is a horse. [Justification: P I- Poss P]
(2) It is possible that there is a horn. [Justification: P I- Poss P]
(4) It is possible that there is a unicorn. [Recombination (1),(2).]
is to represent in a highly tendentious fashion the result of the juxtapositional 
imaginative experiment. The only role that picturing is actually playing here is to 
allow us to grasp the juxtaposition of the horse-like with the horn-like but the 
possibility of a unicorn is not decided by this. The burning question is, why is 
that a picture of that possibility? , and no less than an answer which 
convinces us that the picture literally must be of that possibility can sustain the 
purported necessary truth-preservingness of recombinative reasoning. Lewis, I 
say, must provide an account of what it is that licenses the transition from (3) to
(4) :
(3) It is possible that there is a horse-horn.
(4) It is possible that there is a unicorn.
given that neither he nor anyone else can take the view that pictorial 
equivalence suffices.
(3.510) LEWIS'S TREATMENT OF THE SUB-INFERENCE (3) l= (4) 
REJECTED
Would Lewis accept that he has an obligation to provide an account of this 
inference? In fact, an extremely perplexing passage suggests that his attitude to 
the challenge at the end of the last section would be ambivalent in the extreme. 
In this passage he is referring to his acceptance, on the grounds of 
plenitude/recombination that there could be such things as a talking head not 
contiguous to any body, a dragon and a unicorn :
" / mean that plenitude requires that there could be a separate thing 
exactly like a talking head contiguous to a human body. Perhaps
you would not wish to call that thing a "head” or you would not wish
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to call what it does "talking". I am somewhat inclined to disagree, 
and somewhat inclined to doubt that usage establishes a settled 
answer to such a far-fetched question; but never mind. What the 
thing is called is entirely beside the point. Likewise when I speak of 
possible dragons or unicorns, I  mean animals that fit the 
stereotypes we associate with those names. I am not here 
concerned with Kripke's problem of whether such animals are 
rightly called by those names 22
The passage is perplexing since Lewis seems to be making a variety of claims 
and qualifications which are not easily seen to be mutually consistent. At the 
same time he seems to be saying that he is claiming that it is the possibility of a 
detached talking-head-//7(e thing and not the possibility of a detached talking 
head that the imaginative experiment establishes; that a detached talking-head 
like thing would be a detached talking head and that it is indeterminate whether 
a detached talking-head-///re thing can rightly be called a talking head. On top of 
these claims we are also given the strange remark concerning "Kripke's 
problem". I will attempt to work through these claims and their inter-relations.
(3.511) KRIPKE'S PROBLEM?
Let us first consider "Kripke's problem". The disavowal of concern with what the 
thing is called or whether things are rightly called by such and such a name is 
quite inappropriate. Lewis writes as if there are entities that literally confront us 
and since we know that it is these things of which we are speaking, what we 
call them is neither here nor there. This is not only inaccurate but it neglects a 
crucial connection between language and reality.
When it comes to speaking of what we imagine the position is that because we 
are not confronted with something in the communal environment there can be 
no question of using demonstratives to specify directly the semantic content of 
our thoughts. The only way in which the content of imaginings can be specified 
is by the use of descriptions (an x such that Fx & Gx...) and indirect or 
comparative demonstratives ( an x that is like this except in that H x ), all of this 
in the context of constraints of conversational implicature. The semantic content 
of imaginings are specified in this way or not at all.23 Therefore, when we are 
dealing with the imagined,everything depends upon what "the thing" {sic) is
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called and how it is described, for we have no other way of fixing upon the kind 
of thing of which we wish to speak. More generally and perhaps more 
importantly it is quite wrong to attempt to discard the matter of whether a thing 
can rightly be called by such and such a name. Kripke's problem24 is indeed in 
the first instance one that seems to be entirely internal to linguistic concerns for 
he is dealing with the question of whether, in different kinds of case, it is true 
that x fits the "F"-stereotype if and only if x is rightly called "F". But the question of 
whether a thing can rightly be called "F"cannot but be metaphysically 
substantive for it is partly constitutive of the normativity of language use and the 
connection between language and reality that x ought to be called an "F" 
if and only if x is an F .
Let us suppose that (in the actual world) we discover on Mars creatures which 
are exactly like tigers both superficially and in respect of internal structure but 
which are not sprung from the same stock as Earth tigers 25 Now it is obvious 
that it is not obvious whether these things are tigers. What we actually choose 
call them is indeed entirely beside the point in the sense that we do not make it 
the case that these creatures are (or are not) tigers in choosing to apply ( or 
withhold) the appelation "tiger". However, it is also the case is that once we do 
everything within our powers at a given time to arrive at a judgement as to 
whether the creatures ought to be called "tigers" we have done everything in 
our power at that time to establish whether they are tigers and vice-versa . Our 
best judgement as to whether the creatures are tigers determines and is 
determined by our best judgement as to whether the creatures ought to be 
called "tigers". So, "Kripke's problem" of whether given animals are rightly 
called by a particular (kind) name "F" is not separable from the problem of 
whether the animals are F's . There is no question of being concerned with one 
problem but not the other. Given these two considerations the question of 
whether it is possible that there is a talking head separate from a human body is 
entirely exhausted in our asking whether there could be a thing satisfying such 
and such conditions that would rightly be called "a talking head".
(3.512) INDETERMINACY.
Let us now deal with the indeterminacy or underdetermination that Lewis 
appears to discern regarding the issue of whether the controversial thing should
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be called a "talking head", as when he writes:
"I am....somewhat inclined to doubt that usage establishes a settled 
answer to such a far-fetched question... ”26
It is not clear why this view is taken, but whether the source of 
under-determination is some deep-rooted semantic indeterminacy, vagueness 
or the open-endedness of our concepts, let us accept it. All that we need be 
taken to admit thereby is that there is no question of characterizing the 
relationship between (3) and (4) as being such that (4) is entailed by - i.e. is a 
classical analytic, synonymy-based semantic consequence of - (3). The very 
most that can reasonably demanded of the inference (3) 1= (4) is the maximal 
similarity to analytic entailment that our post-Quinean, post-Wittgensteinian 
sophistication can tolerate and this is, I believe, a qualification that Lewis would 
expect us to bring to bear in our reading of his claim to necessary 
truth-preservingness in this context. It is notable that the acknowledgement of 
this indeterminacy does not stop Lewis from taking a position on the question of 
whether we should apply the terms "talking" and "head". He cannot, therefore 
expect an opponent who acknowledges indeterminacy to hold back on such 
opinions either. So the dispute may proceed without further reference to 
indeterminacy.
(3.513) EXACT LIKENESS AND STEREOTYPES.
What is left to settle is whether Lewis does indeed intend, as we have been led 
to believe throughout, that recombinative inference establishes that there could 
be detached talking heads, unicorns, dragons etc. In the quoted passage he 
seems to be entering a qualification of this position when he says:
"... when I speak of possible dragons or unicorns, I mean animals 
that fit the stereotypes we associate with those names. "27 
Moreover, there is also the suggestion that he takes this to be equivalent to the 
claim that...
"  plenitude requires that there could be a separate thing exactly
like a talking head contiguous to a human body. " 28
Now Lewis is doing one of two things here. Firstly, he may be weakening his 
claim and arguing that all that recombinative reasoning establishes infallibly is 
the weaker of these possibilities, i.e. (3). Secondly, he may be arguing that, in
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these cases at least, anything that fits the "F'-stereotype is an "F" in which case 
if (3) is to be understood as constituting the possibility that there is something 
that fits the "unicorn"-stereotype then this additional argument licenses the 
inference (3)1= (4) i.e. to the possibility that there is a unicorn.
The first option then is to interpret Lewis as remaining agnostic on the issue of 
whether the inference (3) 1= (4) is necessarily truth-preserving but arguing 
instead for the necessary truth-preservingness of the inference (1), (2) I- (3’) 
where (3’) is a more specific version of our (3) viz:
(3 ’) It is possible that there is an x such that x fits the "unicorn” 
stereotype.
In effect this strategy has been tackled at (3.50). Even if we restrict attention to 
cases where the fallibility of the imagination with respect to complexity of 
pictorial detail and perspective cannot seriously be held to undermine the 
soundness of the inference (e.g. talking heads, unicorns and dragons) all that 
seems to transpire is that Lewis's claim becomes trivial. There is, to re-iterate, 
no serious debate as to whether there could be satisfiers of the stereotypes that 
are associated with "unicorn" etc. but in modal theorizing we have an interest in 
much more than these possibilities. We have an interest, for example, in 
whether a person can survive bodily death, in whether pain could be unfelt and 
in whether there could be language-speaking horses, but an imaginative/ 
recombinative epistemology under this weak interpretation does not address 
these stronger possibilities in whose endorsement or rejection we have an 
interest, for this interest is neither extinguished nor appeased when we are 
convinced that there could be or indeed are such P-seeming states of affairs. 
The second strategy involves arguing that the inference from "F" stereotype to F 
- (3) l= (4) - is truth-preserving. When this strategy is at issue it is thoroughly 
inappropriate to use the highly tendentious "exactly like" formulation:
" plenitude requires that there could be a separate thing exactly
like a talking head contiguous to a human body. ”29 
in order to provide support for the soundness of this style of inference. The point 
is that this formulation can satisfy everyone for its implicit appeal is to the trivial 
truth of the platitude that what is exactly like a o  is a 0 but of course the point is 
that modal theorists dispute what exact likeness must amount to in order to 
sustain this truth. For example let us consider the putative detached talking
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head which is supposedly exactly like a head except in not being contiguous to 
a body. This specification is extremely vague as it stands and remember that 
when we are trying to fix the content of our imaginings these means of 
specification are all that we have. Let us try to do better. Say that we have in 
mind a thing which until time t is exactly like your body-contiguous head; it is 
the head of a human being, that human being is a member of a language 
speaking community; at each instant of its history this thing has been 
fundamental-particle-indiscernible from your head at the comparative instant. 
Then at t this 'head' is separated from its body but under unspecified further 
circumstances it continues to execute intelligible, intelligent and responsive 
verbal behaviour and continues to be recognized and treated as a competent 
speaker of the language. This I think is among the strongest detailed versions 
of exact likeness that can be mustered here and I am inclined to say that 
something that conformed to this specification would indeed be a talking head 
detached from a body. However, I am also inclined to say that the specification 
can be no weaker than this if that very possibility - the possibility of a talking 
head- is to be sustained. In particular, there are certain conceptions of exact 
likeness that won't do. It won't do to just to specify a non-bodily-contiguous 
entity that is physically indiscernible from your talking head in the absence of 
any other specification of biological or social context, for, arguably, this 
arrangement of particles could be all that there is, in which case the notion of a 
language becomes untenable as does the notion of talking (talking about 
what?). Perhaps the foregoing is contentious, but it is not contentious (surely!) 
that the specification/oo/cs like a detached talking head is not sufficient to 
determine the application of the term "talking head" to the detached thing. This 
would be, in effect, to argue that the possibility at issue is one in which the 
availability of a mental picture is decisive and this is a thoroughly implausible 
outcome. To register the point with a different emphasis,"exactly like" cannot be 
restricted to a phenomenalistic interpretation if the inference from it is possible 
that there is something exactly tike an F  to it is possible that there is an F  is 
to have any credibility.
Given these observations it seems fair to say that the introduction of exact 
likeness is extremely unhelpful, and all the more so given that it seems that 
Lewis has a straightforwardly statable interpretation of exact likeness in mind,
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i.e. in these cases at least, anything that fits the "F"-stereotype is an "F". The 
convincingness of this thesis is case sensitive as can be seen from the 
divergent claims that are made by e.g. Putnam and Kripke30 with respect to 
such predicates as "Pain (x)" and "Water (x)", so the very least that Lewis owes 
us is a characterization of the range of cases in which he wants to say that the 
inference from "F"-stereotype to "F" does preserve truth. But even if this can be 
done convincingly for a small range of predicates it is absolutely clear that for 
the most part if not always the inference will not preserve truth, for the whole 
point of introducing the concept of a stereotype31 is to locate the modally 
relevant difference - in the case of natural kind terms in particular - between 
satisfying the "F"-stereotype and (rightly) satisfying the predicate "F".
My conclusion is that Lewis has not made clear his strategy with respect to the 
handling of the apparently indispensable sub-inference (3) l= (4) and that the 
different strategies that he may be interpreted as intending are both quite 
unsatisfactory. In sum, there is, and always was every reason to hold that the 
inferential move from (3) to (4) is not necessarily truth-preserving and Lewis 
has given us no reason to think otherwise.
(3.6) A CAUTIOUS APPRAISAL OF THE FOREGOING CASE AGAINST 
RECOMBINATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 
Even if the argument of this chapter were held to have established conclusively 
that Lewis's internal epistemology of modal realism is in disarray - and I do not 
claim that it does - there would inevitably remain the suspicion that this is no 
argument against the ontological thesis of modal realism per se. Of course it will 
be accepted that the genuine modal realist cannot simply remain silent on 
questions of epistemology, but it might also be held that there is no need to 
accept Lewis's recombinative epistemology as the inevitable or even the 
natural epistemological component of a total modal theory based upon the 
ontological commitments of modal realism. In short, it might be argued that the 
efforts of this chapter are at best contributions towards a critique of 
recombination, and that the genuine modal realist is at liberty to benefit from this 
critique and to construct an alternative or re-vamped conception of the 
epistemology of modality.
This appraisal of the relevance of the foregoing discussion may not be unfair
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but the criticism of Lewis's modal epistemology does carry rather more 
significance than this appraisal would suggest, since it is (as far as I am aware) 
theonly attempt that there has been by a proponent of genuine modal realism 
to discharge the obligation to deal with the question of how we know in matters 
of possibility and necessity. The criticism that is implicit in the cautious appraisal 
of the arguments against the recombinative epistemology is that these 
arguments do not show that there can beno viable epistemology of genuine 
modal realism and, of course, that point is well taken. However the chapter 
stands as a critique of modal realist epistemology such as it is and this cannot 




THE METAPHYSICAL CASE AGAINST POSSIBLE WORLDS
(4.0) INTRODUCTION
This chapter is based upon the development and re-orientation of two related 
metaphysical objections which McGinn raises against the status of possible 
worlds as genuine individuals.1 These objections are allegations that possible 
worlds fail to satisfy two conditions which are mooted as necessary conditions 
of individuality. The conditions will be labelled the essentialist and the 
extra-linguistic  conditions respectively. Among the many metaphysical 
objections which have been launched against Lewis's realism these objections 
have been selected for discussion and development since they give rise to a 
challenging comparison of possible worlds with the (abstract) entities of 
mathematics. It will be argued [(4.20)-(4.23)j that the objection based upon the 
essentialist condition is attractive but indecisive. It will then be argued 
[(4.30)-(4.34)] that an objection derived from the extra-linguistic condition (which 
constitutes a substantial amendment of McGinn's initial objection) delivers a 
devastating blow to realism about possible worlds. Before developing these 
objections, it will be helpful first to state McGinn's version of the objections and 
to remark upon the dialectical significance that ought to be associated with 
them.
(4.1) McGINN'S OBJECTIONS STATED AND THEIR DIALECTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSED.
McGinn's objections are posed as a two-pronged attack on the notion that 
possible worlds are genuine individuals. The objections are stated and their 
philosophical motivation supplied in the following passage :
"... (I)t is not easy to define the notion of an individual, vital as that 
notion is, but the following two conditions seem necessary to 
individuality : something is a genuine individual only if (a) it admits 
of proper identification short of exhaustive characterization, and (b) 
its properties partition (non-trivially) into the essential and the 
accidental. Condition (a) captures the idea that an individual is an 
extra-linguistic entity whose properties exceed those we happen to
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fix upon in referring to it : and this is essential if we are to apply the 
picture of first identifying an individual as a potential object of 
predication, and then informatively characterizing it by coupling the 
identifying singular term with a predicative expression. Condition
(b) tells us that an individual is something that has certain 
properties essentially, but it is also such that it can exist through 
variation in respect of other of its properties. Both conditions 
ensure that an individual is something distinct from the descriptions 
true of it "2
Lewis's explicit ontological claims are that possible worlds are individuals and 
in the context of his genuine modal realism, this is to say that they are sui 
generis entities of a kind with the actual world. This genuine realist outlook is to 
be distinguished from its ersatzist rivals and in particular from linguistic 
ersatzism which is the thesis that possible worlds are to be identified with 
abstract individuals which have the status of linguistic representations of the 
actual world.3 Lewis, therefore, ought to relish the prospect of developing 
criteria which facilitate the demonstration of the status of possible worlds as 
individual language-independent entities and McGinn’s purported necessary 
conditions of genuine (extra-linguistic) individuality constitute criteria of this 
nature. As such the dialectical burden which falls to the genuine modal realist is 
to show either that McGinn is wrong in alleging that possible worlds fail the 
condition(s) or to challenge the status of the proposed conditions as (genuinely) 
necessary conditions of individuality. But what ought to be the dialectical 
position of the proponent of these objections?
On this issue Lewis and I stand on one side and McGinn stands on the other. 
McGinn takes the dialectical significance of these objections to be such that 
their success would point the way towards a non-objectual construal of possible 
worlds. As he puts i t :
" Indeed, it seems more natural to construe what are called possible 
worlds (sic) as ontologically of the nature of states and properties; 
but if so modality belongs rather with predicate position: it is not 
properly associated with values of individual variables." 4
And then:
"So formulas containing alleged world variables should be viewed
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with suspicion: we do not understand their import just because we 
can write them down - we must satisfy ourselves that they can 
really mean what they purport to. It seems to me that the indicated 
problem atic status of possible worlds as individuals renders 
surprising the reluctance of our language to treat them so. "5 
My unease with this assessment of the position can be articulated in two ways. 
The first of these is to re-iterate the worry of Ch.1 concerning the real meaning 
of statements.6 There it was argued that the notion that possible world 
statements give the real semantic structure of their modal operator counterparts 
was deeply misconceived, and in Ch.5 I will argue that the reverse tactic of 
arguing that modal opertor statements give the real semantic structure of 
possible world sentences is equally misconceived.7 The arguments for these 
claims will not be rehearsed (anticipated) here. The point is that McGinn's 
suggestions that we should consider construing possible worlds as being 
non-objectual and that we do not really understand the import of "alleged world 
variables" are redolent of the claim that apparently first-order quantificational 
possible world sentences do not mean what they appear to mean and, I argue 
elsewhere, this is an unsatisfactory way to interpret these sentences.
The second way of articulating unease about McGinn's conception of the 
consequence of the success of his objections is by staking the more generally 
appreciable claim that his proposal to deal with possible world statements as 
something other than first-order quantifications over worldly objects constitutes 
a stretching of the meaning of the term "possible world" beyond acceptable 
limits.
Lewis notes and dismisses an attempt to reconcile his views with those of his 
ersatzist opponents. This attempt at reconciliation proceeds on the basis of the 
claim that there is agreement on the question of whether there are possible 
worlds and disagreement only on the matter of what their nature is.8 
He writes:
"Compare the foolish suggestion that all of us at least agree that 
God exists, although we disagree about His nature : some say He's 
a supernatural person, some say He's the cosmos in all its glory, 
some say He's the triumphal march of history,... Given that much 




This response, harsh sentiments aside, is, I believe, quite appropriately directed 
at McGinn's attempt to construe possible worlds as entities other than the 
values of first-order variables. Matters are simplified and better interpretation 
ensues if we say that either possible worlds are individuals or there are no 
possible worlds and, accordingly, if an argument is successful in showing that 
possible worlds are not individuals, then it is successful in showing that there 
are no possible worlds. Lewis, I contend, will be committed to viewing the 
dialectical position in the same way - what turns upon the success of McGinn's 
objections is the matter of the existence of possible worlds and the viability of 
any non-objectual construal of modality is quite a separate matter. Thus, I wish 
to consider McGinn's objections in the context of a conception of their dialectical 
significance which is stronger than McGinn seems prepared to allow, but which 
Lewis would (should!) welcome. To reiterate, the genuine modal realist must 
show either that McGinn is wrong in alleging that possible worlds fail the 
condition(s) or challenge the status of the proposed conditions as (genuinely) 
necessary conditions of individuality. If the status of the conditions can be 
maintained and possible worlds can be shown to fail them, then what is shown 
thereby is that there are no possible worlds.
(4.20) THE ESSENTIALIST CONDITION (ESS)
The essentialist necessary condition on individuality (ESS) is as follows:
(E S S )Entities of a purported kind are genuine individuals only if 
their properties admit of proper partition into the essential 
and the accidental.
The (nominal) choice facing the modal realist is to choose between challenging 
the status of the condition and establishing that possible worlds do not fall foul 
of its strictures. In fact only the former is tenable, since the genuine modal realist 
cannot accept the latter. That the genuine modal realist cannot accept the 
non-trivial partition of the properties of worlds into accidental and essential is 
something that can be shown more easily when presented as a consequence of 
the second of two cases that the realist can make for challenging the status of 
the condition. These points will be addressed in due course [(4.23)]. However, 
there is a distinct kind of reason that may be adduced for the purpose of
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challenging the status of the condition (ESS) which merits first consideration.
(4.21) THE STRATEGY OF UNDERMINING (ESS1 BY MEANS OF A 
COUNTEREXAMPLE
The modal realist might refuse to accept the essential/accidental partition as a 
necessary condition of individuality on the grounds that McGinn has provided 
no positive case for its acceptance. But this would be to claim the high ground in 
the matter of the burden of proof in a situation where the right of either 
protagonist to do so is extremely dubious. It seems more promising and more 
reasonable to attempt to proceed indirectly and to evaluate the plausibility of the 
condition by considering the consequences that it has in terms of the 
candidates that it functions to exclude  from the class of real, genuine 
individuals. In the context of this evaluative procedure, the modal realist will 
strive to point to (other) cases where antecedently acceptable candidates are 
excluded as a result of the imposition of the condition and thereby to undermine 
the plausibility of the condition. McGinn argues convincingly that places and 
times can be regarded as having both essential and contingent properties10 
but, perhaps surprisingly, he does not consider mathematical entities. Let us 
consider, then, the mathematical realm as a prospective source of counter­
examples which will serve to undermine the authority of (ESS).
(4.22) A TENTATIVELY PESSIMISTIC EVALUATION OF THE PROSPECTS 
OF A MATHEMATICAL COUNTER-EXAMPLE.
Whether natural numbers are to be regarded as having contingent properties or 
not seems to be entirely a matter of what ought to be counted as a property. 
Such properties as being Saul's favourite number, or numbering the moons of 
Venus, might be treated as contingent properties of the number two, but it is 
clear that the modality of the association of these properties with the number 
two is traceable to the contingency of certain psychological facts about Saul, on 
one hand, and the contingency of certain astronomical states of affairs on the 
other. However, there appears to be no unproblematic way of dealing with such 
prima facie contingent properties.
Card-carrying platonist Katz, categorizes pure mathematical properties as the 
basic properties of numbers and other properties as non-basic.11 This allows
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us to effect an intuitively compelling distinction between different kinds of 
property while avoiding the strain of a definitive exclusion of non-pure- 
mathematical candidates from the range of a number's properties. On the basis 
of this taxonomy of properties, presumably, both of our problematic properties 
will emerge as non-basic properties of the number two, but contingent 
properties of the number two nonetheless. So, the proper partition of essential 
and accidental properties is secured by this liberal construal which includes 
non-basic properties within the range of properties tout court.
On the other hand, one's inclination might be to accept the strain and attempt to 
enforce the exclusion of non-basic properties from the range of genuine 
properties of the number two. The main difficulty associated with this option is 
that the exclusion will require independent and non ad hoc philosophical 
motivation if it is not to smack of the gerrymandering of the range of properties to 
suit the purpose of undermining (ESS). We should retain an open mind about 
the prospects of developing an appropriately principled basis upon which the 
restriction to basic properties might be secured.
If the case of natural numbers is indecisive, what of the case of sets? There is 
intuitive appeal in the idea that the only genuine properties of sets are the 
properties of their composition, i.e. the properties of having such and such 
members. Moreover, since there are overwhelming and independent reasons 
for holding that it is of the essence of a set that it should have exactly the 
members that it has12 (and hence exactly the cardinality that it has) there is 
intuitive appeal to the claim that the properties of sets do not admit of proper 
partition into the essential and the accidental. But even if we accept that the only 
genuine properties of sets are the properties of their composition we simply 
force the issue one stage back to the question of which properties count as 
properties of composition. To see this consider the following two-stage, 
pro-contingency argument:
(1 ) It is necessary that x is a member of S
(2 ) It is contingent that x is blue.
(1), (2) l= (3)




(4 ) It is a contingent property of S that it has a blue member.
There just seems to be no determinate answer to the question of whether 
having a blue member is a property of composition of S or not, nor, for that 
matter, to the question of whether the inference from (3) to (4) is necessarily 
truth-preserving.
In sum, it is not to be ruled out that the modal realist might be able to construct a 
case for the ineffectiveness of (ESS) which is based upon its independent 
ineffectiveness in excluding from the range of genuine individuals mathematical 
entities such as natural numbers and/or sets. But the prospects for the success 
of this strategy look meagre for two main reasons.
The first is that it is difficult to see how a satisfactory and non-tendentious 
conception of the range of the properties of numbers or sets might be 
circumscribed and the success of the strategy would appear to depend upon 
this possibility. The second is that even if it could somehow be established that 
natural numbers and/or sets do fall foul of the restriction that (ESS) imposes 
upon individuals, the option of arguing that natural numbers and/or sets were 
rightly excluded from the realm of individuals would remain to be addressed. 
McGinn is rightly coy about the standing of the notion of an individual and it 
would be unwise to attempt to place too much weight upon a claim of 
pre-analytical understanding of its content. I have no suggestions as to how we 
might attempt to settle the question of whether sets are individuals. However, it 
may be worth noting that Lewis does not contest the practice of contrasting 
sets with individuals.13 This is of interest given that the price of acceptance of 
this contrast will be to deprive the opponent of (ESS) of a potential counter­
example to its effectiveness.
The opponent of (ESS) would be well justified in remarking that the authority of 
the condition is far more problematic a matter than McGinn's brief discussion 
would suggest. However, the condition does enjoy substantial intuitive appeal 
and the authority which it derives from its intuitive appeal is not immediately 
threatened by the prospect of a clear mathematical counter-example.
(4.23) A TENTATIVELY OPTIMISTIC EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGY. OE 
UNDERMINING (ESS) BY ALLEGING ILLICIT PRESUPPOSITION 
In the event that no counter-example to (ESS), mathematical or otherwise, is to
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be had, the prospect of insisting upon realism about possible worlds at the 
expense of the condition is one that can hold little attraction for the modal 
realist. But the modal realist is not reduced to blank insistence upon realism in 
the absence of a counterexample for a second strategy is available for the 
undermining of (ESS).
The attempt to apply the condition (E S S ) to worlds is of quite distinct 
significance from any attempt to apply the condition to places, times, numbers or 
sets. For possible worlds are - while places, times, numbers and sets are not- 
purported to comprise the analysans of the modal notions of essential property 
and accidental property. It is open to the genuine modal realist to argue that the 
formulation of any claim according to which a possible world has a propertyw/Y/7 
this or that modality involves an illicit presupposition. Such claims will be 
viewed as illicit attempts to reinstate non-objectual modal idioms behind the 
possible worlds and thereby to beg the question against the central modal 
realist tenet that possible worlds are part of the analysans of modal distinctions 
and not vice versa. The modal realist cannot accept that (ESS) is true because 
this would be to endorse the propriety of speaking modally of worlds. Equally, 
there is a wrong way for the consistent modal realist to go about denying the 
susceptibility of worlds to the non-trivial partitioning of their properties into the 
essential and the accidental.
To the modal realist the idea of endorsing a trivial partition of a world's 
properties into the essential and the accidental is no more acceptable than 
endorsing a non-trivial partition. Even though there is a sense in which the 
modal realist will agree that, as McGinn puts it,...
"..what transpires in a world is essential to its identity; the identity 
of a world is fixed by its content. "14
The genuine modal realist cannot entertain what might seem to be otherwise 
perfectly natural and equivalent propositions i.e. (5) & (6):
(5) Each world has all of its properties essentially.
(6) If some world w has some property P, then it is necessary that 
w has P.
To gain entitlement to these propositions the modal realist would have to opt for 
one of two unpalatable alternatives. The first of these would be to accept the 
irreducibility of the non-objectual modal items ("essentially", "it is necessary
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that ") and this would be to abandon the claim that possible worlds can base
an analysis of such modal idioms.15 The second would be to provide a further 
realm of modal ontology (possible universes, possible super-worlds) in order to 
fund the analysis of the modalities of worlds. Apart from the fact that this route 
threatens ramified ontological commitment as we regress to the modalities of 
these newly postulated entities, it conflicts with the modal realist's avowal that 
possible worlds and their contents constitute literally and unrestrictedly all that 
there is.16
The condition (ESS) is unacceptable since its truth requires that we can speak 
meaningfully of modalities of possible worlds and this, the modal realist will 
argue, we cannot do without begging the question against the analytical 
aspirations of modal realism. An appropriate question then is whether these 
analytical goals are independently tenable. However, it appears that the 
allegation of illicit pre-supposition does give the modal realist a prima facie 
means of challenging the applicability of the condition (ESS) to the case of 
possible worlds.
The upshot then is that the genuine modal realist ought not to invest any real 
hope in the prospect of undermining (ESS) by producing an embarrassing 
instance which can be deployed as a counterexample but that there is some 
milage in alleging that the imposition of (E S S ) constitutes something 
tantamount to begging the question against the possible worlds as the 
analysans of the other modal idioms. On balance caution appears advisable 
here, especially given the absence of any defence or justification of the status of 
(ESS) or its universal applicability. The modal realist cannot reasonably be 
held to have been defeated decisively at the hands of a clearly acceptable 
criterion of individuality and given what is at stake it is appropriate to judge that 
the (ESS) based case against modal realism is not proven.17 However, the 
indecision in the verdict arising from the essentialist condition is mitigated by 
considerations arising from the extra-linguistic condition.
(4.30) THE EXTRA-LINGUISTIC CONDITION




{EXL)Entities of a purported kind are genuine individuals only if 
they admit of proper identification short of exhaustive 
characterization.
The obvious course for the modal realist, in the first instance at least, is to 
attempt to show that genuine possible worlds are pronounced genuine 
individuals by the standard of (EXL). If the modal realist seeks a source of 
motivation for pursuing this direction of theorizing, it may be supplied in the 
following form.
Non-actual possible worlds, it is held, are on a metaphysical par with the 
possible world that we inhabit. It follows that if the actual world is an individual 
by the lights of the condition (EXL) then we should expect that non-actual 
possible worlds should also emerge as individuals relative to (EXL).
Now there is no obvious reason for denying the individuality of the actual world 
and no reason at all for denying its extra-linguistic status. From the point of view 
of the genuine modal realist the actual world is to be regarded as an individual 
and moreover an element among a totality of worlds. From the point of view of 
the anti-realist, it is difficult to see what might turn on the question of whether the 
actual world is an individual since, it will be held, there is no call to deal with 
questions of its identity or difference with other things of its kind. Given this 
intuitive individuality of the actual world, its emergence as an individual by the 
standards of (EXL) stands as something of a test of the plausibility of that 
condition. So, the crucial question now is : does the actual world admit to 
identification short of exhaustive characterization?
The answer is that it seems that it does. The main reason for holding that it does 
is that there appears to be no difficulty associated with indexical or token- 
reflexive reference to the (actual) world.18 Lewis himself has argued that the 
term "actual" functions as a modal indexical whose reference is contextually 
determined in a way that is analagous to the contextual determination of the 
referent of a spatial indexical ("here") or a temporal indexical ("now") in a given 
token utterance.19 Similarly, it might be held that the actual world is identifiable 
by way of the demonstrative noun phrase "this world" or by the token-reflexive 
definite description "the world which we inhabit". Clearly, we credit ourselves 
with a facility to identify the world on the basis of the most direct of our 
referential resources, exploiting to the full the contextual features of reference
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determination with which we imbue both implicitly and explicitly token-reflexive 
semantic items and functors ("this", "we"). Furthermore, although it hardly needs 
emphasizing, there is no question of these modes of identification amounting to 
anything but the barest otcharacterizations of the actual world far less 
exhaustive characterizations of the actual world. To put matters another way we 
can have thoughts about the actual world qua individual, if at all, because we 
are acquainted with it.
(4.31) THERE IS NO QUESTION OF CAUSALLY DEPENDENT INDEXICAL 
IDENTIFICATION OF NON-ACTUAL POSSIBLE WORLDS.
The crucial point is that the very feature of our language which sustains our 
(perhaps tentative) conception of ourselves as being able to identify the actual 
world in the absence of an exhaustive characterization - i.e. the contextual 
determination of reference for indexical terms - threatens to ensure that this 
procedure of identification is not generalizable to other, non-actual possible 
worlds.
The difficulty arises because of the crucial role that causal factors have in the 
determination of context. If causal factors (partially) determine context, and 
context (partially) determines reference for token occurences of indexical items 
of the language, then it will be the case that there is at least a risk of a failure of 
determinate reference in the use of indexical items in the absence of 
appropriate causal factors. For paradigmatically concrete objects, there is a 
strong case for holding that causal factors are crucial in determining whether a 
speaker's indexical thought or saying is about one such object rather than 
another. In the case of the actual world, our use of indexical terms such as this 
world or even the actual world can be regarded as identifying a unique 
individual precisely because the matter of which individual is identified seems 
to be settled entirely by our causal embedding and the indexical character of 
the terms "this" and "actual". In the case of non-actual (relative to us) worlds 
there is no question of the content of such hopeful indexical characterizations 
as that world being settled by appeal to causal considerations, for the fact is 
that non-actual possible worlds stand in no causal relations to us. Hence, it 
would appear that there is no possibility of identifying a non-actual world by way 
of the use of an implicitly or explicitly indexical mode of identification.
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(4.32) DESCRIPTIVE IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE WORLDS IS 
ALSO UNTENABLE.
The failure of causally-dependent determination of which possible world one is 
speaking or thinking still leaves open the possibility of identifying possible 
worlds in some other way. McGinn argues that the only way in which this 
identification can be effected is such that it entails collapse into exhaustive 
characterization and, thereby, failure to satisfy the necessary condition of 
individuality. He writes:
”..(l)t seems clear that a world has not been uniquely specified until 
all of its properties have been listed; it is not determinate of which 
w orld  we are speaking until its  w hole content has been  
spec ified ."20
Thus a world could only be identified by a description which represents a kind 
of brute enumeration of its properties: a description of the form (12)
( 1 2 )  (w )(w =W -j <-> (P-|W & P2 W & - P3 W & ..............)).
However, even though recourse to this kind of procedure may be the only 
option left on the table, there is no good reason to assume, as McGinn does, 
that an appeal to a procedure of this kind is legitimate or successful in 
identifying possible worlds.
Worries concerning the legitimacy of the appeal to a listing of all of a world's 
properties can hardly fail to raise suspicions of intelligibility pertaining both to 
the apparent vagueness of the specification and to the cardinality of the 
(purported) totality. Moreover, for worlds of the size and complexity of the actual 
world it is thoroughly implausible to suppose that on the basis of any intelligible 
extension of our capacities, such a world might be susceptible to exhaustive, 
never mind unique, descriptive specification. No intelligible procedure could 
even put us into a position of having to hand a world description whose 
uniqueness or otherwise was left to trouble us. But it is important to emphasize 
that there is more to the question of identification than the problems that arise 
from large worlds.
Let worlds be as small as you like and there remains the matter of non-identical 
but indiscernible worlds. If one permits, as Lewis does as a consequence of the 
principle of recombination,21 that there are possible worlds which contain only 
a single sheet of paper such as this page (and no doubt the space-time it
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occupies) we have no way of specifying any such world uniquely in the face of 
indiscernible others. The obvious way of dealing with this difficulty would be to 
wield Occam's razor and to deny that there are indiscernible (but non-identical) 
worlds but Lewis refuses to do so and for good reason.
McGinn's point was that the satisfaction of (EXL) is part of what it is for a class 
of individuals to be distinct from the linguistic structures which characterize 
them. It is perfectly in keeping with Lewis's views on ontological commitment 
and theoretical utility that he should take the view that the cheaper option of 
linguistic ersatzism would win out over genuine realism were possible worlds 
subject to identification by exhaustive description and therefore, perhaps, 
susceptible to elimination in favour of linguistic representations.22 Lewis, 
therefore sees the need to distinguish possible worlds from their linguistic 
ersatz shadows and for this reason enters the explicit claims:
"...(2) We cannot have two indiscernible descriptions; whereas 
maybe there are indiscernible worlds, and in any case there are 
indiscernible parts of worlds. (3) What can be described is limited 
to what we have words for; whereas worlds can out run our means 
of describing them."23
Lewis's case for maintaining his own genuine modal realism in the face of 
competition from linguistic ersatzism depends clearly upon maintaining that 
possible worlds transcend descriptive representation. Accordingly, it is clear 
that McGinn's claim that possible worlds are  susceptible to descriptive 
identification is, by Lewis's lights and my own, wrong.
(4.33) A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF PROPER 
NAMES FOR POSSIBLE WORLDS 
Before proceeding to evaluate the results of (4.31) & (4.32), there is a further 
mode of linguistic representation of individuals which must be considered in 
connection with the matter of the identification of possible worlds. Evidence for 
the possibility of non causally dependent, non-descriptive representation of 
individuals is afforded by our mathematical practice and, in particular, the 
phenomenon of the use of proper names for numbers . Hence, we may have a 
precedent for our crediting ourselves with the ability to identify unique referents 
of non-indexical, non-descriptive singular terms (names) where these referents
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are abstract (or at least causally isolated from u s ) objects.
The problem is to try to understand how representation of this character is 
possible while eschewing reduction of the individuals in question, i.e to make 
sense of such representation other than at a cost of forcing the represented 
entities into the (our) causal nexus. If a satisfactory response to this question 
were forthcoming, it may be ventured, this response may provide a basis from 
which we might develop a conception of an equivalent mode of identification for 
possible worlds.
This is an ambitious strategy which cannot be dismissed lightly, but there are 
good if rather inchoate reasons that can be brought to bear in order to indicate 
what it is about the case of numbers that permits their representation by way of 
proper names and which is absent in the case of possible worlds.
The means whereby proper names refer to individuals can only be understood 
in terms of other, intuitively more fundamental, modes of linguistic 
representation. Hence, the two great competing theoretical pictures of proper 
names as covert descriptions and covert indexicals.24 The compelling Kripkean 
account of the determination of reference for proper names exploits to the full 
the role of indexical, causally dependent phenomena in this process, and it is 
for the most part as convincing as a positive account as it is as an assault on the 
descriptive theory. However there is an obvious limit to the causal-indexical 
conception of the functioning of proper names and that is the (apparent) 
functioning of proper names of abstract objects.25 Thus while it is the case that 
the descriptive "associations" of proper names are marginalized in the 
determination of the referents of concrete objects, it seems inevitable that 
descriptive content cannot but be assigned a central role in a theory of the 
determination of reference for proper names of abstract objects since, magical 
bare semantic connections aside, there is no presently intelligible alternative 
mode of representation once the causal-indexical mode has been discounted. 
There is however, no question of a simple correlation of proper names for 
numbers say with definite descriptions. A more subtle conception is required 
and this begins with the observation that the determination of reference for 
proper names of abstract objects depends upon those names being used in a 
linguistic medium which includes other modes of representation of the objects 
in question. In particular, the presence in the language of informative identity
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statements invoving names of numbers is a crucial feature of the sense (i.e. the 
determination of reference) of such names.26 I do not propose to attempt to 
elaborate upon this claim but in a sense no elaboration is required in order to 
make the following point.
It would be difficult enough to see how there could be informative identity 
statements concerning worlds were the modes of representation of possible 
worlds limited to complex descriptive singular terms. This is the difficulty that 
McGinn associates with the lack of variety of modes of representation of 
possible worlds27 but he underestimates significantly the degree of poverty of 
representational resources. I am urging a different point concerning the "lack of 
variety" of representational resources for worlds namely - given that there are 
neither indexical nor descriptive modes of representation of possible worlds to 
enable their identification, there can be no question of their being identifiable by 
way of proper names either. This is the crucial difference between possible 
worlds and natural numbers with respect to the possibility of their identification 
by way of proper names 28
(4.34) THE IDENT1FICATION-TRANSCENDENCE OF POSSIBLE WORLDS IS 
A DECISIVE CONSIDERATION IN FAVOUR OF ANTI-REALISM 
Possible worlds, then, are not susceptible to identification by explicitly indexical 
means or by description and this recalcitrance is matched by, and perhaps 
entails, the insusceptibility of possible worlds to identification via the use of 
proper names. Thus, particular possible worlds cannot be identified at all. 
Hence, possible worlds fail to satisfy (EXL):
{EXL)Entities of a purported kind are genuine individuals only if 
they admit of proper identification short of exhaustive 
characteriza tion.
Moreover, the failure is more dramatic than McGinn would have us believe 
since possible worlds do not admit of proper identification tout court. That is to 
say, possible worlds fail to satisfy a (purportedly) necessary condition of 
individuality which requires the identifiability of individuals:
(ID) Entities of a purported kind are genuine individuals only if 
they admit of proper identification.
The only course of defence that remains to the genuine modal realist when
76
77
presented with the failure of possible worlds to satisfy (ID) is to contest the 
status of the condition as a genuine (partial) determinant of the class of 
individuals. This, I take it, would be for the genuine modal realist to show us why 
we need ngl observe the desideratum of no entity without identity, and as such 
the genuine modal realist is placed in a desparate and unenviable position. 
This is not to say that the condition (ID) is unassailable but to say that the 
prospects of assailing it are bleak.
There is one direction of response which can be anticipated and whose 
irrelevance should be emphasized. It is no doubt true that there are more kinds 
of things in the world than are dreamt of in our physics and metaphysics and, 
therefore, true that there are kinds of particulars which exist and for which, since 
we do not recognize their existence, we are in no position to supply identity 
conditions. In this sense there are, no doubt entities which we are in no position 
to identify. But this is no more than to give vent to an appropriately and modestly 
realistic attitude to the question of what there is . The point is that when we are 
faced specific case by specific case with the question of whether we ought to 
judge that there are individuals of such and such a kind in the world the 
requirement that they be properly identifiable is essential to the very idea that 
there are such things of that kind. It is essential to the notion of an individual that 
there should be a clear conceptual basis upon which we can anchor 
judgements of the sameness and difference of individuals and that requires that 
we should be in possession of criteria of identity. Unlike those individuals which 
do exert strong claims to admission into our ontology such as the concrete 
individuals which are located in the spatio-temporal nexus that we occupy, and 
the abstract objects of mathematics, possible worlds can be associated with no 
proper criteria of identity. Hence, my case is rested on the claim that Lewis's 
general Quinean argument29 for postulating an ontology of possible worlds is 
undermined by equally Quinean standards.
(4.4) SUMMARY
This concludes the case against Lewis's modal realism. The conclusion - based 
on internal epistemological and on metaphysical grounds - is that there are no 
possible worlds. The second section of the thesis will be devoted to a critique of 
a second grade of modal realism, viz McGinn's conception of non-objectual
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modal realism. However, before turning to this second conception of modal 
realism there is one important issue which remains to be addressed. In 
adopting the stance of anti-realism about worlds we are now faced with the 
challenge that is implicit in Lewis's observation that even those who scoff at 
possible worlds cannot resist the use of possible world talk.30 This is the 
challenge to the anti-realist about possible worlds to give a coherent account of 
the meaning of possible world statements while remaining an anti-realist. The 




POSSIBLE WORLD TALK AS METAPHOR
(5.00) INTRODUCTION: WRIGHT’S CONDITIONS & OBJECTUAL 
ANTI-REALISM.
In this chapter I will review a number of anti-realist conceptions of the meaning 
of possible world statements and I will defend my own account of world-talk as 
metaphor. I will begin by introducing a set of conditions that have been 
proposed as individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the existence of a 
kind of object given a class of statements that involve prima facie reference to 
and quantification over objects of that kind. These conditions are deployed here 
on the basis that they generate a taxonomy of ways of objectual anti-realism 
corresponding to the denial of one or more of the necessary conditions.
A proposal due to Wright yields three "Fregean" conditions that are individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient for the existence of a class of objects given a 
class of prima facie object-invoking statements.1
(i) The statem ents are apt to record or misrecord features of 
reality .
( ii)  The grammar of the statements is such that if any statement is 
to be true there must exist objects of the kind in question.
( iii)  Some of the statements are, by ordinary criteria, true.
Let us call these the conditions of recording, grammar, and truth respectively. 
Before proceeding with the main business of the chapter some clarifications 
and qualifications are required concerning the condition of truth (5.01) and the 
condition of recording (5.02).
(5.01) THE CONDITION OF TRUTH.
The range of statements to which the conditions are applied will have to be 
restricted so as to exclude the trivial satisfaction of the condition of truth. Trivial 
satisfaction of the condition of truth is threatened from three sources only the 
last of which pertains specifically to the case of possible world statements.The 
first of these is the crop of negative existential statements that will (naturally be 
held to) be true if there are no objects of the relevant kind. The second is the 
crop of existential statements whose truth is guaranteed, regardless of the
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values of bound variables, by first-order logic i.e. logical truths. Accordingly the 
conditions should be understood as applying only to sentences involving (prima 
facie ) reference to or quantification over the purported objects and which 
contain no logical operators other than the existential quantifier itself. There is a 
further threat of triviality that arises in the specific case of possible world 
sentences on a trivial basis viz. that some statements of the type "(3w)(Pw)" will 
be made true by the actual world and which any anti-realist is bound to accept 
to be true. It seems quite reasonable to exempt from the scope of application of 
the condition those statements that are made true in this way in order to 
preserve the connection between anti-realism about worlds and the falsehood 
of statements that purport to quantify over them. The obvious way to achieve the 
desired effect is to read the conditions as applying to statements in relation not 
to possible worlds, thereby risking inclusion of the actual world, but to 
non-actual possible worlds. I propose to proceed on the basis of this stipulation.
(5.02) THE CONDITION OF RECORDING.
It has proved necessary to depart from Wright's formulation of these conditions 
in one crucial respect. Wright introduces the first condition as the condition that 
the statements in question should articulate objective judgements where he
understands the notion of the objectivity of judgement as......
"......the kind of objectivity statements have when they are apt to
record or misrecord features of the real world, features which would 
be appreciable to any creature possessed of appropriate cognitive 
p o w ers ,w h a te ver its  em otional cap acities  or a ffec tive  
dispositions. "2
The difficulty is that the condition of objectivity of judgement so understood 
conflates two theses that must be distinguished in the context of the large scale 
project of discriminating kinds of modal realism. The secondary realist wants to 
view standard non-objectual modal statements as recording features of reality 
but, definitively, does not want to say that what is recorded therein is 
appreciable by any creature irrespective of affective dispositions. Thus 
secondary realism is to be distinguished from any position, such as Blackburn's 
quasi-realism, which is based upon the claim that the role of modal statements 
is not to record features of the real world. I have taken the view that both the
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short-term taxonomic purposes of this chapter and the objective of avoiding 
confusion at a later stage are both served by the supplanting of Wright's original 
condition of objective judgement by the more managable, albeit inchoate, 
recording condition. In any case, it would seem that the recording condition is 
not so far away from Wright's original intentions given that its repudiation is a 
feature of those philosophical theories that he cites as examples of the 
repudiation of objectivity of judgement. (Such theories as Hume's 
"non-cognitivism" about attributions of value and necessity, the sceptical 
solution offered by Kripke's Wittgenstein to the sceptical paradox concerning 
meaning and instrumentalism concerning statements involving apparent 
reference to scientific unobservables.3 )
I have also taken the view that the phrase "features of reality" is to be preferred 
to the original "features of the real world" given that the latter may prove 
tendentious in the context of a discussion of Lewis's modal realism.
(5.1) GENUINE REALISM LOCATED. ERSATZ REALISM DISCOUNTED. 
There is no doubt that the genuine modal realist holds that world-statements 
function to (mis-)record (henceforth simply record) reality. Equally, there is no 
scope for serious doubt concerning the acceptability of the other two parts of the 
Fregean condition to the genuine modal realist in respect of possible world talk. 
Consequently, and happily, the genuine modal realist is an objectual realist by 
(Wright's) Fregean lights. It is useful to assess how ersatz realism fares in these 
terms.
It is not possible to provide a straightforward and unqualified answer to the 
question of whether the ersatz realist will assent to the proposition that the 
grammar of world statements is such that if any statement is to be true there 
must exist objects of the kind in question. The dispute between the ersatz and 
the genuine modal realist turns specifically on the precise nature of the 
(supposed) objects and so the ersatzist response to the proposition will depend 
upon exactly which kind of object is in question. If the objects in question are 
the genuine realist's sui generis worlds, then the ersatzist denies that the 
condition on grammar is satisfied, for by his lights it is another kind of object 
whose existence is relevant to whether sentences of the type "(3w)Pw "are true. 
If his own ersatz worlds are at issue, then all conditions are acceptable and he
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is (happilly) an objectual realist by present standards. The only point that we 
need bear in mind is that from the perspective of the dispute within realism 
about possible worlds it is necessary to distinguish whether the conditions of 
recording, grammar and truth pertain to genuine or ersatz worlds.
Having noted this subtlety regarding ersatz realism I will proceed in what 
follows to ignore ersatz realism as an option. I will consider only genuine 
realism under the heading of objectual realism and although I will carry forward 
the assumption that the conditions are to be understood as pertaining to 
genuine possible worlds, I will not risk the confusion that would be risked in 
classifying ersatz realism as a form of anti-realism relative to genuine objectual 
realism. Henceforth by anti-realism I intend only out and out anti-realism, i.e. the 
view that there are no non-actual possible worlds of any kind .
(5.2) THREE WAYS OF ANTI-REALISM.
The anti-realist about possible worlds must deny at least one of the conditions 
of recording, grammar or truth and with reference to these conditions, three 
distinctive points of departure for anti-realist strategies can be discerned. The 
strategy of denying the condition of recording (Blackburn's) will be rejected as 
will the strategy of denying the condition of grammar (Forbes'). The strategy of 
denying the condition of truth will be endorsed and within this strategic 
framework I will delineate two theories of possible world discourse arguing 
(tentatively) for the relative merits of a metaphor theory over an error theory.
(5.3) DENYING THE RECORDING CONDITION - THE STRATEGY REJECTED. 
Blackburn is largely indifferent to whether we choose to formulate our modal 
commitments in terms of the objectual idiom of possible world talk or not.4 
However, he is sufficiently impressed with the worth of the worldly idioms to lay 
down this marker in his characterization of a successful theory of modality :
"The eventual theory  would be one which maintains the
benefits of possible world imagery, but disallows the metaphysical 
extravagance. "5
In terms of our discussion of objectual realism Blackburn is an anti-realist in 
virtue of rejection of the recording condition i.e Blackburn is denying that worldly 
statements are apt to record features of reality.The denial of ths condition is
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borne from the view that statements involving possible world talk do not 
describe anything but function, rather, as expressive projections of imaginative 
limitations.6 Given this conception of the role of the sayings there is no danger 
of metaphysical extravagance in the form of ontological commitment to possible 
worlds.
I will not deal with this way of anti-realism here, for the attitude that Blackburn 
takes to possible world talk is the attitude that he takes to all modal discourse 
and/7/s non-descriptivist attitude to possible world talk owes nothing specific to 
considerations pertaining to possible worlds as opposed to modality in general. 
I will deal with this generalized non-descriptivism about modality in Ch.12 rather 
than attempt to take up the relevant issues in the context of the discussion of 
objectual modal realism.
However, it seems appropriate to remark that the success of non-descriptivism 
about non-objectual modal statements would not have clear implications for 
possible world talk. A univocal conception of the role of objectual and 
non-objectual modal idioms may appeal to objectual anti-realists on the 
grounds that it bases an inference from (i) the non-recording role of 
non-objectual modal sayings to (ii) the non-recording role of objectual modal 
sayings (by univocity) and so to (iii) the elimination of ontological commitment 
from world talk (by the denial of the condition of recording). But there is no 
obvious reason why objectual modal idioms must be treated as featuring in 
sayings of the same kind (vis a vis aptitude to record features of reality) as their 
non-objectual counterparts. Hence, the success of a non-descriptive account of 
non-objectual modal statements would not establish automatically that the 
proper course of opposition to objectual realism was to deny the condition of 
recording for objectual modal statements. That we should have a univocal 
account of the meaning of possible world statements and their non-objectual 
counterparts is an option that proves very popular7 but no argument is 
forthcoming for the necessity or even the desirability of univocity per se.
(5.40) DENYING THE GRAMMAR CONDITION - THE STRATEGY REJECTED 
Forbes' preferred version of anti-realism proceeds by way of what is in effect a 
denial of the condition of grammar. He denies that the truth of Lw sentences 
requires that there are such things as possible worlds, arguing that these
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sentences have their "real meaning" imputed to them by their Lm translations.8 
It follows from the thesis of synonymy and the auxiliary premise that some 
sentences of Lm are true that Forbes will hold that some sentences of Lw are 
true and, therefore that the condition of truth in relation to Lw is satisfied. He will 
also accept the condition of recording re. Lw statements as a consequence of 
synonymy and his apparent acceptance of the condition re. Lm statements.9 
So, Forbes' anti-realism is based on acceptance of the conditions of recording 
and truth and rejection of the condition of grammar. My view is that this strategy 
is untenable.
Forbes' anti-realist strategy is prompted by the thought that the real meaning 
claim that is involved in the Russellian argument for realism10 can be turned on 
its head:
"Instead of saying that the meaning of a modal sentence is given by 
its Lw rendering,we can say that the meaning of an Lw sentence is 
given by its rendering in (reverse translation into) Lm 11
This manouevre is prompted by the commitment that the anti-realist......
"  has to say that objectual quantifiers when they range over
possibleworlds do not have their literal meaning, the meaning they 
have in ordinary first-order languages; in turn then, the sentences 
of possible world language do not mean what they appear literally 
to mean ." 12
The realist was telling us that a sentence such as (1):
(1) It is possible that Nixon is honest.
really does contain a quantifier over possible worlds, now Forbes' anti-realist is 
telling us that a sentence such as (2):
(2) There is a possible world at which Nixon is honest.
really does not contain a quantifier over possible worlds. What grounds might 
there be for the startling claim that (2) and its ilk contain no quantifier over 
worlds?
I have already argued that such departures from natural syntax for the purposes 
of representing logical form were justified only insofar as we were confronted 
with semantically valid inferences which could not be displayed as syntactically 
valid.13 In the case with which we are now confronted it is obvious that no such 
revision of natural syntax is required for the validity of inferences containing
8 4
85
possible world statements can be displayed straightforwardly in the natural 
first-order syntax of Lw. What other grounds might there be for the claim that 
sentences exhibiting prima facie quantifications over possible worlds do not 
mean what they appear literally to mean?
(5.41) FORBES' CASE FOR Lm/Lw SYNONYMY.
Forbes views the claim as a consequence of the thesis of the synonymy of Lm 
sentences with their Lw counterparts in conjunction with the characteristically 
realist claim that the sentences of Lw have priority over - i.e.impute meaning to - 
those of Lm . It is the purported anti-realist commitment to synonymy that 
supports the weight of the revisionary stance over the meaning of Lw sentences 
and it is this commitment that must be scrutinized.
The realist had an interest in accepting synonymy as part of the package of 
explaining  the validity of modal operator inferences via possible world 
semantics. But why should the anti-realist accept synonymy? Here is Forbes' 
response:
"The challenge for the anti-realist is to give an interpretation of the 
appealing features of possible worlds semantics which shows how 
these features can arise even though there are no such things as 
worlds ; he cannot just ignore the semantics given the intuitions 
that we have about its naturalness, for this is a phenomenon which 
surely requires explanation. Furthermore his interpretation must 
posit som e semantic relationship between sentences of modal 
lan g u ag e ..L m ,and their renderings in possible worlds language 
. .L w ; for without such a relationship, it must seem positively 
miraculous that the semantics agrees with our intuitions about 
validity and invalidity. And we saw earlier that it is hard to think of 
any candidate for this relationship other than synonymy ”. 14 
This case for synonymy is based upon the claim that two features of possible 
world semantics merit explanation: (a) the delivery of agreement with intuitions 
about modal validity; (b) the naturalness of the semantics. It will be argued that it 
is doubtful whether possible world semantics can be viewed as having these 
features simultaneously and that if it can be so viewed, the explanatory burden 
can be accepted and discharged without appeal to synonymy.
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(1-420) FORBES' CASE FOR SYNONYMY REJECTED: falTHE TENSION 
BETWEEN AGREEMENT ON VALIDITY AND NATURALNESS.
The claim of agreement on intuitions about modal validity and the claim of 
naturalness stand in a relation of extreme tension. The claim that possible world 
semantics delivers agreement with intuitive judgements of validity must be 
understood as being limited to central cases for it would appear that these are 
the only cases that we have intuitions about.15 This being the case a possible 
world semantic theory insofar as it conforms to and does not outstrip our 
intuitions about modal validity will be an interpretation that validates only the 
central and uncontroversial core of the set of arguably valid modal inferences. 
In that case the appropriate semantics will be one that validates only the 
theorems of a weak modal logic such as T and therefore a semantics that 
depends upon the functioning of restrictions upon the notorious accessibility 
relation. It does not matter whether it is in fact T or another weak logic that is 
appropriate here. The point is that the only modal logic for which we can 
characterize the validity of the theorems without giving a substantive role to the 
accessibility relation is S5 and the strength of this logic far outstrips our 
intuitions about validity and invalidity. So,either we get the right range of 
agreement with intuitions about validity and are landed with the extremely 
unnatural accessibility relation to explain or, we endorse the logic that 
alleviates the explanatory burden that the accessibility relation brings in its 
wake and thereby court an objectionable revisionism by endorsing as valid a 
range of modal inferences which far outstrips the range whose validity is 
endorsed in our practices and can lay claim to sound intuitive appeal.
(5.421) FORBES' CASE FOR SYNONYMY REJECTED: (b) ALTERNATIVE 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE APPEALING FEATURES OF POSSIBLE 
WORLD SEMANTICS.
Even if the tension discerned in the last section is acknowledged it will still be 
open to a theorist of Forbes' persuasion to hit upon one of these features as the 
appealing feature of the semantics and argue that synonymy explains i t . It is 
important, therefore, to establish that these phenomena can be explained 




l a ) The agreement of possible world semantics with intuitions 
about modal validity.
The question that was posed in the context of the semantic argument for 
realism16 was whether possible world semantics could lay claim to any more 
than that it pronounced valid the right inferences. This question was important 
because, it was generally agreed, from the point of view of the requirement of 
delivering the right results with respect to validity we could take the domain of 
quantification of the interpreting language Lw to be anything we pleased. If 
possible semantics was to be the semantics of modal operator languages this 
would be because some feature(s) of possible world semantics selected it from 
among the range of quantificational interpretations that could do the job with 
respect to validity. (The suggested features were the naturalness and 
explanatory potential of possible world semantics.) The crucial point that is to be 
taken from this reminder is that the power of possible world semantics to 
generate agreement with our intuitions about modal validity does not depend 
upon our construing the values of Lw variables to be possible worlds. Since 
agreement on modal validity can be secured no matter what the values of Lw 
variables are taken to be, agreement must be explicable, if at all, without 
reference to possible worlds. What explains the delivery of agreement is the 
first-order quantificational structure of possible world semantics. There are 
use-driven structural similarities between the existential and universal 
quantifiers on one hand and the possibility and necessity operators on the other 
and these similarities have been noted and exploited ingeniously for the 
purposes of the semantics of modal logic.
The intuitive semantic-structural similarities between the dual modal operators 
and dual first-order quantifiers can be characterized informally in terms of 
abstractions from patterns of natural deduction relations:
(1) Common sequent structure : 0-|(A) =ll= ~02~(A ), 0-|(A) =11= ~02~(A) 
(M1) D A  =ll= ~0~ A OA =ll= - O  A
(Q1) (3x)A =ll= ~(x)~A (x)A =ll= ~(3x)~A
(2) Common sequent structure : 0-|(A) l= P, Pl= O2 (A)
(M2) D A  l= A AI=OA
(Q2) (x)(Ax) l= Am Am l= (3x)Ax
The third important pattern concerns the invalidity of parallel inferences.
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(3) Common sequent structure : NOT [ 0-|(A), 0-|(B) 1= 0-|(A&B)]
(M3) NOT [ OP, OQ 1= 0 (P  & Q)]
(Q3) NOT [(3x)Ax ,(3x)Bxl= (3x)(Ax &Bx)]
This, I am inclined to say, is the bottom line and there is no need to go any
further in seeking explanation of the delivery of agreement. As such the
explanation of agreement falls well short of requiring the hypothesis of 
synonymy.
(b) The naturalness of the semantics.
Possible world semantic interpretations of modal operators, qua possible world 
interpretations, have an intuitive appeal that is not shared by other equally 
validity-effective quantificational interpretations. How is this to be explained 
other than via synonymy?
There are two eminent features of possible world talk that contribute to the 
apparent naturalness of possible world semantics. The first is that possible 
world talk is recognizably modal and the second is that there exists a 
use-determined association of possible talk idioms and modal operators which 
is independent from (and pre-dates) the deployment of possible world talk in 
semantic theory for the purposes of interpreting modal operator languages. 
Now if these features are what the naturalness of possible world semantics 
consists in, and this/s the case, there is simply no compulsion to accept 
synonymy in order to explain naturalness. The alternative that I will propose in 
due course is that these features of the use of possible world talk can be 
accommodated in a conception of possible world statements as metaphors; 
their use does not state but conveys what is stated in the standard use of their 
modal operator counterparts. Accordingly, it is necessary to posit only a broadly 
semantic relationship between possible world statements and their modal 
operator counterparts in order to sustain the explanation of naturalness.
(5.44) DIRECT OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE SYNONYMY THESIS.
So far, it has been argued that there is no need to posit Lm/Lw synonymy and 
now it will be argued that there are two major disadvantages of the thesis of 
synonymy which suggest that we cannot accept synonymy. The first is that the 
thesis (in conjunction with modal operator priority) entails commitment to the
88
89
view that possible world statements do not mean what they appear literally to 
mean. The second is that there is, to say the least, a major doubt as to whether 
the thesis of synonymy works on its own terms. I have already dealt with the real 
meaning issue and so it remains only to expand upon this second allegation. 
There are sentences that can be formulated in the notation of Lw which are 
prima facie statements of identity, difference and number of worlds and which 
have no natural interpretation in Lm - e.g "(w)(w=w)" - and no matter how many 
ad hoc restrictions on well-formedness in Lw that we manage to contrive it 
remains the case that....
"..in  formulating possible worlds model theory, especially if  an 
accessibility relation is involved, one makes stipulations which if 
formalized in first-order language, would be Lw sentences with no 
Lm interpretation. ” 17
Forbes acknowledges that this constitutes a serious problem for his synonymy 
-based anti-realism and sees the clear need to attempt to meet this difficulty. He 
responds to this problem by proposing that we should secure a match of 
expressive power between Lm and Lw by leaving the problematic sentences of 
Lw uninterpreted. Since these sentences are left uninterpreted they do not 
express anything and a fortiori they do not express anything that cannot be 
expressed in Lm. The justification that is proposed for making use of these 
uninterpreted sentences ("stipulations") in the model theory is compared with 
Hilbert's justification of the deployment of certain sentences in mathematics i.e. 
the stipulations are justified since they enable us to establish facts of interest 
about the interpreted sentences. In the case of uninterpreted Lw statements,.. 
"...the justification for the...making of such stipulations, is that a 
sem antical theory conforming to them is in agreement, over 
questions of validity with the fundamental account of validity for
Lm. " 18
There are two major obstacles to the acceptability of this response. The first is 
that this "Hilbertian" style of the justification is in general unconvincing. We 
cannot give ourselves permission to abjure from the interpretation of sentences 
of a theory and the ontological commitment that interpretation entails when we 
find the sentences in practice indispensible. There is an over-riding obligation 
either to accept the ontology that comes in the wake of interpretation or to show
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that the desirable results can be achieved without the deployment of the 
problematic sentences in inferences. The second is that there is a strong whiff of 
objectionable circularity in the case to which Forbes wishes to apply this style of 
justification. On the one hand the thesis of synonymy is being deployed for the 
purposes of explaining inter alia the fact that possible world semantics delivers 
the right results on modal validity. On the other hand the refusal to interpret the 
problematic setences of Lw which amounts to a stipulation of synonymy is being 
justified on the basis that this secures the right results on validity. In light of 
these points I claim that the positive case in favour of synonymy is far from 
compelling.
(5.50) DENYING THE CONDITION OF TRUTH - THE STRATEGY ENDORSED. 
A third strategy for anti-realism, and the strategy that will be endorsed, 
proceeds by acknowledging that possible world talk is what it is and not 
another thing. Sentences involving prima facie quantification over possible 
worlds do contain quantifiers over worlds and these sentences mean what 
they appear literally to mean. Furthermore - and contra the synonymy thesis - 
the possible world sentences that we have been considering are always false 
while many of their modal operator "associates" are true. The focus of this 
anti-realism is the denial of the condition of truth with respect to possible world 
statements.
(5.51) AN INTERPRETATION BASED ARGUMENT AGAINST THE 
REJECTION OF THE CONDITION OF TRUTH.
I will introduce an argument which seeks to establish that neither Forbes' 
strategy nor this third strategy is adequate with respect to constraints on the 
interpretation of possible world talk. I do not intend to press the argument as an 
additional objection against Forbes although this is what I take it to be. My 
central point is that the argument fails to register with respect to the third 
strategy. I will develop two theories of anti-realism based upon the denial of the 
condition of truth and I will show that neither violates the desiderata of adequate 
interpretation.
Any conception of the meaning of possible world talk that incorporates 
acceptance of the conditions of grammar and recording alongside the denial of
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the condition of truth stands as a target for an objection that focuses on the 
interpretative methodology which is implicit within it. Interpretation involves a 
trade off between charity and compositionality. Charity requires that the 
interpretation should maximize truth (ceteris paribus ) in the utterances of the 
community under study and compositionality requires that the semantic 
properties assigned to (provisionally identified) syntactic items should 
characterize their semantic contribution to the totality of recursively specifiable 
sentences in which they feature. Forbes' anti-realism encounters no apparent 
difficulty with charity, for world sentences will be true just in case their operator 
renderings are true by our lights and we assume that this is so in a substantial 
number of cases. The cost of charity in this case is a heavy cost, for semantic 
content must be assigned non-uniformly to items of syntactic structure. The 
semantic contribution of the symbols that would generally be treated as 
quantifiers is not uniform since these function semantically on some occasions 
as quantifiers and then on other occasions, in select contexts, as sentential 
operators depending on the style of the "variable" that is involved. Forbes then 
has the task of explaining why we express our truly non-objectual modal claims 
in a way which must be regarded as thoroughly misleading given the 
interpretation of quantifier syntax in other contexts. Perhaps this criticism is no 
more than a re-orientation of the major objection against Forbes' anti-realism, 
articulating in terms of the theory of interpretation what it is that is unsatisfactory 
about the claim that possible world statements do not mean what they appear 
literally to mean.
In any case the point is not to seek out additional reasons for rejecting what has 
already been rejected. What is of major concern is that the third strategy of 
anti-realism appears to fare equally badly under the scrutiny of interpretative 
methodology. A theory which is based on the acceptance of the condition of 
grammar can claim to be able to offer a uniform and standard interpretation of 
the (prima facie ) quantificational syntax across the language in worldly and 
non-worldly applications alike. The norm of compositionality is served thereby, 
but the price is that possible world statements receive an interpretation that 
renders them, by the theorist's own light, systematically false and this appears 
to be a radical violation of charitable constraints.
Were the foregoing assessment to prove correct, there would be a strong
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temptation to take the view that neither Forbes' anti-realism nor the alternative 
that discerns systematic falsehood is acceptable since neither could be the 
product of adequate interpretation. However, it will be argued that there are in 
fact two theories of anti-realism which are cast in the mould of this third strategy 
and which stand in their respective ways as perfectly intelligible outcomes of 
adequate interpretation.
There are two distinguishable styles of anti-realistic theory that conform to the 
pattern of denying the condition of truth while accepting the conditions of 
recording and grammar. The first is an error theory of possible world discourse 
and the second is a theory of possible world discourse as metaphor . I will 
argue that the metaphor theory is preferable but I will also indicate why the error 
theory has to be held in reserve as a fallback position. I will provide an 
exposition of these anti-realistic theories in turn along with responses to the 
allegations of interpretative inadequacy that have been levelled against them 
before going on to put a (tentative) case for opting for the metaphor theory over 
the error theory.
(5.52) ERROR THEORY ANTI-REALISM STATED.
The idea of a generally statable error-theory anti-realism which can be applied 
to the instance of possible worlds is inspired by Mackie's discussion of the 
case of moral language.19
According to the error-theorist, we have succeeded in imbuing moral language 
with objectual realist pre-suppositions, for statements involving prima facie 
reference to moral values are attempts to record an objective moral reality and 
their grammar is such that the existence of objectual values is required for the 
truth of the statements. These are features of the meaning of the discourse and 
as such they are determined by our use of moral language. What is outwith our 
determination is the way the world/s with respect to the existence or 
non-existence of objective and objectual values and, as philosophical reflection 
establishes, the world is such that it contains no such entities despite the fact 
that their existence is what the truth of many moral judgements have come, at 
our hands, to require.
Even if moral values do not constitute a particularly persuasive case of our 
having imbued our talk with objectual pre-supposition, the form of the account
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emerges clearly enough. W e have acceptance of the conditions of grammar 
and recording along with rejection of the condition of truth backed up by the 
claim that our objectual conceptualization of moral reality is fundamentally 
erroneous. All that remains is to transfer this format to possible world discourse 
and we have an error-theory anti-realism about worlds. On this theory, 
ontological commitment to the existence of possible worlds is an erroneous but 
grammatically entrenched feature of our conceptual scheme. Can such a 
conception meet the objection from the violation of the principle of charity?
(5.53) THE ERROR THEORY DOES NOT VIOLATE CHARITABLE 
CONSTRAINTS ON INTERPRETATION.
It is essential to clarify the degree and the distribution of falsehood that 
adequate interpretation may yield. It is now widely recognized that good 
interpretation does not proceed under the auspices of unbridled charity.20 In 
interpretation we maximize the rationality or, perhaps, the hum anity2^of the 
subjects and neither conception of the interpreter's goal precludes widespread 
falsehood in any given locale. The key to good interpretation is to minimize 
inexplicable or incomprehensibleerror in subjects' beliefs and sayings and so 
it is open to the error-based anti-realist to attempt to argue the use of possible 
world talk into the category of comprehensible error.
There is a specialized local body of discourse which serves as a paradigm case 
of the application of a defence of an error-yielding interpretation based on the 
discerning of comprehensible error. The interpretation of "old" scientific theories 
exemplifies the kind of scenario in which we can make perfectly good sense of 
erroneous entity postulation on the part of the theorists and their assent to 
associated statements that we regard to be systematically false. W e permit 
ourselves to interpret them as systematically failing to speak truly in these 
matters for we know that entity postulation is a risky business and we 
understand how entity-postulation can at any given time be a justifiable move 
by the lights of all the canons of rationality that we operate yet turn out to be 
erroneous. Herein, we have a striking example of the interpreter's right to find 
the subjects - perhaps one's predecessors - guilty of systematic and perfectly 
intelligible local error.22 The case of the error theorist about possible worlds 
will be simply that there is an analogous case to be made with respect to these
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postulated entities. As such the case may well be held to turn upon the strength 
of the analogy, which many will hold to be untenable, between the postulation 
of entities in science and the postulation of possible worlds. I am not intent upon 
establishing the right of the error-theorist about worlds to draw upon the 
scientific case as an analogy since I take the view that the style of the response 
of the error-theorist about worlds is intelligible irrespective of the quality of the 
analogy with scientific entities. However, it is worth noting that Lewis is unlikely 
to have any qualms about the analogy for he avows explicitly a conception of 
his realism as entity-postulation that brings benefits to "total theory".23 Lewis, 
one suspects, will view the error-theorist as a bona fide adversary who finds 
common purpose with the realist in the understanding of what possible 
world-talk is and who diverges from the realist (only) on the question of whether 
the entity postulation is correct.
The style of response of the error-theorist to the objection from the principle of 
charity is clear. There is no violation of charity since the falsehood that is 
discerned in world talk is, although systematic, localized and perfectly 
comprehensible as ambitious but unsuccessful entity postulation. The error 
theory of possible world discourse strikes me as an intelligible position but my 
wish is to reserve it as a fallback option. Its attraction is diminished given that we 
can do better, for we can construct a style of anti-realism that registers the same 
responses to the conditions of recording, grammar and truth and which does not 
find the users of possible world statements in systematic error.
(5.540) THE METAPHOR THEORY STATED.
The second anti-realist option that is based on the strategy of denying the 
condition of truth is the metaphor theory of possible world talk.24 
There is no straightforward means of capturing what it is that metaphors, in 
general, do. In the specific instance of possible world metaphor we might say 
that it is of heuristic value in that it allows us to depict or convey without literally 
stating our modal commitments. World-talk is a good metaphorical medium 
since it exploits the relative centrality of quantificational language and spatial 
concepts in our cognitive lives. In this context I will not go beyond these 
gestures in an attempt to argue that world-talk is metaphorical.25 The objective 
of this section is to show how such an account of the role of world-talk - which I
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take to be both plausible and appealing - can be accommodated as a way of 
anti-realism within the criteria that arise from the semantic conditions that we 
have been considering. That is to say that what is of concern here is what we 
ought to say about metaphor with respect to the conditions of grammar, 
recording and truth in order to reflect accurately the meaning of metaphors and 
in order to articulate the way in which possible world talk is absolved of prima 
facie ontological commitment.
(5.541) DAVIDSON’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHOR.
The broad options that can be discerned within the theory of the meaning of 
metaphors are (i) that they have no literal semantic content (ii) that they have a 
non-standard or special literal semantic content and (iii) that they have standard 
literal semantic content.26 Following Davidson,271 shall opt for the last of these 
and I will build my account of the meaning of worldly metaphors on this 
Davidsonian foundation.
The essence of Davidson's account is that metaphor is not to be characterized 
in terms of a special, additional or encoded cognitive content - metaphors have 
none of these. Rather the deployment of metaphor is discriminated as a kind of 
use to which a statement, with its standard literal meaning, is pu t. Thus, tokens 
of the same declarative sentence type can be deployed without variation of 
literal content in the telling of a lie, the dropping of a hint, and the making of a 
metaphor.28 The central point is really what metaphors are n o t , and the 
sentences deployed in the making of metaphor arenot vehicles of any 
truth-relevant content other than that which they would normally be considered 
to have. Hence metaphors mean what they appear literally to mean in the sense 
required for the satisfaction of the condition of grammar. What then are the 
implications of this position for the truth-values of metaphors?
(5.542) POSSIBLE WORLD METAPHORS FAIL THE CONDITION QE 
TRUTH.
According to Davidson a sentence used metaphorically is usually false. 
Moreover, he argues, it is, by and large, when a sentence is held to be false, 
perhaps even patently false, that it is accepted as suitable for metaphorical 
deployment. This view is rendered more plausible by an alteration of emphasis.
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Given Davidson's account of the meaning of metaphors, some statements used 
metaphorically will turn out to be true, so to speak, accidentally. My 
metaphorical use of the sentence:
(3 ) Davidson has been pulling his socks up lately.
may turn out to articulate a (literal) truth, albeit a truth quite outwith the concern 
of myself and my audience. There can be no question of insisting that falsehood 
is an indispensable facet of metaphor but it is also necessary to revise the claim 
that success in metaphor depends, in general, upon the sentence's being taken 
to be false. What is crucial is that the audience should disregard the truth-value 
of the sentence and the deployment of patent falsehood assists in the 
reinforcement of such disregard since it reminds us that the sentence is not to 
be taken to be true. But that is not quite the same as saying that it is to be taken 
to be false. Thus there is no implication of literal falsehood - even by and large 
- contained in the notion of successful metaphor. The point is that if we treat 
possible world talk as (Davidsonian) metaphor we can see how possible world 
sentences can have a proper and distinctive use whose value does not depend 
upon their being statements of the truth. Once possible world discourse is 
viewed as serving an aim other than the stating of truth, the truth-values of 
possible world sentences are not of primary importance. However, once the 
question of the truth of statements of the type ”(3w)Pw" is raised, and given that 
the literal meaning of the sentences is what it appears to be, the proper course 
of anti-realism, I say, is to hold them literally false.
There is, however, a difficulty pertaining to the condition of truth which merits 
comment before a confident denial of the condition can be issued.
The condition of truth (iii):
(iii) Some of the statements are, by ordinary criteria, true.
depends squarely on the notion of ordinary criteria and we cannot be confident 
in our assessment of whether some world statements are true by ordinary 
criteria unless we can clarify what it is that the appeal to ordinary criteria might 
be intended to achieve here. In particular, there is a major problem with the 
notion of ordinary criteria for truth in the case of metaphor in that we do not 
know \fliteralism is part and parcel of the intended criteria. Davidson writes of 
metaphors being false "in the ordinary sense"29 and it is clear that the basis 
upon which this claim is made is that metaphors are, in general, literally false
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and I would ground a judgement of the falsehood of e.g (4):
(4) There is a possible world in which Nixon loses. 
in the same literalistic criteria. But it is possible to appeal to an alternative 
conception of ordinary criteria which will generate the consequence that 
metaphorical world statements are true by ordinary criteria . Truth by ordinary 
criteria might be held to require communal assent in combination with the 
practice of calling correct or acceptable statements of a given kind "true". In that 
case there will be a strong case for holding that claims such as (4) are true by 
ordinary criteria. It seems then that there is a difficulty over whether truth by 
ordinary criteria requires literalism or not but if the Fregean conditions are to 
maintain their relevance to objectual realism it seems that "ordinary criteria" 
must be read as involving a commitment to literal truth since only this 
interpretation renders the conditions plausible.If anyone feels compelled to 
insist that there are additional brands of truth implicated in our linguistic 
practices, there is little point in insisting otherwise. We should then be careful to 
distinguish which brand of truth is in play in any given context and be prepared 
to take a position on the truth, in that sense, of this or that worldly sentence 
according to best judgements of possibility. Then, it is a metaphorical truth that 
there is a possible world in which Nixon loses the election, and, for that matter, 
that McStay is a tower of strength. The limitation of this approach is that there is 
no obvious way of integrating special brands of truth in a standard semantic 
theory for the language as a whole. Insofar as it proves workable, we ought to 
exploit the clear theoretical advantages in deploying literal truth as truth tout 
court. The fact that literal truth-conditions and literal meaning can be assigned 
to words and sentences apart from particular contexts and styles of use is the 
basis of their claim to an explanatory role in the theory of meaning.30 
In short there is good reason to takeliteral truth to be relevant to the Fregean 
criteria of ontological commitment and consequently for the anti-realist who 
accepts that the condition of grammar is satisfied to bring literalism to bear in 
concluding that possible world discourse fails the condition of truth. So, then, 




(5.543) POSSIBLE WORLD METAPHORS SATISFY THE CONDITION OF 
RECORDING.
The condition of recording (i):
(i) The statements are apt to record or misrecord features of reality.
appears to pose a difficulty for the metaphor theorist, but this difficulty can be 
dispelled.
The metaphor theory shares with the error theory and with realism the 
commitment that possible world statementshave the facility to record features of 
reality. The anti-realistic theories also incorporate the commitment that the 
statements systematically misrecord modal reality since modal reality is 
non-objectual. But there remains an obstacle to the metaphor theorist's 
acceptance on this basis of the condition of recording for the crucial 
consideration is whether possible world statements are apt to record features 
of reality.
It may seem that it is in the matter of the satisfaction of the condition of recording 
that the metaphor theorist and the error theorist should locate their 
disagreement with the metaphor theorist denying that the condition is satisfied 
by world talk. The notion of aptitude is normative and even though sentences 
when deployed metaphorically do, in virtue of their literal content, (mis)record 
features of reality, their deployment as metaphor does not render them apt ,in 
that mode of use, to that task. Crucially, the deployment of metaphor is not 
aimed at the recording of features of reality. The goal of metaphor is, no doubt 
to convey something of reality, but it seems of the essence of metaphor that in 
achieving this indirectly it contrasts with modes of use that aim at recording or 
misrecording (directly) features of reality.
Nonetheless, we should not succumb to this temptation to deny that world 
metaphors are apt to record reality, for the temptation arises from our paying 
attention to the (metaphorical) style of use with which these statements are 
characteristically associated while it is clear that the condition of recording, like 
the condition of truth, must be interpreted as a condition on content. For other 
purposes, when other interests are to the fore and when world statements are to 
be considered in the context of their characteristic style of use (qua speech 
acts) the metaphor theorist will, quite properly, deny the aptitude of possible 
world statements in their characteristic style of use to (mis)record reality.
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However, the relevance to objectual realism of the condition of recording 
requires that the metaphor theorist must acknowledge that the condition 
pertains to the content of possible world statements and, given the Davidsonian 
conception, that the condition is satisfied.
This concludes the exposition of the metaphor theory. We are now in a position 
to register on behalf of the metaphor theorist a rejoinder to the objection from 
the principle of charity.
(5.55) THE METAPHOR THEORY DOES NOT VIOLATE CHARITABLE 
CONSTRAINTS ON INTERPRETATION.
The metaphor theorist, in contrast with the error theorist, does not need to seek 
any explanation or rationalization of error, for in the making of metaphor the use 
of statements that systematically fail of truth is no error. It is permissible to find 
possible world statements always false, precisely becaus equa metaphors their 
use is not aimed at the statement of literal truth and therefore no error is 
involved when the statement of literal truth is not attained in their use. Truth is 
not, in the context of metaphorical use, the "primary dimension of assessment of 
sentences".31 If members of the community appear always to "miss the target", 
that should, in the absence of other explanation, influence the interpreter to 
contemplate that they are not aiming at the target. To put matters the other way 
about, if we find that an interpretation yields endemic falsehood, that in itself 
may be evidence that the community is using language in a sophisticated way; 
lying, fictionalizing, orperhaps indulging in metaphor. All of these language 
games share the feature that their success consists in an achievement other 
than the statement of truths and this is the source of the interpreter's liberty to 
find their literal content false. The account of the use of possible world talk as 
metaphor hereby shows that no threat to any plausible constraint on 
interpretation need be occasioned when possible world statements are 
rendered systematically false.
(5.6) THE ^TENTATIVE) PREFERENCE OF METAPHOR THEORY OVEB 
ERROR THEORY ANTI-REALISM.
The inevitable question is whether anti-realism about possible worlds ought to 
take the form of the error-theory or the metaphor-theory and my view is that the
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latter is preferable. However, there are certain facts about the nature of 
language use that impinge forcefully in this context and which should serve to 
promote caution and a sensitivity to the presence of a substantial 
indeterminacy that attends this issue. The fact of the matter is that the 
community is divided on the question of whether possible world talk is 
metaphorical or not, for in practice some of us use it metaphorically and others - 
such as Lewis do not. Now we have not reached rock bottom here, for there are 
considerations to which we can appeal in order to develop a case in favour of 
one of these practices over the other, but matters are extremely complicated 
here. These complications stem from the complexity of the relationship between 
metaphor and literalistic styles of expression even in the literalistic heartland of 
science.
Quine holds that at the growing edge of science metaphor is often the only way 
in which we can "limn the new order" as our old ways of speaking let us 
down.32 Here is one of his examples:
"The molecular theory of gases emerged as an ingenious metaphor; 
likening a gas to a swarm of absurdly small bodies. So pat was the 
metaphor that it was declared literally true, thus becoming 
straightaway a dead metaphor; the fancied miniatures of bodies 
were declared real, and the term ’body' was extended to cover 
them. " 33
We have here the short history of the role of metaphor in scientific innovation. 
The coining of the metaphor, then the change of meaning of a key term with the 
declaration of literal truth and the death of the metaphor. This shift to 
literalization is a change of use. Moreover it is a shift in use that is equivalent to 
a change in the style of use to which a statement is put - a shift of the aptitude 
(in the broader sense! ) of a statement to record features of reality- and it is a 
shift in which the protagonists of theories play an active part. It will be appeal to 
Lewis to view as conforming to the Quinean history the ascendancy of possible 
world talk to the status of statements which are aimed at, and achieve, 
recordings of the modal features of reality.34 The error theorist will also 
welcome this account of how world talk evolves but will insist that we recognize 
that the process of literalization must sometimes yield falsehood (as it does in 
the case of possible worlds). Since entity postulation is not always successful
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literalization can take root in classes of statements that turn out to be false. The 
metaphor theorist comes to praise worldly metaphor, not to bury it, and 
ultimately the error theorist and the metaphor theorist might be seen as 
disagreeing only about the health of the metaphor.
The anti-realist who accepts the metaphor theory is in a position to claim two 
significant advantages over the error theorist. In the first place, the 
metaphor-theorist has a more satisfying explanation of the use of possible world 
talk and the patterns of assent to possible world claims on the part of those who 
reject realism about worlds for it is not convincing to assign the fatal attraction of 
worldly idioms and the assent that they frequently draw to a disregard for the 
truth on the part of such speakers. The second is that the metaphor theorist can 
claim an advantage of charitable interpretation in a sense broader than that 
which requires only the maximization of truth-speaking. The metaphor theorist 
can, and should, view worldly metaphor as good metaphor and therefore as a 
kind of linguistic success on the part of the community. The error theorist, on the 
other hand is doomed to view the community as indulging in bad literalism and, 
therefore as registering a kind of linguistic failure. It is in this broader dimension 
of linguistic success versus linguistic failure and not in the narrow dimension of 
truth-maximization that the charitable advantage of the metaphor theory over 
the error theory consists.
These considerations tip the balance in favour of the metaphor theory of 
possible world discourse but in a sense this is as much a polemical position as 
an analysis. For once we are satisfied that a community is divided between 
literalists and metaphorists in its use of a particular range of idioms, perhaps all 
that there is left to say is that this is how we ought to use the language. But this 
will be a context-sensitive prescription for when indulging in debate with the 
realist, the anti-realist has little option but to speak as the error theory would 
advise and to direct assent to literal content rather than that which is conveyed. 
(As when saying, without intending to endorse determinism, that there are no 
possible worlds other than the actual world.) Furthermore, if enough people 
were to go over to Lewis's literalistic way of speaking the proper course of 





(5-7) A REMARK ON FICTIQNALISM ABOUT POSSIBl F WORLD TALK.
I do not claim that the ways of anti-realism that I have characterized exhaust the 
options and in particular it may be desirable to add to the list the option of a 
fictionalist theory of world talk. Where avoidance of ontological commitment is 
in the air, talk of fiction proves popular35 but it is not clear how fiction per se 
should be characterized and distinguished from other ways of avoiding 
ontological commitment. For this we will need to appeal to a theory of fictional 
discourse and I have no such theory to commend. However, it is possible to 
indicate two approaches to the meaning of fictional discourse which will issue 
in anti-realism about worlds given the conception of world talk as fiction. These 
approaches register divergent patterns of response to our three Fregean 
conditions.
The first approach to the interpretation of fictional dicourse has it that sentences 
such as (5) :
(5) All Clingons have horns.
are in fact conventional abbreviations of fiction-relativized sentences e.g. (6):
(6) According to StarTrek fiction all Clingons have horns.
in which case the original sentence is (literally) true and moreover it is true 
because it means something other than what it appears literally to mean.36 In 
particular its truth does not require that there are such things as Clingons. On 
this approach we effectively deny the condition of grammar while affirming the 
condition of truth and, since one condition has already been denied, the 
anti-realist qua anti-realist is free either to affirm or to deny the condition of 
recording.
The alternative approach would be to discern within the sentence no hidden 
operators and to view it as a universal conditional whose antecedent predicate 
is empty. It would then follow on standard (Frege, Russell) assignment of 
truth-conditions that the sentence was true and so we would have acceptance 
of the condition of grammar and the condition of truth. This combination of 
commitments paints forces the anti-realist to deny the condition of recording, but 
this may not be an untenable position.
It is obvious that fiction like metaphor qua style or mode of use does not have its 
point in the recording of features of reality and in that style-of-use-relative 




What is not obvious, especially when special proper names or kind terms 
feature in the sentences of fictional discourse, is whether these sentences 
record or misrecord (however inadvertantly) features of reality.
Kripke argues that the conventions governing the use of the predicate "Unicorn 
(x)" are such that nothing that we discover in the world (nor, indeed anything 
that we can identify in any other possible world) counts as falling within its 
extension.37 Kripke's view is tantamount to the claim that the style-of-use 
-independent content of Clingon talk (Holmes talk, unicorn talk) is not capable 
of recording features of reality, for how else is the claim that these terms cannot 
but be empty to be understood? Consequently, if possible world talk is genuine 
fictional discourse and "possible world" is a fictional kind term then a fiction 
theorist, taking the Kripkean line, should deny that world talk is apt to record 
features of reality even in the sense that metaphorically deployed sentences are 
apt to record features of reality despite their characteristic style of use.
(5.8) SUMMARY
Relative to the three Fregean conditions of objectual realism the appropriate 
strategy of anti-realism about possible worlds, I conclude, is the denial of the 
condition of truth. To deny the condition of recording on the basis of a general 
attitude to the role of modal discourse is to adopt an attitude that closes off the 
option of a non-objectual modal realism and there is no other proposal on the 
table that would allow the exercise of this option vis a vis possible world talk 
alone. To deny the condition of grammar is to engage without warrant in a 
revision of the "apparent meaning" of possible world statements and to conduct 
this revision in favour of synonymy with modal operator "equivalents" is to adopt 
a strategy whose basic applicability is subject to serious doubt never mind its 
merit if applicable. Neither of the theories which are characterized by the 
rejection of the condition of truth fall foul of charitable constraints on 
interpretation and while both are tenable anti-realist options, the metaphor 
theory merits preference over the error theory.
103
104
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION TWO: 
MCGINN'S CONCEPTION OF MODAL REALISM
In this second section of the thesis [Ch.6 - Ch.9] I will be concerned with a 
second conception of modal realism i.e. the non-objectual modal realism 
characterized by Colin McGinn. In the second half of his paper, "Modal 
Reality"1, McGinn attempts to arrive at a conception of modal realism which is 
non-objectual and which is recognizable as a realist position in the light of 
Dummett's influential work2- In integrating modal matters with concerns that are 
salient in the general realist/anti-realist debate, McGinn has moved the 
discussion onto a new plane. In this section, my aim is to follow the trail that 
McGinn has blazed, criticizing his strategy and his handling of the issues 
wherever I feel it appropriate. My hope is that in bringing to light the limitations 
of McGinn's conception of modal realism I can utilize this critique of his 
position to launch, in the third section, a third and final version of modal realism 
that we can survey. My central criticisms of McGinn's representation of 
non-objectual modal realism are as follows.
(i) The variety and resources of anti-realisms about modality are seriously 
underestimated. In particular the option of anti-realism based on the strategy 
of proposing a sceptical solution as a response to a sceptical paradox is 
ignored. [CH. 6]
(ii) It is proposed that the only defensible form of modal realism is one whose 
realism consists in endorsing the thesis of supervenience (without reduction) 
of the modal on the actual. However, the discussion of supervenience fails to 
acknowledge several difficulties associated with the application of the 
supervenience and related theses in the modal case and, moreover, there is 
every reason to believe that acceptance of modal/actual supervenience 
involves no commitment to modal realism. [CH.7]
(iii) Consideration of the issues that flow from the discussion of the thesis of 
supervenience should point towards a central question of modal epistemology 
i.e. whether modal knowledge is attainable by conceptual means alone.
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However, McGinn's discussion of supervenience leads him away from this 
central question and as a result he mislocates the problematic nature of modal 
epistemology in the claim that we cannot represent modal facts as causally 
explaining our knowledge of them. [CH.8]
(iv) The modal realism that McGinn offers is wholly unacceptable since it 
provides neither a clear conception of the truth-conditions of modal statements 
nor any account of how we detect modalities. The realism he offers is redolent 
of sceptical paradox and seems ripe for an anti-realist treatment in the form of 
a sceptical solution. (CH.9)
I will deal develop these criticisms following an exposition (in the first part of 
Ch.6) of McGinn's construction of a non-objectual modal realism and his 




McGINN'S CONCEPTION OF A NON-OBJECTUAL MODAL
REALISM
(6.01) INTRODUCTION
Section (6.02) is given over to an exposition of McGinn's conception of the 
nature of modal realism. It is argued that McGinn attributes to modal anti-realists 
in general a commitment to a totally implausible reductionism [(6.10)-(6.13)] and 
that he underestimates the variety and resources of anti-realisms about 
modality thereby ignoring the distinct challenges of non-descriptivism and 
non-cognitivism [(6.20)-(6.22)]. Non-descriptivism is identified as instantiating a 
widespread anti-realist strategy of proposing a sceptical solution to a perceived 
sceptical paradox and I give notice of my intention to deal with this strategy at a 
later stage [(6.30)-(6.31)]. Finally, an attempt is made to discount 
non-cognitivism as a live option in modal theorizing [(6.40)-(6.43)].
(6.02) McGINN'S CENTRAL THESES ON MODAL REALISM
(a ) The realist is not committed to recognition
transcendence . 1
Dummett2 depicts realism concerning a class of statements as a semantic 
syndrome whose central thesis is that the statements in question may be true 
while transcending the recognitional capacities possessed by their users. (All 
of this in the context of a truth-conditional conception of understanding and 
signalled by the acceptance of unrestricted bivalence.) However, this 
classification proves too narrow and must give way to a more flexible 
formulation that does not insist upon the centrality of the notion of 
recognition-transcendence. The general character of realism is that it requires 
problematic epistemic faculties. The problem with a problematic faculty is not 
always that it opens the door to scepticism. Scepticism is an eminent threat 
when the realist construes knowledge of truth conditions of the statements of the 
given class as arising from (i) relatively direct detection of the truth conditions of 
statements from an evidence (potentially reductive) class and (ii) a problematic 
inference from these premises to the truth of statements from the given class. 
There are different ways in which recognitional capacities plus inferential
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resources might fail short of the totality of purported truths mat constitute the 
given class. Yet it is more important to acknowledge that there is on occasion a 
different kind of problem with realist epistemology.
(b ) The m odal realist is endorsing a problematic cognitive 
faculty. 3
In some instances, it is not that our knowing is a matter of the operation of an 
intelligible and uncontroversial faculty which cannot reach far enough into the 
given sector of reality. Rather, it is that the account of our knowing depends 
upon a cognitive faculty whose very intelligibility is in doubt. 
Recognition-transcendence cases include realism about the past (evidence 
class, present tense statements); other minds (evidence class, statements 
concerning behaviour) or even mathematics (statements to the effect that we 
have a proof that P). Problematic faculty cases include ethics, mathematics 
(again), and - it turns out - modality. Certain realists will postulate a special 
faculty (generically./nfu/'tfon ) in order to account for our knowledge of these 
regions of the world. So, in the event that the realist is found postulating a 
controversial capacity or faculty, it may well be that this 'realist' is denying 
recognition transcendence and repudiating the threat of scepticism on the basis 
of the efficacy of that capacity or faculty. That the modal case is of this kind Is 
highlighted by the two-fold consideration (i) that modality is not a specific target 
of sceptical attack (ii) that there is no natural conception of the potential 
reductive class (statements concerning the actual) as evidence class.
(c ) The co-relative modal anti-realism Is a thesis of 
reductive actualism  .4
The anti-realist relative to this form of realism refuses to endorse the purported 
recognitional capacity, but, repudiating scepticism, negotiates the truths of the 
given class into the range of our more mundane and non-controversial 
recognitional capacities. This 'negotiation' centres upon the proposal that the 
truths of the given class are reducible to those of a reductive class. The pattern 
of realist/anti-realist dispute in regions where sceptical worries enjoy a relatively 
peripheral position is, therefore, quite distinctive. Given the claims of the given 
class the realist promotes a rich conception of the truth condition and of our
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capacities for detection. The anti-realist promotes a more modest inventory of 
recognitional capacities and a conception of the truth condition tailored to suit 
these. This pattern in instantiated in the modal case. The realist's characteristic 
view is that modal truth is not reducible to actual truth. The characteristic modal 
anti-realist view, is that of actualism - a reductive thesis which proposes either a 
personsal or impersonal base of reduction.
(d) Plausible modal realism endorses the supervenience of the 
modal on the actual .5
The realist must propose a conception of the relationship between truths of the 
given class (modal) and those of the potential reductive class (actual) and the 
only plausible option appears to be that of supervenience. The supervenience 
of the modal on the actual allows the realist to steer between reductionism on 
one side and independence on the other. Supervenience is consistent with 
realism given the characterisation of modal realism as embodying a 
committment to a controversial or supernumery recognitional capacity, for it is a 
feature of supervenience docjrines that the faculty deemed appropriate to the 
cognition of supervening truths may not be that deemed appropriate to the 
cognition of truths of the supervenient base. Supervenience is congenial to 
modal realism in virtue of this fact.
(e) A priority is the problematic feature of the epistemology of 
modal realism .6
Finally, the epistemology of modality that the realist proposes renders modal 
knowledge a product of a priori cognition and the problematic nature of modal 
realist epistemology traces to this a priority. The a priori is problematic because 
we cannot represent facts of which a priori cognition is claimed as causally 
explaining our knowledge of them and we have no other means of explaining 
our knowledge of states of the world.
This concludes my outline of McGinn's case. I will now proceed to the 
evaluation of the arguments that are brought to support the salient contentions 
within that case. I do not intend to challenge the theses (a) and (b) and the 
theses (d) - on supervenience - and (e) on a priority will be treated at length
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in chapters 7 and 8 respectively. In the remainder of this chapter I will 
concentrate on thesis (c ) and the effect of its acceptance, i.e the 
characterization of modal anti-realism as reductive actualism and th^distorting 
effect that this has on the general conception of the realist/anti-realist dialectic in 
the case of modality.
(6.10) PERSONAL REDUCTIONS
According to McGinn the traditional anti-realist positions concerning modality 
are usefully distinguished into cases of, respectively, impersonal and personal 
actualism ?  The former represents attempts to reduce the truth conditions of 
modal statements to those of statements about 'objective' non-psychological
states of affairs. Personal actualism, on the other hand....
" .suggests reducing modal statements to facts about the one
who uses those statements; such a reduction is aptly called  
'psychologistic'. Different versions of this general doctrine pick  
upon different sorts of properties of persons as constituting that to 
which a modal truth fundamentally reduces; thus the notions of 
stipulation or convention or intention or decision or imagination or 
mental disposition (Hume) are brought reductively to bear. "8 
Furthermore, while the distinction between personal and impersonal reductive 
bases for anti-realism is remarked to have analogies in ethics (and in 
mathematics),9 the only development of this theme is offered in the remark that 
there is a.....
"..very close analogy between Humean accounts of necessity and of 
value; both are conceived as objects of feeling, not of knowledge, 
arising from the de facto constitution of our minds. "10
This is what we are told of personal actualism.
It will assist the investigation of the thesis of personal actualism if we pause, first
(6.11) to draw a needed distinction between kinds of reductionist proposal and, 
second (6.12) to develop a conception of personal reduction in its application to 
the purportedly analogous spheres of the ethical and the mathematical.
(6.11) A PRELIMINARY NOTE ON KINDS OF REDUCTION
It is useful to distinguish two types of proposal that might be understood to be
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implicated in personal actualism or reductionist theses quite generally.
(i) Analytic reductionism is familiar from the discussion of the real meaning 
strategy.11 The central idea is that each statement of the given class has a 
reductive class translation and this may or may not be a prelude to an 
elimination of the given class vocabulary from some range of contexts or for 
some range of purposes.
(ii) Constitutive or metaphysical reductionism has it that in some each truth of 
the given class obtain in virtue of a truth of the reductive class. No translation 
requirement is imposed and therefore there is no analytic relation between the 
predicates of the reduced statements to those of the reductive base. It may or 
may not be the case that this relation is held to obtain with some non-analytic 
necessity.12
Although McGinn never makes it absolutely clear what grade of reduction he 
takes to be implicated in actualist reductions, he appears to have the stronger 
analytic thesis directly in his sights. Since he holds that the realist is at liberty to 
hold the general thesis that modal truths obtain in virtue of truths concerning 
the actual, it seems that he must have analytic reduction in mind as the 
hallmark of anti-realism.13 This intention is further manifest when he commends 
actualist reductions to the list of defeated theses of reductionism -"definitional 
reductionism"- announced by Davidson.14
(6.12) PERSONAL REDUCTION IN ETHICS AND MATHEMATICS 
What content can we associate with theses of definitional reduction in those 
cases which are purportedly analogous to the modal in respect of their 
attraction to person-based reductionists?
The thesis of person-based reduction of ethical truth presumably requires that 
there obtain conditionals of the type (1):
(1 ) "X is wrong" is true ( as potentially uttered by A) <---> A 
disapproves of X.
where these, we should add, are analytic equivalences.
Any such purported reduction of the ethical to the psychological deserves to be 
termed 'naive subjectivism' and it is open to devastating objections. Extremely 
sophisticated objections to such a proposal may be inspired by consideration of 
the relation it bears to following a rule in private or for that matter to conditions of
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truth-evaluability which exclude the possibility of truth depending solely upon 
the act of judgement.15 However, thesimple objection, which no doubt 
impinges significantly on the sophisticated considerations, is that no more is 
required for ethical truth Xhansincerity of utterance given this naive subjectivism. 
If the agent indeed disapproves of X then it is indeed true that X is wrong. An 
eminent consequence of this conception of the truth of ethical statements is that 
it radically undermines the possibility of ethical disagreement. For when you 
insist that homosexuality is not permissible and I insist that it is we (probably) 
are not saying inconsistent things. More than likely, both utterances will betrue 
under the reductionist interpretation of their content.16 
Parallel points would apply to naive subjectivism about mathematics but I do 
not intend to pursue the matter of what a personalized  reduction of 
mathematical discourse might be held to amount to. While there are available a 
variety of positions that attempt to capture the idea that mathematical objects, or 
even mathematial truth, is constructed it would be an unprecedented version of 
psychologism that proposed reducing the truth-conditions of mathematical 
statements to "facts about the one who uses those statements". The 
individualism in this formulation renders the thesis unrecognizable. Frankly, I 
cannot see how such subjectivism about mathematics might afford any appeal. 
Once we take the general considerations on board the issue of the sort of 
property of a person that ought to constitute that to which modal truth 
fundamentally reduces is one that pales into insignificance. For the point is that 
it is a hopelessly implausible position that has it that there is a truth-relevant 
contribution of modal vocabulary to statements which is such that the condition 
of truth is satisfied given the presence of a particular kind of mental state in the 
one who uses such a statement. Personal reductions of ethical, mathematical 
and modal sayings are quite unpromising since they threaten to undermine the 
status of these sayings as arl\cu\atir\Qjudgements and, more bluntly, since their 
acceptance has the consequence that those who claim that actions are the 
better for being more generous or that 2 + 4 = 6 or that cats must be animals 
are, in each instance, speaking of themselves. All of this can be said without 
recourse to any criticism of the purported analyticity  of the reductive 
equivalences but when we come to consider this angle, reduction emerges for 
quite different reasons as a completely untenable position.
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The reductionist, in claiming that our modal use is always equivalent to an 
actualist surrogate, is at a loss to explain the apparent recalcitrance of modal 
idioms to actualist translation. It is a measure of this recalcitrance that even 
supposedly reductionist proposals often smuggle in modal idioms (c.f 
unimaginable, inconceivable ) and the only remotely satisfying non-reductionist 
attempts to elucidate modality (possible worlds) involve these as well. Modality 
certainly feels as though it is what it is and not another thing and the suggestion 
that the modal is notaf all distinctive seems hopelessly impotent in the face of 
that phenomenology.
(6.13) PERSONAL REDUCTIONISM - A RED HERRING 
The classification of modal anti-realism as (any form of) reductionism has two 
extremely negative effects. The first, as we have seen, is that it makes modal 
anti-realism a ridiculously easy target, for the view that modal truth is reducible 
in the way that McGinn suggests that the anti-realist should take it to be, is not a 
live option. The second, and ultimately more damaging, is that because 
McGinn presents personal reductionism as a representation of Hume's view we 
are left with the impression that in seeing off reductionism, we have dealt with 
Hume's anti-realism about modality. The impression that McGinn indeed sees 
matters in this way is further enforced when we observe that he does not in fact 
go on to deal with any of the challenging strands of anti-realist thought which 
are genuinely Humean. I say "genuinely Humean" in order to introduce the 
point that personal actualism has no Humean authority to sustain its relevance 
to the issue of modal objectivity. It is an error to interpret Hume as offering a 
reduction of each modal statement to a pair of descriptive and truth-evaluable 
conjuncts; one concerning (external) actuality and the other a psychological 
condition (perhaps disposition) of an agent who makes the modal claim. There 
are at least two main strands of anti-realist thought in Hume's account of 
necessity, neither of which should be confused with personal reduction and 
both of which are more challenging than personal reduction. These are 
non-cognitivism andnon-descriptivism respectively. Let us review Hume's 
theory of our modal concepts bearing in mind throughout the mooted "close 
analogy between his accounts of necessity and value."17
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(6.20) NON-COGNITIVISM ADUMBRATFn 
In a crucial passage Hume writes:
" Thus necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects; 
just as the necessity by which twice two is equal to four lies only in 
the act of understanding by which we compare these ideas, power 
and necessity are qualities of perceptions not of objects and are 
internally felt by the soul, not perceived externally in bodies. "18 
From this and other passages it is clear that Hume is in the psychological sense 
a non-cognitivist about modality. By this I mean what McGinn appears to mean 
when he applies the term 'non-cognitivist' to Hume i.e. that the distinctively 
modal (and evaluative) mental episodes are in the province of 'feeling' not of 
knowledge.19 This usage of the term 'non-cognitivism' respects its obviously 
psychological etymology, but the term is also widely used to articulate the 
semantic thesis that a class of statements (claims, commitments) are not 
truth-evaluable. In Hume the connection between psychological and semantical 
non-cognitivism is secured because it is the ontogeny of our concepts that 
determines whether or not they make a truth-relevant contribution to the 
sentences that they invest with meaning. In particular, it is because our 'idea of 
necessity' is based on an impression of reflexion - not an impression of 
sensation - that the use of modal vocabulary does not bring in its wake an extra 
truth-relevant contribution.20 So the failure of truth-relevance of modal 
vocabulary follows, for Hume from the psychological aetiology of the concept of 
necessity.21
Hume, then, is no reductionist about modality since for him the modal is, as it is 
for McGinn's realist, "something over and above the actual", but for Hume this 
additional conceptual component brings in its wake no additional truth-relevant 
content.
f6.21) NON-DESCRIPTIVISM ADUMBRATED
The second crucial strand of anti-realist thought in Hume's theory of modality is 
non-descriptivism. What is added to, say, a purely actualist generalization in its 
augmentation with modal vocabulary is not, for Hume, a descriptive component. 
If we bear in mind at this stage - and in the context of the close analogy between 
the Humean accounts of necessity and value - that Hume's theory of moral
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language is essentially an expressive theory,22 vve arrive at a conception of 
what this non-descriptive role of modal vocabulary is. Let us anticipate 
Blackburn's deployment of Hume's views on the nature of modal 
commitments23 and settle upon the claim that the function of modal vocabulary 
is to register the projection of a non-cognitive mental state . At this stage we 
need not make a commitment to an interpretation of what it is that is projected 
in modalizing (e.g. the activity of a mental disposition, a feeling, an expectation, 
an imaginative block etc.), but the notion that something of us is projected 
rather than something of the world described is what is crucial to Hume's theory 
of modalizing.
Non-descriptivism, like non-cognitivism is alien to the thesis of personal 
reduction for the personal reductionist has the user of modal vocabulary 
describing the presence of a psychological something in whose presence the 
truth of the modal statement (partly) consists. McGinn appears to be straining to 
attribute a descriptive bent to modal anti-realism but it is a mystery as to whv he 
should insist upon this given the historical pre-eminence of non-descriptivism 
in (what would normally be thought of as) the modal anti-realist tradition (e.g. 
Hume24 and Wittgenstein25).26
I have tried to show that personal actualism is a red herring as far as modal 
anti-realism is concerned and I have identified non-cognitivism and 
non-descriptivism as two (familiar) non-reductionist strands of anti-realism. I will 
go on to argue that of these non-reductionist strands of anti-realism it is 
non-descriptivism that proves more challenging to modal realism but my first 
task is to indicate (by way of consideration of opposition to moral realism) why 
non-cognitivism and non-descriptivism ought to be distinguished.
(6.22) NON-DESCRIPTIVISM IS DISTINCT FROM NON-COGNITIVISM.
The proponents of non-descriptivism about ethical sentences react differently to 
the question of the truth-evaluability of those sentences. In this matter Ayer27 
adopts the Humean semantic orthodoxy and Blackburn28 opposes it - i.e. Ayer 
is a semantical non-cognitivist but Blackburn is not. This state of affairs in the 
philosophy of value drives home the point that while non-cognitivism and 
non-descriptivism are alike in being non-reductive, they are not to be confused
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with one another. It is a mistake to fail to distinguish between these 
non-reductive anti-realist positions. Certainly,Hume's expressive/projective 
conception of modality is accompanied by non-cognitivism but it will not do to 
attribute quite generally to non-descriptive anti-realists about modality a 
commitment to non-cognitivism. Moreover, the existence of a non-descriptive 
modal anti-realism that disavows non-cognitivism saves us the trouble of having 
to invent it.
Blackburn's quasi-realist29 conception of moral discourse - involving the 
adumbrated combination of semantic cognitivism and non-descriptive 
projectivism - is mirrored in his quasi-realist conception of modal discourse. 
Therefore we do well to acknowledge at this early stage a form of (quasi-realist) 
opposition to modal realism which combines a conception of the role of our 
modal statements as projections (hence non-descriptivism) with a defence of 
their right on that basis to truth-evaluation (hence non-non-cognitivism). 
Blackburn's position will be tackled at an appropriate juncture30 but a great 
deal of ground must be covered before that stage is reached.31 
In the next section I will attempt to reconstruct McGinn's version of the 
realist/anti-realist dialectic with a view to showing how his omission of 
non-reductive anti-realisms arises.
(6.30) REACTIONS TO THE THREAT OF SCEPTICISM: REALISM.
REDUCTION ISM AND SCEPTICAL SOLUTION.
The threat of scepticism can be seen as arising from the standard (Dummettian) 
realist's position i.e. that there may be statements whose truth/falsehood obtains 
even though their truth-value is not decidable on the basis of the recognitional 
capacities that we (uncontroversially) have even when these capacities are 
idealized. As McGinn rightly points out, the realist is sometimes found 
attempting to avert scepticism by raising the stakes and invoking a controversial 
faculty or capacity that overcomes recognition transcendence and measures up 
to the, richly conceived, truth-condition. The anti-realist may react to the threat 
of an unbridgeable gap between truth and our powers of cognition by reducing 
the problematic truth so that the reductively conceived truth-condition falls within 
the scope of uncontroversial faculties.
In sum, if we are to credit ourselves with knowledge of the given kind, this
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seems to require either (i) a "queer" fact that is the object of that knowledge and 
a mysterious faculty appropriate to its cognition or (ii) a "mundane" conception 
of the fact revised in such a way as to render it accessible by cognitively 
familiar means. This dialectic places the fact at the heart of matters and 
revolves around the question of what this fact, properly construed, demands of 
our cognitive powers. But there is another class of options that lies outwith the 
restricting dichotomy of realism or reductionism.
The scenario in which our grasp of the fact threatens to become an inexplicable 
surd (realism) or the fact becomes accessible at the cost of its distinctive identity 
(reductionism) is the essence of a sceptical paradox.32 The paradox is escaped 
by the anti-realist who, as McGinn puts it, "cannot comprehend how the 
introduced faculty is supposed to operate at all"33 but sees no need to attempt 
to squeeze the fact to fit another fact-recognizing faculty. A sceptical solution 
takes off from the denial that the role of the discourse is to state any kind of fact, 
queer or mundane.
Because of the notorious difficulty in substantiating the notion of a fact34 it is 
not a straightforward matter to characterize the relationship between sceptical 
solutions and the (broadly) anti-realist theses of non-cognitivism and non- 
-descriptivism respectively. I take the view that non-cognitivism should be 
regarded as contingent to the strategy of sceptical solution and that 
non-descriptivism should be regarded as essential to that strategy.
(6.31) SCEPTICAL SOLUTIONS AND NON-COGNITIVISM 
To pursue a sceptical solution is, I suggest, to adopt a strategy that bears no 
straightforward relation to a commitment with respect to the (failure of) 
truth-evaluability  of the declarative sentences in question. It has been 
suggested that the natural semantic consequence of accepting the orientation 
of a sceptical solution is to supplant the notion of truth as the primary dimension 
of assessment for the sentences with the notion of assertibility 35 This, however, 
is of little help until we are told what the difference between truth and 
assertibilit/s. Moreover, it will take considerations of a substantial kind to 
ground and motivate the perceived need for just such a distinction. The 
repudiation of truth-evaluability may once have seemed an unavoidable 
commitment given repudiation of the claim to " fact-stating " status, but the issue
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has been complicated considerably by the increasingly popular perception of a 
need, even on the part of those who have seen fit to regard themselves (at least 
on occasion) as "realists" to elucidate the concept of truth as a norm of 
rationality or a standard of (broadly) success in judgement and certainly as 
something other than a property borne by statements in virtue of their 
correspondence to reality. 36 If the matter is posed in a fashion whereby the 
difference between truth and assertibility is that truth-conditions require 
corresponding facts while assertibilitv-conditions do n o t, then repudiation of 
descriptivism emerges more forcefully as the issue that is implicated in the shift 
to assertibility. All hands can then agree on the centrality to the strategy of 
sceptical solution of the repudiation of descriptivism irrespective of their views 
as to whether the appropriation of the concept of truth for correspondence with 
the facts is warranted.
In his discussion of Kripke's sceptical solution, McGinn clearly proceeds on the 
assumption that it is appropriate to view a commitment to non-cognitivism as a 
generalizable feature of the strategy of sceptical solution.37 I disagree. In any 
event, what should be emphasized is that the generality of non-cognitivism 
does not follow from the generality of non-descriptivism. To assume otherwise 
would be to beg the question against those (e.g.Blackburn) who hold that their 
theories, although embracing a non-descriptive view of the role of relevant 
discourse, establish the right to evaluate the sentences in terms of truth- 
Henceforth I intend by use of the term "sceptical solution" an anti-realist 
strategy that embraces non-descriptivism i.e the thesis that declarative 
sentences of a given class do not have a descriptive role.
The position that has been developed is this: I agree with McGinn in holding 
that we can bypass safely the reductionist in our consideration of plausible 
opposition to modal realism. But this leaves untouched the recognizably 
anti-realist strategies of non-cognitivism and sceptical solution as a strategy of 
response to a purported "sceptical paradox" of modality. The presentation of a 
sceptical paradox of modality and confrontation with the associated sceptical 







Here, I intend neither to enter into a detailed critique of modal (semantic) 
non-cognitivism nor into the lengthy and difficult investigation of the right of 
declarative sentences to truth-evaluation that this would require. Instead, I will 
proceed by offering some remarks on the modal non-cognitivist challenges of 
Hume and Wittgenstein with a view to defusing these challenges [(6.41)]. Then 
I will propose as necessary conditions of truth-evaluability of a class of 
sentences, (a) satisfaction of a set of marks of truth [(6.42)] and (b) semantic 
adequacy of truth-theoretic interpretation [(6.43)] and I will claim that modal 
operator sentences meet these conditions.
(6.41) AN ATTEMPT TO DEFUSE THE MODAL NON-COGNITIVISMS 
OF (a) HUME and (b) WITTGENSTEIN.
(a) Hume, as previously remarked, offers a criterion of truth-evaluability based 
upon the distinction between active and passive mental faculties and the 
plausibility of this criterion has been diminished along with the plausibility of the 
philosophy of mind that sustains it.38 However, there is a further radically 
revisionary dimension of Humean non-cognitivism that undermines its 
plausibility.
It is not often remarked how far the revision of our truth-evaluating practices 
would have to proceed were the criterion that Hume proposes applied 
throughout our everyday talk. Yet it is worth noting that given our purported 
projection of not only moral sentiment and causal "expectation", but also the 
continuity of objects in space and time, identity etc. it seems likely that virtually 
nothing that we recognize as having truth-evaluable content will survive the 
rigours of Humean psychological de-construction. Modal and moral non- 
-cognitivism in the hands of a consistent Humean is the thin end of the wedge 
and the outcome of the application of Humean methodology must surely be the 
abandonment of the notion of truth for all practical purposes.39
(b) Wittgenstein's apparent penchant for modal non-cognitivism is somewhat 
puzzling.40 The metaphor which encapsulates Wittgenstein's view of the role in 
use of necessities renders them as rules as opposed to moves in the language 
g a m e.41 Once the point has been made that logical or mathematical 
necessities have a prescriptive (i.e. a non-descriptive!) component to their
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functioning in the language game, it is difficult to see what more is to be gained 
by insisting on the impropriety of attributing truth to the statements in question. 
There is a strong inclination to say that once the claim of a non-descriptive role 
for necessities is taken on board the really important point has been captured. 
This leaves us free (and surely Wittgenstein would have demanded with this) to 
view our standard practice of attributing truth and falsity to such sayings as 
perfectly in order but it should also heighten our sensitivity to the possibility that 
the point of our applying the predication "true" is not absolutely invariant 
across all of the regions of our discourse in which it is applied. Thus, in the face 
of the challenge of Wittgensteinian modal non-cognitivism I respond in the spirit 
of Dummett's (Wittgensteinian?) assessment of moral non-cognitivism:
" At one time it was usual to say that we do not call ethical 
statements "true" or "false", and from this many consequences for 
ethics were held to flow. But the question is not whether these 
words are in practice applied to ethical statements, but, whether, if 
they were so applied, the point of doing so would be the same as 
the point of applying them to statements of other kinds, and, if not, 
in what ways it would be different. ”42
My claims then are that Humean pro non-cognitivist (as opposed to pro 
non-descriptivist) considerations are irrelevant to the contemporary debate and 
that the Wittgensteinian considerations which have been taken as having 
pro-non-cognitivist implications are better focused in the context of the dispute 
concerning the (non-)descriptive role of necessities. Hereby, I hope to have 
defused the specifically non-cognitivist challenges that have been mounted by 
these historically eminent opponents of modal realism and I now want to turn to 
more general considerations that pertain to the handling of cognitivist/ 
non-cognitivist disputes.
(6.42) THE REQUIREMENTS OF COGNITIVISM: la) THE MARKS OF TRUTH 
It is unpromising to attempt to insist that truth-evaluability (as opposed to, say, 
assertibility - evaluability) requires the aptitude of a class of statements to (fail 
to)correspond to reality. Firstly, because, as I have already indicated, I see this 
as begging the question against the possibility of non-descriptivist cognitivism. 
Secondly, because there seems to be no question of settling the issue of
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cognitivism by appealing directly to concepts such as correspondence with 
reality or, relatedly, to the notion of a fact or the content of the world for such 
a direct procedure seems doomed to beg crucial questions in the cognitivist 
debate and as such, as Strawson puts it,..
these contain the problem, not its solution . " 43 
Wiggins44 also despairs of gaining any insight into the nature of truth or into 
cognitivist/non-cognitivist disputes by invoking the notion of "correspondence". 
He argues that the pre-theoretical concept of truth is illluminated via its 
identifiability with an independently developed, functionally-characterized 
theoretical semantic concept ("assertibility") that is adequate for the purposes of 
interpreting the speech of a linguistic community. Wiggins (tentative) conclusion 
might be represented in the following way. When we attempt to gauge how the 
theoretically introduced concept falls short of the content of the pre-theoretical 
concept of truth we find that there is neither shortfall nor overspill - the 
relationship between the concepts of assertibility and (pre-theoretical) truth 
emerges as one of a posteriori identity. Consequently, our confidence that a 
problematic class of statements is interpretable should carry over into the claim 
of their truth-evaluability. The marks of truth/assertibility which are generated by 
the interpretative constraints are as follows:45
(i) That truth is the primary dimension of assessment for the sentences i.e.
that which the sentences it applies to have normally to be construed as
aiming to enjoy.
(ii) That if sentences are capable of truth then their content should be such 
as to support under favourable conditions of investigation a tendency for 
disagreement to diminish and for opinion to converge in agreement 
(though not necessarily to a uniquePiercean limit).
(iii) Any sentence which has (lacks) truth has it independently of any 
individual speaker's means of recognizing it.
(iv) Every sentence which is true is true in virtue of something.
(This is intended as summarizing the first three marks and as capturing 
"the little that was reasonable in the correspondence theory of truth."46)
(v) If a sentence "S i" is true and a sentence "S2" is true then their
conjunction rS-j& S2n is true.
My proposals are: (1) that the presence in the case of modal statements of
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these marks of truth should be regarded as sufficient for cognitivism about 
modal statements; (2) that we should accept that these marks of truth are indeed 
present in the case of modal statements; and (3) that we should acknowledge 
that the acceptance of these first two claims is quite consistent with the 
important anti-realist strategy of sceptical paradox/ sceptical solution.
It is, however, arguable that there can be no question of the presence of the 
marks being sufficient for truth-evaluability given that we can impose a 
well-motivated and substantive requirement of semantic adequacy on the 
truth-evaluability of a class of statements.
(6.43) THE REQUIREMENTS OF COGNITIVISM: (b) SEMANTIC ADEQUACY 
At first sight it seems that no light could be shed on cognitivist/non-cognitivist 
disputes from considerations that arise within the semantic core of interpretation 
theory, i.e.Tarskian theories of truth.47 This Tarskian core consists of a 
characterization of truth for the sentences of a given language and proceeds by 
generating a "truth-condition" to each sentence on the basis of its lexical 
components and modes of composition. The apparent (and now widely 
accepted) philosophical neutrality of Tarskian theories of truth48 seems to 
reflect a view that such theories have nothing to tell us concerning more 
philosophically substantial matters relating to the concept (or conception) of 
truth. However, it turns out that the modal case is special in this respect for 
wecan develop an important angle on the viability of modal cognitivism from 
consideration of the semantical project of the construction of a Tarskian theory 
of truth for modal languages. The inefficacy of truth-theoretic considerations 
upon the dispute over cognitivism in the moral case stands as an interesting 
contrast 49
Wiggins expounds the mininal status of the assumption that a semantically 
adequate procedure for generating Tarskian T-theorems must be available 
where the object language, L, contains moral vocabulary:
" Moral philosophy as we know it makes many sophisticated claims 
about meanings, some of them very hard to assess. Compared with 
everything that would be involved in making those assessments, 
what we are assuming here is minimal. It is only that the discursive 
or informal comments that the moral theorist hopes to make about
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the status of this, that or the other judgment in L will presuppose 
that such a biconditional can be constructed for each sentence of L. 
These assertion conditions give the meaning of the judgments he 
wants to comment upon. If no such principled understanding of 
what they mean may be thought of as obtainable, then (whatever 
other treasures he posses) he cannot even count on the first 
thing."50
The plain fact is that the theory of truth is oblivious to many aspects of the 
"meaning" of declarative sentences beyond their grammar51 but it is the 
gram m ar alone of philosophically contentious stentences (e.g. sentences 
containing moral vocabulary) that determines their susceptibility to truth 
theoretic processing.
The axiom dealing with an expression such as, "x is courageous", is, in the 
standard case, homophonic or austere, viz:
(2 ) (x)[SATS (x, L, is courageous" ) <--> x is courageous]
The measure of the semantic success of the theory containing such an axiom is 
its ability to satisfy Convention T in generating, in conjunction with approved 
logical resources, a theorem of the type (3),
(3 ) TRUE (L, "Mandela is courageous.") <--> Mandela is 
courageous.
for each object language sentence. In the case indicated, neither the axioms 
nor the theorems appear to bring with them any problem for the cognitivist's 
project and, equally, this "success" is hardly a hammer blow to non-cognitivism. 
Yet were there something amiss in this narrow semantic arena - if, in Wiggins' 
words, we "cannot even count on the first thing" - this could not but be to the 
detriment of the cognitivist's aspirations. In other words, truth-theoretic 
adequacy is a one-sided test in the dispute between cognitivist and opponent. 
If the truth-theoretic treatment of a philosophically contentious class of 
declarative sentences proves straightforward, this, of itself, is no feather in the 
cognitivist cap. But, if it proves that the sentences are not susceptible to the 
processing, then this is a powerful semantical point in favour of 
non-cognitivism. In this way truth-theoretic considerations may impinge on the 
question of the (non-)cognitive role of declarative modal sentences. 
Truth-theoretic adequacy impinges forcefully on the prospects of modal
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cognitivism in a way that affords no parallel in the moral case, for voices have 
been raised in doubt concerning the availability of a semantically adequate 
theory of truth for object languages containing modal operators.
The salient objection against the adequacy of theories of truth for modal 
operator languages is based upon the allegation that instances of axiom 
schemata which have to be deployed in the derivation of T theorems viz:
(4) TRUE (L ,r 0 ( P  & -P )1) <—> □  [TRUE (L,r ~(P & -P)1)].
are false.52 The case is that the left side is true, but the right side false. The 
right side is false since in some other possible worlds the expressions,""-" and 
"&", mean something different and in some of those worlds the L sentence,
"~(P & ~P)" with its non-actual meaning is false. So, the sentence inside the 
modal operator on the right side of the biconditional:
(5 ) TRUE (L, r~(P & ~P)'1)
is contingent and not necessary, and the modalized sentence on the right side 
of the biconditional:
(6 ) □  [TRUE (L,r~(P & ~P)n)]
is false, as is the entire biconditional (4) itself.
Not surprisingly, there are available responses to this objection. However, the 
claims of the respondents depend upon principles whose philosophical 
pre-suppositions are not clear (since no argument is offered for the acceptance 
of these potentially far-reaching principles) and so the philosophical 
defensibility of the truth theories that have been proposed remains in doubt. 
(The principles concern, inter alia, the identity conditions of languages and what 
is counterfactually true of them.) I take the development of a semantically 
adequate and philosophically defensible theory of truth for a class of languages 
containing modal operators to be crucial to the prospects of defending a view of 
our modal statements as being non-objectual and truth-evaluable. That such a 
theory of truth can be developed is a difficult proposition to establish and I have 
devoted a lengthy appendix to this issue.53 Here, I will simply enter the 
(tentative) conclusion of that appendix which is that we can develop a 
semantically adequate and philosophically defensible theory of truth for 
languages containing modal operators. I contend on the basis of this conclusion 
that the major threat to modal cognitivism, based upon the allegation semantic 




SUPERVENIENCE (I): THE CONCEPTION OF MODAL REALISM AS 
SUPERVENIENCE WITHOUT REDUCTION
(7.0) INTRODUCTION
Reductionism and non-cognitivism have been discounted as viable options in 
modal theorizing and the anti-realist strategy of sceptical paradox/solution has 
been identified as a further response to the problematic which McGinn viewed 
as meriting only realist or reductionist response. In this chapter I will challenge 
McGinn's positive conception of modal realism as acceptance of the 
supervenience (without reduction) of the modal upon the actual.
McGinn, as we saw in Ch.6, characterizes the realist as construing modal 
commitments as having truth-conditons in such a way that modal truths are not 
reducible to actual truths. He proceeds by remarking that irreducibility is 
compatible with the respective theses of the independence of the modal from 
the actual and the supervenience of the modal on the actual - these theses 
being mutually incompatible - and argues that modal realism (construed as the 
claim that modal truths are epistemically problematic relative to actual truths) 
can and must incorporate the supervenience thesis.1 It can because  
supervenience is quite consistent with there being distinct recognitional 
capacities appropriate to supervening and base truths, and this leaves open the 
prospect of the former being associated with a relatively problematic 
(controversial) recognitional capacity; it must because the alternative to 
supervenience (i.e. independence) is wholly unacceptable 
Cause for concern with this approach arises from the subsequent - relative to 
McGinn's discussion - emergence of a variety of important distinctions between 
kinds of supervenience thesis and problems which attend their application. 
When we come to evaluate the effect of these factors upon the formulation of a 
thesis of modal/actual supervenience, doubts concerning the non-trivial 
applicability of supervenience (and related) theses duly arise, but more 




(7-1) INDEPENDENCE, w e a k  s u p e r v e n if n c e  a n d  s t r o n g
SUPERVENIENCE CHARACTERIZFD 
According to the simple intuitive conception of supervenience, if A (associated) 
truths supervene on B (base) truths, then there can be no A difference between 
entities unless there is a B difference.2 However, philosophers with varying 
interests3 have felt the need to distinguish among a variety of sharply 
formulated theses which attempt to capture this simple intuitive conception and, 
furthermore, have identified a range of problems pertaining to the application of 
these theses. For the purposes of the discussion we may settle on two versions 
of supervenience - weak and strong - that have been distinguished in the 
literature.4 The relevance of the distinction between these versions is two-fold: 
(a) McGinn draws no such distinction and thereby erroneously attributes to 
Putnam the acceptance of an extreme realism about modality - realism with 
independence; and (b) it allows us to rebut an argument, due to Lewis, against 
non-objectual construals of modality - 1 deal with the latter point in Appendix B. 
In order to introduce the relation of independence and the distinction between 
weak and strong supervenience, I will offer an example of their application to a 
specific case.
Let it be the case that 'B*' marks a place for a description of the total physical 
state of an organism and 'A'" for a description of the totality of intentional states 
of the organism. The thesis of independence of the intentional from the physical 
has it that organisms which are physically indiscernible may still differ with 
respect to their intentional states, thus:
(IND) o(3x)(B*x & B*y & A"x & ~A"y)
The thesis of weak supervenience is simply the denial of (IND), but it can be 
written more conveniently thus:
(WEAK) □  [(3x)(B*x & A"x)~>(y)(B*x-->A"y)]
So the claim of WEAK is intended as being that in each possible world, if two 
organisms are physically indiscernible, then they do not differ in their intentional 
states. It is important to be clear about what the denial of independence 
commits us to, or to put it another way, to be clear about what weak 
supervenience is not.
In the first place, WEAK like its stronger relative is designed to accommodate 
variable realization of associated properties. In other words, it does not exclude
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the possiblity that you and I may be doppelgangers in our intentional lives while 
being of distinct physical types. Physical doppelgangers within any possible 
world must be indiscernible in their intentional states but it is not being claimed 
that the converse obtains.
In the second place, the scope of the modal operator in WEAK is such that it is 
a world-specific thesis. WEAK says of each possible world that within it the 
presence of a B*/A" combination is sufficient for the truth of the generalization 
(1) :
(1 ) (x)(B*x-->A"x).
In Blackburn's phrase weak supervenience constitutes "a ban on mixed 
worlds"5. If something in a world is B* and A" then nothing in that world is B* 
and not A". But this minimal condition is consistent with a number of 
counter-factual (i.e. inter-world) combinations. For example in this world the 
generalization (1) holds non-trivially (i.e. something is B*) but in some other 
possible world, again non-trivially, the generalization (2):
(2) (x)(B*x-> ~A"x)
holds - the other worldly B* things might even be non-intentional entities!
The acceptance of WEAK then, may be an appropriate option for a theorist who 
wishes to accept psycho-physical regularities while rejecting psycho-physical 
laws .Thus, a Cartesian might well argue against pain/C- fibre identity on the 
grounds that while an exceptionless regularity:
(3 ) (x)(Cx ~> Px)
obtains (among humans) in the actual world, there are other worlds in which the 
exceptionless regularity:
(4 ) (x)(Cx »> ~ Px)
obtains. This is sufficient for the modal argument against so-called "property 
identity".6 Why one would want to stop here and not go for independence is not 
at all clear, but the point has been simply to indicate what the application of 
WEAK and IND would amount to in these cases.
WEAK is to be contrasted with the stronger supervenience relation STRONG: 
(S TR O N G ) □  [(3x)(B*x& A"x) --> □  (y)B*y~> A"y)]
This stronger thesis still accommodates variable realization, but it rules out 
certain other options that are consistent with the ban on mixed worlds. 
Particularly, given STRONG there are no inter-world physical Doppelgangers
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that differ intentionally - the B* things of other worlds must be A" things.7 
The logical relations between the theses IND, WEAK and STRONG that must be 
borne in mind are as follows:
(i) STRONG ~>WEAK (ii) STRONG ~> -  IND (iii) WEAK <--> ~ IND 
Consequently there is a logically consistent position which consists in the 
acceptance of WEAK alongside the denial of STRONG and the denial of IND 
i.e. the acceptance of weak-but-not-strong supervenience.
(7.20) McGINN'S UNWARRANTED ATTRIBUTION TO PUTNAM OF THE 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE MODAL FROM THE ACTUAL 
McGinn takes the claim of the independence of the modal from the actual to be 
quite implausible but nonetheless he attributes this claim to Putnam.8 I want to 
show that the attribution of the independence thesis to Putnam is hasty and 
unwarranted in light of the availability of the distinction between STRONG and 
WEAK.
It is evident from McGinn's handling of Putnam's discussion9 that he (McGinn) is 
conflating theses which ought to be distinguished. Putnam writes:
"Does the totality of facts about what events actually take place 
determine the truth-value of all statements of the form 'It is possible 
that P'? To me, at least, the answer, it seems is, "no", and if the 
answer is "no", then both the Quinean account of logical necessity 
and Humean account of causality have to be wrong. "10 
McGinn alleges that in proposing this view, Putnam is endorsing the 
independence thesis in connection with modal truths and actual truths. For my 
part, I do not see that anything in the quoted passage, or in Putnam's 
discussion of the example which occasioned his comment, shows him to be 
sympathetic to independence. The quoted passage is susceptible to 
interpretation in a way that renders Putnam's consistent with weak 
supervenience and, so, consistent with the repudiation of independence. There 
are three reasons for accepting this interpretation.
Firstly, WEAK, it will be recalled, is a world-specific thesis whose effect is to ban 
mixed worlds so that, at each world, what holds is one of the generalizations (1) 
and (2):
(1) (x)(B*x --> A"x) (2 ) (x)(B*x --> ~A"x)
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In the modal/actual application, actual truths (concerning x) are intended as 
being exhausted in the base description B* and modal truths in the associated 
description A". In fitting Putnam's (quoted) views into the context of the 
discussion of supervenience, the crucial question is whether WEAK can be 
identified with a thesis of the "determination" of A-truths by B-truths. The answer 
is that it cannot, for, in general, the acceptance of WEAK (but no stronger thesis 
of dependence) allows us to assert both (5) and (6):
(5) 0(3x)(B*x & A"x) (6) O (3x)(B*x & ~ A"x)
So once we fix the weak supervenient base x might yet either have associated 
state A" or lack associated state A" and this, surely, is no determination of the 
A-truths by the B-truths.
Secondly, a consideration of the context of Putnam's repudiation of 
"determination" further supports the view that he is not best viewed as 
endorsing independence. The focus of his attack is a 'Humean' account of 
modalities i.e. one which...
"..assumes that what is true in possible worlds is totally determined 
by what is true in the actual world plus our conventions . "11
and more specifically, the view that necessarily true generalizations - construed 
as including the laws of logic - can be accounted for on the basis of "moderate 
conventionalism":
" I f  anyone is tempted to hold it, the form of moderated  
conventionalism that consists in saying the laws of logic are just 
true in the actual world, but given that they are true in the actual 
world, it's a matter of our convention that they are true in all 
possible worlds, seems to me quite untenable." 12 
It does not matter that the concept of convention is central to the formulation of 
the point in this instance. What Putnam is objecting to quite generally is the 
purported determination of all general modal truths on the basis of the actual 
truth of a non-modal generalization plus some additional 'condition'. The plain 
fact is that weak supervenience does not represent, far less determine, the 
necessary truth of B/A generalizations at all for it is characteristic of WEAK that 
it permits worlds at which there are true generalizations of type (2) despite the 
actual truth of (1):
(2) (x)(B*x ~> ~A"x) (1) (x)(B*x ~> A"x).
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In his attack on the account of what it is that confers truth upon generalizations 
of the type:
(NEC) IH(x)(B*x-->A"x)
Putnam is tackling an issue other than that of whether independence of the 
modal from the actual is tenable. So, given that he is concerned to repudiate the 
"determination" of the truth-conditions of NEC generalizations, the repudiation 
of WEAK is not a plausible interpretation of Putnam's aims.
There is a third consideration, relating to an example that Putnam offers, which 
further undermines McGinn's "independence" interpretation. Here is McGinn's 
exposition of the example which may have "misled"13 Putnam into the 
(purported) acceptance of independence:
(# )" .. .he asks whether it is possible that there be two worlds 
indiscernible with respect to the occurrence of actual events in 
them, but differing as to the fission of a small particle in a certain 
counterfactual experiment. "14
To clarify: the supposition is that in neither world is the particle in question 
bombarded with protons (say) at the given time; the question is whether we can 
hold that the counterfactual (7 ):
(7) If x had been bombarded with protons at time tf, a fission of x 
would have occurred.
is true of particle P i , in world W-(, but not true of particle P2 in world W2.15 
Putnam's response is, indeed, that we can. But how does this response relate 
to the issue of the independence of the modal from the actual? This is McGinn's 
"paraphrase" of the question that Putnam poses:
"So, the question is whether two particles could be the same in all 
actual properties yet differ in their counter-factual properties." 16
This is an equivocation between an intra-world and an inter-world interpretation 
of the relation that is alleged to obtain between the particles. In the inter-WQ.fl£l 
interpretation, the question is:
(Q a) Could it be the case that P i in world Wj has a type-identical 
intra-world description with that of P2  in world W2 , yet Pfhas, 
while P2  lacks, a certain counterfactual property that P-\ 
has? (W 1 *  W2 )
This is the content that is articulated in the quotation, (#), above and it is indeed
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the question that Putnam poses and to which he responds affirmatively. Now 
consider the intra-world version:
(Q b) Could it be the case that within some world W, P~i and ? 2  
have type-identical actual descriptions, yet (at W) P2  lacks 
some counterfactual property that P i has?
(Qb) is quite distinct from Putnam's question (Qa) and it is (Qb) that is 
relevant to the thesis of independence - a positive response to (Qb) is. an 
endorsement of independence. The world that is required by an affirmative 
response to (Qb) is a mixed world in precisely the sense that weak 
supervenience excludes: for at W we would have indiscernibility of actual 
properties for P-j and P2 but a modal difference i.e. an associated property 
difference without a base property difference. But Putnam is not answering 
(Qb) affirmatively for he is not answering the second question at all! In sum, 
McGinn has conflated the logically distinct cases of inter-world and intra-world 
comparison and then attributed unjustifiably to Putnam the denial of weak 
supervenience when Putnam is in fact responding to the inter-world question 
(Q a ).
My case, then, is that Putnam may be repudiating strong supervenience of the 
modal on the actual but he is not repudiating weak supervenience and so he is 
not endorsing independence. This possibility is rendered invisible to McGinn 
by his failure to distinguish between strong and weak supervenience.
Before moving on, a final remark concerning the interpretation of Putnam is in 
order. There is some difficulty in attempting to fix more precisely what it is - in 
terms of the notions of supervenience and reducibility - that Putnam is claiming. 
The three factors that have been brought to bear in arguing that Putnam is not 
denying weak supervenience of the modal on the actual - talk of 
"determination", consideration of the (NEC) type generalizations and his 
concern with the inter-world question (Qa) - might be held to indicate that he is 
concerned to deny either the strong supervenience on, or the reducibility of the 
modal to, the actual. It will be argued below [(7.4)] that, in the modal case, the 
acceptance of weak-but-not-strong-supervenience is not a feasible option but 
there is no reason to believe that Putnam is influenced by that consideration. 
Therefore, although the factors that have been adduced here do, I believe, 
show that Putnam is not embracing independence, there is no further evidence
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that allows us to settle whether Putnam intends (i) to repudiate only 
"determination" qua reductionism or (ii) to repudiate "determination" qua strong 
supervenience and therefore - given repudiation of independence - to embrace 
the (unstable) option of weak-but-not-strong supervenience. However, to 
emphasize, what is paramount here is not what Putnam's positive claim is, but 
that the attribution to him of the thesis of the independence from the actual of the 
modal is unwarranted.
(7.21) THE MORAL OF McGINN'S INTERPRETATION OF PUTNAM 
McGinn suggests that Putnam has been influenced by the special case of 
quantum mechanical indeterminacy firstly in asserting independence for 
nomological necessity and then in generalizing independence to other kinds of 
necessity e.g. logical necessity.17 I do not know whether Putnam would go on 
to affirm independence - i.e. to affirm the intra-world proposition were he to 
address i t . Perhaps the special case of physical indeterminacy for certain kinds 
of events enforces assent here. My case is that a proper understanding of 
Putnam's example does not permit us to attribute the assertion of independence 
even  in the nomological case. McGinn attempts to pre-empt Putnam's 
indeterminacy-dependent example by invoking examples which are not 
obviously susceptible to the vagaries of fundamental physical indeterminacy.18 
In the first case, that of the dispositions of substance samples, the distinction 
between the relevant inter-world and intra-world questions is again conflated. In 
the second, the ambiguity is finally resolved in favour of the intra-world reading 
when the reader is asked to consider...
two sectors of the universe in which the same sequences of 
(type) events occur "19 (My emphasis, J.D.)
and is then invited to concur that their lawfulness is not independent of actuality, 
viz:
"....surety, if sequences of events differ in respect of lawlikeness, 
that is due to some actual feature of the events concerned (or 
perhaps surrounding conditions). "20
So McGinn is now clearly addressing what independence does require and 
(special considerations of fundamental indeterminacy aside) he is right to insist 
that the repudiation of such independence is implicit in our conception that
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investigation of actual micro-structures yields knowledge of what is 
counterfactually true of substances. He is also right, I believe, in insisting upon 
the repudiation of independence in the central case of "strict or metaphysical 
necessities".21 He writes:
Consider first synthetic necessities such as the necessity of 
orig in , kind, com position and identity. Presum ably the 
[independence] claim will take the form of envisaging two objects 
just alike in these respects - they instantiate the same non-modal 
properties and relations - yet for one object these properties and 
relations are essential while for the other they are not. So, for 
example, two human beings could both instantiate the relations that 
constitute having a certain origin - they developed in the same way 
from gametes and so forth - yet one has his actual origin 
essentially while the other has his contingently ; and similarly for 
the other synthetic necessities. To anyone who takes such 
essentialist claims seriously this must seem quite implausible : it is 
impossible that two objects be alike in their actual properties but 
d iffer in the modalities with which they instantiate those 
properties."  22
My own view is that we should push McGinn's point further and hold that the 
denial of independence in the case of these strict synthetic necessities at least, 
is not only implausible but has claim to be (partially)co/7sf/Yt/f/Ve of the modal 
concepts in question.
(7.30) BASE INDISCERNIBILITY AND THE THREAT OF TRIVIALITY 
The second consideration relating to the application of supervenience theses is 
the threat of trivialization of supervenience theses arising from indiscriminate 
conceptions of base indiscernibility.23 If we are concerned to frame 
supervenience theses where the bases are of a highly general nature - such as 
the totality of physical or natural properties of a system - then trouble threatens 
in conjunction with the identity of indiscernibles. If the content of supervenience 
claims makes appeal to the totality of an entity's physical/natural properties this 
compels us to consider maximal physical/natural descriptions. When we 
construe 'maximal description' widely so that it is indeed all of an entity’s
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physical/natural states that are specified in such a description then, 
notwithstanding difficulties about the intelligibilty of such totalities, there is at 
least a threat that any maximal description will apply to, at most, one entity. 
Perhaps the threat can be averted (see below) but the situation is potentially 
dangerous. The thesis of independence (IND):
(IN D ) 0(3x)(3y)(B*x & B*y & A"x & ~A"y)
will turn out to be false (for any A, B) if B-indiscerniblity is sufficient for 
(intra-world) identity i.e. if the thesis (=) holds 
(= ) n(x)(B*x --> (y)(B*y ~>(y = x))
By the same token, if (=) holds then this has the effect of rendering the thesis 
WEAK:
(W EA K) IH[(3x)(B*x & A"x) ~> (y)(B*y ->A"y)]
trivially true.24 The question then is: how good is the claim (=) for a given 
B-family?
The question promises trouble. For one thing it depends upon the operant 
conception of the extent of B-reality: in particular whether B is being held to 
constitute a monistic basis of all that there is. Many authors25 have wanted to 
hold that physical descriptions are quite general in the sense that all that there 
is is physically describable - all of reality is physically realised - even though 
eschewing stronger theses of physicalism. There is no straight answer to the 
question of whether such monistic physicalists will count properties in such a 
way that all physical properties amounts to all properties.
If so, B-indiscernibility will collapse into indiscernibility tout court and the issues 
that arise will then be those that are familiar from the general discussion of the 
identity of indiscernibles.26 For example: can properties admit of purely 
qualitative individuation or need they be distinguished with the help of indexical 
resources? If not, and the monist is intent upon counting properties in such a 
way that there are more properties than there are physical properties, then this 
will involve appeal to some intentional or perhaps even modal distinction in 
order to make that case.
I do not intend to pursue the fine detail of these problems, but it is abundantly 
clear that insofar as these are genuine problems they are thoroughly 
exacerbated when the supervenient base under consideration is the totality of 
actual properties. The idea of a maximal actual description must bring in its
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wake the strongest possible chance of entailing the uniqueness of the satisfier 
of the base description. Anyone who was worried that a genuinely maximal 
physical/natural specification entailed the trivial falsehood of IND (and the trivial 
truth of WEAK) could not be/ess worried by the prospect of invoking a maximal 
actual specification.Furthermore, at least one proposal that has been advanced 
in order to offset the threat of triviality has, disturbingly, no application to the 
modal case.
(7.31) NO_RE_SP!TE VIA A LIMITATION THESIS
Blackburn proposes a 'Limitation Thesis'27 in an attempt to obviate the collapse 
of supervenience theses into triviality. According to the Limitation thesis, there 
must be a specifiable limitation on the kind of B-properties that are involved in a 
base description. Thus he argues that the content of an agent's mental states at 
time t cannot be held to depend upon those physcal properties of the agent by 
which relations to future, as yet non-existent, things are implicated; the moral 
properties of an agent cannot depend on the agent's absolute position of origin. 
In this way there is a chance that the circumscribed base description will be not 
be satisfied uniquely. The limitation thesis is not unproblematic, as even a 
cursory consideration of the examples shows, but what might its application in 
the case of modal supervenience amount to? It must surely be the claim that 
some specifiable actual properties of an object are totally irrelevant to what is 
modally true of it. Upon that basis we could exclude those properties from 
the intended scope of the B-description ( as we might exclude absolute position 
of origin from our moral deliberations). It is by those means that we attempt 
painlessly to remove the threat of specifying (accidentally) all of an object's 
properties. But this manoeuvre will not succeed in the modal case, for given 
any property P of x, x 's  having P is relevant (logically sufficient) to its being 
possibly P and relevant (logically necessary) to its being necessarily P. The 
much weaker claim that some of an object's properties are irrelevant to some 
of its modal properties is thoroughly unexacting and it cannot serve the purpose 
for which the Limitation Thesis was designed.
Now, by way of a rejnoinder, it is arguable that the difficulty that has been raised 
here is beside the point. The threat of trivialization arises only when a maximal 
actual description of an object is invoked whereas the supervenience claims
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that McGinn has in mind are far more specific, relating a limited range of base 
properties to a limited range of associated properties. The claims are more akin 
to the localized claims of supervenience of, say, pain sensations on C-fibre 
states than to the grand claims of supervenience between families of properties 
v\z:the mental on the physical ;the moral on the natural 28 
Now, it is certainly true that McGinn does concentrate on the more limited 
claims; his strategy is to distinguish synthetic from analytic necessities and to 
formulate localized independence theses in each case.29 But even if we are to 
take a position on the individual dependencies irrespective of holistic 
dependence of the modal on the actual, a threat of "trivialization" still arises - 
albeit from a different source - along with other items of interest.
(7.4) SOME MODAL LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING WEAK .
STRONG AND IND IN THE MODAL CASE 
McGinn, as we saw at (7.21), registers his opposition to independence in 
writing:
"....it is impossible that two objects be alike in their actual 
properties but differ in the modalities with which they instantiate 
those properties”. 30 (My emphasis, J.D.)
Under a natural interpretation of this remark, we find that there are logical 
guarantees of the falsehood of the thesis of the independence of the possible 
from the actual, and of the truth of both weak and strong supervenience of the 
possible on the actual.
Let us take "O" to be a schematic marker for a specification of origin - to deploy 
McGinn's example - and "X "as a marker for a modal operator. The modal 
independence schema is (8) :
(8 ) <> (3x)(3y)(Ox & Oy & I(O x) & ~X(Oy))
Instances of the independence thesis will be logically false and (since WEAK is 
equivalent to the negation of IND) instances of the weak supervenience thesis 
logically true when "X" is replaced by a possibility operator "o" as it is in the 
instance (9) :
(9 ) o(3x)(3y)(Ox & Oy & O(Ox) & ~O(0y))
One hesitates to pronounce these instances trivially false. Arguably the logical 
falsehood of these instances reveals something important about the nature of
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modality, given the (alleged) general falsehood of modal independence claims.
It should be noted that the strong supervenience of the possible on the actual, 
as well as the weak supervenience of the possible on the actual emerges as 
logically true. The modal strong supervenience schema - the parallel to the 
modal independence schema (8) - is (10) :
(1 0 ) □  [(3x)(Ox & X(Ox)) ~> □  (y)(Oy ~> X(Oy))] 
and its possibility operator instance (11) :
(11) □  [(3x)(Ox & <>0x) ~> □  (y)(Oy ~> oOy)]
is logically true in virtue of the logical truth of its (necessitated) consequent. So 
the strong and therefore the weak supervenience of the possible on the actual 
are guaranteed logically.
The second point is that when we consider those independence theses which 
are the instances of (8) that result from the insertion of a necessity operator '□  " 
i.e (12):
(1 2 ) o(3x)(3y)(Ox & Oy & □  Ox & ~ □  Oy)
we find that the denial of independence is sufficient for strong supervenience, 
given the truth of independently credible essentialist claims.
To see this, consider the minimum commitment to supervenience (WEAK) that 
is entailed by the rejection of independence. This minimum commitment 
consists in the ban on mixed worlds, but it is distinguished from strong 
supervenience in being consistent with the claim that there are worlds in which 
all of the B* things are non A". In the modal case at hand, this 'difference' which 
is characteristic of weak-but-not-strong supervenience is captured by the thesis
(13 ):
(1 3 ) O(x)(0x --> ~ □  (Ox))
The characteristic claim then is that there could be (to persevere with McGinn's 
example) humans whose origin is such that they have developed (in a certain 
way) from gametes but only contingently so! Consequently, if claims of 
essentiality of origin (or kind, or composition) of the form (14)31:
(1 4 ) □  (x)(O x~>D (Ox))
are accepted as true - and they should be - then the option of 
weak-but-not-strong supervenience is ruled out.
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(7-5) A-DOUBT CONCERNING THE PLAUSIBILTY OF WEAK 
SUPERVENIENCE IN AN ANALYTIC CASF 
The final point that will be made in connection with the application of 
supervenience theses to the modal/actual case concerns what McGinn dubs the 
"analytic necessities". At (7.21) his evaluation of the independence claims with 
respect to synthetic necessities was endorsed whole-heartedly, but the 
evaluation of the denial of independence in such instances proves less 
straightforward. Two examples of weakly supervening analytic necessities are 
offered. I will argue that while the first of these, (I) , when qualified 
appropriately, is supportable, the second, (ii) presents a difficulty.
(i) " Two sentences could not agree in the actual meanings they
have yet differ with respect to their necessity "32
We have seen enough already to appreciate the distinction between reading 
actual sameness in some respect as an intra-world as opposed to an 
inter-world relation. Let us first consider the intra-world comparison.
A source of confusion arises from the problematic interaction of modal 
vocabulary with semantic vocabulary.33 Accordingly it is helpful to introduce 
two further simplifying assumptions: (a) that claims of truth and (sameness o f ) 
meaning apply to sentences relativised to a language; (ii) that the claims made 
in respect of truth and (sameness of) meaning of sentences are relativised to 
the same language throughout and (iii) that if a sentence means in L that P at 
some world, then that sentence means in L that P in all possible worlds.34 
These assumptions are necessary if we are to deflect speculation about such 
matters as the counterfactual variation in meaning of sentences that are 
actually synonymous and the counterfactual existence of distinct languages that 
actually co-exist. This paves the way for a precise statement of this application 
of the independence thesis:
(15) O [ SYNONYMOUS ("Si ","S2",L) & TRUE ("□  S f,L ) &
~TRUE (" □  S2",L) ]
Independence then can be seen to amount to the claim that two sentences of L 
have the same actual meaning (in L) - and hence the same meaning in L at 
every world - yet at some world "S-|" is true in L and it is not the case that, at that 
same world, "S2" is true in L. Once matters are posed in this way it does indeed 
seem that independence has no credibility. Certainly one might indulge in a
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critique of the concept of synonymy, but if any conception of synonymy 
emerges from that process, it seems that it must be constrained by its 
consequences for sameness of truth value of synonymous sentences in the 
same world. Independence seems a violation of a condition which is partly 
constitutive of the concept of synonymy and so we can agree that the 
independence thesis as formulated above is false.35
(ii) nor could two sentences of the same logical form whose 
logical constants have the same meaning differ with respect to the 
modality of their truth-value. "36
There is a good prima facie case in favour of the independence thesis here, for 
there are  cases of sameness of logical form and apparent difference of 
modality of truth-value.
What is it for two sentences to "differ with respect to the modality of their 
truth-value"? Presumably that for some sentences "S-i" and "S2" of L , and 
considering the necessity operator" D"37, we have:
(1 6) □  (TRUE ("SV, !_ ) )& -□  (TRUE ("S2", L))
Now by the accepted truth-theoretic axioms governing " □  " and 38, (16) is 
equivalent to (17):
(1 7 ) TRUE ("DSi", L) & -TRUE ("□  S2", L)
If '□  " is understood as a metaphysical necessity operator then it is clear enough 
that the independence condition can be satisfied, viz:
(1 8 ) TRUE ("□  (x)(Hx --> □  Hx)",L) & -TRUE ("□  (x)(Px - > □  Px)", L)
(Take the L predicates "Hx" and "Px" as having the senses of the respective 
English predicates "x is human" and "x is a postman".) Hence we have a case 
where "Si" and "S2" have the same logical form but differ with respect to the 
modality of their truth-values: the independence thesis so interpreted is true.
It might be mooted that this line of argument can be ruled out on the grounds 
that the author’s intention was to deal with "analytic necessities" and not, 
therefore, metaphysical necessity. But what might these analytic necessities 
be? If "conceptual" necessity is at issue then (18) might still hold depending 
on how that notion is understood. If logical necessity is at issue then we have a 
problem.
If logical necessity is intended as a genuine object language modality requiring 
truth in all logically possible states of affairs then metaphysical necessity and
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logical necessity are absolutely co-extensive. There are absolutely no possible 
worlds in which metaphysical necessities fail to obtain.39 To hold that the 
logically possible worlds are the metaphysically possible worlds is to hold that 
logical and metaphysical necessities are truth-relevantly univocal i.e 
metaphysically modal operators can be re-interpreted as logically modal 
operators (orvice versa ) salva veritate. The essential difference between 
metaphysical and logical necessity will be, broadly, epistemological since it 
pertains to the kind of reason that we have in the respective instances for 
holding the exceptionless (strict/unrestricted) necessity to obtain.The 
consequence of the view that the metaphysically necessary is logically 
necessary (and vice versa) is that there are sentences of the same logical form 
whose logical constants have the same meaning but which differ with respect to 
the modality of their truth-value and, therefore, that the independence thesis 
obtains for logical necessity so understood.
If logical necessity is intended as a formal metalinguistic modality, such as 
Quinean logical truth, then we have a different consequence for independence. 
Quinean logical truths are all and only those sentences which are true under all 
normal re-interpretations of their non-logical constituent expressions.40 
Consequently many metaphysical necessities are not logical truths in Quine's 
sense. However, it is obvious from the definition of Quinean logical truth that it 
is not possible that there could be sentences with the same logical form that 
differ with respect to their logical truth. Independence is false when the modality 
is logical necessity qua logical truth but, it may be felt, trivially so. On the other 
hand the falsehood of independence here, as in the case of synthetic 
possibilities, may be construed as logically determined but substantive.
The upshot is that the evaluation of independence in the case of "logical 
necessity" yields conflicting verdicts once the notion of logical necessity is 
disambiguated and that this at least hinders the repudiation of independence in 
this instance of analytic necessity.
(7.6) ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUPERVENIENCE OF THE MODAL QN THE 
ACTUAL IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR ANY INTERESTING MODAL. 
REALISM.
It is important to arrive at a conception of which are the important consequences
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of this investigation into the application of supervenience theses in the 
modal/actual case. Let us assume that there is no insurmountable difficulty 
associated with the worries expressed at (7.30)/(7.31) - concerning trivialization 
as a consequence of unique satisfaction of base descriptions - and (7.5) - 
concerning the feasibility of an independence claim about logical necessity. 
This assumption allows us to concentrate upon the following substantive 
conclusions.
Firstly, the theses of the weak and the strong supervenience of the possible on 
the actual are logically true (7.4). Secondly, there is every reason to hold that 
the necessary is not independent from the actual and indeed that acceptance of 
this principle may be partially constitutive of competence with modal concepts
(7.21). Thirdly, a class of popular and plausible first-order essentialist claims 
prove to be inconsistent with the thesis that the necessary stands in a relation of 
weak-but-not-strong-supervenience to the actual (7.4). The upshot is that strong 
supervenience of the modal (necessity and possibility) on the actual is secured 
by the combined constraints of norms of modal conceptual competence and 
independently plausible and relatively uncontroversial first-order essentialist 
claims.41
This result might be embraced by a theorist of McGinn's persuasion and 
construed as a vindication of modal realism qua supervenience without 
reduction, but my contention is that it has a different significance. The 
significance of the result is that the acceptance of supervenience without 
reduction cannot be regarded as sufficient for modal realism in any interesting 
sense. It is not sufficient for any interesting modal realism since it is necessary 
for any theory of modal concepts which accepts both that modality is what it is 
and not another thing (no reduction) and that entities which are actually alike 
with respect to the property 0 cannot differ with respect to the essentiality of their 
possession of 0 (no independence). One might wish to insist that any 
remotely plausible theory of modalty must be realist in this sense . This, it seems 
to me, would be disingenuous, but in any event it is clear that the interest of 
"modal realism" cannot lie in its identification with supervenience any more than 
it did in its identification with the repudiation of reduction.42 The lesson which is 
suggested by the consideration of reduction and now supervenience is that to 
locate a realist/anti-realist dispute about modality on the axis of
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independence-supervenience(s)-reduction is simply to locate it on the wrong 
axis.
It would be useful if this case against the "realism-significance" of 
supervenience could be bolstered by an example of an avowed modal 
anti-realist (say a proponent of sceptical paradox and solution) who was also an 
awowed supervenience theorist. I know of no such example but there is an 
interesting comparison to be drawn.
In the case of moral realism the claim that the moral supervenes on the natural 
is taken by Blackburn as a fact whose explicability is a challenge to both realist 
and anti-realist alike. He writes:
"Supervenience claims are very popular in philosophy, because 
they promise some of the advantages of reduction...(b)ut the 
promise is slightly hollow : supervenience is usually quite 
uninteresting by itself. What is interesting is the reason why it 
holds." 43
So on this perspective the supervenience of the moral on the natural is no 
criterion of realism; it is a fait accompli, the explanation of which is a test of the 
relative merits of non-reductionist realist and anti-realist conceptions of the 
moral. To accept as a fait accompli and without further qualification the 
characterization of the relation between the modal and the actual as 
supervenience without reduction would be, as we shall see [(Ch.8] , to exhibit 
undue haste, but the general point is that insofar as the acceptance of this 
characterization requires only the simultaneous denial of reduction and 
independence it earns too easily a victory for "realism". To re-iterate the 
acknowledgement of the supervenience of the modal on the actual is not 
sufficient for any interesting modal realism .
This concludes the criticism of McGinn's deployment of the notion of 
supervenience in the attempt to develop a form of modal realism. However the 
application of the notion of supervenience to the modal case has a further 
dimension of interest which is of central importance to modal theorizing in 
general and to the third grade of modal realism that I will eventually discuss. 
This further dimension of interest of supervenience arises from the fact that the 
consideration of certain interpretations of the supervenience relation leads us to 
confront the issue of conceptualism about modality i.e. the issues of whether, or
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which, purely conceptual sensitivities are involved in our judgements of 
modality. Chapter 8 is given over to these issues before the critique of McGinn's 






A further matter of crucial importance can be portrayed as an aspect of the 
project of formulating and applying theses of supervenience. Since theses of 
supervenience (and independence) are inherently modal, it is no surprise that it 
is important to establish the sort of modality (e.g. logical, metaphysical, 
conceptual, physical) by which a thesis of supervenience is being held to be 
governed.1 The general need to distinguish between metaphysical and 
conceptual varieties of supervenience arises because there are cases in which 
it may plausibly be claimed that a given family of associated properties is 
metaphysically but not conceptually supervenient upon a given base.2 In the 
present case McGinn's proposal is that the relation of the modal to the actual is 
that of supervenience without reduction and the question of which modality is 
being held to govern this supervenience claim is crucial. For when 
supervenience theses are interpreted as being governed by conceptual 
necessity, the matter of their truth generates what is perhaps the most 
fundamental question of modal epistemology i.e. whether modal truths are 
known by conceptual means alone.The first task in the process of investigation 
is to arrive at a firm conception of what a claim of supervenience without 
reduction amounts to.
(8.10) METAPHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE WITHOUT REDUCTION IS 
UNTENABLE IN THE MODAL/ACTUAL CASE.
Blackburn3 and Kim4 formulate theses of supervenience without reduction 
which are equivalent to, in our terms, weak-but-not-strong supervenience. The 
intended content of this thesis is that there is a ban on mixed worlds but, further, 
that there is a world of the kind which strong supervenience cannot tolerate. 
This is to say that there are worlds in which there are B*-things all of which are 
A" a M  worlds in which there are BMhings all of which are non-A". The most 
perspicuous formal representation of this state of affairs is as a conjunction of 




(S W R ) □  {(3x)(B*x & A"x)} & 0(3x)(B*x & A"x) &
□  {(3x)(B*x & ~A"x) ~>(x)(B*x ->  ~A"x)} & <>(3x)(B*x & -A"x).
It has already been demonstrated [(7.4)] that the truth of the first-order 
essentialist claims of necessity of kind, composition and origin requires at least 
Strong metaphysical supervenience of the modal on the actual. Evidently, then, 
metaphysical SWR is inconsistent with these first-order essentialist claims.5 
This fact narrows the options for the theorist (e.g. McGinn) who wishes to 
maintain a position of supervenience-without-reduction of the modal re the 
actual alongside the noted first-order claims of metaphysical necessity. On pain 
of inconsistency, such a theorist must endorse a non-metaphysical 
interpretation of the modality that governs the supervenience-without-reduction 
claim. This is, indeed, the combination of options that McGinn intends to 
advance since his first-order essentialism is advanced alongside frequent 
indications of a conceptual interpretation of the modality that governs his 
favoured thesis of supervenience without reduction. We are, therefore, directed 
towards the consideration of what a conceptual interpretation of SWR amounts 
to and whether its application to the modal/actual case is tenable.
(8.111 INTRODUCING CONCEPTUALISM: CONCEPTUAL (SWR) THESES 
CONTRASTED WITH CONCEPTUAL (NEC) THESES 
Blackburn makes it abundantly clear that claims of SWR are inconsistent with 
claims of B*/A' necessity.6 The latter are formalized as the NEC theses:
(NEC) D(x)(B*x -> A'x)
The main interest of his discussion of conceptual SWR and of B*/A' (conceptual) 
necessity lies in the criterion which he associates with the truth of the latter. He 
endorses the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural and 
explains his opposition to theses of B*/A' necessity in that instance:
".....it does not seem a matter of conceptual or logical necessity that 
any given total natural state of a thing gives it any particular moral 
quality. For to tell which moral quality results from a given natural 
state means using standards whose correctness cannot be shown 
by conceptual means alone. It means moralizing and bad people 
moralize badly but need not be confused. "7




(C) A B*/A" conceptual necessity claim is true only if one can tell 
which A-state results from a given B-state by using standards 
whose correctness can be shown by conceptual means 
alone.
Applying this, the condition of truth of the modal B7A" conceptual necessity 
claim is that one should be able to tell, by using standards whose correctness 
can be shown by conceptual means alone, which modal state (necessary F/ 
contingent F) results from the given (actual) state F. My position will be that this 
condition is satisfied. Henceforth I shall use the term "conceptualism" to refer to 
the thesis that the standards of correctness (of truth) for metaphysically modal 
judgements can be shown by conceptual means alone. My defence of 
conceptualism will be developed in three stages. The first stage of this defence 
is offered in the remainder of this chapter, the second is offered in Chapter 9 
and the final stage in Chapter 10.
(8.12) CONCEPTUALISM ACKNOWLEDGES A POSTERIORI NECESSITIES. 
What would it be to deny conceptualism? It would be to claim that the truth of 
modal judgements cannot be shown by conceptual means alone, i.e. that some 
non-conceptual means are required in order to show that modal judgements 
are true. This, it should be noted, is not to be identified with the suicidal claim 
that only non-conceptual means are required. The latter claim would appear to 
depend not merely upon a faculty of modal "intuition" but upon a faculty of 
modal intuition that operated in the way that sensory perception was once 
supposed to i.e. in such a way as to present to us given facts without troubling 
our conceptual sensitivities.
The characteristic claim of the reasonable opponent of conceptualism, then, will 
be that something over and above our acknowledged conceptual awareness is 
efficacious in modal judgement. Just as non-conceptual sensitivities are 
required in moral judgement8 so non-conceptual sensitivities are required in 
modal judgement. In light of this characterization of reasonable oposition to 
conceptualism it is absolutely crucial to establish the intended scope of the 
conceptualist claim, for otherwise it can come to seem that the opponent of 




There is a sense in which it is clearly true that non-conceptual sensitivities are 
required in order to establish the truth of certain modal judgements, notably the 
a posteriori necessities. That is to say, it is clearly true that our judgement that 
Hesperus is necessarily identical to Phosphorus, or that any stuff that is not the 
element with atomic number 79 cannot be Gold, cannot be justified solely by 
conceptual means. Acknowledgement of this phenomenon is no admission of a 
source of counterexamples to conceptualism but it does force clarification of the 
intended scope of the conceptualist thesis.
The epistemological process which the conceptualist intends to address - and 
the proper analogue of Blackburn's moral example - is that wherein we judge 
whether an actual state of a thing is necessary or contingent once we are aware 
of that actual state. It has been noted that Kripke presents a typical a posteriori 
necessity (" □P") asthe modus ponens conclusion of (i) an a posteriori and 
non-modal minor premise ("P") and (ii) an a priori and modal major premise 
("P~> □  P").9 We can articulate the present point in the context of the modus 
ponens representation of a posteriori modal knowledge in stating that it is 
neither the minor premise, nor the conclusion to which conceptualism speaks 
but to the modally efficacious and a priori major premise.
The proper question is whether non-conceptual sensitivities are required for the 
purposes of our deliberations in the transition from awareness of an actual state 
of a thing to awareness of the (non-)contingency of the thing's having that state. 
If the answer to that question is to be "yes", then the opponent of conceptualism 
can claim either that some familiar but non-conceptual sensitivity suffices to 
account for our modal beliefs,or that we require a special non-conceptual 
modal sensitivity or faculty. Thus the opponent of conceptualism appears to be 
faced with a choice between empiricism or platonism in the epistemology of 
modality and neither of these approaches is acceptable. I will explain how the 
conceptualist offers a viable alternative to these approaches in Ch.9 where I 
state my criticisms of McGinn's conception of modal epistemology. Meanwhile I 
will proceed with the development of a conceptualism that eschews the 
empiricist and platonist models of our sensitivity to modality.
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(8 -20) UNACCEPTABLE VERSIONS OF CONCEPTUALISM REPUDIATED 
I want to say that we should insist that all a priori knowledge falls under the 
constraints imposed by conceptualism. Thus, conceptualism (as presently 
intended) about pure mathematics is quite in order. However I want to distance 
this conceptualism about the a priori from various theses which may be 
purported to follow from it. There are many sources of criticism of the thought 
that a priori knowledge in general, and modal knowledge in particular, can be 
established on the basis of conceptual sensitivities alone. In dealing with these,
I hope to support my prefered brand of conceptualism by distancing it from a 
variety of (more broadly) conceptualist theses which I consider to be 
discredited. The three major difficulties that may be anticipated are unwanted 
associations with the univocity of a priori knowledge [(8.21)]; the analyticity of 
modal claims [(8.220)-(8.221)]; and inappropriate standards of correctness in 
conceptually determined judgements [(8.230)-(8.232)].
(8.21) THE UNIVOCITY OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
I do not intend to endorse the quite implausible claim that there is a 
homogeneous or univocal epistemology of the a priori. The a priori is not a 
recognitional capacity or faculty - a priority is a predication that applies to 
recognitional capacities or to judgements arrived at by the exercise of such 
recognitional capacities. Different recognitional capacities are exercised in 
each of the folowing judgements:/70 person could have been an inanimate 
object; the cube root of 1728 is 12 ; all bachelors are male . These judgements 
(or the capacities that give rise to them) are unified by their a priority but it is 
quite clear that the kind of grounds that an individual has for asserting any one 
of these propositions is quite different from those pertaining to the assertion of 
any other. We should no more say that these judgements are the product of a 
single recognitional capacity in virtue of all being a priori than we should say 
that the judgements: there are Wolves in France; post-boxes in Britain are red 
and Moses lived over two thousand years ago are the product of a single 
recognitional capacity in virtue of the fact that they are all a posteriori.
(8.220) ANALYTICITY AS INDEFEASABILITY,
Quine's "near as we can get" characterization of analyticity has it that a
147
148
sentence is analytic iff it commands assent come what may.10 Since it has been 
argued that Quine's critique of the analyticit/synthetic distinction is intended as a 
critique of the necessary/contingent distinction,11 and especially in the context 
of avowed conceptualism about modal claims, it seems natural to charge that 
the (conceptualist) necessitarian is open to whatever charges are appropriate to 
the proponent of analyticity.
The first point of note within this charge is the insinuated co-extensiveness of 
the necessary/contingent distinction with the defeasible/indefeasible distinction. 
We can remain agnostic on the isuue of whether any statement (sentence?) is 
unrevisable and challenge this insinuation by pointing out that some of the 
strongest candidates for indefeasabiliv are uncontentiously (metaphysically) 
contingent by normal criteria e.g there are (timelessly) sentient beings , some 
surfaces are red .
The second point is that we need not and should not moot (purported) necessity 
as a guarantor or even an accompaniment of indefeasability. In order that this 
point be made clearly, it is important to tackle a potential source of confusion in 
the discussion of the analyticity of a purported necessity. Consider a claim of 
analyticity as it applies to a sentence of the form (1):
(1 ) □  (x)(Fx --> Gx)
where the modality is metaphysical. There are two questions that may be 
thought relevant to the matter of analyticityqua indefeasability:
(i) Does the sentence inside the scope of the necessity operator have 
analytic status i.e. is the sentence "(x)(Fx --> Gx)" unrevisable ?
(ii) Does the whole modalized sentence have analytic status i.e. is the 
sentence " □  (x)(Fx --> Gx)" unrevisable?
Clearly there is a genuine distinction here. Any grounds for the withdrawal of 
assent in the former case will be a fortiori grounds for the withdrawal of assent 
in the latter. However, withdrawal of assent in the latter case may be on grounds 
that require the repudiation of the necessity of the generalization but not its 
actual truth i.e. we may come to believe that a generalization previously held to 
be true and necessary is true and contingent.
The conceptualism that I wish to defend finds no difficulty in accepting both 
that many statements concerning the actual world, whose necessitations we 
currently endorse, could come to merit our dissent and that some statements
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presently held to be necessary will come to be held only contingently true. Were 
we to resist either of these possibilities this would be tantamount to dismissing 
out of hand the view that our modal outlook was capable of improvement and 
susceptible to criticism and this, I say, we should not do. (See Ch.10).
(8.221) ANALYTICITY AS TRUTH IN VIRTUE OF MEANING ALONE 
There is absolutely no reason why the conceptualism that is being proposed 
here should be identified with the view that claims of metaphysical necessity are 
true in virtue of meaning alone. Perhaps, as Wiggins12 suggests, we have 
greatest hope of generating these truths from artefact kind terms and other items 
that are subject to definition or a specification of nominal essence. Perhaps, as 
Putnam13 suggests, we should acknowledge a class of relatively trivial truths in 
virtue of meaning alone without reading into this the indefeasibility of cherished 
and entrenched statements of scientific theory. Perhaps, as Wright14 suggests, 
we must recognize as "a hard fact" that our linguistic training secures our assent 
to certain previously unencountered sentences without recourse to empirical 
investigation and view this as the basis of a category of truths in virtue of 
meaning alone. All of these lines are persuasive in their own way but I 
emphasize that conceptualism in the present sense does not depend upon 
establishing that there are truths in virtue of meaning alone. The conceptualism 
that I defend is not definition-oriented and consequently it can be explained why 
an interesting class of necessity statements are not "analytic" in another familiar 
sense of the term.
A relatively strict (Fregean) characterization has it that the analytic statements 
are those that can be derived from logical truths in conjunction with explicit 
definitions.15 But the terms that we would need to introduce into any such 
procedure in order to generate familiar essentialist claims, notably natural kind 
terms, are undefinable. 16
The position is then that although governed by the epistemological constraint of 
conceptualism - to tell which modal states result from a given natural state 
means using standards whose correctness can be shown by conceptual means 
alone - claims of metaphysical necessity are not analytic i.e. neither 
indefeasible nor true (if true) in virtue of meaning alone. Once we have 
eschewed the association of judgements whose standards of correctness can
149
150
be shown by conceptual means alone with analyticity, there seems to be no 
further obstacle to identifying the class of judgements characterized by the 
general conceptualist thesis with the class of a priori judgements. We can say 
that judgements of metaphysical necessity are, like mathematical judgements, 
synthetica priori claims.
(8.230) THE STANDARDS OF CORRECTNESS IN CONCEPTUAL 
JUDGEMENTS AND THE RULE-FOLLOWING 
CONSIDERATIONS
The question of the standard of correctness of modal judgements (construed a^  
la conceptualism) will be raised in the context of Wittgenstein's problematic 
concerning what it is (correctly) to follow a rule.17 The rule-following 
problematic is invoked for two reasons. Firstly, because the theorist of 
metaphysical necessity cannot simply ignore the rule-following problematic 
given the implications it threatens for our thinking about the a priori quite 
generally and secondly, because by proceeding in this fashion we can shed 
light on the important matter of the degree of objectivity that is implied in the 
notion of standards of correctness that can be demonstrated by conceptual 
means alone. I will indicate [(8.231)] how judgements of metaphysical modality 
can be likened to instances of (maximally) pure rule-following and then I will 
discount several conceptions of the standard of correctness appropriate to such 
judgements [(8.232)]
(8.231) JUDGEMENTS OF METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY AS 
INSTANCES OF PURE RULE-FOLLOWING
Wright18 describes the correct application of a rule as a two-fold sensitivity 
involving: (i) sensitivity to relevant features of a presented situation and (ii) 
sensitivity to what - in respect of those features - will fit or fail to fit a rule. Even 
though actual rule-following, the production of "steps", involves the interaction of 
reactions of both kinds, it is (ii) that is the locus of interest in the rule-following 
considerations. These "R-informed" responses are those that are only possible 
for agents who have an inkling of the rule whilst the others are those that may 
be possible for other agents. In practice, the R-informed responses will not 
always be separable from the others given that the cognitive processes that
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result in the production of a step may involve the "holistic interaction" of both 
kinds of response. However there are cases in which it seems that, at least to a 
very great extent, extricabilitv is possible. Making a move in chess, it is argued, 
is one such case. Take the example of castling :
"Correctly castling in the course of a game of chess, for instance, 
will depend both on apprehension of the configuration of the 
chessmen at the time of the move [non R-informed -J.D.] and on a 
knowledge of whether the configuration (and the previous course of 
the game) permits castling at this point [R-informed - J.D]."19 
In such cases of extricability the output "step", Wright indicates, can be 
represented as the product of a modus ponens step given a major premise 
(R-informed) and a minor premise (non R-informed).
The canonical procedure for arriving at a posteriori judgements of metaphysical 
necessity is subject to illuminating (and slight) re-description in this light. We 
might say that, typically, a judgement of metaphysical necessity depends upon 
the exercise of two kinds of sensitivities that we have. There are those 
sensitivities which are operative in our judging that an individual indeed falls 
under a particular concept F and those which are involved in judging the 
modality with which that individual instantiates that concept. In practice there 
will be no question of separating the responses which relate to the application 
of the concept F from those which relate to the application of the modality. For 
example, it is arguable that someone who agrees with us in all judgements 
concerning whether a natural kind predicate "Px" is applicable to presented 
individuals but who lacks (somehow) the ability to respond as a modalizer has 
not in fact grasped our concept - for to grasp that concept is inter alia to 
understand that it is a natural kind concept and to grasp all the implications that 
this has for its application in counterfactual contexts etc. However, this does not 
stop us from wanting to distinguish in our own case, kinds of sensitivities which 
are at least salient at distinguishable "stages" of the procedure of modal 
judgement - hence the notion of the two-fold a priori/a posteriori canonical 
procedure.
Viewed in this way, an a priori major premise of the modal justification (2):
(2) (x)(Px ~ > D mPx)
can be identified as encapsulating the R-informed judgement that instantiations
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of the concept for which "P" stands are subject to the application of the rule of 
metaphysical necessitation. This extricability from non-R-informed judgement is 
a mark of a priority or, what is the same thing, the province of conceptualism.20 
Insofar as we can liken the application of a metaphysical modality to a move 
that depends only upon one kind of sensitivity - i.e. a purely conceptual, 
rule-informed, modal response - we liken it to an instance of (maximally) pure 
rule-following. This is to press further the conceptualist affinity of the 
mathematical and the modal, for the classical case of knowing how to continue 
an arithmetic series derives its special interest from its status as maximally pure 
rule-folowing requiring essentially only knowledge of the preceeding elements 
of the series and knowledge of what the concepts require of us.
My point in instigating this comparison of modal and mathematical judgements 
with respect to their status as instances of (maximally) pure rule-following is to 
raise the question of the objectivity of the standard of correctness of modal 
judgements. Since modal judgements have standards of correctness that can 
be established by conceptual means alone and judgements that have 
standards of correctness that can be established by conceptual means alone 
are instances of pure rule-following we can regard modal judgements as 
instances of pure rule-following. Then, finally, the standard of correctness that is 
appropriate in modal judgements is set by the standard of correctness of 
judgements of rule-following.
My hope is that it may prove possible to indicate a line of response to the 
rule-following problematic that earns the modal conceptualist the right to 
proceed unfettered by the suspicion that an unacceptable conception of what a 
concept requires of us is being smuggled in among the conceptualist baggage. 
However, the quest to understand the implications of Wittgenstein's 
rule-following considerations is not so much a project that occupies 
"post-analytic" philosophers as the paradigm within which they work. I do not 
claim to do justice to these issues here, for they are simply too large to be 
treated in the context of this thesis at the length they merit. However, by way of 
a compromise between a full discussion and an embarrassing silence I will rely 
(further) on the work of Crispin Wright21 in order to delineate the salient forms of 
response to the rule-following problematic and then indicate the standing of 
these lines of response to the conceptualism I wish to defend
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(8-232) THREE UNACCEPTABLE CONCEPTIONS OF THE STANDARD 
OF CORRECTNESS OF PURE RULE-FOLLOWING 
JUDGEMENTS : QUIETISM. SCEPTICAL SOLUTION AND 
PLATONISM.
I will deal, in all, with five responses to the rule-following problematic. Here I will 
deal with the first three options and in Ch.10 I compare the two remaining 
options and indicate which of these the most defensible version of modal 
realism should incorporate. Of the five options it would seem that only three 
(platonism and the two options of Ch.10) are consistent with any remotely 
recognizably realist attitude to modality since only these entail that there is such 
a standard of truth for judgements which are the products of pure rule-following. 
Here I indicate briefly, my grounds for rejecting three kinds of response, i.e the 
two recognizably non-realist responses of quietism and sceptical solution, as 
well as the platonist response.
(a) Quietism
The first conception of rule-following that I wish to mention may be termed 
"official Wittgensteinianism"22 or "quietism" 23 The hallmark of this attitude is a 
despair of constitutive questions i.e. the attitude that we must reject as improper 
the question of what it is that makes it the case that a given step is a correct 
application of a rule. The phenomenon that we purport to explain in pursuing 
the constitutive question is the phenomenon of agreement in judgements and a 
philosophical error is embodied in thinking that there can be any such 
explanation. It is difficult to appreciate where acceptance of this view would 
leave us, but it is difficult not to read into it an antipathy to the enterprise of 
familiar philosophizing such as the present attempt to formulate and evaluate a 
thesis of modal realism. I do not understand the consequences of quietist 
acceptance well enough to see how to argue against it or indeed to see 
whether there can be argument against it. The best that I can do is to register my 
view that there is a point in pursuing constitutive questions and proceed 
accordingly.
All of the remaining options - here and in Ch.10 - are those which consider 
constitutive questions legitimate and offer some form of substantive responses 
to the question of what it is that makes it the case that a given step is a correct
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application of a rule.
(b) Sceptical solution
First among the non-quietist options and second overall is the sceptical solution 
(a.k.a. "non-cognitivism"/"irrealism") i.e. the response of Kripke's Wittgenstein.24 
The central features of this sceptical solution are: (i) that judgements concerning 
the application of a rule in a new case are evaluable in terms of assertibility not 
truth; (ii) that both the explanation of the point of invoking a distinction between 
correctly and erroneously applying a rule, and the assertibility conditions of 
claims concerning the correct application of a rule make essential reference to 
the community.25 A claim of the type x is following rule R (e.g x means y in 
using z) is assertible whenever (roughly) x's R-informed responses are in 
agreement with the responses of other members of the community and x can be 
trusted in his (or her) R-centred activities. The intention of this response is 
clearly to establish that nothing constitutes truth for claims that a rule is being 
followed and that in this respect these claims are to be contrasted with objective 
judgements.
I have explained elsewhere [Ch.6] my view that the thesis of semantic 
non-cognitivism ought to be separated from what is essential to a sceptical 
solution, namely non-descriptivism, and I have explained my view that the 
distinction between truth and assertibility that is sought in this context has not 
been substantiated. On this basis I would oppose the non-cognitivist component 
of the response of Kripke's Wittgenstein. This leaves open the question of the 
descriptive role of "claims" concerning what counts as following a rule and it is 
an important and difficult question. I will argue elsewhere [Ch.11] that the 
non-descriptive status of a class of claims cannot be established on the basis 
that the acceptance of the claims is associated with the acceptance of a 
commitment to act or think in a particular way nor on the basis that they have a 
normative role. Insofar as the case for the non-descriptive nature of 
rule-following claims depends on these considerations the arguments of 
Chapter 11 support a rejection of that case. Insofar as the case for 
non-descriptivism draws support outwith these considerations I have no 
argument to offer against it.
(c) Platonism
The first positive response to the question of what constitutes the truth of
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judgements concerning the following of a rule, and the third response overall, 
is the Platonistic conception.This is the position which Wittgenstein clearly 
repudiates in his attack on the picture of going on in the same way in the 
application of a rule as a matter of cognizing a fact which obtains quite 
independently of any deliberations concerning the requirements of the rule.
This is the objectivist picture that Wittgenstein articulates in the conception of 
"rules as rails"26 and I will proceed on the assumption that Wittgenstein's 
refutation of this objectivist syndrome is decisive. Consequently I have no 
interest in trying to earn a platonistic standard of correctness for modal 
judgements on the basis of platonistic standards of correctness in 
rule-following. I admit happily that a modal realism after this fashion would be 
wholly unacceptable.
In rejecting these unacceptable standards I am registering my conception of 
what acceptable (modal) conceptualism does not entail and this constitutes the 
last of the three clarifications of conceptualism that were announced [(8.20)] as 
comprising the remaining work of this chapter. However, as yet there has been 
no claim concerning the standards of correctness of judgements which an 
acceptable conceptualism does incorporate. The two options that remain in the 
way of positive responses to the constitutive question, and which stand as 
candidates to sustain a realist and conceptualist conception of modality, will be 
considered in Ch. 10 where I will attempt to show how the third style of modal 
realism that will be considered is not only consistent with,but draws support 
from, a considered response to Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations.
In Chapter 9 , 1 return to the critique of McGinn's representation of modal realism 




McGINN’S MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY AS SCEPTICAL PARADOX 
AND THE CONCEPTUALIST ALTERNATIVE
(9.0) INTRODUCTION
McGinn finds the thesis of supervenience without reduction congenial to his 
formulation of realism since supervenience leaves room for an epistemological 
asymmetry of base and associated properties. It does not follow from the fact 
that the A-truths supervene on the B-truths, and the fact that faculty X is 
appropriate to the cognition of B-states that faculty X is appropriate to the 
cognition of A-states.1This asymmetry permits the claim that while the modal 
supervenes on the actual, the faculty whereby we cognize modalities may be 
problematic relative to those whereby we cognize actual states of affairs. 
McGinn construes the presence of such relatively problematic cognitive 
faculties as a signal of realism (in general), and he claims that cognition of 
modality is problematic relative to cognition of actual states of affairs. He argues 
convincingly that knowledge of modalities is non-empirical both relative to a 
crude (perceptibility) criterion of the empirical and relative to a more 
sophisticated criterion (i.e. empirical non-conservativeness in Field's sense).2 
More specifically, modal knowledge is a priori and this is what its 
epistemologically problematic nature, and the crux of modal realism, consists in. 
A priori truths are characterized as those that may be known without any 
causal interaction with the subject matter of some justifying statement and the 
problem is, supposedly, that the only theory of knowledge that we have is one 
which explains our knowing in terms of causal interaction with appropriate 
subject matter. Modal knowledge is problematic because we cannot represent 
modal facts as causally explaining our knowledge of them and so we are 
confronted with a seemingly grim dilemma in the face of the desire to maintain 
that we have modal knowledge i.e. either we accept the possibility of 
non-causal influence on the mind or we give up the idea that knowledge results 
from what is known!3
In order that we can be absolutely clear about McGinn's conception of the 
position in which the realist is left I will quote his final remarks at some length. 
"...(M)odality is not perceptible: we cannot perceive modality (have
156
157
an impression' of necessity) because modal knowledge is a priori, 
and a priori knowledge is not, by definition, based on the kind of 
causal process involved in exercises of the faculty of perception 
but note that the definition of the a priori does not tell us how a 
priori knowledge is acquired: the characterisation is entirely  
negative. Of course names of appropriate a priori faculties are not 
far to seek: 'reason', 'intuition', and the like. But these do not afford 
any real hint as to the mechanism or mode of operation of the 
faculties denoted. The point can be put generally and intuitively as 
follows: our conception of knowledge - that is, of the relation 
between knowledge and reality - construes the state of knowing as 
somehow the effect of that which is known. Thus perceptual 
knowledge is our basic model of how knowledge comes about (the 
causal theory of knowledge is built upon this model): and we 
conceive of other kinds of knowledge - in memory or by induction - 
as approximating more or less closely to this model. But with a 
priori knowledge the model seems to break down altogether. Either 
we try to conceive of a non-causal mode of influence upon the 
knowing mind, which seems incoherent; or we decide to give up the 
idea that knowledge somehow results from what is known, which 
leaves us perplexed about what such knowledge consists in and in 
want of an alternative conception. ...The epistemological problem 
with modality is, then, that we cannot represent modal facts as 
causally explaining our knowledge of them. And the trouble with 
this is that we have no other going theory of knowledge. We thus 
reach the uncomfortable position of agreeing that there is a priori 
knowledge but not understanding how such knowledge comes 
about. And this, it seems to me, is the form that the problematic 
epistemology of modal realism takes. My own view is that we are 
here confronted by a genuine and intractible conflict between what 
our metaphysics demands and what our epistemology can allow. If 
modal realism is to be finally accepted, it must find some way of 
alleviating the conflict to which it gives r/’se."4
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The supervenience thesis in his hands amounts, as he recognizes, to no more 
than a denial of independence and when it comes to explaining how or why 
supervenience obtains, the theorizing peters out. He remarks :
What is difficult, here as elsewhere, is to give an illuminating 
explication of the supervenience relation: to specify exactly how 
the statements in the domain of the relation determine the truth of 
statements in its range. Unfortunately, I have no very interesting 
suggestions to make along these lines: but, as Nagel says in 
another connection, one can know that something is true without 
yet knowing how it can be." 9
Now were we, somehow, sufficiently secure in the conviction that we indeed 
cognize modalities and had to hand a theory of how we know, the puzzle of 
supervenience might be (temporarily) tolerable, but the singular striking fact 
about modality is that neither a firm prior metaphysical conception of modal 
reality nor any familiar faculty or means of belief formation is available to 
provide a way of cantilevering the other.This paucity of explanatory or 
elucidatory content in the style of modal realism that McGinn develops is 
somewhat obscured by the discussion of a large number of related issues. But, 
in essence, the modal realist is being forced into a predicament in which it 
becomes obligatory to present an argument a la Moore10 (ethics) or 
Godel11 (mathematics) for a faculty of intuition . In Moore's argument for ethical 
intuitionism it is taken as a premise that we have moral knowledge, the further 
claim that this knowledge could not be the product of empirical recognition is 
then introduced in conjuction with the first premise to yield ( by inference to the 
best explanation?) the conclusion that there is an efficacious but non-empirical 
faculty of moral cognition.12 Both Moore's ethical intuitionism and the 'modal 
intuitionism' towards which McGinn's realist is propelled are in clear respects 
challenges to a naturalistic conception of knowledge as, indeed, is Godel's 
(epistemological) intuitionism about mathematics. At least in mathematics there 
is a well-entrenched inclination to construe the relevant sector of reality as 
consisting in an array of abstract objects.13 The case of morality provides no 
such firm metaphysic but does yield, surely, a firm commitment that no special 
objects are implicated in the assumption that moral statements may be true. In 
the case of modality the nature of reality is sharply controversial. If we take the
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objectual realist's standpoint then the temptation will be - and Lewis succumbs 
to this14 - to attempt to use this firm conception of the truth condition to dislodge 
a fully general causal condition on knowledge. The position in which McGinn's 
dialectic strands the non-objectual realist is one wherein the non-objectual 
realist is bound to attempt to dislodge the general causal condition on knowing 
on the basis of what is a far more slender metaphysic i.e. a modal reality which 
supervenes on the actual . I am not, of course, suggesting that the proper 
reaction to this comparison of objectual and non-objectual realism is to retract 
opposition to objectual realism about modality. However, we must, I think, 
acknowledge that an objectual realist such as Lewis comes off better than 
McGinn's non-objectual realist in at least having his metaphysics to comfort 
him.15
In sum McGinn's realist will be left with no conception of how modal statements 
can be trueor how these truths can be known and were we indeed compelled 
toward the position that this doubly binding sceptical paradox bequeaths us, a 
search for a sceptical solution would, I contend, seem a more fruitful endeavour 
than a blank insistence that modal truths are known. However, there is an 
alternative to McGinn's terminus and so the hopes for a tenable modal realism 
are yet alive. These hopes will be pursued and evaluated in the third and final 
section of the thesis but before pursuing that option it is necessary to undermine 
the epistemological dialectic which McGinn advances and which leads to the 
untenable position of sceptical paradox. This latter task will occupy the 
remainder of this chapter.
(9.20) THE AIM OF REPRESENTING FACTS AS CAUSALLY EXPLAINING 
OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THEM IS ILL-CONCEIVED.
McGinn's definitive statement of the epistemological problem with modality is as 
follows:
"....(w)e cannot represent modal facts as causally explaining our 
knowledge of them. And the trouble is that we seem to have no 
other going theory of knowledge. We thus reach the uncomfortable 
position of agreeing that there is a priori knowledge but not 
understanding how such knowledge comes about. "16 
There would be a sharp problem for modal epistemology were it the case that
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the enterprise of representing various realms of facts as causally explaining our 
knowledge of them had broad and successful application while modal 
knowledge, or indeed a priori knowledge in general, remained as a recalcitrant 
surd outwith the scope of that style of explanation. However, this scenario 
simply does not obtain.
There is a permanent temptation to construe all kinds of knowledge as 
instantiating the model of perceptual knowledge and, as McGinn himself 
indicates, the causal theory of knowledge is built on this model.17 Now given 
that the causal theory of knowledge is built on the perceptual model, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that we should reach the most favourable evaluation 
of its explanatory potential by considering its application in that sphere. By the 
lights of the causal theory, the problem with modal knowledge is that we cannot 
represent modal facts as causally explaining our knowledge of them.We should 
be able to improve our appreciation of the kind of illumination we thereby lack 
in the modal case by considering how we are able to represent perceptual facts 
as causally explaining our knowledge of them.
(9.21) THE CAUSAL THEORY CANNOT EVEN ACCOMMODATE ALL OF 
PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE.
It is clearly the case that our perceptual mechanisms are appropriate objects of 
scientific study and that our perceptual states are accordingly susceptible to 
causal explanation. However, it is necessary to distinguish the primary property 
case from its secondary property counterpart with regard to the representation 
of facts in causal explanations of our knowledge of them, for in this matter 
primary properties occupy a unique position. The point is that the vocabulary of 
systematic and maximally accurate causal explanation is primary property 
vocabulary. As such, in the context of causal explanation of our primary property 
perceptual awareness, the description of the states of which we are aware is a 
representation of those states in homogeneous vocabulary. This is not the case 
when we turn to secondary property (say,colour) perception. Causal 
explanations of an agent's perception of the colour of a surface do not involve 
the description of {because in secondary property vocabulary - they involve 
descriptions of surfaces in terms of the primary properties in virtue of which, we 
might say, the facts about its colour obtain. Consequently, we cannot say of
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even secondary property facts" that they can be represented as causally 
explaining our knowledge of them, and the point obtains with even greater 
strength in relation to all sorts of other facts our awareness of which would not 
normally be considered to be a priori, such as the states of mind of others, the 
cruelty of an action. No doubt some may balk at the very idea that such states 
should be counted as facts, but no dispute over the scope of the factual should 
be permitted to detract from the application of the present point to the 
paradigmatically (for standard empiricism) factual secondary properties.
A further important point has to be made in connection with the idea that we can 
provide causal explanations of perceptual knowledge. What was referred to in 
the previous paragraph were causal explanations of perceptual experience 
and while intimately related to perceptual belief (and knowledge), perceptual 
experience must be distinguished from perceptual belief. Clearly we want to 
distinguish categorically intentional (propositional) content from phenomenal 
(experiential) content on general grounds. But even in the case of perceptual 
knowledge were we can expect the closest of connections between 
phenomenal content (experiences of redness) and the intentional content of 
judgements (believing that x is red) we need to be clear that perceptual 
experience stands in no constitutive or direct relation to perceptual belief (or 
knowledge). We might say that at best the phenomenal content of an agent's 
perceptual states fixes the content of belief concerning the apparent colour of a 
surface.But this belief will then be integrated in the holistic network of the totality 
of the agent's attitudes and then the agent may judge -in aiming at the truth - 
that x is orange given background beliefs to that lead him or her to introduce 
some compensatory or corrective component in the judgement of the colour of 
x.
The considerations raised in the last two paragraphs have been developed in 
the context of the purported bastion of the causal theory of knowledge i.e. 
perception. They have related to non-inferential knowledge and scenarios in 
which the known fact is relatively comfortably construed as constituted by, or 
true in virtue of a locatable and neatly packaged complex physical state. In sum, 
we have considered conditions which are most favourable to the causal theory 
of knowledge and we still find that we have had to qualify in fundamental ways 
the claim that, in these instances, we can represent the facts as causally
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explaining our knowledge of them. This should lead us to be extremely guarded 
in our acceptance of the claim that our best (only?) going theory of knowledge is 
based on the idea that, in general, we can represent facts of a given kind as 
causally explaining our knowledge of them.
(9.22) ALL STATES OF MIND ARE CAUSED BUT THE HOPE OF CAUSAL 
EXPLANATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE IS FORLORN.
What, then,can be said about the role of causal relations between the agent 
and the world in the acquisition of knowledge?
Any moderately naturalistic response to this question will take off from the 
commitment that there cannot be (in McGinn's phrase) "non-causal influence on 
the knowing mind" if this is taken to mean that there are (physically realized) 
states of the mind that are not the product of causal processes. However, there 
is every reason to believe that it is a forlorn hope that we can have causal 
accounts of the ontogeny of intentional states - (x believes that P being an 
instance of a general case) - that are anything other than rough, schematic, to a 
large extent ad hoc and confined to individual agents. For even if it proved 
possible to characterize in "complete" detail the physical processes of 
"organism-environment interaction" there are considerations from every angle 
that obviate the prospects of whipping up an explanatory theory of knowledge 
on this basis.
(a) The putative causes (i.e. the facts) are liable to be physically hetrogeneous. 
There is no reason to expect that, even if there are such things, the physical 
complexes that constitute the satisfaction conditions of "x is 0", will constitute a 
physical kind for any but a very few substituends of 0 .(Consider the 
substituends "French","courageous","a chair", "late".)
(b) The causal routes from facts to head are equally likely to be physically 
disparate. Many different cocktails of perception, inference and communication 
can be expected to apply across cases in which agents have the true belief that 
London is in England.
(c) The putative effects (i.e states of agents in which the relevant propositional 
attitude (network) is realized) are likely to prove physically heterogeneous. 
Again there is no reason to expect, far less insist, that two individuals of whom 




The arguments against the thesis that we can represent facts as causally 
explaining our knowledge of them it are familiar enough and I will not pursue 
their elaboration here.19
(9.3) A PRIORITY  AND THE DISTINCT PROBLEMS OF THE OBJECTUAL 
AND NON-OBJECTUAL MODAL REALIST 
There are more and less far-reaching conclusions that one might be tempted to 
draw from the acceptance of the critique of the causal explanation strategy in 
epistemology. It may seem a natural step to proceed boldly to the conclusion 
that there is no special problem for the epistemology of modality : we cannot 
represent modal or any other facts as causally explaining our knowledge of 
them. While the latter claim may well be true I agree with McGinn that special 
difficulties arises for our purported knowledge of modality and moreover that 
these trace to a priority, but I disagree with him as to the nature of the problem 
that the a priori presents.
According to McGinn, the hallmark of a priori truths, and the fact that makes 
them a genuine source of epistemological perplexity, is that they can be known 
without causal interaction with the subject matter of some justifying statement.20 
This view of the problematic nature of the a priori would be more appropriate if 
we were dealing with a conception of the facts - the subject matter of justifying 
statements - that renders them incapable of standing in any causal relation to 
the "knowing" agent. Such a conception of the facts in the modal case is 
characteristic of the genuine objectual modal realist,21 but, surprisingly, 
McGinn gives the impression that the same kind of problem with respect to 
causation is common to objectual and non-objectual realist alike.In the context 
of his critique of Lewis's objectual realism and having introduced how the 
causal isolation of other worlds gives rise to the objection that nothing can be 
known about them, he continues:
"The general point here is that we cannot get into epistemic contact 
with entities so remote from the sphere of actuality in which we are 
condemned to toil. "22
Quite! But he then voices a doubt about the dialectical power of this point 
against objectual modal realism "aionel' since... /(OVER)
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modality gives rise to such epistemological problems even 
when non-objectually construed; so the underlying difficulty is not 
escaped by abolishing the worlds. "23
This is surely wrong, for as long as we make no ontological commitment to 
possibilia the states of affairs in virtue of which (actual) things have their 
properties essentially, accidentally, or whatever are not isolated from us in the 
way that possibilia are supposed to be and this is an important difference. It is 
important because the kind of problem that is generated for modal epistemology 
is now seen to be quite unlike that facing the number-theoretic platonist and 
more like that facing the moral realist . The locii of values and modalities are 
uncontroversiallyftere and causally efficacious - it is the apparent strangeness 
of the states and not the accessibility of the entities that are in the states that is 
the source of puzzlement. However, once we take the view that this fact - i.e. 
that these states of things cannot be represented as causally explaining our 
knowledge of them - does not amount to any strangeness , we will be left 
awaiting an account of what other considerations might be thought to stand in 
the way of our treating them as genuine features of the world. This and related 
matters will occupy centre-stage shortly but I will end this discussion by 
returning to McGinn's dilemma of a priority in order to offer a conceptualist 
response and to indicate an alternative conception of what it is that the 
problematic nature of the a priori does consist in.
(9.40) THE DILEMMA OF A PRIORITY - A CONCEPTUALIST RESPONSE 
The supposed dilemma of a priority is this:
"...(w )ith a priori knowledge the model seems to break down 
altogether. Either we try to conceive of a non-causal mode of 
influence upon the knowing mind, which seems incoherent; or we 
decide to give up the idea that knowledge somehow results from 
what is known, which leaves us perplexed about what such 
knowledge consists in and in want of an alternative conception."24 
The conceptualist25 will respond to this challenge directly.
A priori knowledge is conceptual knowledge. Conceptual knowledge does not 
emerge as the product of a non-causal influence on the knowing mind - the 
conceptualist can freely admit that the complex processes that constitute an
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individual's acquisition of concepts and reflection concerning the compliants of 
those concepts are processes that are under appropriate descriptions covered 
by causal explanation. The acquisition of a concept is not a non-causal process 
- it is not an exercise of platonic intuition. This much can be accepted without 
claiming either (i) that there is always a general and non-trivial causal 
characterization of all of the instances of a concept F ; or further (ii) that there is 
always a causal characterization of all of the instances ofF which can in turn 
sustain a general causal characterization of the process which constitutes the 
acquisition of the concept F  on the part of all relevant agents; or yet further (iii) 
that we can expect a general causal characterization of the process whereby 
the acquisition of the concept F gives rise to the formation of modal beliefs of 
the type that it is not possible that anything that isF could not have been non-F . 
It will be clear from the foregoing that the conceptualist will not be impaled on 
the other horn of the dilemma either. It is quite acceptable to insist in the case of 
synthetic metaphysical necessities at least that knowledge does "somehow 
result from what is known" i.e from that which one's modal knowledge is 
knowledge of. Some might even want to go so far as to insist that in order to 
have acquired at least certain concepts (natural kind concepts) one must have 
appropriate causal connections to individuals that fall under that concept. 
Given this view, and the further assumption that acquisition of these concepts is 
a necessary condition of having certain items of modal knowledge, we have to 
hand a representation - albeit a highly schematic representation - of how modal 
knowledge concerning, say, horses does, or indeed must, result from what the 
knowledge is of i.e. horses.
(9.41) HOW TO AFFIRM A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE/A A/D EVADE THE DILEMMA 
How does the conceptualist manage to accept both of these claims in 
conjunction with the claim that there is a priori knowledge? The answer is that 
McGinn is wrong in thinking that the existence of a priori knowledge implies the 
truth of at least one of the horns of his dilemma.
The dilemma of a priority is supposed to arise from McGinn's characterization 
of a priori truths as those for which knowledge does not require causal 
interaction with the subject matter of some justifying statement. This 
characterization is illuminating and intuitively appealing and there are no
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obvious grounds on which to base its rejection. In these circumstances it is 
appropriate to accept the propriety of the characterization and to work within 
that constraint i.e to accept the thesis (T) on a priority :
(T) From the assumption that there is a priori knowledge it
follows that it is possible that some X can know that P while 
X does not interact causally with the subject matter of any
statement Jt,J2  dn that is a justifying statement of P.
McGinn takes (T) to imply either that the subject matter of the Jj must influence 
the mind of X by a means other than by causal interaction or that the knowledge 
that P does not (not causally, not non -causally) result from what is known. 
However, it can be shown that there are clearly other possibilities that entail 
that there can be a priori knowledge and which are consistent with the 
falsehood of both of the disjuncts that are the horns of McGinn's dilemma.
The first of these is that a knowledge claim may be inferentially primitive i.e. 
there may no justifying statements that stand in a relation of inferential support 
to the knowledge claim.Then, since there are no justifying statements there can 
be no causal interaction with the subject matter of a justifying statement and the 
putative knowledge will be a priori by McGinn's characterization.
We clearly cannot accept that just any knowledge that is not appropriately 
represented as the product of inferential justification should count as a priori. 
Accordingly, this possibility indicates that McGinn's formulation will have to be 
amended or at least understood as being governed by an interpretative 
convention. The convention would be that the justifying statements of a 
knowledge claim P should be understood to include P itself. In that way we can 
exclude from the realm of a priority those knowledge claims which are 
themselves intuitively a posteriori but are not happily viewed as the product of 
inferences - e.g. there is a cup in front of me.
The second possibility is that the content of justifying statements of an item of 
knowledge may be such that their subject matter may not be capable of causal 
agency.
One way in which this can arise is if the subject matter of the statements 
includes particulars that cannot influence us causally (numbers, possibilia ) and 
in such instances one seems compelled to grasp the non-causal influence on 
the mind horn of McGinn's dilemma. Another way that this possibility can arise
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is if the subject matter of the justifying statements is non-particular, for it seems 
that only particulars are the sorts of things that can be causally efficacious - that 
can be causes.
This kind of consideration is familiar from the general discussion of the causal 
theory of knowledge.26 A crude causal condition on knowing has it that the 
state of knowledge is caused by the state of affairs that it is knowledge of. But as 
the case of universal generalizations (in particular) attests there are some 
"states of affairs" that are not happily viewed as potential causes of anything 
due to their spatio-temporal disparity - all of the world's hydrogen cannot cause 
anything. A correlative characterization of a priori knowledge would have it that 
an a priori truth is one that can be known without causal interaction between 
agent and the subject matter of the truth. This would be a poor characterization 
since it at least runs the risk of rendering all knowledge of universal 
generalizations a priori. (Arguably it has the same effect on a variety of 
knowledge claims concerning the future and which we would normally have no 
hesitation in deeming a posteriori.) The risk arises from an ambiguity in the 
characterization. The condition of possible absence of causal interaction 
between agent and subject matter of the statement might be read as interaction 
between agent and some of the subject matter, or, between agent and all of 
the subject matter. Clearly, for many universal generalizations the latter will be 
impossible.27
Knowledge of universal generalizations, then, will be a priori either if the 
premisses from which it is inferred are not themselves suitable causesor if the 
knowledge is inferentially primitive. So, if knowledge of modal universal 
generalizations fits either of these epistemological profiles its a priority can be 
acknowledged without running foul of McGinn's dilemma. Futhermore, if either 
profile is appropriate then we are in a position to say that what is significant 
about a priori knowledge is that it is canonically universal knowledge (c.f. 
Kant28)which is not supported by justifying statements that concern particulars. 
From an empiricist perspective the problem of a priori knowledge is that it is 
general knowledge of universal generalizations that is not the result of an 
inference from (knowledge of) particular instances.
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(9-5) .A REMARK QN THE ROLE OF CAUSAL CONSIDERATIONS IN 
EPISTEMOLOGY
Before moving to the defence of this conception of a priori knowledge as 
essentially universal, I will make a final remark on the role of causal conditions 
in epistemological theorizing. The upshot of my arguments is that we have 
arrived at the following statement (A) of what is distinctive and potentially 
problematic about a priori knowledge:
(A ) A priori knowledge is general knowledge - (of universal 
generalizations) - that is not the result of an inference from 
(knowledge of) particular instances.
This statement is genuinely epistemological. By this I mean that the statement 
deploys thenormative epistemic concept of justification and this normativity 
seems to me to be essential to epistemology. It is quite proper to temper 
epistemological theorizing with naturalistic constraints. All thought, I am 
prepared to say, gets into the head as the result of causal interaction between 
the agent (with all that is already in the head) and the (social and physical) 
environment in which the agent is located. This constraint is not empty, for it 
poses prima facie difficulties for any view of our cognition of reality which has it 
that we can have knowledge of, more generally thoughts about, entities with 
which we can have no causal interaction (abstract objects, possible worlds). 
Furthermore it may be proper, on occasion, to invoke causal requirements as 
necessary conditions of an agent's knowing that P, but these are invariably 
normative requirements. We might require that an agent stand in an appropriate 
causal relation to something or some event in order that an ascription of 
knowledge is merited. But it is quite another thing to fancy that in epistemology 
we are, or ought to be, aiming for non-normative causal conditions that are 
sufficient for knowing that P. The point is not merely that no generalizable, 
non-trivial formulation of such conditions for a reasonable variety of 
propositions is not even remotely likely. It is that even if it were (perhaps per 
impossible ), merely causal explanations of how an agent came to form the 
belief that P, causal explanations of how that thought was elicited in the agent, 
cannot hope to fill the scope of our epistemological interests.




(9-60) THE JUSTIFICATION OF MODAL RFI IFFS
The pattern of justification for claims of a posteriori necessity that has been 
endorsed29 is one whereby a modus ponens inference yields a modal 
conclusion based upon a modal major premise and a non-modal minor 
premise. Our epistemological concerns are focused upon those modal 
conditional statements that function as major premises.
My first claim is that when such a conditional is a universally generalized 
conditional as in the inferences (1) or (2):
(1) (x)[Fx ~>D(Fx)], Fa l= DFa (2) (x)[Fx ~> □(Fx)], (3x)(Fx) l= (3x)( DFx) 
it is to be treated as primitive in the sense of being subject to no justification on 
the basis of particular instances . I do not expect this claim to be controversial 
since there is no plausibility in the idea that the universally general conditional 
is a conclusion of an enumerative induction nor in the idea that some sort of 
ordering is available to ground a mathematical induction here. No other 
candidate mode of inference from particular instances suggests itself.
My second claim is more problematic. It is that when the conditional is about a 
particular, as in the inference (3):
(3 ) Fa-->DFa, Fa I-DFa
it should be treated as a consequence (an instance) of its universal 
generalization. Now the singular conditionals are obviously log ical 
consequences of the universal generalizations, but the case must be made for 
the claim that the universal generalizations have epistemic priority over the 
singular conditionals. If this case is to be made plausible we must take account 
of an important objection against it.
(9.61) KANT'S THESIS.DANCY'S OBJECTION AND A REPLY TO THE 
OBJECTION.
Dancy argues that there can be a priori knowledge of particulars that is not 
dependent upon knowledge of a corresponding universal generalization and, in 
so doing, he takes himself to be arguing against a Kantian thesis i.e. that there 
can be no a priori knowledge of particulars.30 Given an obvious qualification 
of this thesis to allow that there can be a priori knowledge of particulars as a 
result of inference from universal generalizations, I say that we should embrace 
the Kantian thesis. Accordingly it is necessary to deal with a purported example
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of a priori knowledge that is non-derivatively of particulars.
Dancy draws attention to Kripke's famous lectern.31 The justification of the 
essentialist claim that the lectern could not have been made of ice utilises the 
conditional (4):
(4 ) □  (Lectern t is made of wood --> □  -  (Lectern t is made of ice))
This, it is argued, is a priori, concerns a particular and need not have been 
arrived at as a consequence of an inference from a corresponding universal 
conditional. Hence Kant's thesis is false since there is a priori knowledge of 
particulars.
Interestingly, there is some evidence that Dancy is not altogether happy with his 
own treatment of the example. He admits that the patent connection between 
acceptance of the essentialist claim in this particular case and the acceptance 
of its universal generalization may well incline us to say that...
"...the particular truth was, in a sense, a consequence of the 
universal truth M.32
This inclination is, in my view, nothing less than an (appropriate) inclination to 
treat the singular knowledge concerning Kripke's lectern as an inferential 
consequence of the universal generalization and thereby to affirm the 
epistemological priority of the universal generalization. But Dancy does not 
accept this.
His way of dealing with the difficulty is to attempt to convince the reader of the 
epistemological priority of the particilar knowledge by emphasizing that that 
very lectern has a role in the (causal) history of the item of modal knowledge 
had by a typical member of Kripke's audience. I will argue that these 
considerations should not persuade us to desert the inclination that the 
knowledge is primitively general.
Let us assume that as a matter of fact a particular lectern elicits (and features in 
causal explanations of) those thoughts that constitute an agent's reflective 
deliberation about the composition and origin of lecterns and the essentiality or 
contingency of their properties.This assumption does not entail that the 
content(s) of the individual's proximal lectern thought(s) are thereby fixed as 
being of that particular lectern. This is not to deny that such a causal factor can 
be decisive in the determination of the content of a thought when the issue is 
one of which particular a thought is about, but the present case is not of that
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kind. Let us grant that if a member of Kripke's audience is having thoughts 
about a particular lectern then the thoughts are about that particular lectern. My 
point is that we need not and, indeed, should not represent the members of the 
audience as indulging in any modal reasoning involving thoughts whose 
content is such that they are of, or about, a particular. For, surely, it is possible 
that a perceptual encounter with a particular object (an X) should cause in the 
perceiver X-thoughts that are not about that (or any) particular X and if this is 
accepted, it should be further accepted that the mere fact that that lectern has a 
causal role in the genesis of an agent's thought cannot exclude the possiblity 
that the agent's lectern thoughts concern the artefact kind lectern, an arbitrary 
lectern or lecterns in general.
The foregoing explains why we need not ascribe to the typical member of the 
audience thoughts about that particular table in the characterization of their 
modal deliberations, but why should we take the view that we should not 
ascribe such thoughts to the agents in this context? Dancy's argument does not 
succeed in establishing that we have, in cases of this kind, counter-examples to 
Kant's thesis but we are still in need of an alternative account of what is going 
on in cases such as that of the lectern.
(9.70) UNIVERSALLY GENERAL MODAL KNOWLEDGE AS INFERENTIALLY 
PRIMITIVE KNOWLEDGE 
We still have the option of maintaining that modal universal generalizations are 
inferentially primitive i.e. that they are not happily or satisfactorily viewed as the 
product of any canonical inferential procedure. On balance it seems that this 
remaining option is the one that merges best with conceptualism33 about 
necessity.
To opt for the view that knowledge of modal universal generalizations are 
inferentially primitive is not to say that they are insusceptible to justification. 
Moreover, it is certainly not the case that it would be acceptable simply to insist 
that we have such knowledge while abrogating all responsibility for the defence 
of that claim. Here the conceptualist has the advantage of being able to take 
recourse to a theory of concepts (or conceptual content) in order to provide a 
needed explanation of our right to claim modal knowledge at all. The 
conceptualist is not like the (epistemological) intuitionist whose position is
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simply an insistence that we have a faculty of modal knowing - a position which 
collapses into an enforced silence at the first probings of its content.34 
The major point is that a conceptualist style of justification is not best served by 
submitting to the constraint of having to represent modal knowledge as an 
inferential consequence of premises about concepts. To show that there is 
modal knowledge that is not the inferential consequence of premises about 
concepts it would have to be shown both that modal claims can be items of 
knowledge and that modal knowledge claims are subject to a non-trivial but 
non-inferential justification. The former question coincides with the final 
important question that this thesis attempts to deal with and the latter depends 
upon a more general picture of the role of metaphysical necessity in our 
cognitive procedures. These matters will be aired in Ch.11 and in Ch.12 
respectively.
(9.71) A FINAL REMARK ON McGlNN’S CONCEPTION OF THE
EPISTEMOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS OF MODAL REALISM.
I am now in a position to enter a final remark relating to McGinn's conception of 
the epistemological commitments of the modal realist.
It was pointed out in the original summary of McGinn's case35 that he rejected 
what he saw to be too narrow a formulation of (generalized) realism. The 
problem was that while indeed in certain cases the realist was committed to a 
view of knowledge as "mediated by a problematic inference"36 from statements 
of the evidence class to statements of the given class, this epistemological 
profile of realism does not cover all cases. In particular, in the modal case....
it is not that we have actear idea of the mechanism of operation 
of the faculty but worry that it cannot reach far enough ; rather, it is 
obscure what it would be for the alleged faculty to yield cognitive 
states consisting in a knowledge of the realist's truth conditions - 
so with (e.g.) abstract objects and ethical values. (As I shall later 
suggest, this difference turns upon the role of causation in the 
operation of the faculty.) "37
My position vis a vis McGinn's understanding of the issue can be put as follows. 
He is right about purported modal knowledge not being rendered problematic 
because it is mediated by a problematic inference, but to this the conceptualism
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that I have promoted allows us to add that this is in a sense no surprise since 
modal knowledege is not (canonically) mediated by inference at all. However (i) 
the consequence of this anti-inferential stance need not be not intuitionism and 
(ii) the problems concerning the role of causation in the processes of our 
forming modal beliefs concerning abstract objects and ethical values 
respectively are quite distinct and modal knowledge of actual things is in this 
respect like knowledge of values and not like knowledge of abstract objects. 
This limited region of comparability of the modal with the moral will be 
expanded in order to provide the third and final conception of modal realism.
This concludes my critique of the second (i.e. McGinn's) conception of modal 




INTRODUCTION TO SECTION THREE: 
SECONDARY MODAL REALISM
The modal realisms of Lewis and McGinn have proved indefensible. It is the aim 
of the third and final section of this thesis to develop and evaluate a third 
conception of modal realism. As I indicated at the end of Ch.9, the idea which 
underlies the notion of a third modal realism is the analogy with moral realism. It 
is my hope that the ever more sophisticated discussion of moral realism can 
help us to gain badly needed insight in the modal arena. In order that the 
analogy between moral and modal realism might start at reasonable odds I 
invite the reader to consider several aspects of the modal case that have been 
encountered or established in the pursuit thus far and which bear important 
similarities to the moral case:
(1) Realism about moral values is not best seen as an objectual/ 
existential thesis concerning the (nature o r) reality of a class of entities. 
(Modal comparison - hereafter MC - Ch.1-5)
(2) The case of values is such that the 'potential reductive class' (purely 
naturalistic statements) does not stand in a relation of evidential base to 
a seemingly inferentially distant given class. (MC - Ch.6)
(3) One variety of moral realism (intuitionism) defends the thesis that we 
have a cognitive faculty which explains our ability to detect values 
somehow located in the world. (MC - Ch.9)
(4) [As a consequence of (2) and (3)] we have a moral realism which
exhibits the pattern of denial of recognition transcendence alongside 
acceptance of a problematic cognitive faculty.
(5) The Humean account renders moral evaluation as an exercise of feeling 
(as opposed to cognition) and hence semantical non-cognitivism about 
moral statements is proposed as a consequence of the aetiology of 
evaluative psychological states. (MC - Ch.6)
(6) Moral realism is constrained by the denial of the independence of the 
moral from the natural.(MC - Ch.7)
McDowell has been influential in promoting a view of realism that begins with 
the repudiation of the kind of perspective on moral reality and epistemology that 
McGinn offers us in the modal case. McDowell claims that the primary quality
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model of moral reality turns the epistemology of value into "mere mystification" 
and that on such a model...
it seems that we need to postulate a faculty - 'intuition' - about 
which all that can be said is that it makes us aware of objective 
rational [moral J.D.] connections: the model itself ensures that 
there is nothing helpful to say about how such a faculty might work, 
or why its deliverances might deserve to count as knowledge."
This diagnosis of the defects of the primary quality model of moral reality fits 
perfectly the brand of non-objectual realism that we have encountered. McGinn 
has given us no reason whatsoever to suppose that the deliverances of our 
modal 'sensitivity' deserve to count as knowledge. In the face of the historical 
preponderance of modal anti-realism towards sceptical solution and the 
epistemological impasse which he offers us this is unforgivable. The only hope 
for realism in modality is that it may evolve a form that transcends the brute 
assertion of our cognition of an objective modal reality. My proposal is that we 
should look to McDowell's secondary quality realism (hereafter secondary 
realism ) as a means of liberating modal realism from the sceptical paradox in 
which it has become ensnared.
The need to move away from a primary property model of the reality of moral 
values is occasioned by a variety of factors (to be discussed) including the 
anthropocentric nature of evaluation, the role of evaluations in guiding action 
and the style of explanation that is appropriate to the operation of our sensitivity 
to values. McDowell's secondary realism about values is an attempt to maintain 
a conception of values as in the world as genuine properties of things and, 
correlatively, of evaluative statements as potentially true descriptions of reality 
and that while acknowledging that values bear a special relation to the 
sensitivities and interests of creatures such as ourselves.
My claim is that the anthropocentric traits of modalizing render a primary realism 
(such as McGinn's) as inappropriate in the modal case as it is in the case of the 
evaluative. Accordingly, it will be essential to the prospects of modal realism 
(and of general interest) to attempt to develop and evaluate a secondary modal 
realism. In Ch.10, I will argue that anthropocentricity and not perceptibility (in 
any literal sense) is the feature of paradigmatic secondary properties which is 
an appropriately generalizable feature of secondary realism and that a proper
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conception of the standard of correctness for secondary property judgments 
facilitates the extrapolation of that standard to the cases of moral and modal 
judgement. In Ch.11 ,1 will argue that statements of metaphysical necessity - like 
statements of logical necessity and statements of moral evaluation - are 
statements which have an expressive role and whose acceptance is related 
constitutively to certain courses of conduct. Following an attempt to outline the 
nature of the commitment that is expressed in a claim of metaphysical necessity,
I argue that the only recourse for modal realism is to accept the descriptive/ non- 
descriptive duality of the role of these modal claims. In Ch. 12, I gauge the 
degree of departure from more traditional realist themes to which the secondary 
modal realist is committed while emphasizing the contrast between secondary 
modal realism and sophisticated anti-realism in the form of Blackburn's 
quasi-realistic projectivism. I argue that modal parallels of those arguments 
which Blackburn deploys in an attempt to establish the superiority of 
projectivism over realism in the moral case either fail outright or succeed 
against the target they characterize but remain irrelevant to secondary modal 
realism as developed here. The final task of that chapter, and of this thesis, is to 
point the way towards the difficulties which are likely to be encountered in an 
attempt to defend the secondary modal realist strategy which has been initiated 




SECONDARY REALISM (I): ANTHRQPQCENTRICITY. GENUINE PROPERTIES 
AND THE CONSENSUAL STANDARD OF TRUTH
MQ.Q1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I will confront three issues which are relevant to the clarification 
of what the content of a secondary realism (in general) is intended to be and I 
will develop the case for a construal of modality in these secondary realist ways. 
In the first place I will develop the conception that anthropocentricity , as 
opposed in particular to perceptibility is an aspect of secondary properties the 
secondary realist intends to extrapolate to the modal case. [(10.10)-(10.13)] In 
the second place I will begin to develop a conception of what it is for secondary 
properties to be genuinely in the world with a view to generalizing this criterion 
of genuineness to modalities. [(10.20)] Thirdly, and in the context of this second 
objective, I will oppose a consensualist standard of truth for modal judgements 
and argue that in this respect modal judgements further resemble secondary 
property judgements since the latter are not, despite arguments to the contrary, 
properly regarded as being subject to a consensual standard of truth.[(10.30)- 
(10.43)] Within this discussion of the issue of consensualism, the development 
of conceptualism will be completed with the completion of the brief 
consideration of Wittgenstein's rule-following problematic that was suspended 
at the close of Ch.8. [(10.40)-(10.43)]
(10.10) MODALITIES ARE NOT PERCEPTUAL BUT ANTHROPOCENTRIC 
For McDowell, a key feature in which the promise of a comparison of values 
with secondary properties lies is that...
"....(t)he ascription of a secondary property to an object is only 
adequately understood as true, if it is true, in terms of the object's 
disposition to present a certain sort of perceptual appearance.."1
McDowell views an appeal to a perceptual model of our awareness of values 
as a crucial and beneficial aspect of the comparison of values with secondary 
properties. I will argue that insofar as the comparison with secondary properties 
is fruitful in the moral or modal arenas this has nothing to do with secondary 
property experience being a kind of perceptual awareness. My disagreement
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allows me to pursue the idea of a secondary modal realism while freeing me 
from the commitment to defend a perceptual model of awareness of modality.
(10.11) MODAL PHENOMENOLOGY DOES NOT COMPEL A 
PERCEPTUAL MODEL OF MODAL AWARENESS 
McDowell's realism is influenced by consideration of the phenomenology of 
evaluative thought. Evaluative thought, he agrees with Mackie,2...
"...presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world" 3 
and this phenomenological dimension of our moral awareness...
makes it virtually irresistible to appeal to a perceptual model. "4 
McDowell accepts, following Mackie, that a perceptual model of our awareness 
of values that is based on the primary property case lapses into absurdity, but 
argues in turn that a secondary property perceptual model is fruitful and 
available to one who wishes to consider values as real features of the world.5 I 
will argue that even though there is a sense in which some modal awareness 
does present itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world it is the case 
that an appeal to a perceptual model of that modal awareness is eminently 
resistible.
There are two aspects of the phenomenology of necessity that merit our 
attention. The first of these is the powerful objectivist pull of our contemplation of 
certain necessities.The acceptance of a logical necessity, to take an example, 
often presents itself to us as a matter in which we have precisely no. choice. It 
strikes us as being compelled upon us from without. This is what makes it so 
difficult to entertain the conception of the acceptance of logical necessities as 
the product of decision or convention.6 But the objectivist pull of metaphysical 
necessity is not like this (see Ch. 11). The phenomenology of modality in 
general, then, is akin to that of morality. In certain instances it seems that there 
just is nothing else that one may properly think or do, but in others our 
convictions sit easily with our awareness of alternatives of whose acceptance 
we can make something. However there is another respect in which the moral 
and the modal seem phenomenologically quite different.
Whether an individual agent's evaluative response to a state of affairs is correct 
or not - as when struck by the cruelty of an action - there is undoubtedly a sense 
in which such a response can be elicited with, as it were, a minimum of
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reflective participation on the part of the agent. In this sense, it seems to me, 
there is the dimension of the involuntary in some "value-experiences" that is 
quite similar to the experience of secondary properties. But this dimension 
seems to be almost completely absent from our awareness of modality. One's 
"state of awareness" concerning a human being with whom one is confronted 
that she could not (say) have been other than human does not present itself to 
one in anything like the way that the awareness of the colour of her hair or for 
that matter the evil of her professed indifference to others can i.e. as something 
which simply impinges on one and feeds into, or pre-figures fully-fledged 
judgement with all of its propositional or intentional content. McDowell himself 
remarks that the role of reason in evaluative thinking seems to require that we 
regard the apprehension of value as an intellectual rather than a merely  
sensory matter.7 This is correct, but it does not detract from the observation that 
while there is no room at all for something like an unreasoned, involuntary 
response in the phenomenology of modality, there is at least some room for 
such a response in the moral case.8
Taking both points into account my claim is that the phenomenology of the 
modal is less influential in leading us to form a view of the modal as a real 
aspect of the world than its moral counterpart. But I do not rest my main point on 
this claim. Even if phenomenological considerations were to furnish us with 
extensive and unambiguous support for the reality, externality or objectivity of 
necessity there would still be no point in pursuing a perceptual model of modal 
awareness to parallel the perceptual model of value awareness. There would 
be no point because the perceptual model of the awareness of values is, I will 
argue, without substance.
(10.12) THE PROSPECTS OF A MODEL OF MODAL AWARENESS ARE 
NOT IMPROVED BY A COMPARISON WITH THE PERCEPTUAL 
MODEL OF THE AWARENESS OF MORAL VALUE 
Although he draws our attention to the point that we cannot cast sensitivity to 
value as a merely sensory matter, McDowell underestimates the significance of 
this admission to the project of promoting a perceptual model. A distinction 
drawn between sensory and not-merely-sensory awareness, one might think, is 
hardly of limited, derivative or incidental interest in the context of an invitation to
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pursue a perceptual model of that awareness. Yet McDowell acknowledges 
that colour-awareness and value-awareness are on opposing sides of the 
sensory/ not-merely-sensory distinction while promoting a perceptual model of 
awareness for value. He excuses himself with the remark that in the 
epistemology of value.
"...the perceptual model is no more than a model ."9
But now the reader is left wondering exactly how perception is relevant to 
awareness of value if not in respect of sensory awareness.
It cannot be because there are relatively well understood causal processes that 
explain our sensitivity to value parallel to the causal processes and 
explanations of our sensitivity to colour. For in the case of values there are no 
such processes or familiar and successful styles of explanation. Moreover even 
if there were available accounts of how experience of value is causally related 
to the world in this or that case, there is little or no reason to believe that they 
would exhibit the generality required of causal explanation 10 or, as McDowell 
himself points out, that the attempt at "merely causal" explanation might by itself 
be satisfying.11 So, the content of the perceptual model is not to be sought in 
this direction.
Nor can the entrenchment of perceptual idioms in our talk of our awareness of 
evaluative states be germane, for the proliferation of these idioms is totally 
indiscriminate. Perceptual idioms are rife in both non-philosophical and 
philosophical talk pertaining to knowledge of every kind that anyone could wish 
to claim. 12 We speak of seeing that a conclusion follows from premises, or 
seeing that an agent intended to do such and such, and, indeed, seeing that an 
action was wicked or seeing that a certain state of affairs is possible. Of course, 
there is a tendency not only to speak in such ways but, as McGinn has 
indicated13, to elevate perception to the status of epistemological paradigm i.e. 
to appeal - for the most part unreflectively - to a perceptual model in every case. 
But this in itself is unhelpful unless we can give content to that appeal in order to 
judge whether it is appropriate in any given instance rather than merely the 
expression of our hankering and, perhaps, the reflection of the ontogenic or 
even phylogenic primacy of sensory experience.
It squares with McDowell's general intentions that he should insist upon a 
perceptual model as a means of distinguishing his secondary realism from
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projectivism .14 Awareness of value is like perception in being a mode of 
detection of real properties as opposed to a projection of an evaluative 
something onto a value free world. The secondary realist hereby re-iterates his 
realism but this, surely, is not sufficient reason to attempt to sustain the appeal 
to a perceptual model.
Blackburn claims that McDowell and others have failed to give any content to 
the perceptual model of value experience to which they appeal beyond 
asserting its distinctness from projection.15 I think that the substance of this 
complaint is correct and that our understanding of the apprehension of 
necessity cannot benefit from a comparison with this model. However this 
admission does not of itself undermine the prospects of a secondary realism 
about modality. For there is still space for a style of secondary realism that finds 
analogues in the modal case of those features of secondary properties other 
than those which they enjoy qua perceptual properties. In order to make this 
case, I must explain how we can re-orientate secondary realism away from its 
perceptual origins.
(10.13) THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC  ORIENTATION OF SECONDARY 
REALISM
I suggest, following Wiggins, that we develop our interest in a feature of 
secondary properties that is more general than their perceptibility namely their 
anthropocentricity. The category of secondary property, or more specifically that 
of colour, is anthropocentric for...
"....the category corresponds to an interest that can only take root 
in creatures with something approaching our own sensory 
apparatus."'16
Indeed, secondary property ascription is only to be understood in terms of the 
presentation of a perceptual appearance to creatures with something 
approaching our own sensory apparatus. However, this is an unwanted feature 
in a generalized secondary realism.
The point is that while paradigm secondary properties are undoubtedly 
anthropocentric and perceptual , the secondary realist should seek to 
extrapolate the former feature without making any direct appeal to the latter. An 
anthropocentric category is one that corresponds to an interest that cannot take
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root in a creature whose nature is, in some sense, alien to us, but this alienation 
may be the product of factors other than differences in sensory apparatus. For 
example we might venture that in the case of values, the understanding of 
property ascription depends upon the ability to experience certain "sentiments 
of approbation".17 In the case of modality the anthropocentric dimension may 
be thought to reside neither in our sensory nor our sentimental natures but in 
what is loosely called our "conceptual apparatus". Insofar as the search for a 
generalizable basis for secondary realism concerns us, it is the anthropocentric 
nature of secondary property judgements that is the appropriate basis.
Perhaps this formulation does not depart significantly from McDowell's 
intentions, but if so his persistent emphasis of the "perceptual model" becomes 
difficult to comprehend . My remarks might be best taken as registering - as it 
has become customary to say - a difference of presentation rather than policy, 
but it is an important difference nonetheless. The advantage of the present 
re-orientation is that in abandoning the association with the perceptual model, it 
enables us to abandon a misleading symbol of the project of secondary realism 
and to clear the way for the application of secondary realism in the domain of 
the rational. Such a re-orientation is especially important to the prospects of 
application to the modal case where the a priori status of judgements is a 
salient feature. For it is a traditional hallmark of a priori knowledge that it 
arises from the operation of our reason and is, therefore, in some sense, 
independent of our capacities for having perceptual experiences of any 
particuiar character. Those who wish to emphasize the role of rationality in 
moral thinking should also welcome this non-perceptual emphasis even if they 
would, as they should, stop short of classifying moral knowledge as a priori.
(10.20) SECONDARY PROPERTIES AS GENUINE PROPERTIES 
The feature of secondary properties other than their perceptibility that influences 
McDowell's realism is that there is no obstacle to treating these as genuine 
properties of the objects that confront us.18 The secondary realist must give 
substance to the realism that is intended by this usage, and moreover this must 
now be done in such a way as to preserve consistency with the mark of 
anthropocentricity that has been laid down. There are two regions that I wish to 
develop with this objective in mind.
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The first of these centres upon the question of the appropriate standard of truth 
for secondary property (and relevantly similar) judgements. This discussion 
constitutes the remainder of the present chapter. The second region concerns 
the connection between genuineness of properties and the descriptive role of 
sayings ascribing these properties. This will be the concern of Ch.11.
(10.21) GENUINE PROPERTIES AND SUBJECTIVITY.
Secondary realism is committed to the idea that what it is for a property to be 
genuinely of the objects that confront one is for it to be there independently of 
any particular experience of it. 19 This is a necessary limitation upon the 
constitutive connection between, for example, being red and being such as to 
look red, for unless we acknowledge that..
"...an object’s being such as to look red is independent of its 
looking red on any particular occasion. "20
...we give up the right to think of ourselves as making a judgement in such a 
case. It is for precisely this reason that what McGinn called "personal 
reductions"21 (e.g. personal actualism) make nonsense of the idea of there 
being judgements of the relevant kinds. If the psychological states which 
constitute awareness of a colour, a value or a modality are "brought reductively 
to bear" upon colours, values or modalities then we degenerate into a crude 
subjectivism which guarantees the success of a sensitivity in its very activation 
and that is fatal to the idea that this awareness can be viewed as issuing any 
kind of judgement.22
This insistence on a property's being there independently of any particular 
experience of it is a starting point in the explanation of what there is for 
secondary realism in the idea of a property's being a genuine property of the 
objects that confront one. We have already acknowledged [(6.42)] that this 
distance between the act of judging and the correctness of a judgement is a 
starting point in the explanation of what is required for truth-evaluability. 
However, the foregoing remarks should make it clear that everyone ought to be 
in the market for that degree of independence - or at least everyone other than 
perhaps extreme emotivists who would not be disturbed at the exclusion of 
moral response from the realm of judgement.23 The crucial questions are what 
further degree of independence of the standard of correctness for judgements
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from actual responses does the secondary realist propose and can the 
appropriate degree of independence vary from one kind of (anthropocentric) 
judgement to another? There is an extremely important criticism of the project 
of secondary realism that can be developed in relation to these questions. For 
once we acknowledge that a distinction between real and apparent colour 
(goodness, possibility etc) is indeed essential to judgement - a distinction 
between seeming right to me and being right - we must still remain sensitive to 
the possibility that the distinction ought to be drawn in accordance with different 
standards in different spheres of judgement. In particular, it may be argued that 
it would be a mistake on the part of the secondary realist to propose that the 
standard of correctness of secondary property judgements can be generalized 
to the moral or modal regions. An argument against a common standard of 
correctness for secondary property and moral judgements has been proposed 
and it can be generalized easily in order to generate an argument against a 
common standard of correctness for secondary property and modal 
judgements.
(10.30) ERROR COMMUNAL CONSENSUS AND TRUTH - AN
EXTRAPOLATION TO THE MODAL CASE OF McGINN'S 
ARGUMENT AGAINST A SECONDARY PROPERTY STANDARD 
OF CORRECTNESS FOR MORAL JUDGEMENTS 
McGinn offers an argument that attempts to undermine the comparison of moral 
values with secondary properties by showing that the standards of correctness 
in judgements appropriate in the secondary property case lead to disaster 
when applied in the case of moral values.24 This argument has an exact 
parallel that threatens to undermine the comparison of modalities with 
secondary properties. The arguments proceed as follows:
(a) Secondary property judgements are governed by a standard 
of correctness that is determined by a dispositional thesis 
concerning secondary properties.
(b) If the dispositional thesis and the associated standard of 
correctness of judgements is applied in the (moral / modal) 





(c) The comparison of (moral values/m odal\\\es)with secondary 
properties is seriously undermined.
The conclusion follows from the premises in each instance. But clearly one 
might reject the conclusion by challenging an appropriate premise. I am going 
to argue that neither moral-(b) nor modal-(b) can be rejected but that neither 
moral-(c) nor modal-(c) follows since we ought to reject premise (a).
(10.31) THE PREMISE MORAL- (b) CANNOT BE REJECTED.
Moral - (b):
If the dispositional thesis and the associated standard of 
correctness of judgements is applied in the moral case, an 
unacceptable conception of moralizing ensues.
To reject this premise would be to hold that the conception of moralizing that 
ensues from the application of the dispositional thesis and the associated 
standard of correctness to the case of moral values is not unacceptable. Since I 
find the ensuing conception of moralizing totally unacceptable, I maintain that 
moral - (b) must be accepted.
Here is the definitive statement of the dispositional thesis as it applies to moral 
evaluation :
"A parallel [to the secondary property case -J .D .]d ispos itiona l 
thesis about value properties will hold that (e.g.) being good 
consists in a propensity on the part of good things to elicit in 
observers reactions of moral approval: 'good' applies to something 
if and only if it produces sentiments of approbation in people."25 
With secondary properties, the real/apparent distinction and so the standard of 
error is drawn from within the realm of appearance - by reference to standard 
or typical experiences . In contrast with the case of primary properties, there is 
no standard of correctness altogether external to perceptual appearance 
against which the correctness of the judgements can be assessed.26 If the 
internal standard that pertains in the secondary case were applied to morality 
this would show that moral error.
"...could consist at most in a failure of conformity of one person's 
moral reactions with the moral reactions of others: the theory
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cannot allow that a whole community might be in moral error, or 
that a solitary judger might make moral mistakes, since this would 
require some standard of correctness external to that provided by 
an essentially arbitrary norm of moral reaction.If the standard were 
to change, as it could for secondary qualities, then moral 
judgem ents would cease to be true which once counted as 
instances of moral knowledge - we could not say that the change of 
moral reaction constituted any kind of moral mistake. "27 
The dispositional thesis, then, accords to community consensus a status as 
constituting truth in the matter of moral judgement, but this status is quite 
spurious.
It is essential to our practice of moralizing that we should be in a position to 
insist that it is possible that - taking the extreme case -all moral agents should 
"fall into error". As Blackburn puts i t :
"(G)oose-stepping along with everyone else can yet lead to moral 
error "28
And, we might add, this would be the case even if, as the result of a deceiving 
demon, we were to slip into our new attitudes (and jackboots) in such a way that 
the deterioration was not visible en route.29 Furthermore, we cannot earn our 
right to this critical overview of other communities on the basis that present 
(actual) consensus is constitutive of moral truth. For the price of this startling and 
irresponsible complacency is the abandonment of the hope that we may 
improve upon our present moral reactions and judgements. The fundamental 
problem with the dispositional thesis is that it generates an anti-critical, and 
hence unacceptable conception of moral evaluation.
Given this criticism of the dispositional thesis it is important to understand why it 
might hold any attraction in the first place. Perhaps the thought is that 
acceptance of the dispositional thesis is the price of anthropocentrism i.e that 
the only way of capturing the anthropic dimension of moralizing is to commit 
oneself to constitutive claims of type (1):
(1) x is good iff x produces sentiments of approbation in people.
This thought is mistaken, for there is no reason why we cannot have the 




According to McDowell,30 a value property is to be identified as a kind of state 
which merits an evaluative response as opposed to one which (merely) elicits 
such a response (even if the response is elicited throughout the community). 
Similarly, Wiggins anticipates and rejects McGinn-style dispositional theses as 
an adequate grounding for an anthropocentric conception of value by 
counterposing (2) to the dispositional thesis instance (1):
(2 ) x is good iff x is the sort of thing that calls forth or m a k e s  
a p p ro p r ia te  a certain sentiment of approbation given the 
range of propensities that we actually have to respond in this 
or that way. 31
He generalizes from this particular case and explains the connection between 
the valuable and our affective natures ;
".. for each value predicate 0  (or for a very large range of such) 
there is an attitude or response of subjects belonging to a range of 
propensities that we actually have such that an object has the 
property 0  stands for iff the object is fitted by its characteristics to 
bring down that extant attitude or response upon it and bring it 
down precisely because it has those characteristics.” 32 
The difference between the content of dispositional and non-dispositional 
theses of moral evaluation is signalled clearly by the use of the contrasting 
"merit" and "elicit", for we well understand the normative distinction between an 
object's eliciting an attitude and its meriting such an attitude. Eventually, we 
shall see how a parallel contrast informs a non-dispositional conception of 
modality [(11.12)].
(10.32) THE PREMISE MODAL- (b) CANNOT BE REJECTED.
Modal - (b):
If the dispositional thesis and the associated standard of 
correctness of judgements is applied in the modal case, an 
unacceptable conception of modality ensues.
I will argue that the proper standard of truth for modal judgements is like that of 
moral evaluations in being other than as determined by a dispositional thesis. 
To see this we should consider what the application of a dispositional thesis to 
modality might amount to. In the moral case the thesis is (1 ): /Over
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(1) x is good iff x produces sentiments of approbation in people.
It is natural to expect that a dispositional thesis of modality will centre on that of 
which we can or cannot conceive. Consider, then, the thesis (3) concerning the 
metaphysical "must" as a candidate for a dispositional thesis about modality:
(3 ) x can be 0  iff it is conceivable that x is a
Consider also, the Quine-inspired thesis (4) which is overtly dispositional in 
tying the standard of correctness of our de dicto modal judgements to our 
dispositions to proceed in mending the Duhemian n e t:
(4 ) A statement is necessary (a priori, analytic) iff it would 
command assent come what may.
The critique of the dispositional conception of moral evaluation centred on the 
perceived need for a gap between communal consensus and truth for moral 
judgements in order to serve our critical interests. The dispositional thesis could 
not provide this. Equally, there is every reason for us to seek access to the 
notions of criticism and improvement of judgements concerning what is possible 
or necessary and, moreover, that the modal truth is no more than the moral truth 
constituted by any actual consensus of judgement. Inductive considerations 
undermine consensualism concerning the standard of truth of modal statements 
for there is a history of propositions that have been held necessary (without any 
intra-communal dissent) yet have turned out, we say, to be false.33 Our 
commitment to a critical perspective on our modal judgements is reflected in the 
latter description of the turn of events. We wish to retain the right, in some cases 
at least, to view ourselves as standing in substantive disagreement with these 
past communities on modal judgements and that is why we speak of their errors 
and of their beliefs turning out to be false. Had we no perception of a need for 
a critical perspective we might simply abrogate the right to substantive 
disagreement on (e.g) judgements of possibility and allow that a given 
judgement is true in their conceptual scheme and false in ours.
Moreover the critical perspective is not chauvinistic about our present actual 
conceptual dispositions for there is no privileged role for the limits of our 
communal and current powers of conception, or our contemporary opinions of 
which propositions a total theory cannot do without, vis a vis the modal truth. 
We can understand how a modal judgement that commands our exceptionless 
communal assent could fall short of truth for we are familiar with the kind of
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process whereby we come to appreciate a new way in which a proposition 
(hitherto held false) can be true and our modal evaluation alters in the wake of 
this appreciation. We know also that the tide can flow in the other direction. An 
adjustment of modal evaluation may arise from the insight that a proposition 
hitherto held true was held true as the result of some confusion or 
narrow-mindedness on our (communal) part. History shows that a perfectly 
consensual totality of actual modal judgements - particularly concerning what is 
impossible - can be wrong and similarly we may now (or at any given time) be 
guilty of harbouring modal error. Therefore, in recognizing this possibility we are 
obliged to disavow a constitutive connection between any actual consensus of 
modal judgement and truth.
This is the initial statement of the case for accepting modal-(b). I will return to the 
issue below [(10.34)].
The position is, then, that in accepting the parallel premises moral-(b) and 
modal (b) and the validity of the inference that McGinn offers, we are bound to 
accept that the comparison of modalities with secondary properties is 
undermined unless we reject premise fa). I will argue that we should reject 
premise (a) and that we can improve the prospects of secondary modal realism 
by proposing an alternative standard of correctness in judgement that suits the 
secondary property and modal cases alike.
{10.330) THE DISPOSITIONAL THESIS OF SECONDARY PROPERTIES 
(PREMISE (a)) REJECTED 
The core of the dispositional thesis concerning colours is that the instantiation 
of the property of, say, redness in an object consists in a disposition of the 
object to produce sensory experiences in perceivers of a certain 
phenomenological character. This basic insight is not in doubt, but proper 
respect for the distinction between real and apparent colour entails that we 
cannot constitutively fix the colour of an object as the colour it appears to have 
to just any subject or, for that matter, to just any group of subjects. We need 
some normative component such as a requirement of normality of observers or 
observational circumstance in order to enforce the requisite distinction. Indeed, 
the component must be internal to the realm of perception or else we abrogate 
the needed constitutive link between secondary properties and the way that
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they appear to creatures relevantly like us .There is, however, room for dispute 
in the matter of precisely how we should fill out the normative component so that 
we achieve, so to speak, the right kind of dependence of the correctness of 
judgements upon actual or hypothetical reactions. It is this component that will 
determine our assessment of the scope for error that exists in secondary 
property judgement. My view is that McGinn has underestimated the scope of 
error that may obtain in secondary property judgement and, consequently, he 
has underestimated the scope for moral error that would obtain were moral 
judgements///ce secondary property judgements in this respect. McGinn's 
dispositionally-determined standard of correctness in (e.g.) colour judgements 
apparently leaves no room for the possibility of error in the face of consensus on 
the part of the totality of normal human observers. I am tempted by the prospect 
of operating a standard of correctness that is anthropocentric, internal to the 
realm of perception and reaction-dependent but which also sustains the 
principle that truth for colour judgements is n£i constituted by any actual 
consensus however wide the community of judges. It is clear from many of 
McGinn's remarks that he holds it to follow from the dispositional thesis that an 
error of colour judgement could consist at most in a failure of conformity of one 
persons perceptual experience with the experiences of others.34 This strikes 
me as being less than obvious and I shall offer this example as a means of 
conveying the nature of the difficulty that I find with this conception of error.
(10.331) AN EXAMPLE CONTRA THE DISPOSITIONAL THESIS FOR 
SECONDARY PROPERTIES AND THE BEST JUDGEMENT 
ALTERNATIVE TO THE CONSENSUAL STANDARD 
Say it is the case that around our solar system some condition obtains - 
perhaps a cloud of massive proportions- but because of our perspective 
(literally) we never become aware of its presence. Suppose further that if this 
cloud had not been there or were it to disperse after the demise of all actual 
sentient beings, then the local environment would be such that had any normal 
human observers been there, they would have had perceptual experiences of 
distant planets and stars of a systematically different qualitative character. To 
use the stock example - the bodies appear in the counterfactual scenario as the 
spectral inverses of their actual apparent colours so (e.g.) while X appears as
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red to all actual normal observers it would appear as blue were the cloud 
absent etc.
I am inclined to say that a perfectly proper application of the distinction between 
real and apparent colour might lead us to maintain that (really) X is blue even 
though as things stand in actuality everyone judges (erroneously) that X is red. 
Any example which is so distant from our everyday interests and practices of 
colour discrimination is likely to be contentious and may even strike the reader 
as raising a question which is insusceptible to determinate resolution. However, 
the nature of the difficulty that it raises for McGinn's dispositional standard can 
be pressed rather more generally.
We can still operate a needed internal (to perception) standard of correctness 
for colour judgements if, following a proposal of Wright,35 we classify true 
colour judgements as those which reflect our best judgements of colour. The 
concept of best judgement relies on that of cognitively ideal conditions of judger 
and circumstance. In effect, my example will succeed insofar as it convinces the 
reader that the actual circumstances of judgement that it involves are less than 
ideal. The difficult question is whether the appeal to cognitively ideal conditions 
can here or in general escape the charge of circularity but if it can, and if we can 
otherwise make good the concept of best judgements of colour, then the point of 
opposition to McGinn's consensual standard of correctness can be put in the 
following way. Truth in colour judgements reflects the deliverances of best 
opinion but there is no guarantee that any community actually judges in those 
circumstances that must obtain if their (even perfectly uniform) judgements are 
to count as best. Consequently there is room for error - qua disagreement with 
the deliverances of judgement relative to best standards - on the part of a (the) 
whole community of colour judges.
It remains to be argued that insofar as the best opinion standard of truth for 
colour judgements is tenable, then this standard, in making room for an 
improvement in judgement over any actual consensus, rQ~infQI£.6JS, the 
comparability of the secondary property case with that of modality. To that end I 
will now turn to complete the task begun in Ch.8 of evaluating the range of 
responses to Wittgenstein's rule-following problematic with a view to indicating 
why a non-consensual standard of truth is appropriate to judgements of 
metaphysical necessity qua products of pure rule-following.
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(10.40) THE ASYMMETRY OF SECONDARY PROPERTY AND MODAL 
JUDGEMENTS re. CONCEPTUAL ism 
An obvious prima facie disparity between the standards of correctness of modai 
and secondary property judgements resides in their asymmetry vis a vis 
conceptualism. The truth values of modal judgements are known to us, if at all, 
by conceptual means alone and in this respect modal judgements are to be 
contrasted with all a posteriori judgements and with secondary property 
judgements in particular. In the latter case we want a notion of assent to a 
colour-ascribing statement (e.g."x is blue") relative to specifiable (albeit, 
hypothetical) conditions of the members of an audience and of the object or 
surface to be judged in order that we might arrive at proper, non-trivial 
constraints on an "internal" standard of correctness. We require of the object to 
which the colour is being ascribed that it is situated in good light, that it be 
relatively stationary etc. We require of the subjects that their attention is focused 
on the object in question, that they are possessed of normal visual equiptment, 
and that they are competent in the application the concept blue. The crucial 
point is that in order to substantiate the standard of correctness for any non a 
priori judgement we must invoke sensitivities or capacities in the judges over 
and above their conceptual sensitivities or capacities.
In the realm of thea priori this is n£t the case. It would seem that the only way in 
which we can pursue the matter of what would constitute the best cognitive 
conditions of judges in the case of modal judgements is to look further into the 
matter of conceptual competence and this, as I have already argued points 
directly to the issue of what it is correctly to follow a rule. Specifically, we can 
expect in the case of the a priori in general, and modal judgements in 
particular, the standards of correctness appropriate in judgements of pure 
rule-following as we can in the case of judgements concerning conceptual 
content or meaning. It is appropriate to return now to the question of what these 
standards are ?
The conception of the relevant standards commended by quietism, and 
platonism have already been discounted and the encounter with sceptical 
solution awaits us. C onsensua lism  remains to be considered and so a 
consensualist standard of truth for modal judgement may yet be compelled by 
the rule-following considerations even though it is not compelled by a (proper)
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comparison with the standard that obtains in the case of secondary property 
judgements.
(10.41) SQNSENSUAUSM AS THE FOURTH RESPONSE TO THE 
RULE-FOLLOWING PROBLEMATIC AND AN ARGUMENT FROM 
CONCEPTUALISM TO CONSENSUALISM.
Wittgenstein showed decisively that there can be no question of constructing 
standards of judgement concerning the content of concepts after the fashion of 
a purportedly infallible introspective access to one's own mental 
representations. Indeed, much of the polemic of The Investigations is directed 
against the idea that grasp of meaning is like a secondary quality experience 
and particularly so when secondary quality "judgements" are being associated 
with C artesian  standards which endorse the impossibility of introspective 
error.36 The Wittgensteinian prognosis, it may be ventured, is consensualism . 
According to consensualism a judgement which is the output of an instance of 
pure rule-following is a genuine judgement whose truth is constituted by 
community consensus about application of the rule. This option might be 
informed beneficially by the account of assertibility conditions that is given in 
Kripke.37 The idea would be that the details of the account of the conditions of 
assertib ility  could be "lifted" and re-cast as conditions of truth to suit the 
purposes of framing a positive response to the constitutive question.
It would then be quite true to say in the case of pure rule-following judgements 
that error could at most consist - as McGinn claimed that it did in the case of 
secondary properties - in a failure of conformity of one person's reactions with 
the reactions of others. It would be entirely a matter of being out of step.The 
relevant reactions being whatever verbal and non-verbal responses a person 
sees as constituting going on in the same way in the application of a concept. 
The argument then is simply:
(A) The correctness of modal judgements can be established by 
conceptual means alone.
( B) The standard of truth for judgements whose correctness can be 
established by conceptual means alone is consensual.
Therefore,
( C ) The standard of truth for modal judgements is consensual.
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Given the patent validity of the argument and the acceptance of modal 
conceptualism (i.e premise (A)) the only recourse is to deny premise (B) and to 
propose an alternative to the consensual standard of truth for judgements which 
are the products of pure rule-following.
(10.42) THE CONSENSUALIST RESPONSE TO THE RULE- 
FOLLOWING PROBLEMATIC REPUDIATED 
The salient objection against consensualism as a standard of correctness in 
pure rule-following judgements has already been registered at (10.32) with 
respect to the modal, namely that consensualism can leave no room 
improvement in our outlook in matters a priori. This is not, perhaps an an 
immediately familiar Wittgensteinian theme but it relates to important 
Wittgensteinian anti-consensualist themes. Salient among these are the notion 
of our modifying our concepts and of our (communal) efforts to act in 
accordance with a rule as an effort to satisfy a real requirement.38 The 
consequence of a consensual standard of truth in a priori judgements is a kind 
of conceptual relativism and incommensurability.39 On the consensualist 
standard, it would appear that the only possible description of the shift from, say 
Euclidean to non-Euclidean geometry is one wherein one set of sharply 
bounded (by consensual determination) geometrical concepts is applied 
correctly but then abandoned in favour of different geometrical concepts. But in 
this scenario no room is left for the essential open-endedness of our 
geometrical concepts and the possibility that we can be mistaken about what a 
concept requires of us. That we ought to make room for such a possibility is a 
consequence of the need to maintain a distinction between correct and 
incorrect applications of a rule. For it has been argued, to propose that the 
requirements of a rule are constituted by what we communally take to be the 
requirements of the rule is to surrender the notion of a requirement in 
rule-following just as much as the infamous identification of the requirements of 
a rule with what I take them to be.40 Successful rule-following involves the 
satisfaction of norms and a non-normative standard (I) is not transmuted into a 
normative standard (WE) in the simple process of aggregation.
The foregoing is no more than an extremely sketchy case against a 
consensualist response to the rule-following problematic but it is a case whose
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essential plausibility is, I submit, compelling. Moreover, so put the case 
commends clearly the direction in which the would-be realist conceptualist 
should pursue the hope of a better response to the question of what constitutes 
the standard of correctness in pure rule-following judgements. What is missing 
from consensualism is a genuinely normative component to the conception of 
what successful rule-following consists in and this is to hand in the form of a fifth 
proposed response to the rule-following considerations.
(10.43) THE TRUTH OF PURE RULE-FOLLOWING JUDGEMENTS 
REFLECTS BEST OPINION. - THE FIFTH AND BEST 
RESPONSE TO THE RULE FOLLOWING PROBLEMATIC.
Wright proposes tentatively that truth for pure rule-following judgements is, 
constitutively, what we judge to be true when we operate under cognitively ideal 
conditions. The alternative formulation is that the truth of pure rule-following 
judgements reflects best opinion. Furthermore, this proposal is supported and 
elucidated by reference to an analogy with colour judgements.41 
The prospects of a secondary realism about modality would be improved 
considerably were Wright's project to prove successful. It is of course pleasing 
for the secondary modal realist to be able to refer to an independently 
developed source of the thesis that secondary property judgements have a 
standard of truth equivalent to that of modal judgements. But what is more 
important is the prospect of a sophisticated modal realism - sophisticated in the 
sense that it emerges intact from a head-on encounter with the rule-following 
considerations. It remains to be seen whether Wright's project is viable.
The best opinion option is attractive because it responds to the deep need to 
recognize the possibility of the aberration of consensually endorsed judgement 
while binding the standard of correctness in rule-following to a viewpoint that is 
an intelligible extension of the capacities and sensitivities that we actually have. 
The option is attractive but it cannot be claimed at this point that it has been 
shown to be feasible.
A general difficulty which besets any such best opinion option is that of 
specifying in a non-question-begging way the circumstances of environment 
and judge that might be held to constitute a scenario that is favourable to 
deliverance of opinions that have proper claim to being, precisely, best.42 The
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specific difficulty with pure rule-following judgements, is that there is no obvious 
basis from which we may extrapolate in our attempt to characterize the ideal 
circumstances of judgement. In the case of a posteriori judgements, as we saw 
with colour judgements, we can produce a substantial list of conditions of judge 
and environment that seem to demand consideration. But once we accept as 
given the truth of a judgement concerning what is actually the case, what kind of 
factors would have a claim for inclusion in the list of ideal modalizing 
circumstances? It seems clear that any further interaction with the environment 
is irrelevant here. It seems also that all that could be relevant are conditions of 
an individual judge or community of judges. But what can we find to say here? 
We might of course insist here as we do elsewhere that the judges be attentive, 
sincere or of whatever other psychological orientation we find appropriate. 
However this is to resort to psychological platitudes rather than to address the 
problem of specifying epistemological conditions that are particularly if not 
uniquely relevant to a priori judgements and for which the notion of these being 
best is non-circular and intelligible.
It is appropriate to consider the realm of mathematical judgement in the hope 
that this may provide us with some insight to the a priori in general. If we 
identify truth in mathematical judgement with best opinion and we regard best 
opinion as being that which is tune with provability, this satisfies the 
conceptualist requirement that the standards of correctness (i.e. truth) of the 
judgements in question can be demonstrated by conceptual means alone. 
Wright's discussion of this issue (in another context43) suggests that we may be 
at a loss to impose any more substantive conditions on the notion of a proof 
than that a purported proof should be a genuine proof if it survives arbitrarily 
many checks by those deemed expert by prior acknowledgement. Even if we 
could be sure of our conditions of idealized provability in mathematics there 
would remain the problem of contriving an analogue of proof in the modal case 
i.e a canonical basis upon which we generate grounds of modal assertion.
What we want to insist upon in the modal case is that here, as elsewhere (c.f. 
colour), the judges are to be competent or even expert with relevant concepts, 
but this smacks of question-begging! If a priori judgements can be shown true 
by standards whose correctness can be demonstrated by conceptual means 
alone, circularity is at least threatened if we insist that ideal conditions of
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investigation of the judges are constituted in their conceptual competence. This 
circle may be loosened in a favourable way if we can negotiate ourselves into a 
position to spell out constructively what it is that the requisite idealized 
conceptual competence consists in in specific regions of a priori deliberation 
such as the application of metaphysical modalities but I have no positive 
proposals in this respect.
Beyond this, I admit, I have little to offer. Perhaps the project of stating idealized 
conditions of cognition is beset with far more difficulties than we are seduced 
into believing by attention to the secondary property case. That is to say that 
secondary properties might well represent a relatively easy case while the 
modal and other a priori judgements are lined up on the (burgeoning) other 
side with the hard cases. If appeal is to be made to idealized conditions of 
judgement in the elucidation of standards of truth for classes of judgement then 
judgements concerning future events, judgement for spatially unrestricted 
empirical generalizations and moral judgements are among those that spring 
to mind as likely to pose problems when it comes to specifying constructively 
the nature of their respectively ideal conditions.
However since the point of this project is to construct a novel conception of 
modal realism it is to be expected that some liability must be taken on board in 
relation to the sub-projects. The secondary modal realist ought to accept the risk 
associated with the response to the rule-following considerations that Wright 
has adumbrated on the grounds that it is an undefeated response and that the 
risk looks good value. It is also difficult not to take some comfort in the thought 
that the development of an adequate response to the Wittgensteinian puzzle is 
hardly a burden that falls on secondary modal realist shoulders alone.
(10.5) APPRAISAL OF THE FOREGOING
The first claim of this chapter was that the potentially generalizable feature of 
secondary properties was their anthropocentricity. This anthropocentricity was 
then to be squared with the claim that secondary properties were nonetheless 
real - genuine properties of things. A minimal condition of their reality was their 
independence from the responses of individual judges and, it was argued, from 
the responses of any actual community of judges. Treating the standard of truth 
for secondary property judgements as being such that truth reflects best
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judgement in cognitively ideal circumstances is, in a sense, an option that is 
forced upon the theorist who wants anthropocentricity and reality. It seems 
forced since it is difficult to imagine how else we might sustain simultaneously 
the potentially irreconcilable desires to view the properties as there 
independently of (any amount of) us yet such as to be appreciable only to 
beings with certain non-universal ranges of sensitivity and interest. 
Nonetheless, this is a model to which the secondary modal realist gladly 
adheres since it generates the possibility of a non-primary conception of modal 
reality. With the next turn of the discussion we shall see why this avoidance of a 
primary property conception of the modal is essential to any plausible theory.
In Ch. 11 I will argue that statements involving metaphysical modalities have an 
important and identifiable non-descriptive role and I will go on to indicate my 
reasons for holding that secondary modal realism and only a secondary modal 




SECONDARY REALISM HI): THE NON -DESCRIPTIVE ROLE OF 
STATEMENTS OF METAPHYSICAL NFCFSSITY
M1.01 INTRODUCTION
Let us say that when procedures, or patterns of conduct are held to be 
constitutively related to the acceptance of sayings with a characteristic kind of 
content, that the sayings express commitments. In this usage, the expression of 
a commitment is to be viewed as a role of a saying which is different from that of 
a pure or simple articulation of belief.1 A salient example of commitment 
expressing discourse is moral discourse wherein the acceptance of a moral 
claim is held plausibly to involve a prima facie "pull" towards certain courses of 
practical conduct on the part of the agent who accepts that moral claim. There is 
a long standing tradition of modal theorizing which emphasizes the role of 
modal sayings as expressions of commitment to patterns of intellectual conduct 
and, therefore, of modal sayings as having a non-descriptive role.
The acceptance of a generalization as causally necessary has been held to 
express a commitment or propensity to draw certain inferences given the 
agent's awareness of the obtaining of familiar antecedent conditions.2 The 
acceptance of a statement as logically necessary has been associated with a 
commitment that the truth-value of the necessitated statement will never be 
revised in light of new information that occasions a re-distribution of truth-values 
within our belief system as a whole.3 The acceptance of a statement as a logical 
necessity has also been held to have the status of the a prescription, decision or 
policy concerning the conditions of assertibility of contingent statements.4 
It will be argued here that there is every reason to acknowledge that statements 
of metaphysical necessity have a commitment expressing role and an attempt 
will be made to outline the nature of that commitment [(11.10)-(11.12)]. The 
acknowledgement of a commitment expressing role for statements of 
metaphysical necessity has the following dialectical significance.
To hold that modal statements have a descriptive role and only a descriptive 
role is to repudiate the central insight of the modal anti-realist tradition. This is to 
adopt a stance which I take to be a (further) characteristic of a primary realist 
attitude to modality and this stance is inconsistent with the acknowledgement of
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an essential commitment expressing role for modal statements. However both 
anti-realist and secondary realist positions are consistent with the 
acknowledgement of this role. The resolution which I take to be definitive of 
modal anti-realism is that modal statements do not describe anything (insofar as 
they are modal) i.e. that modal statements have only a non-descriptive role .5 
To accept that modal statements are such that it is their nature both to describe 
modal features of the world and to express commitments - i.e. to accept that 
modal statements have a dual descriptive and non-descriptive role - is a further 
mark of the secondary realism that I am constructing by extrapolation from 
McDowell's treatment of the moral case. It is the purpose of this chapter to 
present a case for the prima facie viability and plausibility of a form of realism 
that permits the descriptive/non-descriptive combination [(11.20)-(11.23)].
(11.10) CLAIMS OF METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY AS EXPRESSIONS 
OF COMMITMENT - THE EXAMPLE OF LOGICAL NECESSITY 
There is a notable and unfortunate absence of discussion of the question of 
whether we can discern a kind of commitment that is characteristic of our 
acceptance of metaphysical necessities. My view is that we can discern such a 
commitment and I will attempt to provide a basic conception of the nature of this 
commitment. My strategy will be to use an account of the commitment 
expressing function of statements of logical necessity as a basic model for the 
construction of an account of the commitment expressing function of statements 
of metaphysical necessity.
It is a familiar theme that the acceptance of a claim of logical necessity involves 
a commitment to deal in particular ways with the management of our beliefs 
concerning what is actually the case. Blackburn's conception of claims of logical 
necessity is anti-realist since he views them as no more than expressions of 
commitments.6 However, the secondary modal realist can benefit from this 
conception by drawing upon Blackburn's account of the nature of logically 
modal commitments without accepting that modal statements are confined to 
the role of expressing such commitments. Blackburn's basic conception of 
logical modalities is set out as follows :
" We allow possibilities, rule out impossibilities, and insist upon 
necessities. This is not describing anything...It is more like
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adopting a norm, or a policy or a rule that a thesis be put 'in the 
archives above the hurly-burly of empirical determination."f
A simple example will serve to indicate the general intention that lies behind 
this conception.
A count informs us that there are thirteen in each of two groups of students while 
a count of all taken as a single larger group yields a total of twenty-seven. Once 
mundane checking is carried out with no relief, we embark on a strategy of 
framing hypotheses in order to account for the discrepancy. However we limit 
the range of acceptable hypotheses in refusing to entertain the notion that the 
arithmetic proposition (1) :
(1 ) 13 + 13 = 26
- which we treat as a logically necessary truth - has been falsified.
The precise nature of a logically modal commitment is not of paramount 
importance here. The central point is that a theory of logical modality is 
incomplete without consideration of the commitments that are related to our 
practice of making modal judgements and which are manifest in the conduct of 
our thinking and, ultimately, our action in the actual world. Even worse is a 
theory which following such consideration presents modal sensitivity only as an 
exercise of pure cognition and, relatedly, of modal statements as having only a 
purely descriptive role. It is implied by such a conception that agents could 
share with us the concept of modal distinctions while remaining unmoved by 
their modal judgements in their dealings in the actual world (e.g. in their 
dealings with recalcitrant evidence) and this outcome is, frankly, unbelievable. 
Such a conception of the modal has no more plausibility than a conception of 
moral evaluation according to which other creatures could share with us an 
awareness of the cruel (say) while remaining utterly indifferent to the promotion 
or prevention of actions or practices to which they held this concept to apply.® 
The marker that is being laid down here is that it seems simply undeniable that 
assertions of logical necessity are commitment-expressing. They have an 
identifiable non-descriptive role of the kind that has been adumbrated and no 
theory, "realist" or otherwise, can afford to ignore this phenomenon. Given this 
axiom of modal theorizing it would be natural to expect to find a similar 
commitment expressing function in the case of the other alethic modalities. It will 




(11-11) -M QPAl COMMITMENTS VIEWED AS REGULATING THF 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN APPEARANCE AND REALITY 
Wright describes the function of logical necessities in intellectual life as the 
means whereby we regulate the distinction between appearance and 
re a lity .9 This provides a useful starting point for our thinking about 
metaphysically modal commitments.
Our reasoning concerning the actual world may take the form of an inference 
from the premise that no metaphysically possible world is a world in which it is 
the case that P, to the conclusion that the actual world is not a world in which it 
is the case that P. Thus, on occasion, it is our conviction that no metaphysically 
possible world is a P-world - that it is metaphysically impossible that P - that 
sustains the belief that the actual world is not a world in which it is the case that 
P. Given that the world is not always and everywhere the way that it appears to 
be we have a persistent interest in the evaluation of the appearances , and this 
evaluation frequently leads us to rail against the claim that the world is a world 
in which it is the case that P - despite the fact that the world seems to be a world 
in which it is the case that P. Thus, we claim that we do not inhabit a world in 
which there are Gold samples composed of atoms other than those of the 
element with atomic number 79 even though we inhabit a world in which there 
is Gold-seeming stuff (composed of Iron Sulphide) which has this composition. 
Similarly, a kind of liquid that is colourless, tasteless, odourless, falls from 
clouds, fills lakes etc. but which contains no Hydrogen, is not water. My 
contention is that we can explain these metaphysical claims as emerging from a 
commitment to constrain and amend one's use of natural kind terms according 
to the deliverances of best science.10
(11.12) NORMATIVITY AND THE TRANSITION FROM INTELLECTUAL 
COMMITMENT TO METAPHYSICAL CLAIM 
In general, the commitment involved in the acceptance of metaphysical 
necessities is in the first instance a commitment to adopt certain constraints in 
one's reflective representation and description of the phenomena. To accept a 
metaphysical necessity is to adopt an intellectual norm whose function is to
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issue prescriptions to the effect that certain actual or imagined states of affairs 
merit (alternatively,do not merit) given descriptions. It is important to emphasize 
that the normative content of "merit" is crucial here. This normativity is 
indispensible to the right of passage from the mere acceptance of a pattern of 
linguistic practice to the making of metaphysical claims - e.g from constraining 
one's application of the predicates "Horse" and "Gold" on the one hand, to 
claiming that would not be a horse; that would not be Gold on the other. This 
transition is not licenced by a parallel but non-normative constraint whose force 
is that one should accept the communally determined range of application of 
the predicate as constituting the extension of that predicate. That is to say that, 
for natural kind terms at least we ought to endorse instances of the first but not 
the second of the following (constitutively intended) schematic conditionals:
(2) x merits application of the predicate "K"iff x is K.
(3 ) x elicits communal application of the predicate "K"iff x is K.11 
Here we have the manifestation of the distinction between a merited response 
and an elicited response that has already been seen to be crucial to the 
difference between consensualism and secondary realism in the spheres of 
values and secondary qualities.12 But, in the application of a natural kind term 
even more than in our moral evaluations we have a deep commitment to the 
idea that we may be found wanting in our current communal conception of what 
the concepts require of us and, correlatively, we are prepared to accept much 
more easily the possibility of widespread falsehood within the scientific than the 
moral compartment of our thought.13
What meriting the application of the natural kind predicate amounts to here is a 
hostage to our conception of the best (causal-explanatory/taxonomic) theory of 
the kind and to what such a theory would determine to be in the extension of the 
kind term. My claim is not, of course, that our current decisions to apply or 
withold application of natural kind predicates are governed by (unknown) best 
science. Here and now we do the best we can with the help of current science 
in forming opinions as to which instances merit the application of kind 
predicates, but this activity is regulated by a conception of best science in that 
our present practices of application of natural kind predicates are defeasible 
against the best-science standard. Thus while we presently resolve not to 
describe non-H20  stuff as water and accept as a matter of metaphysical
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necessity that water is H2O, we view both our resolution, and therefore our 
judgements concerning the metaphysically modal, as defeasible in the light of 
the possibility of an improved outlook that may be forthcoming with the 
betterment of science.
This, I am arguing, is (roughly) how the regulation of the distinction between 
appearance and reality is conducted and manifest in the matters of the 
identification of the extension of a natural kind term. In sum, my case is that 
claims of metaphysical necessity reflect our need to draw a line between what 
appears to be a member of a given natural kind and what really is so. Our 
opinion as to where that place is, along with our opinion concerning which 
specific claims that we are to take to be metaphysically necessary, is 
determined at any given time by current science. However with our concept of a 
superior scientific outlook and a best science comes the acceptance that we 
may now be drawing the needed line in the wrong place and so be issuing false 
judgements regarding what is metaphysically necessary or possible.
I will now turn to the task of explaining the secondary realist accommodation of 
the metaphysically modal commitment that has been sketched. This explanation 
will take place in the context of an exposition of the secondary realist 
conception of what it is to be a genuine property of a thing.
(11.20) GENUINE PROPERTIES ASSOCIATED WITH DESCRIPTIVE 
STATEMENTS
We can extract an interesting criterion of the genuine from McDowell's 
discussion of a version of "non-cognitivism" which he outlines as follows:
" Non-cognitivists hold that ascriptions of value should not be 
conceived as propositions of the sort whose correctness, or 
acceptability consists in their being true descriptions of the world; 
and correlatively, that values are not found in the world, as genuine 
properties of things are ."14
The general correlation that is implicit in the formulation of the non-cognitivist 
thesis is (C) :
(C ) The correctness of propositions Pj consists in their being true 
descriptions of the world iU  the properties they ascribe are 
found in the world as genuine properties of things.
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My suggestion is that we should adopt this correlation as part of the secondary 
realist conception of genuine properties.We ought to distinguish two restrictions 
on the correctness of property-ascribing statements which are relevant to the 
status of properties. The restrictions are that a correct statement of this kind 
should be: (i) true; and (ii) descriptive. By glossing over this distinction in 
his formulation of "non-cognitivism" McDowell gives the impression that one 
who opposes the descriptive status of evaluative commitments - if they're not 
descriptions they can't be true descriptions - is thereby obliged to embrace 
non-cognitivism. It was precisely in deference to the theorist who wishes to 
insist on truth-evaluability for the disputed claims while contesting that they 
describe anything that I suggested that we should restrict the use of the term 
"non-cognitivism" to its narrow semantic application i.e. to apply to a thesis of 
the denial of truth evaluability.15 I propose to maintain this usage since it allows 
us to distinguish positions that ought to be distinguished. Secondary realism 
requires that correctness in genuine property-ascribing statements requires that 
they be true, but secondary realism is distinguished from its anti-realist opposite 
by requiring that their truth is a matter of their success as descriptions.
This conception of the criteria of correctness for property-ascribing judgements 
as true descriptions, when added to the conception of the standard of truth for 
property-ascribing judgements as independent of the actual reactions of any 
individual judge or community of judges,16 yields a total conception of what it is 
in terms of secondary realism for a property to be a real property
(11.21) SECONDARY REALISM AND THE DESCRIPTIVE/
NON-DESCRIPTIVE DUALITY OF MORAL EVALUATIONS.
McDOWELL'S RESPONSE TO A NEO-HUMEAN ARGUMENT 
The secondary realist about a given class of statements considers correctness 
for those those statements to consist in their being true and descriptive. While 
there will be no disputing this conception in the case of secondary properties it 
is perfectly clear that the opponent of secondary realism about values will be 
inclined to argue against the purported analogousness in this respect of values 
and secondary properties.
Within a classical Humean perspective, ascriptions of colour, sound, taste etc. 
are paradigms of truth-evaluability and the descriptive functioning of language.
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These features of statements are determined by the ontogeny of the relevant 
concepts and in the case of secondary property ascribing statements the 
relevant concepts (e.g. colour concepts) are direct derivatives of impressions of 
sensation. On the other hand evaluations and indeed modal claims are held to 
be neither properly truth-evaluable nor descriptive precisely because the 
ontogeny of evaluative and modal concepts traces them to impressions of 
reflection. So in Humean consideration there is a clear difference between 
colours and values corresponding to the difference between sensation and 
reflection, the passive and the active. In Hume the distinction between 
impressions of sensation and impressions of reflexion is correlated with a 
distinction between passive and active mental faculties - between reason and 
the passions. Now, while it is unlikely that there will be any enthusisasm for 
such classical Humeanism, it is the case that many will feel it appropriate to 
challenge secondary realism about moral values on the grounds that these 
differ sharply from secondary properties with respect to their action-relatedness. 
McDowell considers an argument against the status of moral evaluations as 
(potentially) true descriptions. The argument is Humean in spirit though 
formulated in rather "un-Humean" terms.17 The argument may be represented 
as follows :
(4) Ascriptions of moral value impute reasons for acting.
(5 ) Propositional attitudes whose content is expressible by true 
descriptive statements cannot be cited as complete reasons 
for acting.
Therefore,
(6) Ascriptions of moral value are not true descriptive 
statem ents.
A natural supplement to this argument is a further inference from (6) and the 
correlation (C) of the previous section:
(C ) The correctness of propositions Pi consists in their being true
descriptions of the world iff the properties they ascribe are 
found in the world as genuine properties of things.
to the conclusion (7):
(7) Evaluative properties are not to be found in the world as 
genuine properties of things.
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The complete chain of neo-Humean argument, then, is from the role of the 
relevant mental states in the causation of behaviour, to the semantic role of the 
sayings that express the content of those states and finally to an anti-realism 
about the properties.
The would-be secondary realist about values accepts (C) and so is left with the 
option of rejecting either of premises (4) and (5). McDowell is not prepared to 
surrender the first of these premises. Indeed, in a sense it is here that we find 
thekey to his departure from the primary quality model of awareness. In holding 
that judgements of moral value are action-guiding McDowell intends that an 
agent who accepts such a judgement...
"....may ( depending on his opportunities for action) eo ipso have a 
reason for acting in a certain way, independently of anything else 
that is true of him."18
Moreover, if to stand in this kind of relation to action is partly constitutive of what 
it is for a judgement to be a moral evaluation then values cannot coherently be 
thought of as simply there in the world as primary properties might be 
supposed to be, since values are intrinsically related to our propensities to 
act.19
McDowell reccommends instead rejection of premise (5):
(5 ) Propositional attitudes whose content is expressible by true 
descriptive statements cannot be cited as complete reasons 
for acting.
Critical assessment of this rejection will repay us with further material for the 
construction of a secondary modal realism. The secondary realist must consider 
moral statements to be (potentially) true descriptions but it now seems clear 
that, in insisting upon the action-guiding character of moral commitments, 
McDowell is also insisting that we acknowledge an important non-descriptive 
aspect of the use of moral statements. In sum, he is advocating a view of moral 
statements as having a dual, descriptive and non-descriptive, aspect to their 
use.
In the following sections, I will attempt to bolster the plausibility of an approach 
which acknowledges this kind of duality by invoking Dummett's discussion of 
the relationship between the acceptance of assertions and the consequences 
for aaction that are associated with that acceptance.20
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(11-22) THE CONSEQUENCES o f  a c c e p t in g  an  a s s e r t io n  
Dummett makes the point that there is a sense in which all assertions are to be 
acted on, the acceptance of an assertion as true commits the believer to a line 
of action.21 This point is made alongside the suggestion that the work of the 
later Wittgenstein encourages us to shift attention in our attempts to understand 
meaning from the grounds on which an utterance is made (truth, verification, 
confirmation, asertibility etc.) to the consequences of acceptance of that 
utterance. Whether a consequence based semantics can or ought to be carried 
through programatically is a matter on which I take no position. However, once 
taken on board, the central insight that assertions are in general to be acted 
upon helps us abandon the fetish of regarding moral statements as unique in 
their strong action-relatedness. In order to provide initial backing for this insight, 
let us consider the case of yet another class of statements.
Dummett writes concerning our settling a question of personal identity:
"We have reasonably sharp criteria which we apply in ordinary 
cases for deciding cases of personal identity : and there are also 
fairly clear consequences attaching to the settlement of such a 
question one way or the other, namely those relating to ascription 
of responsibility, both moral and legal, to the rights and obligations 
which a person has, and also to motivation ( in the sense that it is 
ordinarily thought that a person has at least a different kind o f  
motivation for securing his own future happiness than for securing 
that of another). ”22
He continues by arguing that were we confronted with a community whose 
criteria of personal identity were different from our own e.g...
"as a result of a highly literal belief in re-incarnation "23 
we would still be in a position to recognize this fact for,...
"(p)recisely what would make the criteria they used criteria for 
o e r s o n a I  i d e n t i t v  would lie in their attaching the same 
consequences in regard to responsibility, motivation, etc. to their 
statements of personal identity as we do to ours ,"24 
It appears that the very possibility of recognizing the concept of personal identity 
as present in a community depends upon the members of that community going 
on in certain ways where this means extra-linguistic as well as linguistic ways.
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Let us locate this point explicitly in the context of radical interpretation in order to 
be clear about its intended force.
There are constraints on the ascription of sentence content that arise from the 
requirement that we render speakers intelligible. Now, part of what it is to 
maintain intelligibility is to square the content we ascribe to sayings with what 
speakers who assent to those sayings believe and with what they go on to say 
and do as a result of having such beliefs.25 The connections between beliefs, 
commitments and action are subtle and my aim is not even to begin to attempt 
to characterize the complex relations in which they stand to one another. But the 
general point that can be taken from the personal identity example is that it may 
beconstitutive of the very identity of a concept that is invoked to articulate the 
content of a speaker's belief that it should stands in some intrinsic relation to 
commitment and action .
However this claim is faced with certain obvious difficulties. As Dummett himself 
acknowledges, any attempt to provide an account of the meaning of utterances 
in consequence-based terms seems to be faced with enormous difficulties in 
light of some truisms regarding the nature of action.26 The course of action (if 
any) that results from the acceptance of an assertion is dependent upon the 
agent's aims (if any) in the relevant context and the other statements that the 
agent holds true. Moreover there is, in general, no question of fixing any two of 
the parameters of belief, aim and action and on that basis deriving a value for 
the third. Nonetheless, awareness of this limitation does deprive us of the 
deeply entrenched conviction that there are, at least in salient cases, statements 
for which we are in a position to specify, perhaps on the basis of charitable 
assumptions about an agents background beliefs, courses of action that count 
as acting on the acceptance of that statement and, for which the relation to 
action is essential to the identity of the concepts involved in the content of that 
statement.27
(11.23) SECONDARY PROPERTIES MORAL AND VALUES LOCATED 
ON A CONTINUUM OF ACTION-RELATEDNESS.
The picture that is suggested by these brief considerations is one in which 
action-relatedness is a feature of all (belief-expressing) statements and wherein 
there is no call for a strict and mutually exclusive categorization of
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commitment-independent, dsscriptive statGmGnts on thG onG hand, and 
commitnriGnt-involving, non-dGScriptivG statGmGnts on thG othGr. It would, 
howGVGr, remain possible and natural to locate classes of statements at some 
distance along a continuum of degrees of commitment-involving content. The 
continuum picture is natural because it allows us to respect the clear 
pre-analytic differences between statement classes that appear to contrast 
sharply in respect of their degree of action-relatedness by placing them at a 
suitable distance from one another. Consider e.g. predications of types (8) & 
(9) respectively:
(8 )  x is cruel.
(9 )  x is yellow
That there is a difference between such paradigmatic predications of values 
and secondary properties with regard to their action-relatedness is not in 
question. Thus we can acknowledge comfortably a feature which Blackburn 
notes as one of many "significant differences between secondary 
properties and values ”28 
i.e...
" It  is up to a subject whether he cares about any particular 
secondary property in any way. If morality consisted in the 
perception of qualities, there would be theoretical space for 
culture which perceived the qualities perfectly, but paid no 
attention to them. But however it is precisely fixed, the practical 
nature of morality is clearly intrinsic to it, and there is not the 
theoretical space.” 29
Even though the proper course for the secondary realist is indeed to take this 
point, there is an important facet of Blackburn's formulation which merits 
comment since it raises the issue ofthe implications that the continuum 
conception of action-relatedness might harbour for the philosophy of mind. 
Clearly what underlies the reference to perception here is the Humean notion 
that perceptual awareness is in itself passive and the point is well taken that 
sensitivity to value is not passive but is action-directing. But the issue is whether 
we must view matters in terms of a Humean conception of mind - according to 
which each of our mental faculties operates either in the active or the passive 
mode - in order to make sense of the contrast between secondary properties
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and values. The conception of a passive/active continuum allows us to make 
sense of the striking contrasts with respect to action-directedness of claims that 
the agent accepts without involving a commitment to the sharp Humean 
dichotomy. However, it is appropriate to acknowledge that the entitlement to this 
conception may depend ultimately upon the tenability of the amendments in the 
conception of mind that it may well be held to enforce. The chain of (Humean) 
argument that has been invoked proceeded from the role of relevant mental 
states in the causation of behaviour, to the semantic role of the sayings that 
express the content of those states and finally to an anti-realism about the 
properties. This chain of argument properly reflects an intimate relation between 
our propositional attitudes and our sayings. If we are rejecting a sharp 
dichotomy between purely passive and purely active mental faculties this 
cannot leave intact the corresponding opposition of (passive) belief and (active) 
desire. It seems to have been accepted by certain moral realists, for the case of 
moral evaluations at least, that the mental states that are the locus of evaluative 
judgements are neither (pure Humean) beliefs or desires. McDowell himself is 
explicitly critical of the conception of rational explanation that arises from the
acceptance of the opposition of reason and passions which is a feature of....
"eighteenth century philosophy of mind ."30
Others have attempted to proceed beyond criticism by pursuing an alternative 
based upon the classification of evaluative mental states in a hybrid category of 
propositional attitude ("besires"31) No doubt any proposal to generalize 
descriptive/non-descriptive duality across the board will benefit greatly from - 
not to say require - support from generalized versions of these proposals 
regarding the "mental role" of evaluations but I cannot pursue the matter further 
here.
(11.30) SUMMARY
In this chapter I have attempted to establish two things. The first is that there is 
no serious alternative to regarding claims of metaphysical modality as 
essentially commitment-expressing. The second is that the secondary realist 
hopes to accommodate this conception of claims of metaphysical modality while 
maintaining a conception of these modalities as genuine states of the world. It 
may well be argued, by the primary realist or the anti-realist that the hopes of
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the secondary realist are neither here nor there since the secondary realist is 
simply not entitled to eat the cake and have it with respect to the issue of modal 
description versus modal commitment. The best response to this criticism is 
simply to remark that it seems far too early to say whether the secondary realist 
is entitled to this combination of views. However, it may also be held that a 
consideration of the issues that have been aired in the second half of this 
chapter indicates that the secondary realist has earned a prima facie 
entitlement to the option of casting modal sayings as essentially dualistic with 
respect to description.
The appropriate judgement to make at this stage is that a form of modal realism 
which accommodates the conception of modal commitmentsm/p/rt be viable in 
the sense that the kind of realism that it is might be on general grounds a 
coherent and viable form of position. Given this judgement the ground which 
emerges as being of central strategic importance to is that which centres upon 
the claim that modal sayings are even partly descriptive. As matters stand the 
position is that the secondary modal realist must defend the descriptive function 
of modal judgements in order to keep alive the prospects of modal realism. 
Even if the secondary realist's pro-descriptive arguments succeed there still 
remains the task of pressing home the entitlement to descriptive/non-descriptive 
duality. The anti-realist, on the other hand has the prospect of killing off the final 




THE EVALUATION OF SECONDARY REALISM IN LIGHT OF THF 
PROJECTIVIST ALTERNATIVE
(12.0) INTRODUCTION : SECONDARY REALIST PEPARTURFS FROM 
FAMILIAR REALIST THEMFS
It is important to take stock before entering this final stage of assessment of the 
prospects of modal realism.
At the beginning of Section Three, the position was that the conceptions of 
modal realism associated with Lewis and McGinn respectively were, for 
different reasons, inadequate. The stated project was then to develop a third 
conception of modal realism - secondary modal realism - on the basis of a 
comparison with the moral realism of McDowell.
A serious question mark hangs over the secondary realist project since it will, 
no doubt, be felt by some that the objective of formulating a viable theory of 
modality that merits designation as realism has been lost or abandoned 
somewhere along the way. Indeed, it is undeniable that there are many 
junctures that might be identified as signalling departure from genuinely realist 
intent and it is important to provide an inventory of these. (No further argument 
will be offered in connection with any of these rejected "realist" claims.)
Firstly, the secondary modal realist is a non-objectual modal realist and so is 
not to be found propounding an ontological commitment to a distinctive class of 
object.
Secondly, while a minimum requirement of any kind of realism has been served 
by the continuing assumption of truth-evaluability for modal statements, there 
has been no insistence upon a correspondence theory of truth. It may be held 
that what ought to differentiate modal realist and anti-realist is that the former 
will insist that modal statements are true in the correspondence sense while the 
latter will insist that modal statements are true in the assertibility sense.
Thirdly, the standard of truth for modal judgements which is incorporated in 
secondary realism is such that best judgements of modality are held to 
determine the extension of the truth predicate as it applies to modal statements. 
It may be held that in giving up the idea that our best judgements reflect the 
modal truth that the entitlement to the term "realism" has been abrogated.
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Fourthly, and as a consequence of the operant standard of truth, the secondary 
nodal realist cannot accommodate the realist theme of the objectivity of 
meaning , i.e.
the notion that the meaning of a statement is a real constraint to 
which we are bound....and to which verdicts about its truth-value 
may objectively conform or fail to conform, quite independently of 
our considered opinion of the matter."1
Since, for the secondary modal realist, the truth-values of modal statements 
reflect best judgement there can be no question of verdicts about these 
truth-values conforming objectively to anything quite independently of our 
considered opinion of the matter.
Fifthly, given the repudiation of the objectivity of meaning it seems to follow that 
the secondary modal realist is also committed to the repudiation of the thesis of 
the objectivity of truth for modal statements. To hold that truth for a class of 
statements is objective is...
"..(t)o hold that a class of statements may be fully intelligible to us 
although resolving their truth-values may defeat our cognitive 
powers (even when idealized)...” 2
The falsehood of the objectivity of truth for a class of statements is a clear 
consequence of the falsehood of the thesis of the objectivity of meaning since to 
hold that statements may be undetectably true in the way that the objectivity of 
truth requires is to leave oneself with ...
"..no alternative but to think of their meanings as, so to speak 
reaching into regions where we cannot follow....” 3
Thus the secondary realist standard of truth can be seen as putting paid to the 
possibility of sustaining two allegedly realist strands of thought.
Sixthly, in acknowledging the anthropocentricity of modality and the 
commitment expressing function of modal statements the secondary modal 
realist eschews any clear entitlement to claim modal statements as objective 
judgements. The objectivity of judgement is....
"..the kind of objectivity that statements have when they are apt to 
record or misrecord features of the real world - features which 
would be appreciable by any creature possessed of appropriate 




Although modal statements are viewed as recording features of the real world, it 
is not clear that the secondary modal realist will not be keen to accept the 
distinction between cognitive powers, on the one hand, and emotional 
capacities and affective dispositions on the other. The reason is that the 
distinction at least threatens to re-inforce the eighteenth century philosophy of 
mind which leads to intolerance of the secondary realist conception of the 
essential descriptive/ non-descriptive duality of modal statements.5 Hence, 
secondary modal realism is not recognizably realist in the sense that required 
by the objectivity of judgement either.
Given these disclaimers the suspicion might be aroused that so-called 
secondary modal realism has collapsed by default into what is viewed more 
properly as a version of modal anti-realism. Now any dispute concerning which 
combination of "realist" theses is really constitutive of modal realism is bound to 
be fatuous. Ultimately, our concern must be to arrive at the formulation of a 
defensible conception of modality and then disputes over nomenclature can 
follow. But the survival of a distinctive identity for secondary realism depends 
crucially upon its being differentiated from a potent anti-realism with which it 
shares many important features.
(12.11 PROJECTIVISM PROTECTED BY QUASI-REALISM.
The most potent form of opposition secondary realism about the moral and the 
modal is a sophisticated projectivism, more specifically Blackburn's projectivism 
protected by quasi-realism.G This projective conception of the modal is the 
sceptical solution that was anticipated in Ch.6. The shift to projection is 
proposed as a remedy to the worry concerning the nature of the faculty whereby 
necessity is detected. The remedy works because it removes the cause of the 
worry i.e. the assumption that we can only retain proper entitlement to various 
attractive features of our modal discourse if we regard modalities as features of 
the non-projected world.
In Blackburn's conception, what is projected when we treat a claim concerning 
the actual world as a logical necessity is our inability to make anything of a way 
of thought that denies that claim. His account of the circumstances in which an 
imaginative block can be projected justifiably as a genuine logical impossibility
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is subtle and illuminating.7 Its main feature is that it distinguishes those 
imaginative limitations which we can view as arising from naturalistically 
explicable limitations of our powers of conception from other, deeper 
imaginative limitations. However from the point of view of the meta-modal 
discussion it is not so much the details of the circumstances of right projection of 
conceptual blocks that is of interest, as the content of the meta-theory in which 
the projective account is contained.
We are interested in the implications that a projective account of modality has 
for such issues as the truth-evaluability of modal statements, the metaphysical 
cost of projection, the standards of truth appropriate to modal judgements, the 
distinctiveness of modal concepts etc. Blackburn calls the meta-theoretic 
structure in which he deals with these issues quasi-realism, and it is in this 
meta-theory that our interest lies.
It was indicated in Ch.11 that a conception of modal language in the style of 
Blackburn differed from secondary realism in that it denied a descriptive 
function to modal sayings. The metaphysical correlate of non-descriptivism is 
the view that modalities are not in the world as genuine features of things; the 
epistemological correlate is that necessity is not detected or recognized but 
projected outward in appropriate circumstances. In order to consolidate the 
point that these are indeed the only issues which differentiate the quasi-realist 
projectivist from the secondary realist about modality, it will prove useful to 
outline the salient features of a quasi-realistic theory of the modal.
The stated objective of a quasi-realist approach to the moral and the modal is to 
attempt to earn on the basis of a slender (non value-laden, non modality-laden) 
metaphysic, those features of moral and modal language that tempt people 
towards realism.8
The first of these realist-seeming features is irreducibility. The modal is 
distinctively and irreducibly modal and there is certainly no question of 
projection being interpreted in such a way that it involves the notion of the 
modal claim having a truth-condition which concerns the agent.
The second feature, and related to the first is that modal claims satisfy the 
non-subjectivist, minimum condition on genuine judgements. There are 
standards which pertain to correct projection and there is no question of 
successful modal judgements being guaranteed to coincide (a la personal
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actualism) with the activation of the agent's projecting faculty.
The third feature is semantical cognitivism. In practice we treat moral and modal 
sentences as capable of truth and falsehood not only by calling them "true" or 
"false but by imbuing them with such propositional behaviour as deploying 
them as premises and conclusions in moral and modal argument. The 
quasi-realist intends to respect this practice - and perhaps there is no option but 
to respect this practice - and attempts to earn the right to truth-evaluation for 
the relevant claims. (The quasi-realist construction of truth satisfies the 
conception of truth which is determined by the constraints of Ch.6).
The fourth feature is a non-cconsensual standard of truth for quasi-realistically 
protected statements. The quasi-realist standard of truth involves an appeal to a 
standard of truth which allows for improvement at any stage of the moral and 
modal outlook of any actual community.
There is, of course the question of the quasi-realist's entitlement to these 
features to be considered and Blackburn is keen to emphasize that the right to 
treat moral and modal claims in these ways has to be earned. The ability of the 
quasi-realist projectivist (hereafter, the projectivist ) and the secondary realist 
(hereafter, the realist ) to deliver each of these features of modal judgement 
will stand as a measure of the relative viability of the respective conceptions of 
the modal. No doubt there is much that remains to be resolved in this respect. 
However, my intention is to allow that both kinds of theorist have established a 
prima facie entitlement to those attractive features of modal language to which 
they lay claim. Then, given this assumption, we can look towards the dimension 
of theorizing that differentiates the projectivist from the realist in order to assess 
the viability of this third grade of modal realism. Success in this dimension of 
theorizing emerges as a test of the viability of realism in precisely the following 
sense. If it is the case that the modal realist loses in the dispute which separates 
modal realism from modal projectivism, then modal realism will have nothing 
to sustain it, for the position will be that the (other) attractive features of modal 
realism can be had more economically in the acceptance of projectivism.
(12.20) RESOLVING THE REALIST/PROJECTIVIST DISPUTE*
Blackburn is keen to emphasize his view that, in the moral case at least, the 
dispute between the realist and the projectivist is a genuine disputeancf a
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dispute that the projectivist wins.9 Here, I want to examine Blackburn's reasons 
for taking this position with a view to evaluating the prospects of settling the 
dispute between the secondary modal realist and the modal projectivist. His 
case can usefully be split into two parts.
The second of these is the direct critique of realism and this will be addressed at 
a later stage. [(12.30), (12.30)] The first part of the case concerns the purported 
comparative advantages of projectivism over realism. The success of 
quasi-realism, Blackburn claims, leaves a projective account of morality "far the 
most attractive" on the grounds of (i) economy, (ii) metaphysics and (iii) the 
theory of action and desire.10 Each of these grounds stands as a potential 
source of advantage of a projective over a realist account of modality. They will 
be addressed in turn in (12.21), (12.22) & (12.23).
(12.21) THE PROJECTIVIST ARGUMENT FROM ECONOMY 
The following argument from economy is a direct parallel of an argument 
that Blackburn offers in favour of moral projectivism.11 
The projective theory intends to ask no more from the world than what we know 
is there - the natural world containing actual things, their actual (natural) 
features and our patterns of reaction to these. By contrast a theory assimilating 
modal understanding to perception demands more of the world. Perception is a 
causal process : we perceive those features of things which are responsible for 
our experiences. It is uneconomical to postulate both a kind of feature of things 
(their modal features) and a mechanism (intuition) by which we are happily 
aware of these.
An adequate response to this argument must begin by acknowledging that the 
modal realist claim that modalities are (genuine) features of the world brings in 
its wake the need to make a fundamental epistemological choice.
The realist must either take the view that there is no mechanism that affords us 
awareness of the states in question or take the view that there is such a 
mechanism. If the realist takes the fomer position, then a hopeless degree of 
recognition transcendence ensues. If there is no mechanism of awareness of 
the states in question then how could we ever be justified in claiming that such 
states are features of the world never mind arrive at some normative basis for 
the distinction between merited and non-merited applications of concepts of the
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kind at issue. This line of response is a non-starter. Accordingly, it seems that 
the realist must opt to grasp the the other horn of the dilemma and avow that 
there is a mechanism whereby we are aware of the states in question. It may 
then seem natural to charge that this amounts to at least relative extravagance 
since the projectivist requires no such mechanism of awareness in order to 
account for our experience of the given kind.
It is not clear how much of Blackburn's intention is captured in this articulation of 
the case from economy but the case is weak at a variety of points.
The first of these arises in relation to metaphysical economy. Of course it is the 
case that wherever we have a realist claiming that 0's are genuine features of 
the world and a (correlative) anti-realist claiming that the world (at least in the 
absence of our projective contribution) is 0-free the anti-realist will have (ceteris 
paribus) the more economical metaphysic. If the point were simply that anti­
realism is (ceteris paribus) metaphysically more economical than a realism that 
asserts that there are 0-states in the world, then the claim would be true but 
utterly question-begging if presented as a comparative advantage of anti­
realism. Moreover, it will be natural for the realist to claim the high ground of 
economy qua better value on the basis that the slender metaphysic of the 
anti-realist grounds an unsuccessful attempt to explain the phenomenon of 
modalizing. That is to say, the realist can be expected to claim that realism is the 
cheapest price at which modality becomes explicable.The metaphysical price 
by itself settles nothing here, otherwise the projectivist might as well defer to the 
eliminative actualist who has the most economical theory of all.
Nor can it be the case that the projectivist can be claiming that a mode of 
awareness of modal states is inherently more expensive in virtue of its being a 
cognitive or detecting faculty or mechanism that is trained on what is genuinely 
in the world, when opposed to a faculty of awareness of a state that is projected 
onto the world. On both realist and projectivist accounts we have an awareness 
of modal states. From where, then, does the projectivist's purported advantage 
of economy arise?
It can only be on the grounds that it is not the very existence of a mechanism of 
awareness of modality that is at issue between projectivist and realist, but the 
kind of mechanism that the realist is being portrayed as demanding i.e. a 
faculty of intuition where the operation of this faculty is construed as something
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more than a natural response to the natural world. Realism is uneconomical, it 
must be thought, because it is committed to a modal epistemology which 
requires influences other than causal influences on the knowing mind.
The secondary realist response to this charge has already been registered.12 
The primary realism that McGinn outlines entertains the possibility of our 
accounting in this way for our modal awareness, but secondary realism does 
not. Our awareness of modalities is an awareness constrained by the 
acceptance of the thesis of conceptualism and there is no reason whatsoever to 
attribute to secondary realism a commitment to a non-natural account of such 
sensitivities. All in all, it is difficult to deal with the argument from economy. 
Perhaps the best that can be said in defence of the prospect of such an 
argument playing an effective and non question-begging role in the evaluation 
of the realist projectivist dispute at this stage is that it would be relevant in a 
competition between a wholly naturalistic projectivism and a realism that 
required non-causal sensitivities and/or states of reality with which no causal 
commerce on our part was possible. But in the context of an opposition to 
projectivism that takes the form of a realism that eschews both of these 
poisoned chalices the relevance of considerations of economy is somewhat 
obscured. This is not to claim that fault has been found with the argument from 
economy, rather it is to claim that it has no force in the matter of settling the 
realist/projectivist dispute in the absence of further clarification of its intended 
content.
(12.22) THE PROJECTIVIST ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICS. 
Thankfully, the metaphysical argument proves easier to pin down. The
metaphysical argument for a projective theory of morality....
"...is in effect a development of the simple thought that moral 
properties must be given an intelligible connection with the natural 
ones upon which they somehow depend 13
Clearly, it is equally reasonable to expect that modalities must be given an 
intelligible connection upon the properties upon which they somehow depend 
i.e. the actual properties of things. It transpires, however, that the advantage that 
Blackburn claims in this respect for a projective theory of morality is related to 
the explanation of a phenomenon that has no modal parallel. Blackburn wants
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to say, and rightly so, that the relation of the moral states to the natural states 
upon which they somehow depend" is one of B/A supervenience without 
necessity .14 This is to insist upon the ban on mixed worlds while further 
insisting that there are worlds in which something is A'and B* and worlds in 
which there are things which are A' and non-B*. Now the problem that exercises 
Blackburn is to explain why it is, given that if there is no B7A' necessity, that 
there should be a ban on mixed worlds and he takes the view that we can 
provide an answer here in terms of constraints on the projection of B-states 
onto A-states - terms to which the realist has no counterpart.
The modal realist can concur with Blackburn that claims of B/A supervenience 
without necessity are especially difficult to justify. The difficulty is well put in the 
context of a claim of such dependence of the mental on the physical,
"It would be as though some people are B* and thinking of dogs 
and others are B* and thinking of their aunts, but there is a ban on 
them travelling  to inhabit the same place: com pletely
inexplicable ."15
The dubious spatial metaphor notwithstanding, the point is well taken. However 
the modal realist does not (ought not!) make a claim of this kind regarding the 
metaphysical dependence of the modal on the actual. It would indeed be a 
mysterious and potentially defeating commitment of modal realism that 
comprised the endorsement of two possible kinds of humans - the essentiallly 
human and the contingently human- that were nonetheless not compossible. 
But the realism that I have defended endorses B/A metaphysical necessity in 
the case of modal/actual dependence in deference to first-order essentialist 
commitments.16 Accordingly, the problem of intelligibility that arises from the 
ban on mixed worlds in conjunction with the absence of B/A necessity does not 
even arise in the modal case far less provide a basis on which the projectivist 
may seek to gain an advantage over the realist.
(12.23) THE P R O J F C T IV IS T  ARGUMENT FROM COMMITMENT,
The argument from commitment (as we shall call it to maintain its relevance 
beyond the moral case) is that projectivism in representing mental states of 
moral awareness as active desire-based expressions of attitude, rather than 
passive, motivationally neutral states of belief, represents the pull to action that
2 2 2
223
is involved in the acceptance of a moral commitment. In this respect, the 
argument proceeds, projectivism compares favourably with a realism that 
construes moral sensitivity as a simple belief-based awareness of a worldly 
state of affairs. The inevitable accompaniment of this construal of moral 
sensitivity is acceptance of the view that moral awareness would always have 
to be supplemented with a desire in order that the agent should have even a 
prima facie reason to act. It also appears to follow from such a view that the 
cognition of a moral state of affairs could in principle co-exist in an agent with 
any set of attitudes whatsoever. Again, the content of the parallel case for modal 
projectivism is clear.
This pro-projectivist case, like the argument from economy is misdirected at 
secondary realism. It achievess no more on behalf of projectivism than that it 
compares favourably with an account of modality which severs the seemingly 
constitutive connection between modal awareness and the patterns of 
intellectual conduct in which we engage. This dialectical orientation has the 
consequence that projectivism is only placed to claim a significant advantage 
over a theory that claims that there is no constitutive connection betwen the 
cognition of modality and the course of our thinking. This is an advantage that 
may be held to accrue over primary modal realism, but while there may be 
room to doubt whether secondary realism can ultimately be successful in its 
attempt to square realism with the active component of moral and modal 
discourse, it certainly cannot stand accused of intending to represent moral 
beliefs as passive or contingently related to intellectual conduct. It is not the 
case that that which is believed to be necessary stands on a par with that which 
is believed to be contingent when we are faced with (potentially) recalcitrant 
evidence and the secondary realist is distinguished among "realists" in 
recognizing and attempting to accommodate this feature. The modal content of 
our beliefs actively regulates our proceedures in such scenarios and the 
secondary realist acknowledges that this conceptual role is (partially) 
constitutive of what it is to have modal categories of thought.
The projectivist argument from commitment - like the argument from econonmy 
succeeds against primary realism but does not even apply to secondary 
realism.
The pro-projectivist comparative arguments, then do not appear to make so
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much as a dent in a suitably sophisticated realism but the realist still has a more 
direct challenge to face.
(12.30) BLACKBURN'S CRITIQUE OF REALISM: falTHE PERCEPTUAL 
MODEL OF AWARFNFSR
There are two strands to Blackburn's critique of McDowell's moral realism. The 
first and less important of these is a critique of the perceptual model of moral 
awareness ; the second concerns the realist's conception of the proper scope of 
explanation and the role of explanatory considerations in the resolution of the 
realist/projectivist dispute.
The critique of the perceptual model can be dealt with swiftly.The appropriate 
response to the allegation of the vaccuity of the perceptual model of moral 
awareness is to concur. The case for so responding has already been made 
along with the claim that the prospects of an illuminating perceptual model of 
modal awareness are even more dismal.17 So, while the critique of the 
perceptual model of awareness may apply to McDowell's moral realism, there 
is no perceptual model of modal awareness incorporated within secondary 
modal realism as adumbrated here.
(12.31) BLACKBURN'S CRITIQUE OF REALISM; (b) - THE REALIST 
CONCEPTION OF EXPLANATION
McDowell's most important arguments in favour of moral realism are arguments 
whic are intended to establish its explanatory advantages. In the course of 
making the positive case in favour of realism McDowell argues:
(i) that values indeed fail an explanatory test which is often mooted as the 
explanatory test for reality.
(ii) that this test does not have the status of a unique explanatory test for 
reality.
and
(iii) that moral values pass a more sophisticated and equally valid 
explanatory test for reality.18
Blackburn offers two criticisms of McDowell's conception of the explanation of 
value experience.19 It will be argued that these criticisms are both wide of the 
mark and that a proper understanding of McDowell's position reveals genuine
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explanatory considerations which can be martialied in favour of modal realism.
(12.32) MCDOWELL'S APPRAISAL OF EXPLANATORY TESTS FOR 
REALITY
McDowell's evaluation of explanatory tests for reality20 depends upon the 
recognition of two important distinctions. The first distinction is the familiar 
distinction between kinds of explanation, specifically between causal (C) 
explanations and non-causal (N) explanations. The second distinction is a 
distinction between kinds of explanatory test that relate to our experience or 
awareness of a given range of phenomena, 0 . These are (T1) and (T2) 
respectively :
(T 1 ) If 0  vocabulary is indispensable in the explanation of 0  
experience, then 0  states are real.
(T 2 ) If the explainer cannot consistently deny the reality of 0  
states, then 0  states are real.
By simple combination of kinds of explanation with kinds of explanatory test we 
have four explanatory tests for reality to consider viz: (CT1), (CT2), (NT1) & 
(N T 2 ).
The reality of values, McDowell argues must be judged relative to a reasonable 
combination of kind of explanation and kind of test and his conclusion is that 
values are real in virtue of their satisfying the test (T2) for a non-causal, 
normative style of explanation. That is to say the appropriate explanatory test 
for the reality of values is (NT2). Why is this explanatory test reasonable.
The first consideration that is offered is that (T1) tests are in general 
inappropriate tests of reality no matter how interpreted. The test which emerges 
from the causal explanatory interpretation of (T1) is unreasonable from a 
secondary realist point of view since not even secondary properties pass it. 
Indeed, if the standard is the indispensability of 0 vocabulary in causal 
explanations of 0 experience, only primary properties will turn out to be real.21 
But McDowell seems to want to urge the point against (T1) tests more generally 
than under the causal explanatory interpretation. He writes:
" The right explanatory test is not whether something pulls its own 
weight in the favoured explanation (it may fail to do so without 
thereby being explained away), but whether the explainer can
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consistently deny its reality. " 22 (My emphasis J.D.)
On this basis the test (NT1) is excluded from consideration as well. This leaves 
the case of test (CT2) to consider and this, McDowell rules irrelevant to the 
reality of values. He writes:
"..a virtue (say) is conceived to be not merely such as to elicit the 
appropriate 'attitude' (as a colour is merely such as to cause the 
appropriate experiences), but rather such as to m erit it. And this 
makes it doubtful whether merely causal explanations of value 
experience are relevant to the explanatory test, even to the extent 
that the question to ask is whether someone could consistently give 
such explanations while denying that the values involved are 
rea l."23
So the test (NT2) emerges as the explanatory test since it is the only test which 
is both relevant in relating to non-causal modes of explanation and reasonable 
in imposing a requirement which falls short of the indispensability of the 
relevant vocabulary in explanations.
No further comment will be made on McDowell's reasoning at this stage. I turn 
now to address (in turn) Blackburn's criticisms of McDowell's conception of the 
explanation of value experience.
The first of these is that McDowell has, in effect, misrepresented the nature of 
the explanatory interest that is exhibited in certain familiar aspects of our 
practices of enquiry. [12.330] The second is that McDowell's conception of 
value experience renders the aspiration to frame causal explanations of value 
explanations illegitimate. [12.331]
(12.330) BLACKBURN'S FIRST CRITICISM OF McDOWELL'S 
APPRAISAL.
Blackburn gives the following account of McDowell's case for the explanatory 
advantages of a realist theory of value over a projectivist theory ;
"In effect it uses the 'interest-relative nature of explanation to cite 
contexts in which poper explanations of various verdicts can be 
given by citing supposedly projected states of affairs.'Why did I find 
that frightening/ funny/ appalling?' It can satisfy the interest behind 
such questions to answer 'Because it m $ r i fp (/ fright/ mirth/
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humour.' 'Why do we find human happiness good?' 'Because it Ag 
good."24
He goes on to make the point that there is no good reason to read into these 
patterns of question and response anything of more significance than the desire 
on the part of questioner and respondent to establish whether some local error 
has occurred. The questioner can be viewed as expressing a suspicion that in 
the subject's finding this particular thing frightening (funny/appalling/good), 
what is being exhibited is a strange or anomolous departure from the kind of 
evaluation that would be expected in the normal course of things. The 
respondent may be seen as articulating the conviction that no such departure 
has occurred and that in fact the evaluative verdict that has been called into 
question is a part of normal, non-anomolous, non-surprising evaluation. Hence 
Blackburn's illuminating comment:
" Compare :'why do we say that the cube root of 1728 is 12?' 
'Because it is  12'. "25
This sober appreciation of the lack of metaphysical significance of the given 
pattern of question and response is perfectly in order. However, it does not 
speak to the kind of explanatory consideration upon which McDowell's case is 
rested. It is true that McDowell's case does, in effect, involove an appeal to the 
interest relativity of explanation but it does not involve such an appeal in the 
way that Blackburn suggests. The explanatory test to which McDowell appeals 
is, as we have seen, the test (NT2) and, indeed, part of his reason for fixing 
upon this test was that we have more explanatory interests than causal interests 
and, accordingly, we should not always expect a causal-explanation based test 
to be appropriate. Now a realist who wished to defend the (NT1) test might 
also be well advised to appeal to such relativity of our explanatory interests. But 
the relevant considerations are (i) that Blackburn's point makes sense as a 
criticism of an (NT1) realist but (ii) McDowell's realism is not based upon the 
success of values vis a vis (NT1).
To uphold (NT1) realism is to uphold the reality of values on the grounds that 
needed normative explanations of our value experience cannot dispense with 
evaluative vocabulary. Thus, the proponent of (NT1) realism might well want 
to argue that the only satisfactory, genuinely explanatory, responses to the 
explanation seeking questions of the kind, why does X find this good , are
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those which involve a reality affirming emphasis of the presence of the 
evaluative property (it is good ) or those which invoke the normative propriety of 
the detection of the value (it merits such a response). Blackburn's rejoinder can 
then take its course but it is of no consequence to McDowell's case since 
McDowell s case is not based upon the purported indispensability of evaluative 
vocabulary in explanations of value experience. Moreover, perhaps the 
irrelevance of this rejoinder is to be explained on the basis that Blackburn has 
mistaken (NT1) for the other criterion upon which McDowell's realism in fact 
rests i.e. (NT2)
(12.331) BLACKBURN'S SECOND CRITICISM OF McDOWELL'S 
APPRAISAL
There is a second criticism of McDowell's realism which can be developed from 
Blackburn's remarks concerning the realist critique of projectivism. Although he 
hesitates to attribute the view directly to McDowell or for that matter any other 
moral realist, it is clear that Blackburn associates with moral realism a quietist 
attitude which deems illegitimate, or at least forlorn, the quest for naturalistic 
explanations of moralizing.26 Blackburn views a projectivist metaphysic (and 
the associated opposition to the perceptual model of moral awareness) as 
giving space to a wider explanatory interest which realism-cum-quietism 
dismisses. The role of this wider explanatory interest is introduced by way of a 
further mode of response to the questioner who asks Why does X  find Y 
frightening /  good ?
" This questioner may be asking why we find something frightening 
because he finds any such reaction puzzling : why do human 
beings ever feel fear, or get as far as supposing that anything 
merits fear? No doubt there is an answer to hand: one which talks 
of the behavioural consequences of the emotion, and their 
evolutionary advantages to creatures that have it. In a similar vein
we try to place the activity of moralizing  In particular we try to fit
our commitments into a metaphysical understanding of the kinds of 
fact that the world contains: a metaphysical view which can be 




The suggestion that realism is predisposed against this intellectual outlook 
comes with the following question and characterization:
Could it be that this explanatory interest is somehow unjustified: 
that explanations of a certain type cannot be had, or that the desire 
for them is the desire for an illusory ’external' viewpoint outside of 
all standpoints and perspectives? This is the justification for not 
having or wanting an explanatory theory along my lines at all ."28 
There are many strands to this criticism and it is important to take care in their 
separation.
The first strand concerns quietism. That which Blackburn characterizes as a 
justification for rejecting the style of explanatory theory on offer might be 
associated with certain aspects of McDowell's Wittgensteinian strictures against 
"externality" or the hankerting after a "sideways on" pertspective on our moral 
and mathematical procedures.29 Moreover it might be said that McDowell could 
have been more emphatic in distancing his meta-theory of the moral from the 
quietist overtones which are undoubtedly present in the Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of mathematics which he invokes in order to bolster his 
meta-theorizing. If quietism were to emerge as a feature of McDowell's moral 
realism then it would stand as a further feature of this moral realism that would 
be an unwelcome feature of a generalized secondary realism. With respect to 
quietism, as with respect to the perceptual model of moral awareness, the 
secondary realist can take Blackburn's point. But, in defence of McDowell there 
is no indication in McDowell's main critique of projectivism30 that he is 
endorsing such quietism.
The second strand of Blackburn's criticism is based upon the detection of an 
anti-naturalistic current in moral realism, but this detection is also dubious.What 
McDowell is sceptical of, and rightly so, is the suitability of causal explanations 
of our awareness of values to exhaust the region of our legitimate explanatory 
requirements. The point is that the response of a properly functioning sensitivity 
to virtues is merited and not just elicited and that...
this makes it doubtful whether m erely causal explanations of 
value are relevant to the explanatory test.."31 (My emphasis - J.D.)
This consideration, of itself is quite neutral with respect to the question of 
whether (broadly) causal explanations of our practices of moralizing and
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modalizing are possible or desirable, but it stands as a bulwark against the 
(imperialistic) aspirations of a certain kind of naturalism to displace non-causal 
modes of explanation and to colonize all of explanatory space.32 The stand of 
the realist, we might say, is non-naturalistic as opposed to anti-naturalistic. The 
position is not, as Blackburn has it, that only anti-realism is willing and able to 
accommodate the eminently legitimate aspiration to develop naturalistic 
explanations of our modal (and moral) responses to the world. The position is 
that the realist is railing against (what the realist takes to be) the illegitimate 
aspiration to develop, to the exclusion of other explanatory projects,only 
explanations of our modal (and moral) responses to the world which are purely 
naturalistic.
(12.4) A FINAL STATEMENT OF SECONDARY MODAL REALISM.
It is now possible to characterize extensively the self-image of secondary modal 
realism. Secondary modal realism embraces a conceptualist epistemology of 
metaphysical modality and a best-judgement-reflecting standard of truth in 
modal judgements; it embraces an ontological conception of these modalities 
as anthropocentric yet genuine features of things; it recognizes the duality of 
descriptive and non-descriptive role as an essential feature of modal claims and 
it departs, at crucial junctures from traditionally recognized realist themes. This 
secondary modal realism is not vulnerable to the projectivist's argument from 
metaphysics since it views strong metaphysical supervenience of metaphysical 
modalities upon actual properties as a necessary condition of intelligibility in a 
theory of metaphysical modality. Secondary modal realism neither requires a 
perceptual model of our modal awareness, nor depends upon the acceptance 
of quietism, nor repudiates aspirations to explain naturalistically the 
phenomenon of our modalizing.
No doubt there is much to be said both on the matter of the tenability of these 
marks considered both individually and when evaluated in terms of their mutual 
consistency. However, my final remarks will not be concerned with an attempt to 
bolster the secondary modal realist's entitlement to any one, or to any given 
combination, of these features. Rather, I will be concerned to attempt to indicate 
and to dabble in the region into which the secondary modal realist must venture 
if the positive case for secondary modal realism is to be developed.
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(12.50) SCOPE FOR FURTHER WORK fal: A LACUNA IN THE POSITIVE 
CASE FOR (NT21 EXPLANATORY TESTS FOR REALITY 
Thus far, the discussion of the explanatory tests of moral reality has been 
confined to defending McDowell's construal of these against Blackburn's 
attacks, and I have argued that the attacks miss their target. However, this is not 
to say that McDowell's explanatory case for moral realism is unproblematic. In 
this final section, I will argue that there is a significant lacuna in McDowell's 
positive case for moral reality and I will attempt to indicate how a secondary 
modal realist ought to react to this position.33
McDowell's case is that values are real and determined to be so by the (NT2) 
explanatory test for reality, i.e values are real since one who indulges in the 
(perfectly legitimate) practice of attempting to provide non-causal explanations 
of our value-experience cannot consistently deny the reality of values. But 
before the secondary modal realist can attempt to gain honest title to modal 
reality by this route, some tough questions concerning the status of the (NT2) 
test must be addressed. The criticism that leaps to mind in connection with 
McDowell's claim of the reality of values is that we lack a reason for holding that 
our interest in these non-causal explanations of, say, the fearful,...
"..will simply not cohere with the claim that reality contains nothing 
in the way of fearfulness."34
Or to put the matter in a different way, it is not at all clear why McDowell takes 
the view that the intelligibility which non-causal explanations confer on our 
responses is undermined by a claim of the non-reality of the fearful 35 What is 
amiss here is one of two kinds of supplementary contribution.
The first would be a general case which purports to establish that (what we 
might call) fictionalist or instrumentalist - i.e. reality-denying - conceptions of 
non-causal explanations always undermine the intelligibility of our relevant 
responses. The second would be a case specific to values (modalities) which 
drew, explicitly or implicitly, upon some general criteria of demarcation, i.e 
criteria which enabled us to separate those cases for which instrumental 
conceptions of non-causal explanations of our responses do undermine the 
intelligibility of relevant responses, from those in which instrumentalism does 




Two considerations suggest that the pursuit of a locally based, rather than a 
globally based, case against modal instrumentalism will prove more rewarding. 
The first is that there is a consideration of economy that militates against a 
generalized anti-instrumentalist strategy. The modal realist is (of course) 
prepared to bear the cost of modal ontology, but to rest the case for accepting 
this ontology on a generalized anti-instrumentalism would be to buy in 
incautiously to a potentially enormous ontological commitment. The reason is 
simply that a generalized anti-instrumentalism brings in its wake a new batch of 
ontological commitment for each case in which we have a non-causal 
explanatory interest in some kind of "response" that we exhibit. To put matters 
another way, without the potential safety-valve of instrumentalist construal, 
ontological commitments will proliferate (via (NT2)) to match our interests in 
non-causal explanations of our phenomenology.
The second consideration which promotes the attraction of a local opposition to 
modal instrumentalism is that while the enormity of the task of pursuing a 
generalized anti-instrumentalism is prohibitive, we have at least a clue about 
the lines along which a modal anti-instrumentalist case may be constructed.
(12.51) SCOPE FOR FURTHER WORK (bLAN ATTEMPT TO FILL THE 
LACUNA IN THE MODAL CASE AND A TRANSCENDENTAL 
ARGUMENT FOR MODAL REALITY 
McGinn claims that the analogy between mathematical and modal theories with 
respect to empirical conservativeness contrasts with an important disanalogy 
between the explanatory profiles of mathematical and modal theories.36 He 
writes:
" Field... argues plausibly that the role of mathematical statements 
in scientific  explanations is ex trin s ic  to the phenomena being 
explained: and this is an important part of his case for adopting a 
fictionalist attitude towards mathematical sentences. However, it 
seems that modality is not thus extrinsic to the explanations: for 
one does not have a genuine explanation unless modalities are 
implicated - so it would not be feasible to combine a realist account 




Now, it must be emphasized that McGinn's remarks are not offered with our 
present concerns directly in mind and, furthermore, that his remarks concern, in 
the first instance at least, causal explanations. However there are elements 
within this remark which bode promise for the secondary realist's 
explanatory-test defence of modal reality.
The crucial thought is contained in the thesis that one does not have a genuine 
explanation unless modalities are implicated. This thesis might be developed 
in two ways to illuminate the issue of the status of our (NT2) test.
In the first place, given the (only slightly) more explicit thesis that all 
explanations implicate modalities, it follows (a fortiori) that explanations of our 
modal experience implicate modalities.
In the second place, the thesis ought to be interpreted in lines with the T2 
conception of an explanatory test [12.32] as I shall now procedd to argue.
The content of the thesis that all explanations implicate modalities, hangs 
delicately upon the ambiguity of "implicate". A T1 -reading of the (latter) thesis 
yields an interpretation according to which modal vocabulary is indispensable 
in the explanation of modal experience. A T2-reading of the thesis yields an 
interpretation according to which the explainer cannot consistently deny the 
reality of modal states. The first of these interpretations appears simply 
implausible, for while it may be the case that explanatory claims depend for 
their explanatory status upon their modal status, there can be no question of 
statements whose modal status is not manifest in their syntax failing of 
explanatory status. For example, while the theorems of a genuinely 
causal-explanatory theory may have to be counterfactual -sustaining in order to 
fulfil a full and genuine explanatory role, there is clearly no bar to formulating 
the relevant theory in purely actualist vocabulary.38 This point would appear to 
apply mutatis mutandis to non-causal modes of explanation. A fact which is well 
attested when we consider those actualist (in vocabulary)normative 
explanations of our experience of values (and of the fearful and suchlike) which 
McDowell illustrates.39 The second interpretation, i.e that the explainer cannot 
consistently deny the reality of modal states seems at least more plausible than 
the first. McGinn's case would appear to be that we know a priori that there can 
be no nomanilizing of the modalities that support explanatory activities since a 
purportedly modally-nominalized explanation simply fails to be an explanation.
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If this thought is correct, then we have in the modal case a kind of guarantee 
against the possibility of denying the reality of modalities which feature in 
explanations which does not hold for evaluative components. The comparable 
security of modal reality might be illustrated in the following way.
If we had a complete naturalistic explanation of moralizing, i.e of what it is and, 
quasi-realistically why we do it,4® then there would have to be at least scope 
for doubt as to whether the kind of non-causal explanatory interest which 
McDowell taps would have any further locus. McDowell clearly thinks that this 
kind of non-causal interest is ineliminable. But insofar as they are discernible, 
his grounds for this view are that the naturalistic explanatory project is 
incompletable41 rather than that it leaves something out even when, by its own 
lights, complete. So, in one sense, the question of whether values are real 
hangs upon whether the naturalistic explanations of the kind the projectivist 
lionizes are to be had. If McGinn's thesis of the intrinsicness of modalities to 
explanations is correct, then the dispute between the modal realist and the 
modal projectivist differs from the moral dispute in a crucial way. If the 
projectivist enterprise of naturalistic explanation is wholly successful, it will still 
be the case that real modalities have succeeded in getting in behind, as it were, 
the causal explanation of our modalizing, for we cannot have genuine 
explanations - even explanations of our own modalizing - that cohere with the 
denial of the reality of the modalities which are intrinsic to the explanatory 
practice.
Three final comments are in order concerning this "transcendental" argument 
for modal reality which has emerged from the consideration of the explanatory 
test for reality.
The first is that the claim that lies at the heart of the argument, i.e. that all 
explanations implicate modalities stands as an eminent potential target of 
attack. I have not attempted to defend this claim here since I have no clear 
sense of how it might be defended and not because it strikes me as standing in 
no need of defence.
The second is that the argument may seem to establish at best only the reality 
of causal modality since it is causal modality which sustains, in the relevant 
sense the practice of naturalistic (ultimately causal explanation). However, to 
conceed this much would be to prompt the secondary realist about
234
235
metaphysical modality to argue, as Wiggins has,42 for a dependence of causal 
modalities upon the de re must of essence" and to seek to gain the reality of 
metaphysical modality thereby.
The third and final comment is that the transcendental argument will be of 
interest to the afficianado of the modal realist/projectivist dispute not least 
because its applicability to the modal case and its inapplicability to the moral 
echoes a theme which already haunts the modal quasi-realist. Namely, that the 
phenomenon of modalizing unlike that of moralizing appears to overflow the 
bounds of the naturalistically explicable 43
(12.6) CLOSING STATEMENT
The assessment of the health of modal realism which emerges from this thesis 
is brief but not pessimistic. The conceptions of modal realism due to Lewis and 
McGinn do not yield plausible views of the modal but moreover they leave one 
with the sense of not having got to the heart of the question of the objectivity of 
modality. The secondary modal realism which has been developed here is not 
short on attractive features, indeed it has been constructed with a view to 
accommodating these. Furthermore, in attempting to provide a realist contrast to 
quasi-realist projectivism it does, I claim, get to the heart of the question of the 
objectivity of modality by responding directly to Blackburn's challenging 
agenda. The dialectical obligations of the would-be secondary modal realist are 
of three kinds. Firstly, to earn properly the right to those attractive features of 
modality which have traditionally been associated with an anti-realistic 
metaphysical outlook - in particular, the function of modal claims as what I have 
termed "commitments"; secondly, to investigate more thoroughly the mutual 
consistency of the marks of secondary modal realism which have been claimed 
here on their individual merits; thirdly, to accept the challenge of refining and 
clarifying the explanatory tests for reality which McDowell has placed on the 
agenda but whose defence remains to be constructed.
My view is that the health of modal realism depends squarely upon the 
satisfactory execution of these tasks. This is not in itself a pessimistic overview, 
but that these regions are all but uncharted reflects well the lack of modal realist 




THE VIABILITY QF THEORIES OF TRUTH FOR LANfil JAGES CONTAINING
MODAL OPERATORS
(A.O) INTRODUCTION
The viability of a homophonic theory of truth for a language containing modal 
operators emerges as an issue of great philosophical interest. The pursuit of 
the project is motivated in two main ways;
(a) The rejection of possible world semantics will only be properly credible 
when successful alternative semantic proposals are shown to be available.1 If 
a homophonic theory of (absolute) truth can be provided for a modal operator 
language Lm , this will provide the basis for the attainment of a variety of 
semantic goals, perhaps most notably those associated with the "Davidsonian 
programme".2
(b) The semantic claim of 'non-cognitivism' is that the (non-)cognitive role of a 
certain class of sayings is such that they are not, strictly speaking, 
truth-evaluable.The availability of an adequate theory of truth for a class of 
sentences stands as a one-way test in a cognitivist/ non-cognitivist dispute.3 If 
the truth-theoretic treatment of a contentious class of declarative sentences 
proves straightforward, this, of itself, is no feather in the cognitivist cap. If it 
proves that the sentences are not susceptible to the processing, then this is a 
powerful semantical point in favour of non-cognitivism. In this way, truth 
-theoretic considerations impinge on the question of the (non-)cognitive role of 
declarative modal sentences. [See Ch.6]
In a seminal paper4 Peacocke argues that an adequate theory of (absolute) 
truth is constructible for a language containing modal operators. The 
acceptability of Peacocke's approach palpably depends upon the acceptability 
of a methodological principle and an associated strategy for semantic 
theorizing. No justification of this principle is offered by Peacocke or, as far as I 
know, by those who accept the theory of truth that he proposes.5 
Davies also claims to have provided an adequate theory of truth for a language 
containing modal operators5 albeit modal operators with slightly different 
semantic properties from those with which Peacocke is concerned. Davies
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theory depends upon methodological principles in addition to those required in 
Peacocke s case although, again no justification of these is forthcoming.
Many serious difficulties can be raised in connection with the methodological 
principles (and the associated stategy) upon which the acceptability of these 
truth theories depend. My position is that the right to the truth theoretic "results" 
has yet to be earned and that it can only be earned by addressing, and then 
overcoming, these difficulties. My tentative conclusion is that no case against 
Peacocke's theory is proven and to that extent at least the right of access to the 
theory of truth is defensible.
I will deal in SECTIONS ONE and TWO with Peacocke's theory and the issues 
that it generates.I will deal in SECTION THREE with Davies' theory and the 
further issues that are raised by that style of theory alone.
SECTION ONE 
(A1.0) PEACOCKE'S TRUTH THEORY
Peacocke presents a truth theory for a simple modal propositional language, 
Lo, with two unstructured sentences, "P" and "Q" along with the sentential 
operators , "&"and "D".7 The axioms are as follows:
(T1) □  [TRUE ('P', Lo) <--> P]
(T2) □  [TRUE ('Q', Lo) <--> Q]
(T3) □  [TRUE r ~An ", Lo) <--> -TRUE (Lo, A)]
(T4) □  [TRUE ( r A & B \ Lo) <~>TRUE (Lo,A) &TRUE (Lo,B)]
(T5) □  [ TRUE ( r □ A n ’,Lo,) <--> □  TRUE (Lo, A)].
Here, "A" and "B" are variables over Lo sentences and axioms (T3) - (T5) are 
abbreviations of their universal closures.
Every instance of the schema (S):
(S ) □  [TRUE ( Lo,r a 1 ) <-> a]
is provable in such a theory as long as we assume that the logic of the proof 
theory is at least as strong as quantified S4.8 So the theory is of sufficient 
strength to generate strict truth-conditions as well as material truth-conditions 
for each sentence of Lo. (The strict conditional is equivalent to the necessitated 
material conditional " □  (P->Q)".) The theorems required by Convention T, i.e. 
every instance of the schema (M):
(M ) TRUE ( Lo,r a1 ) < - > a
237
238
are only derivable via their necessitations.
(A1.1) WALLACE'S OBJECTION TO PEACOCKE'S TRl ITH THEORY 
This theory is an appropriate target of an objection which has it that 
necessitated T-theorems and, therefore, theories that imply them, are false.9 
The possiblity that is appealed to in order to support the allegation of falsehood 
for the necessitated T-theorems is that words might have had different 
meanings. Gupta rehearses the argument for the falsehood of (1) :
(1 ) □  ('Lizzy is playful.' is true in English <-> Lizzy is playful.)
"...if ’Lizzy’ in English had been used to talk about, say Martha - the 
morose and unplayful child - then the sentence ’Lizzy is playful' 
would have been false. Though of course the change of name 
would leave Lizzy’s playfulness unaffected. "10
(A1.2) REPLY: THE ESSENTIALIST PRINCIPLE
Peacocke considers what is essentially the same objection as it pertains to a 
consequence of a substitution instance of (T5) i.e (2):
(2) TRUE [ (Lo, r □  (~ (P& -P)"1 ) <-> DTRUE ( Lo, r~ (P& -P)"1 )]
He writes,
"This is said to be false because ... ' - 'and  '&' might have meant
something different.  Not so: the right side says that necessarily
the expression '~(P& ~P)' is true inLo and those expressions could 
not have meant anything else in that very language Lo. (Lo is a
proper name of that language.) Languages are here identified by
the meanings of expressions in them and a language in which
meant something other than negation would not be Lo."11 
He then generalizes:
" This position has the consequence that if the language parameter 
place of the semantic predicates used in a truth-theory is filled by a 
proper name, the axioms will generally each be necessarily true or 
necessarily false."12
Clearly, this case for the necessitation of the axioms of the theory applies 
equally to the theorems.
The principle that is invoked by Peacocke, and upon which the acceptability of
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his proposed truth-theory depends, is what we might call the essentialist 
principle, a language has its semantic properties essentially. No justification of 
this principle is offered by Peacocke or, as far as I know, by those who accept 
the theory of truth that he proposes.13 However the principle hardly presents 
itself as one that stands in noneed of justification and, indeed, it is susceptible 
to a variety of objections. Accordingly, the task of providing a philosophically 
adequate theory of truth for the modal operators is unfinished for it involves a 
defence of the essentialist principle and no defence of the principle has been 
forthcoming.
I propose to offer a defence of the essentialist principle considered in the 
context of the theoretical projects that it regulates.That is to say the guiding 
question is whether semantic theorizing improves or deteriorates when it is 
conducted on the basis of theories in which the principle is incorporated. In 
order to tackle this question, I would like to locate the essentialist principle in a 
slightly extended context - one which affords a specific conception of what a 
language is.
The essentialist principle has the consequence that languages are modally 
Inflexible, i.e. a language cannot survive a counterfactual variation in its 
semantic properties. What I want to suggest is that modal inflexibility is naturally 
accommodated along with temporal inflexibility - a language cannot survive any 
change over time in the meaning of the expressions that it contains - in a 
conception of languages as abstract objects.14 Moreover, far from standing in 
opposition to any deeply entrenched canons of semantic theorizing, this 
conception is reflected in the presuppositions of many familiar theoretical 
projects. I do not claim that this is the only way in which the essentialist principle 
can be defended, only that it strikes me as the most promising way of 
proceeding. My main aim is to show where acceptance of the essentialist 
principle leads and to chart the territory upon which a more thorough defence 
must be mounted. I will develop my position through a series of responses to 
objections against the essentialist principle.
(A1.3) THE FIRST OBJECTION TO THE FSSSENTIAUST PRINCIPLE; INITIAL 
MISCONCEPTIONS DISPELLED,
If the conception of languages as temporally and modally inflexible is to stand
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any chance of acceptance then an effort has to be made to square that 
conception with the strong intuition that languages could and do survive 
changes of meaning on the part of the expressions that they contain. There is 
obviously and undeniably a contingency in the association of our signs with the 
uses in which they are deployed - that is why the situation that Gupta described 
is perfectly intelligible. Equally, there exists, obviously and undeniably, the 
phenomenon whereby the use of a sign changes over time. These points are 
not at issue; the only issues concern whether and how these features can be 
represented theoretically. I will illustrate, by dealing with a relevant objection, 
how these phenomena can be given theoretical representation by one who 
wishes to uphold the modal infexibility of languages
Anil Gupta makes a point which suggests that proponents of the essentialist 
principle are at a loss to represent these phenomena given the conceptual 
resources to which they restrict themselves.He proposes that we recognise two 
concepts of truth "both of which are present in our ordinary conceptual 
scheme."15 He proceeds:
" On the first concept here represented by Tf ( = is a true-f 
sentence of L) a sentence A is true in a world W if and only if A is 
true in W with the meaning it has (in L) in W. On the second
concept of truth T2  a sentence A is true in W if and only if A is
true in W with the meaning it has in the actual world . "16 
It is a consequence of the essentialist principle that only T2 is in order. If the 
distinction betwen T-\ and T2 is to be non-trivial, the acceptability of T-| depends 
upon the purported possibility that a sentence of a given language L may vary 
in meaning from world to world and this "possibility" is not consistent with the 
rigidity of the term "L". To put the point in a slightly different light,i t would follow 
that our necessitated T theorems were false if truth were interpreted a la_Ti  but 
true given the T2 interpretation.
Gupta wants to say, moreover, that we must recognize both concepts of truth if 
we are to keep faith with our natural, practical judgements concerning semantic 
counterfactuals. But, if we must, the essentialist principle is clearly damaged 
since its acceptance militates against recognition of a concept (truth a la T 1) 
which is apparently required in our semantic theorizing.
The case that is intended to compel our acceptance of T-\ is based on the
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consideration of thGSG semantic counterfactuals :
(3) If red were to mean what "white" means then snow would be
red.
(4) If red were to mean what "white" means then "snow is red"
would be true (in English).
The case proceeds:
" Intuitively we judge (4) to be true but (3) false. If so, then ’true' in
(4) must be understood as expressing the first concept of truth. If it 
expresses the second concept, (3) and (4) say the same thing and 
hence have the same truth value".17 [Here I have substituted my own 
enumeration for Gupta's.]
The most attractive form of rejoinder on the part of the proponent of the 
essentialist principle will be to show that the intuitive contingency, which 
underpins the natural acceptance of (4), can be represented in a way that does 
not involve recourse to the concept T, or to any other concept whose content is 
not consistent with the essentialist principle.Such a rejoinder is available 
The first move in dealing with (4) will be to replace it with a formulation that 
embodies a relativization of semantic concepts to a language viz;
(5) If "red" were to mean (in English) what "white" means (in
English) then "Snow is red " would be true (in English).
The best that can be said of this counterfactual is that it is trivially true since it 
has an impossible antecedent, but this,clearly is not the ground upon which (4) 
merits assent. That assent is given on the basis of the perceived contingency in 
the sign-meaning relation and the representation of that contingency can be 
expedited as follows:
(6) If "red" were to mean (in Twin-English) what "white" means (in
English) then "Snow is red." would be true (in Twin-English)
where Twin-English is just like English except that "red" refers in Twin-English 
to white and "true in x" is interpreted a la T2 . (An obvious parallel can be 
constructed to represent our intuitive judgement of the temporal flexibility of the 
sign-meaning relation.)
In summary, then, the rejoinder to Gupta is that the intwtlYS CQnlinflSDCy. Qf.thS 
sian-meaning relation can be represented 3S the CQntinflSUCy that 01)6 ,. 
language, rather than another, is the actual language Qf th6 POP.UlatlQIT
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Now, the outstanding drawback with this proposal is that it renders every 
change in the semantic properties of expressions sufficient for a change of 
language. The slightest counterfactual variation in the referent of a name — as 
when Lizzy refers not to Lizzy but to Martha — demands description as a 
scenario in which a different language is being considered, and this we would 
not ordinarily, or intuitively, endorse. Now, this consequence is indeed counter 
-intuitive and, it must be conceeded, phenomenologically inaccurate. But, if we 
are prepared to allow that these considerations cannot of themselves be 
decisive, then the proponents of modal and temporal inflexibility are not 
defeated by the noted phenomena.18
(A1.4) THE SECOND OBJECTION : ESSENTIALIST SEMANTICS IS 
NQN-EMPIRICAL
Peacocke claims that the acceptance of (what is in effect) the essentialist 
principle presents no obstacle to the conception of the study of language as an 
empirical study. In an earlier paper19 he presents a strategy for the construction 
of a theory of meaning - the actual language strategy - that provides us with a 
context in which this case may be developed.
In the last section it was proposed that we should represent the flexibility of the 
sign-meaning relation as one rather than another language being the actual 
(current) language of the community. It is an empirical matter to establish which 
language is the actual language of the community. Roughly speaking, a 
language L can be identified as the actual language of a population P if its 
sentences, their syntactic and semantic properties fixed by the truth theory, 
match the empirically ascertained content of the population's utterances.The 
empirical component is, as usual, a matter of relating patterns of assent and 
dissent to reasonable patterns of belief. For present purposes, nothing turns on 
accepting any particular version of the empirical constraints on interpretation. 
What is important here is to appreciate the role of both empirical and 
non-empirical components of semantic theorizing. An analogy with the 
application of mathematics - in particular with geometry - helps our appreciation 
here.
Let us accept that space is not but might have been Euclidean, then we can 
represent this contingency in the claim that Euclidian space might have been
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actual. It is not a contingent fact about Riemannian space that triangles of 
different areas have non-equal angle sums but it is contingent that Riemannian 
space is actual. It is an empirical matter to establish which space is actual. Our 
theory of space is sensitive to the observations and measurements that we can 
make and, they are defeasible in the light of these considerations. However, in 
the course of this project we deploy pure geometry with all of its resources 
including a variety of logically possible spaces whose structural properties are a 
matter for a priori determination. The scientist then attempts to gain evidence 
that will help us to select among hypotheses that are a priori possibilities, e.g. 
that space is Euclidean, Riemannian etc.
Davidson has also urged that the distinction between pure and applied 
semantics should be appreciated by way of analogy with that between pure and 
applied geometry.20 In his view we should not claim that there are two different 
kinds of languages, formal and natural. Rather we can be interested in 
languages in two kinds of ways.21 For certain purposes we fix the relevant 
features of an object-language under study by stipulation - all that we could 
want to know is known exactly and completely: an enterprise of this kind is 
purely a priori. But when we are interested in the empirical study of language 
our hypotheses are..
"open to test, subject to error and doomed to be to some extent 
incomplete and schematic ”.22
This is not true when we deal with pure, abstract semantical structures but when 
this fact is located in methodological context it provides no threat to the idea that 
a theory of meaning should be an empirical theory.
(A1.5) THE THIRD OBJECTION : A PLATONISTIC EPISTEMOLQGY QE 
UNDERSTANDING
If languages are to be regarded as some kind of abstract object then we must 
explain how we can make this claim without a commitment to a Platonistic 
conception of the epistemology of understanding.
In the first place, understanding,or language mastery, or linguistic competence 
must be construed as a range of abilities to execute and respond to appropriate 
speech acts. Certainly we speak of an agent's understanding as knowledge of 
a language, but it is a fantastic misconception to attempt to extract from this
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facon de parler an epistemological commitment to explain understanding on the 
model of cognition of an object. From the standpoint of our interest in the 
epistemology of understanding it is of relatively minor importance whether a 
language is supposed to be an abstract, as opposed to a psychological, 
concrete or whatever other kind of object, for understanding is not a matter of 
training a cognitive faculty on any kind of object - it is not like perception.23 
But even if this insight is rejected and one is determined to harbour a relational 
(a knowledge of) conception of the epistemology of understanding, the actual 
language strategy still provides no guaranteed route to a platonistic 
epistemology. Even given that the actual language strategy unequivocally 
brings in its wake an ontological commitment to abstract objects, it must be 
emphasized that the strategy is a strategy for the theory of interpretation. But the 
theory of interpretation need not, and perhaps ought not be conceived as a 
theory of understanding. Once we absolve a theory of interpretation of the 
responsibility of generating a set of rules or instructions grasp of which 
purportedly explains native speakers' (implicit) knowledge of the language, 
there is no reason why the ontological commitments of the theory of 
interpretation should determine our conception of the epistemology of 
understanding.24
Acceptance of the actual language strategy for the theory of interpretation does 
not, then commit one to a view of an agent's understanding of a language as a 
matter of cognition of an abstract object.
SECTION TWO
This section continues to deal with objections to Peacocke's theory but for the 
purposes of exposition I have chosen to present it separately from the 
objections in section one above since the arguments are rather dense and to 
some extent self-contained.
(A2.1) THE FOURTH OBJECTION fMARK 1): PEACQCKE'S PRINCIPLE GIVES 
RISE TO CIRCUI AR DEFINITIONS OF LANGUAGES 
Peacocke anticipates an objection against his proposal for the specification of 
languages on grounds of circularity, i.e.:
"....that the only way of specifying what "Lo”, taken as a proper
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name of one of these languages, refers to, is to advert to a truth 
theory that actually contains the name 'Lo\ "25
However, Putnam has argued (in relation to Carnap's proposal that languages 
be defined by semantic rules) that a worse consequence than circularity obtains 
when Tarski's 'semantical conception of truth' is employed for the purposes of 
individuating a language.26 I will adapt Putnam's central points to the present 
case.Consider a simple language L-j defined by the use of the semantical 
predicate "true - in - L-j" as follows:
(D F ) L-|= df: the language L such that for any sentence S of L,
S- is- true - in - L-| iff
[ (case a) (S=Mthe moon is blue") & The moon is blue or 
(case b) (S="snow is white") & Snow is white 
& (syntactic restriction) no other inscription is a 
sentence of L.]
A first reaction to this proposed definition may indeed be one which echoes 
Peacocke's mention of circularity, i.e. that the specification of the referent of the 
name "L-|" contains the name "l_i" since the name features as part of the 
truth-predicate "x is-true-in-L-j". Putnam responds by pointing out that as the 
Tarskian conceives of the concept of truth, the predication " x is-true-in-L-j" 
contains the item "L-j" only as a syntactic part - its occurrence does not have the 
semantic significance of naming the language to be defined. The truth-predicate 
(expressing the "semantical concept of truth") that Tarski shows us how to 
define27 is to be understood as language relative in the sense that a truth 
predicate is defined for each language, but each truth-predicate is itself 
semantically unstructured. That is to say, one cannot think o f" x is -true-in-l_i" 
as a predicate which is built up from "x is true in y " in the way that "Tom is the 
brother of Bill" can be analysed into semantically significant parts including the 
dyadic relation "x is the brother of y ". Now the point is not simply that the 
Tarskian avoids circularity by choosing the syntax of the truth-theory in such a 
way as to avoid use of the item "L-j" as a name. Of course we could write the 
truth-predicate in any way we please "TRUE(x)", "TRUE L^(x) , T(x) . What is 
important is the conceptual significance of Tarski's truth-predication. Given the 
(semantically) dyadic relation "x is true in y", we can form the closed sentences.
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(7) "Lizzy is playful" is true in English.
(8) "Lizzy est folaitre" is true in French, 
and, most graphically;
(9) (x)(3y)( x is true in y)
all of which contain the same predicate of truth. For the Tarskian to think of the 
truth-predicate in terms of the structure of a dyadic relation is self-defeating 
since to do so is, as we see from the example, to import a universal conception 
of truth (i.e. truth for arbitrary or variable L). This is a conception whose 
definability Tarski repudiated!
Hence, when we appreciate fully the conceptual content of the semantical 
conception of truth, and through this the (absence of) semantic significance of 
the item "L-|" in the Tarskian truth-predicate "x-is-true-in-L-)", we appreciate that 
there is no circularity involved in defining the language name "L-|M via use of 
that predicate. However this appreciation leads us to another problem.
(A2.2) THE FOURTH OBJECTION /MARK2LTHE DEFINITIONS MAY BE NON­
CIRCULAR BUT THEY ARE ALSO NQN-SEMANTIC 
As intended in the semantical conception of truth, the truth-predicate 
"x-is-true-in-L-|", is subject to eliminative definition. Thlsabbreviated truth 
predicate is (analytically) equivalent to a disjunctive predication i.e
(1 0 ) S is-true-in-L-( J ff [(S="The moon is blue" & The moon is blue)
or (S="Snow is white" & Snow is white)]
More generally:
".....to be [  true in any given language L] is identified with the 
property of having the spelling of any one of the sentences of L 
(say the nth fa some standard enumeration) and its being the case 
that the nth condition in a list of truth conditions recursively 
associated with the sentences of Ly by the definition Tarski 
constructs is satisfied ." 28
When we introduce the extended, non-abbreviated truth predicate i.e. the 
definiens o f" x is-true-in-L-|" into the definition of "L-|' it can be seen even more 
clearly that the circularity, allegedly arising from the use of the name Li , was 




(D F M 1) L-|=df: the language L such that for any sentence of L, S
(S= The moon is blue" & The moon is blue) 
or (S="Snow is white" & Snow is white)
Iff [ (case a) S="The moon is blue" & The moon is blue 
o r  (case b) S= 'Snow is white" & Snow is white 
& (syntactic restriction) no other inscription is a 
sentence of L.J
The defect of this definition is not circularity arising from the appearance of a 
semantic term "L-j" in definiens and definendum - rather it is that the definition 
of the language is a non-semantic definition. The only definitional characteristic 
of a language is the syntactic component which characterizes its sentences. 
Manifestly, a semantically distinct language in which the sentences "The moon 
is blue" and "Snow is white" are associated with truth-conditions other than, 
respectively, the moon is blue and snow is white will, as long as these are its 
only sentences, satisfy the above definition of L-|.
I accept that Putnam's case demonstrates decisively that Peacocke's proposal 
to identify languages by the meanings of expressions they contain, cannot be 
carried through by way of definitions of languages that deploy Tarski's 
semantical conception of truth. However the matter does not end here.
(A2.3) REPLY : A NQN-TARSKIAN DEFINITION OF THE OBJECT LANGUAGE 
We must consider the possibility that there may be some other way of 
proceeding in the definition of languages that does not rely on the semantical 
conception of truth. In fact it seems that Peacocke is indeed committed to an 
alternative procedure.
In the course of outlining the significance of the claim that the Tarskian truth 
predicate is not a construct from a semantically more basic predicate, "x is true 
in y", I remarked that this latter predicate implicitly depends upon a concept of 
truth in a variable or arbitrary language. Peacocke utilizes such a predicate in 
the style of truth theory that he proposes - it is indeed as a name that the item 
"L-j" occurs in Peacocke's theory. Happily, this ensures that a definition based 
on this semantical concept, unlike a counterpart based on Tarskian truth, will be 
genuinely, ineliminably semantic. However the charge of circularity based upon 
the appearance of the name "L-|" in definiens and definendum is now quite
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appropriate and must be faced. Peacocke's own way with the charge is to claim 
that the use of the term "l_i" is dispensible in the definition ("specification") of the 
language but .unfortunately, he does not indicate how this is possible. However, 
we can turn again to Putnam in order to acquaint ourselves with the form that 
such a definition might take.29 We achieve the desired result by modifying the 
previous definition by substituting for the extended Tarskian predicate the 
predicate "TRUE (L,S)" where this is understood as expressing the concept of 
truth in arbitrary or variable L, thus;
(D F M 2)l_ i =df: the language L such that for any sentence of L, S; 
TRUE (S,L)
iff [ (case a) S="The moon is blue" & The moon is blue 
or (case b) S="Snow is white" & Snow is white 
& (syntactic restriction) no other inscription is a 
sentence of L.]
Putnam claims that this descriptive definition describes uniquely the language
L-j .30,31
Since the definition succeeds in terms of uniqueness and avoids circularity, its 
acceptability will depend entirely upon the acceptability of the key concept that it 
employs, i.e. the concept of truth in arbitrary or variable L. The question is, then, 
whether this concept is acceptable. I will consider two objections to the 
acceptability of the concept of truth in arbitrary or variable L and then indicate a 
line of thought which suggests that its acceptability is pre-supposed in the 
project of interpretation.
(A2.41) TRUTH IN VARIABLE L : UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE 
UNDEFINABLE?
It may be thought that thedefinability of the concept is the key here. 
Acknowledging that Tarski was correct in his contention that the concept of truth 
for variable L cannot be defined, we might then attempt to legislate the 
unacceptability of the concept on that basis. However, definability is not a 
neutral criterion of conceptual respectability in the present context for the kind of 
definition that Tarski has in mind is a definition that is free of semantic 
vocabulary. The requirement that truth for variable L should be definable by 
these restricted means is motivated by the attitude that semantic concepts are
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respectable only insofar as they are reducible to, or eliminable in favour of, 
non-semantic concepts.32 If the respectability of a semantic concept is being 
held to require that it be susceptible to eliminative definition then it is clear that 
this criterion of respectability is not acceptable to anyone who takes seriously 
the view that languages are to be specified semantically. Only a concept of 
truth that resists definition by solely non-semantic means could possibly 
introduce a genuine semantic element in the specification of a language. A vivid 
illustration of this point has already been encountered, for it was the 
eliminability otx is-true-in-L/  (a^  la the semantical conception) that brought 
about the collapse of the first definition of a language into a merely syntactic 
restriction.
Of course it will remain open to the objector to insist that the eliminability of all 
semantic vocabulary is a well motivated objective and so much the worse for 
any proposal to specify languages in ineliminably semantic terms. But then the 
quality of the objection against the concept of truth in variable L can be seen to 
be related directly to the plausibility of the programmatic eliminative materialism 
that motivated Tarski. In that case, I presume, few will be inclined to regard the 
objection from undefinability as carrying much weight.
(A2.42) TRUTH IN VARIABLE L: UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE 
PARADOXICAL?
A second proposal would find semantical concepts respectable just insofar as 
they are free of paradoxes such as those inherent in the pre-theoretical or 
intuitive concept of truth.The content of our intuitive concept is conferred by the 
use of the term "true" and its cognates and as such it is vulnerable to the liar 
paradox etc. So if truth in variable L is identifiable with the intuitive concept, and 
Putnam, for example, seems to be endorsing this identification, then it would 
appear that we deploy truth in variable L at the unacceptable cost of importing 
inconsistency into our semantic theorizing.
The rejoinder is simply that truth in variable L should not to be identified with the 
intuitive concept. The appropriate weaker claim is that the concept of truth in 
variable L models more accurately than the semantical conception the concept 
of truth that we ordinarily deploy. But, plainly, it does not follow from this weaker 
claim that truth in variable L reflects all of the features of our natural linguistic
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use of truth predicates. In particular it does not follow that truth in variable L will 
give rise to semantic paradox.
There is no reason to expect that truth in variable L must svBrywh&rB give rise 
to semantic paradox, i.e. regardless of restrictions on the kind of object 
language to which it is applied. What gives rise to the paradox of the liar in our 
natural linguistic deployment of the intuitive concept of truth is the application of 
the truth predicate to sentences containing the truth-predicate itself. (Natural 
languages contain their own truth-predicate.)This possibility does not arise for 
the application of the truth predicate to the sentences of our modal propositional 
object language Lo given the standard assumption that it contains no semantic 
vocabulary.
The upshot is that once we repudiate the identification of the intuitive concept of 
truth with truth in arbitrary or variable L we remove the only basis that there is for 
holding that the latter concept is of itself paradox-laden. My conclusion is that 
neither objection against the acceptability of the concept of truth in variable L 
succeeds.
(A2.43) A POSITIVE CONSIDERATION : THE PROJECT OF TRUTH- 
THEORETIC INTERPRETATION PRESUPPOSES TRUTH IN 
VARIABLE L.
A positive approach would counter allegations of the unacceptability of the 
concept of truth in variable L by arguing that the enterprise of using a theory of 
truth to interpret the speech of a community pr&-suppos&s the availability of the 
concept of truth in variable L.
Tarski's criteria of adequacy for truth-definitions included the derivability, for 
each object language sentence, of a theorem of the form (11);
(11) s is true in L iff p 
in which the right hand side of the bi-conditional was a meta-language 
translation of a sentence mentioned on the left. The defined truth-predicate is 
introduced to us in a way that exploits, albeit indirectly, our independent access 
to the concept of translation.When the semantic project is one in which we are 
attempting to illuminate the notion of meaning by way of a theory of truth, we 
cannot construe adequacy in the truth theory as dependent upon satisfaction of 
a translation requirement. Rather it is our pre-theoretical grasp of a concept of
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truth that enables us to verify T-sentences.33 Now this concept of truth that is 
within our grasp and which grounds this verification cannot be identified with 
the semantical conception of truth as it applies to our own or for that matter any 
other language. Grasp of Tarskian truth predicates could not ground our 
verification of T-sentences in the case of a new language under study, for each 
of these is a semantically distinct unstructured predicate true-in-Ln . Our 
recognition of the truth of T-sentences in the interpretation of new languages 
seems to require that we are possessed of a truth concept which is available for 
application in the case of new languages i.e. a concept of truth for arbitrary or 
variable L. It is mastery of such a concept, it may be argued, which grounds our 
recognition of the familiar "true" in the new contexts "true in La", "true in Lb" etc. 
and our ability to verify T-sentences containing it.
(A2.5) SUMMARY OF SECTION TWO
The use of theTarskian semantical conception of truth for the purpose of 
defining a language via a theory of truth does not result in circular definitions. 
However, a proper appreciation of the semantical conception of truth shows that 
the intended definition collapses, disastrously, into a merely syntactic restriction. 
Peacocke's proposed language definitions utilize a distinct concept of truth, i.e 
truth for an arbitrary language. Since such a definition avoids circularity, triviality 
and is otherwise successful in its own terms, the question of the acceptability of 
this definition turns entirely on the acceptability of the concept of truth it deploys. 
To require that this concept of truth is acceptable only if definable is to beg the 
question against the proposal that a language should be individuated 
semantically and, moreover, to do so on the basis of implausible eliminative 
materialist suppositions.To require that an acceptable concept of truth should 
be paradox-free is reasonable but the allegation that the concept of truth in 
variable L is paradox-laden is supported only by a gratuitous claim of identity 
between this concept and our intuitive concept of truth. The claim of identity is to 
be repudiated and reflection on the source of the semantic paradoxes indicates 
that there is no further reason to associate these with the application of the 
concept of truth in variable L. Alongside a minor positive consideration, the 
replies to the objections from indefinability and paradoxicality stand as the 
defence of the acceptability of the concept of truth in variable L. The conclusions
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are (i) that the concept and the style of definition that deploys this concept are 
acceptable and so (ii) Peacocke's proposal to specify languages semantically - 
a proposal upon which the viability of the truth theory has been held to rest - is 
defensible.
I will comment further upon sections one and two in the conclusion of the 
chapter. In the meantime, I will consider a truth theory for weak necessity 
operators that is due to Davies. This theory extends the methodological 
presumptions of the previous theory in taking a position on the conditions of 
existence of languages in addition to acceptance of the essentialist principle 
and the actual language strategy.
SECTION THREE : WEAK NECESSITY
(A3.0) WEAK NECESSITY AND ITS TRUTH THEORY
There is a family of essentialist claims of a type which attribute necessities to
contingent existents :
(12) It is necessary that Socrates is human.
A semantic representation of the intended content of such claims must proceed 
without incorporating the unintended consequence that the denotation of the 
term "Socrates" (i.e. Socrates) should exist at every possible world. One way of 
achieving this is by interpreting the sentence (12) as containing a weak 
necessity operator 'Qw' so that the sentence is of the form:
(1 3 ) D w Fa
Kripke introduces the term "weak necessity" in the following rough formulation:
" When weak necessity is at issue we say that " □ (A (t- j ,tn ))”is
true if  and only if with respect to every possible situation in which 
the denotations of tn" exist they are A M.34>35
Martin Davies defends a truth-theory that he has developed for the weak 
necessity operator and in so doing he is led to consider the issue of the 
existence conditions of languages.36 He must consider this issue, for when 
weak necessity is in play the truth of a meta-linguistic statement such as .
(1 4 ) D w (TRUE("Fa",Lo))
is dependent upon an evaluation which considers those situations in which the
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' denotation of "Lo" exists.
The details of Davies' theory are not of present concern - we can assume that it 
is perfectly viable given the methodological assumptions he makes. It is only 
these assumptions concerning the existence conditions of languages that I wish 
to discuss. The success of his project depends squarely upon the truth of these 
assumptions and to the extent that these emerge as questionable so does the 
success of the project.
(A3.1) THE CONTINGENT EXISTENCE OF LANGUAGES UNSUPPORTED 
Davies is a proponent of the conception of languages as unchanging and 
unchangeable things.37 It may therefore seem initially surprising that he is in 
fact proposing that languages should be held to exist (in general) contingently. 
However there is no reason to demand that abstractness requires 
non-contingent existence. Perhaps it is in considering the natural numbers as 
paradigm abstract objects that we become susceptible to treating necessary 
existence as a mark of abstractness, for there seems to be no remotely 
plausible basis for treating natural numbers as contingent existents. However, 
Frege deploys criteria of abstractness which permits that abstract objects may 
depend for their existence on the existence of particular concrete objects.38 It 
follows, given the contingent existence of these particular concrete objects that 
the abstract objects in question also exist contingently. For Frege natural 
numbers are pure abstract objects; that is to say that they do not depend for 
their own existence on the existence of any particular concrete objects. Other 
abstract objects such as sets and sequences (whose members are not pure 
abstract objects) do depend for their existence upon the existence of their 
members. Consequently sets and sequences are, in general, contingently 
existing abstract objects. There is no reason to expect that the actual language 
theorists in treating languages as abstract objects is bound to treat them as pure 
abstract objects in Frege's sense.
The foregoing is no more than a defence of the very idea of a contingently 
existing abstract object, but what of Davies' positive case for including
languages in this category? He writes:
since the objects denoted by the names of Lo exist (we may 
suppose) contingently and languages have their semantic
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properties necessarily it is natural to allow that Lo itself exists 
contingently. "39
Unfortunately, herein we have the extent of the case. It may indeed be "natural" 
to hold that languages exist contingently if we are intent upon identifying these 
with empirical phenomena - the products or practices of humans in social 
groups in specific regions displaying mutual intelligibility, etc. On this view the 
existence of languages such as English, German, etc. has a contingency rooted 
in our existence and evolution as a species and, no doubt, what might be 
termed our "forms of life". But the actual language strategist is committed to 
interpreting such elements of contingency as the contingency that this or that 
language, specified semantically, is ever the actual language of a population. 
The actual language strategist, if he wishes to provide a justification for treating 
languages as contingent existents, had better look elsewhere.
(A3.2) AN ESSENTIALIST JUSTIFICATION
While Davies offers no justification of the contingent existence of languages, he 
does present us with a criterion of their contingency of existence; call this (CE): 
(C E ) A language exists in a possible situation if and only if the 
objects to which its names refer all exist. 40 
There is a familiarity about this criterion of contingency in that it echoes the 
(natural) criterion of the contingency of existence of sets and sequences; these 
being held to exist in those possible situations in which all of their members 
exist. But there is no obvious relationship between these cases and that of a 
language - that is to say, there is no obvious justification of (CE) that can be 
manufactured from the thought that the linguistic case is somehow a special 
case of the set-theoretic. The following esentialist justification seems more 
promising.
Consider the thought that the semantic properties of languages are essential 
properties of those languages. Now, in general, we can think of essentiality of 
properties in this way: if object x has property P essentially then we can say of 
each possible situation that in that situation either x exists and is P or x fails to 
exist. Consequently a possible situation in which nothing has P is a situation in 
which x fails to exist, e.g. a possible situation in which nothing is human is a 
situation in which Socrates does not exist. How then might we envisage a
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situation in which nothing instantiates the semantic properties of Lo - a situation 
in which nothing could be Lo - bearing in mind that we cannot take recourse to 
scenarios in which no such language is used? It is at this stage that the 
contingency of existence of the referents of the names of Lo may be thought 
relevant. Perhaps we can argue as follows. It is essential to a genuine proper 
name - as opposed to other singular terms, e.g. definite descriptions - that it 
should have a referent in order that it be meaningful at all. So, a situation in 
which Socrates did not exist would be a situation in which no proper name of 
any language could genuinely refer to Socrates. Lo could not exist in such a 
situation since it numbers among its essential properties that expressed in the 
axiom (15):
(15 ) □ w (REFERS("Socrates", Lo, Socrates))
Similarly for each distinct referent of an Lo name and so the essentiality of 
semantic properties can ground a case for arguing that the contingency of 
language existence should match the existence of the referents of proper 
names of the language.
I have two kinds of observation to make on this argument.
(A3.3) THE PRIVILEGED STATUS OF PROPER NAMES UNEXPLAINED 
This argument, and moreover Davies criterion of contingency of language 
existence quite generally, confers a totally unexplained status of privilege to the 
proper names of the language. An adequate explanation of this status must do 
more than persuade us that proper names are, as it were, essentially referential 
- it must further persuade us that only proper names have this quality. The 
prospects of developing such an explanation are not promising. If the case for 
proper names being essentially referential is to rely on their having, in some 
sense, a demonstrative component a la the "direct" theory of reference then the 
same arguments are widely held to apply, mutatis mutandis, to at least some 
predicates.41 That is to say, even if these arguments can be sustained then it is 
difficult to see how Davies' condition can be a sufficient, as opposed to a 
necessary condition for the existence of languages. There is no ruling out in 
advance the possibility that some other justification of the privileged status of 
names may be constructible, but the obvious course of justification is not 
sufficient. An appropriate justification might be termed Millian in advocating the
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essentiality or directness of the reference of proper names while denying this for 
the case of predicates or "general names".42
(A3.4) THE JUSTIFICATION THREATENED BY FMPTY PROPFR NAMFfi 
If it is proposed that the existence of all of the referents of the proper names of a 
language in a possible world is even a necessary condition of the existence of 
that language in that world, the most obvious source of difficulty for this proposal 
is the phenomenon of empty or bearerless names. We can develop an 
argument that is designed to show that acceptance of the condition leads to 
disaster for the actual language strategy.
It is a direct consequence of the proposed necessary condition that no 
language that exists at the actual world contains an (actually43) empty name.In 
turn, then, no language that exists can be identified with the actual language of 
a community such as our own in which the use of bearerless names is a notable 
feature. The effect of adopting Davies' condition is, therefore, to rule out a priori 
the attainment of the professed goal of the actual language strategy i.e. to select 
on the basis of empirical constraints which semantically defined language is the 
actual language of the community.
It is at this point that we should bear in mind the larger picture and I think that 
when we do so we reach a more sober evaluation of the predicament that 
Davies’ condition generates for the actual language strategy.
Assume that Davies' condition is not in force and that absolutely any language 
can be held to be available, existent at the actual world, as an a priori 
candidate for identification with the speech behaviour of a community of 
speakers. Let us now imagine that we are dealing with a case of the following 
kind. As interpreters of population P we find an expression which best fits our 
(ever -evolving) theory as being of the syntactic class whose members are used 
as proper names. However, despite our conviction that the expression is 
standardly, and uniformly used with quite serious, genuine, assertoric intent44 
we can find no bearer for this "name" and come to conclude that the name has 
no bearer. How are we to represent the semantic properties of this expression 
via the resources of a theory of reference and truth?
A language, considered as fixed by legislation, is specified by appropriate 
semantic rules - let's say axioms given the present context. Now what, in the
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context of truth or reference theoretic semantics, is the form of semantic axiom 
that is appropriate to deal with an empty name in a language? A semantic 
theory in the style of Davies deals only in austere axioms of reference, that is to 
say axioms such as (16):
(16) D w REF(,,a”,alL)
that state barely the referent of a name. That the axioms are necessitated is 
irrelevant here.
Now, it seems that if a theory confines itself to such axioms it cannot model a 
community's use of (sentences containing) empty proper names without 
entailing falsehood. So let us be clear that Davies' theory, given its restriction to 
austere axioms of reference, would face this problem anyway, irrespective of 
the criterion of language existence. But this is not only Davies' problem, for it 
seems that in general reference-cum-truth theoretic semantics has nothing at 
all to say about proper names that lack reference.45 It may be argued that 
reference-cum-truth theoretic semantics need not confine itself to axioms of 
reference that are austere. Fair enough, perhaps it need not.But the only other 
proposal that comes to mind is one whereby the referent of a name is identified 
with that of a definite description, and, for familiar reasons, this hardly seems a 
promising approach 46
(A3.5) RUSSELLIAN THOUGHTS AND THE EXISTENCE OF LANGUAGES 
Finally, we must not simply assume that it is a defect in a theory of truth which 
aspires to serve as a theory of sense that it can ascribe no content to sentences 
containing empty proper names. For such a theory is answerable to constraints 
related to propositional attitude ascription and it may be argued that no thought 
is expressed via the use of an empty name. This is the position of John 
McDowell47 and in effect it construes the radical interpreter as ascribing content 
on the basis of a Russellian conception of a thought - i.e. there are thoughts 
whose existence depend upon the existence of an object that the thought is 
about.48
The emergence of Russellian thoughts in the discussion is illuminating for it 
would now appear that Davies' condition on the contingency of existence of 
languages echoes a familiar theme from the theory of content. Davies' 
languages are made for the expression of Russellian thoughts in that they are
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available for each other in the same possible worlds. A world in which Nixon 
does not exist is a world in which Russellian thoughts about him are not, as it 
were, available to be thought, correlatively, that world has no languages 
containing proper names of Nixon. I am not concerned to defend Russellian 
thoughts with a view to defending Davies' condition of language existence, I am 
merely indicating the direction in which a (badly needed) philosophical 
justification of the condition of language existence might be expected to 
proceed.
(4.0) SUMMARY OF THE APPFNDIY
The objections of Section One seem to me to have been the most relevant and 
central to the project of constructing homophonic theories of (absolute) truth for 
languages containing modal operators. Both of the theories that have been 
under consideration here are dependent upon the essentialist principle and the 
objections of Section One are clearly directed towards that principle. However, 
the objections fail for, contrary to allegation, the essentialist principle can be 
held consistently with the modal and temporal flexibility of the "sign-meaning" 
relation ; the principle does not thwart the claim to empirical status of theories of 
interpretation and, finally, even if the principle is augmented by the logically 
distinct ontological thesis that languages are abstract objects this does not 
involve a commitment to a platonistic epistemology of understanding.
The considerations that emerge from the discussion of Section Two are 
perplexing. It is not obvious whether a defence of Peacocke's theory requires 
the definability of the proper name of the language that features in the axioms 
and theorems of the theory. If a defence does require this then, manifestly, there 
is trouble for the theory given the choice between on one hand, a genuinely 
semantic definition of (e.g) "Lo" involving a theoretical concept whose propriety 
is (at least) highly dubious, and on the other a definition that collapses into the 
purely syntactic in virtue of its deployment of an eliminable but (otherwise?) 
quite proper theoretical concept. However, it is in the first instance the project of 
defining (proper names of) languages that is threatened in the face of this 
dilemma and nol the essentialist principle, and the case that the latter is 
particularly dependent upon the former has not been made. To make such a 




Davies' theory (discussed in Section Three) is more vulnerable than 
Peacocke's since it inherits all of the exposure of the latter and has increased 
liability on two fronts. The outstanding difficulty with this theory is that it invests 
in proper names an unexplained and priveleged status in the determination of 
the (modal) existence conditions of languages. If this difficulty can be overcome 
or circumvented then there will be scope for the exploration of the dependence 
of Davies' conception of the existence of languages upon the ascription of 
Russellian thoughts in the interpretation of a speech community.
At the outset, I proposed two factors motivating the pursuit of theories of 
(absolute) truth for modal languages. One was the desire for an alternative to 
possible world semantics and the other was the prospect of a score in the 
dispute between modal cognitivists and their opponents. I consider the latter to 
be of greater importance in the context of the discussion of modal realism and I 
will close by commenting upon the effect of the discussion of this chapter on that 
issue.
The position was that the susceptibility of modal operators to (adequate) 
truth-theoretic interpretation stood as a one-way test in the dispute over 
truth-evaluability. The non-cognitivist gains an upper hand if it can be shown 
that an adequate truth-theoretic interpretation of the operators cannot be - or 
more modestly has not been - provided. It is my view, on balance, that it should 
be concluded that the non-cognitivist has not scored a point here. However, it is 
also true that the philosophical case for the adequacy of those truth theories that 
have been discussed here needs to be developed and improved in many 
respects. Until that task is addressed properly the threat of a semantic argument 
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But then again it is not obvious that Lewis could not simply abandon this 
way of speaking or that this is genuine modalizing. The point which this 
claim is intended to serve is that wishing that certain non-contingent things 
were otherwise is idle. (Lewis 1986b, p.125) This he could say as well by 
saying that it is only wishes about contingent things which arenof idle and 
that any wishes concerning the amodal (submodal?, pre-modat?) and the 
necessary alike are idle.
18. McGinn does not consider the phenomenon of indexical identification of 
the actual world and so fails to note a crucial disanalogy between the 
actual world and other possible worlds in respect of the condition (EXL).
19. See Lewis 1986b pp 92-6; Lewis 1983 passim .
20. McGinn op cit, p. 152.
21. See Lewis 1986b, pp.87-92 et passim & Ch.3 above.
22. See Lewis 1986b Ch.3, entitled "Paradise on the Cheap?"
23. ibid, p.165.
24. These are intended as characterizations of the so-called Frege-Russell 
theory and Kripke's alternative "picture" respectively. See Kripke 1980, 
passim .
25. This apparent lacuna in the causal picture of reference is hinted at in 
McGinn's remarks on the causal theory of reference in McGinn 1984,
p.166.
26. This point is suggested by Dummett's famous discussion of abstract 
objects. See Dummett 1973, pp. 471-512.
27. McGinn op cit, p. 153.
28. Lewis dismisses Dummett's way of drawing the abstract/concrete 
distinction for objects in terms of a distinction between kinds of senses that 
proper names might have, insisting that such factors tell us nothing of the 
nature of the entities in question. One might have expected that the 
complete absence of proper names for worlds might have drawn Lewis's 
comment. (See Lewis 1986b, p.82 n.56.)
29. This is intended as a characterization of Lewis's argument from theoretical 
utility. See the Introduction to Section One above.
30. Lewis 1986b, p.3.
CHAPTER 5.
1. Wright 1983 passim ; Wright 1987 p.9.
2. ibid, p.6.
3. loc c it.
4. Blackburn 1984, pp.213-6.
5. ibid, p. 216.
6. See Blackburn loc cit & Ch.12 below.
7. c.f. Lewis 1986b Ch.1; Forbes 1985 Ch.4.
2 6 5
266
8. Forbes op cit, pp.89-94.
9. ibid, pp.217 ff.
10. See §1.40-1.43.
11. Forbes op cit, p.80.
12. loc cit.
13. §1.41 ff.
14. Forbes op cit, p.80.
15. ibid, p.70.
16. See n.10.
17. Forbes op cit, p.94.
18. loc cit.
19. Mackie 1977.
20. See e.g. Grandy 1973 ; McGinn 1977 and Wiggins 1980c.
21. The use of the term "humanity" in this context is initiated in Grandy op c it.
22. Putnam airs these issues in his discussion of a constraint on interpretation 
which he calls, "The Principle of the Benefit of Doubt". See Putnam 1978, 
pp.24-5 et passim.
23. Lewis op cit, p.4.
24. One hears in conversation the notion that world talk is metaphorical and 
the hint that this is a viable option has been dropped in the literature (e.g. 
McGinn's interpretation of Kripke's conception of possible world talk as 
"evocative metaphor", McGinn 1981a, p.162). However, I know of no 
attempt to develop this initial conception.
25. Even if it is the case that metaphor is anti-systematic (c.f. Davidson 1982g 
p.245; Blackburn op cit, p. 180) in that there are no rules for the 
construction of metaphor, that is not to say that a systematic body of 
discourse cannot be deployed metaphorically. In any case, the use of 
world talk as metaphor precedes its systematization at the hands of modal 
semanticists. See §5.6 below.
26. For a useful summary of the various approaches to the meaning of 
metaphors see Blackburn op cit, pp.171-9.
27. Davidson op cit.
28. It is also wrong to attempt to characterize these linguistic activities in 
terms of special kinds of illocutionary force for one can make an assertion 
in the metaphorical deployment of a statement and, arguably one must 
make an assertion in deploying it mendaciously.
29. Davidson op cit, p.257.
30. ibid, p.247.
31. Wiggins op cit, p.205. See Ch.6 below.
32. Postscript On Metaphor, Quine 1981, p. 188
33. ibid, p.187. Compare Nietzsche:
" What then is truth? A movable host o f m etaphors, 
metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human 
relations which have been poetically and rhetorically tempered 
by, transferred, embellished, and which, after long usage, 
seem to be fixed, canonical and binding . Truths are illusions
2 66
2 67
which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that 
have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous 
force, coins which have lost their embossings, and are now  
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31. The position which Blackburn's theory occupies is also rendered invisible 
by the distinction that is drawn by Forbes (Forbes 1985, pp.216-20) 
between modal non-cognitivism and "modal objectivism". He introduces 
modal objectivism as the view that...
"  to some sense there are features of reality which make
modal judgements true or false... provided that it is understood 
that there is nothing in the use of the label which implies that 
an objectivist cannot appeal to facts about psychology; both 
'in ternal' and 'external' features of reality are prima facie 
suitable for an objective grounding for modal truth. The 
position which affords the proper contrast with objectivism is 
that of the non-cognitivists according to whom the content of 
modal propositions (sic) is such as to render the notions of 
truth and falsity not genuinely applicable to them."
Quasi-realism is emphatically not non-cognitivist for it insists on truth- 
evaluability but it is not objectivist either since it balks at the acceptance of 
"features of reality which make modal judgements true or false."
32. The terms "sceptical paradox" and "sceptical solution " are taken from 
Kripke 1982 where a sceptical paradox/solution concerning meaning is 
developed in an attempt to cast light upon the rule-following problematic of 
Wittgenstein 1953 §188-240. See, ironically, McGinn 1984 pp. 65-6 for the 
suggestion that Kripke's sceptical solution recapitulates a strategy that is 
antecedently familiar in such disparate quarters as ethical discourse 
(expressive theories) scientific theoretical discourse (instrumentalist 
theories) and mathematical discourse (nominalist theories).
33. McGinn 1981a, p.167.
34. See e.g Davidson 1982h, Wright 1987 p.6.
35. McGinn 1984, p.67 etpassim.
36. See e.g. Wiggins 1976c, 1980c, 1987a ; McDowell 1981 & Putnam 
1978.
37. See McGinn 1984 pp.65ff, pp.181ff.
38. See McDowell 1981, pp.154-6.
39. Compare Hume's pessimistic view that we can hope for satisfactory but not 
true opinions. (Hume op cit, p272.)
40. I am concerned here with the (alleged) non-cognitivism of the later 
Wittgenstein e.g. in The Remarks on The Foundations of Mathematics 
(Wittgenstein 1956). (For the allegation of later Wittgensteinian non- 
cognitivism, see Forbes op cit p.219. Forbes follows the interpretation of 
Wright 1980) I am not concerned with the Tractarean non-cognitivism 
about logical necessity that is the upshot of the conception of 
(truth-evaluable) significance as the division of logical space. (Wittgenstein 
1961 , §4.463).
41. See Wittgenstein 1956, II.28 et passim ; Wright 1980, Ch.XXI.
42. Dummett 1978a, p.51.
43. Strawson 1950. Cited in Wiggins 1980c, p.190.





47. See Davidson 1982, passim .
48. See e.g. Putnam 1978, Introduction, pp. 1-6.
49. Properly this should be considered a further contrast since the moral
cognitivist has a prima facie difficulty with the applicability of the marks of
truth to the case of practical deliberative judgements ("Must V") and there is 
no comparable difficulty for modal cognitivism. (Wigginsop cit, pp. 214-7.)
50. Wiggins 1987a, pp. 109-10.
51. This point is made, but with different concerns in mind, in Wright 1980, pp. 
280-1.
52. Not that the non-cognitivist is going to claim that (B) is false for given non 
-cognitivism modal sentences are not truth-evaluable. From the stand point 
of the non-cognitivist ,the objection is best deployed as a challenge to the 
cognitivist in the form of the charge that the cognitivist project does not 
work on its own terms since falsehood, by the cognitivist's own lights, of 
axioms and theorems is truth-theoretic inadequacy par excellence.
53. See Appendix A below.
CHAPTER 7
1. McGinn 1981a, pp. 172-77.
2. The first problem that we encounter in this messy business concerns the 
sorts of things that constitute the proper domain of the relation of 
supervenience e.g. states, properties, predications. In speaking of "truths" 
McGinn (loc cit) appears to have a statement oriented conception in mind. 
This practice squares with Dummett's concerns to construe the 
commensurable concept of reduction as a relation between families of 
statements. (See Dummett 1978g, 1982.) My intention is to follow McGinn 
and Dummett in this respect.
3. See e.g, Blackburn 1984 (Ch.6), 1985a ; Kim 1984; Lewis 1986b passim ; 
McFetridge 1985 and Teller 1983. I will often attribute a point or a
distinction to more than one of these authors despite the fact that their
disparate terminologies and logical structures often obscure the fact that 
they are (in my judgement) saying the same thing.
4. Blackburn 1985a, Kim op cit.
5. Blackburn 1984, p. 185.
6. Thus weak supervenience is consistent with the premises of the Cartesian 
argument against the identity theory in Kripke 1980, Lecture III.
7. It is notable that the significant modal claim NEC - ( for an account of its 
significance see §8.11 below) - :
(NEC) □(x)(B*x->A"x)
follows from STRONG given the assumption that something in some 
world is B* and A". But it is important to note that NEC is not equivalent to 
property identity for it still leaves open the possibility that there are 
organisms whose pain states (say) are not realized as C-fibre stimulation. 
It does not, however, permit the possibility of C-fibre stimulated organisms
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who are not feelers of pain .
8. McGinn op cit, pp. 173.
9. Putnam 1983f. The example which Putnam discusses concerns 
nomological necessity but the moral for unrestricted modalities, such as 
metaphysical modality, is clear.
10. Putnam op cit, pp. 108-9. Cited at McGinn op cit, p.173.
11. Putnam op cit, p. 108
12. ibid, p. 109.
13. McGinn op cit, p.173.
14. ibid, p. 174.
15. I am here allowing myself (and Putnam and McGinn) the luxury of the 





20. loc c it.
21. ibid, p.174.
22. loc c it.
23. In developing this consideration I am expanding on a more specific point 
concerning physical indiscernibility made in Blackburn 1985a.
24. The thesis STRONG:
(STRONG) □  [(3x)(B*x & A"x) ~> □  (y)(B*y ~> A"y)] 
may be false even when (=):
(= ) □  (x)(B*x --> (y)(B*y -->(y = x))
is true if there is one world in which the unique B* is A" and another world 
in which its unique B* is non-A". However, the trivial truth of STRONG is 
secured given an inter-world version of the identity of B-indiscernibles, 
(=+):
(=+) □  [(x)(B*x »> □  (y)(B*y ~> (y = x))]
The acceptibility of this stronger principle will obviously depend upon the 
suitability of the B-family as well as delicate questions relating to the 
propriety of haeccetism. (On haeccetism see Kaplan 1975 & Lewis 1986b)
25. e.g. Davidson 1980b, 1980c, 1980d; Fodor 1974; & Boyd 1980.
26. An extremely thorough discussion of these issues is to be found in
Wiggins 1980a, Ch.2.
27. Blackburn 1985a.
28. The distinction between local and non-local applications of supervenience 
is made in Kim op c it.
29. McGinn op cit, p. 174.
30. loc cit.
31. These essentialist claims are modal instances of the (NEC) thesis.
32. loc cit .
33. Such problems feature strongly in the struggle for a Tarskian theory of truth




35. No doubt the issue is complicated by the phenomenon of indexicality. For 
example, if "S" and "S' are indexical or token-reflexive sentence tokens of 
the same syntactic type, "I am cold.", there is undoubtedly a sense in 
which these tokens mean the same thing on different occasions of their 
standard use despite the fact that their truth-value will vary across utterers. 
However I cannot see any point in contriving this utterly commonplace and 
unmysterious phenomenon to support the possibility that independence 
requires. Assume the language L is free of indexical items.
36. McGinn op cit, pp. 174-5.
37. Nothing, of course, depends upon the choice of the necessity operator," □ "  
here. A complementary case for its dual possibility operator, "o" can easily 
be made.
38. I have in mind the truth theory in Peacocke 1978. Again, see Appendix A.
39. This is the standard intention. See (e.g.) Putnam 1975d, p.233, p.243 ; 
Kripke 1980, p.164; Forbes 1985, p.237.
40. Quine 1961, pp.160ff.
41. Note that even if one was inclined, for whatever reason, to insist upon the 
falsehood of the first-order essentialist claims the security of weak 
supervenience of the necessary on the actual, and of the modal in general 
on the actual is guaranteed by the regulative status of the rejection of 
independence.
42. See Ch.6.
43. Blackburn 1984, p. 186.
CHAPTER 8
1. See Blackburn 1984, p .221 & McFetridge 1985, passim. Throughout this 
chapter, I indicate, as necessary, whether conceptual or metaphysical 
modality is involved in the intended interpretation of a formula by the use of 
subscripted modal operators (e.g." □  M" &" □  q").
2. See e.g. Blackburn 1985b, p. 13 where it is mooted that the secondary 
(associated) properties of bodies are metaphysically but not conceptually 
supervenient upon their primary (base) properties.
3. Blackburn 1985a.
4. Kim 1984.
5. Given that the essentialist claims are true, and the thesis of metaphysical 
SWR false we have confirmation in the modal case of a tentative thesis of 
Blackburn (Blackburn 1985a) viz, that metaphysical SWR claims are, in 
general, untenable and that either B7A" (metaphysical) independence or 
B*/A' (metaphysical) necessity proves preferable.
6. Blackburn 1984, p. 184.
7. loc c it.
8. See n.10.
9. The point is made in McGinn 1981a, p .157-8; Salmon 1982, Ch.7 
pp.193-216, et passim ; & Forbes 1985 pp.231-2. Kripke endorses this
procedure explicitly in Kripke 1977, p.88.
10. Quine 1961b. Putnam holds that Quine's non-classical conception of
2 7 2
2 7 3
analyticity stems from the identification of analyticity with the positivist 
conception of a priority. See Putnam 1983g.
11. Putnam loc c it.
12. Wiggins 1980a, pp. 124-6.
13. Putnam 1983g.
14. Wright 1980, p.362.
15. This concept is mentioned in Dummett 1978e, pp.420-1and in Quine 
1961b, p.24.
16. See Kripke 1980 passim , Putnam 1975b passim & Wiggins op c it , Ch.4 
et passim.
17. Wittgenstein 1953 passim.
18. The account of pure rule-following in this section is drawn from Wright 
1989, pp. 255-6.
19. ibid, p.255.
20. Contrast the case of moral judgement (See n.7.) Precisely what we cannot 
do in the case of the application of a moral evaluation is to represent 
matters as if the output judgement is the product of an inferential process 
linking (i) A minor premise ("N") stating naturalistic features of a situation 
and (ii) A major premise stating an a priori or purely conceptual condition 
on what fits or fails to fit the rule governing the application of an evaluative 
term "E". For a compelling rule-following related explanation of why this 
cannot be done see McDowell 1981.
21. Wright op cit.
22. ibid.
23. Blackburn 1984, p. 146.
24. Kripke 1982.
25. See McGinn 1984, pp.77ff, pp.184ff.
26. See Wittgenstein op cit §218. For more on Wittgenstein's deployment of 
this platonist imagery see McDowell op cit, pp.145-54; McGinn op cit, 
pp.21ff; Wright op cit & Wright 1980, Ch. 1 et passim . This objectivist 
picture has been associated with definite semantic theses such as the 
investigation- independence of meaning (Wright 1981) or the objectivity of 
meaning (Wright 1987, pp.5 ff).
CHAPTER 9
1. McGinn 1981a, p.176.
2 . ibid, pp.178-82. I accept this anti-empirical component of the case and I 
will not spend time on its exposition. For non-conseravativeness see Field 
1980a, passim .
3. McGinn, op cit, pp. 183-6.
4. ibid, pp.184ff.
5. See §6.30 - 6.31.
6. McGinn 1984, p.66n8.
7. McGinn 1981a, p.185.
8. loc cit, n.51.






13 Our "best conception" of mathematical truth c.f. Benaceraff 1973.
14. Lewis 1986b, pp. 108-9.
15. Although like McGinn's non-objectual realist, Lewis is left claiming a priori 
knowledge on the slender basis that there could be no empirical modal 
knowledge.
16. McGinn 1981a, p.185.
17. ibid, p. 184.
18. In advancing these highly generali criticisms I am manifesting the influence 
of Fodor's work in the field.See, in particular, Fodor 1974, 1981 & Fodor 
1981a, passim .
19. I acknowledge that a fuller discussion would deal with the possibility of a 
functional characterization of cognitive relations of organism-environment 
interaction. I can only record my view that a retreat to that kind of 
characterization entails a departure from the substance of purported 
causal explanations of knowledge.
20. McGinn 1981a, p.183. (Originally, McGinn 1976b.)
21. Lewis op cit, pp. 108-9.
22. McGinn 1981a, p.153.
23. loc cit.
24. ibid, pp. 184.
25. As characterized in Ch.8 above.
26. See Chapter 2 .
27. In the context of these considerations it can be appreciated that the retreat 
to a characterization of the a priori in terms of (the causal relations 
between agent an6)justifying statements as opposed to the knowledge 
claim itself achieves two aims. First, it recognizes the role of inference in 
the acquisition of knowledge and second, it does not deem knowledge 
claims a priori solely in virtue of the fact that the "subject matter" of the 
knowledge claim itself is not properly viewed as that which can be a cause. 
Both of these advantages accrue in the instance of a posteriori universal 
generalizations given that the canonical account of our knowledge of these 
is framed in terms of enumeratieve induction and causal, evidence-giving 
contact with particular instances. No doubt this canonical account appears 
simplistic, but that is of no consequence to the main point.
28. Kant 1961. See Ch.2.
29. See §8 .12.
30. Dancy 1985, pp. 218-21.
31. ibid. See Kripke 1980, pp. 113-5.
32. Dancy op cit, p.220.
33. Again, conceptualism as adumbrated in Ch.8 above.
34. This claim will be borne out in Ch.10
35. See §6 .02.





1. McDowell 1985, p.111.
2 . Mackie 1977, pp. 31-5.
3. McDowell op c it, p. 110.
4. loc c it.
5. McDowell op cit, pp.111 ff.
6. c.f. Blackburn 1986, p.128.
7. McDowell op cit, p.111.
8. Perhaps this contrast is reflected in the contrast between the appeal of 
modal conceptualism and the utter implausibility of moral conceptualism.
9. loc c it.
10. See the discussion of the role of causality in epistemology at §9.5.
11. McDowell op cit, p. 119.
12. c.f. Blackburn 1985b, p. 16.
13. McGinn 1981a, p.184. Given that McGinn is aware of this tendency it is 
extremely puzzling that he should make the following remark:
"Kripke clearly wishes to maintain a strongly objectivist view of 
modal truth: his essentialism commits him to it and he often 
speaks, realistically , of our seeing whether some statement is 
necessary or contingent "ibid, p.161. (My emphasis - J.D.)
14. For the projectivist alternative see Blackburn 1981, 1984, 1985b & 1986 
passim .
15. Blackburn 1985b, pp.13-18.
16. Wiggins 1987c, p.107.
17. c.f. Hume 1888, Book I I I .
18. McDowell op cit, p.112.
19. loc cit.
20. loc cit.
21. McGinn 1981a, p.169. See §6.10 - §6.13 above.
22. c.f. Wittgenstein 1953, §258.
23. c.f. the stronger views voiced in Ayer 1936.
24. McGinn 1983, pp.150-3.
25. ibid, p. 147.
26. ibid, pp. 13-4.
27. ibid, p.151.
28. This vivid phrase is Blackburn's (Blackburn 1981, p.173.). Interestingly 
Blackburn is claiming, in this context that McDowell's views on 
rule-following in ethics entail a community consensus standard of 
correctness in ethical judgement. McDowell disowns this standard of 
correctness (McDowell 1985b, p.120 ff.) but it is not clear why he thinks 
that he may do so. The non-consensual but internal standard of 
correctness in rule-following which will be introduced below would seem to 
fit perfectly his purposes.
29. c.f. Wiggins 1987b, p.207.
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30. McDowell op cit, p.118.
31. Wiggins 1987b, p.206.
32. loc cit.
33. c.f. Quine 1961b.
34. McGinn 1983; p.12 , p.151.
35. Wright 1989, pp. 246ff.
36. Wittgenstein 1953 passim .
37. Kripke 1982.
38. Wittgenstein 1953. For concept modification see §67 & pp.208ff ; for the 
requirements of a rule see §206-242.
39. The relativist consequences of the consensual standard of moral truth are 
noted in McGinn 1983 p. 153.
40. Wright 1980 p.2.
41. Wright 1989, Section III et passim.
42. Wright himself is concerned with this difficulty ibid, pp. 247ff.
43. Wright 1983 pp.92-3.
CHAPTER 11
1. Blackburn uses the term "commitment" more widely than this, intending it to 
apply to any broadly assertoric sayings. He then distinguishes within this 
class of sayings those which are and those which are not simple 
expressions of belief. I have chosen to use the term "commitment" in the 
way indicated since (i) I find Blackburn's usage misleading and (ii) The 
notion of expressing a commitment strikes me as being well suited to the 
labelling of a role for sayings which is conduct-related and not simply 
belief stating. (As far as I can gather Blackburn proposes no general term 
for the former kind of role for sayings.) My intentions are at one with those 
of Blackburn in aiming at this distinction. See Blackburn 1981, 1984 
(Ch.6), 1985b, 1986.
2. Hume 1888, Book I, Part III passim.
3. This is to associate with Quine a critique the necessary/contingent 
distinction via his critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction. See Quine 
1961a & Putnam 1983g.
4. This is intended as a Wittgensteinian conception. See Wittgenstein 1956 
V,6; 4,5 et passim & Wright 1980, p.377 et passim.
5. See Ch.6 & Ch.12.
6. Blackburn 1984 (Ch.6), 1986, p.127.
7. Ibid, p.127.
8. See § 11.22 below. By failing to pay any heed to this striking feature of 
logical modality both Lewis and McGinn leave themselves open to the 
charge of harbouring primary realist attitudes to modality.
9. Wright op cit, Ch.XXI, pp. 401-2.
10. Here I will discuss only kind-based essentialist claims but the general idea 
is easily transferable to essentialist claims concerning individuals.
11. The metaphysical import of merited application of a term - as articulated in 
(2) - is a notion that was deployed in the critique of Lewis's evaluation of
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what he called "Kripke's problem. See §3.511.
12. §10.31 above.
13. Perhaps this is related to the relative ease with which we (think we) can 
conceive of an ideal scientific point of view differing radically from our own 
when compared with an ideal moral point of view differing radically from 
our own.
14. McDowell 1981, p.141.
15. See §6.20.
16. See§10.21 - 10.43.
17. McDowell 1981, p. 154.
18. loc cit
19. McDowell 1985, p.111.
20. Dummett 1973, Ch.10
21. ibid, pp.354 ff.
22. ibid, p.358.
23. loc cit.
24. loc c it.
25. See Davidson 1982a.
26. Dummett, op c it, pp.357-8.
27. Of course this specification will be defeasible in the light of a better 
appreciation of the agent's belief/desire profile. For an informative and 
concise discussion of these issues see Fodor 1981, Introduction.
28. Blackburn 1985b, p.13.
29. ibid, p.15.
30. McDowell 1981; p. 143, p. 154.
31. Altham 1986, p.284.
CHAPTER 12
1. Wright 1987, p.5
2 . loc cit
3. loc cit
4. ibid, p.6
5. See Ch.11, §11.23 et passim.
6. See Blackburn 1984, Ch.6 & Blackburn 1981; 1985b; 1986 passim.
7. Blackburn 1986, §V pp. 133-137.
8. For a concise statement of theses see Blackburn 1984, Ch.6.
9. Blackburn 1981, pp. 163-4.
10. Blackburn 1984, p.182
11. loc cit
12. §9.40 ff.
13. Blackburn 1984, p.187.
14. See §8.1 I f f .
15. Blackburn 1984, pp. 185-6.
16. See §7.4
17. §10.11,§10.12.
18. McDowell 1985, §4 pp. 117-20.
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19. Blackburn 1985b, pp.17-8.
20 . McDowell op c/Y.
21. Hence the privileged position of primary properties re. the causal theory of 
knowledge. See §9.21.
22. McDowell op c/Y, p.118
23. loc cit
24. Blackburn 1985b, p.17.
25. loc cit
26. ibid, p. 13.
27. ibid, pp.17-8
28. loc cit..
29. See McDowell 1981, passim.
30. i.e. McDowell 1985,passim.
31. ibid, p. 118.
32. Compare Wiggins' remark:
"Surely it can be true that we desire x because we think x good 
and that xis good because we desire x...the explanation of the  
"because" is different in each direction the second "because"  
may have to be explained in some such way as this: such  
desiring by human beings directed in this way is one part of 
w hat is required for there to be such a thing as the perspective 
from  which the non-instrumental goodness of x is perceived." 
(Wiggins 1976c, p. 106)
33. No doubt there is room for a challenging and far-reaching scepticism 
concerning the very idea that our non-causal explanatory interests carry 
the same ontological authority as our causal explanatory interests. 
However, l assume in what follows that the notion of a non-causal 
explanatory test for reality is feasible.
34. McDowell 1985, p. 119.
35. loc cit
36. This is Field’s notion of empirical conservativeness. See Reid 1980, 
passim.
37. McGinn 1981a, p.182(n.46).
38. Compare Davidson, who in discussing the modal status of the theorems of 
a theory of interpretation (i.e T-theorems) , makes the point that some 
concession to "intensionality” is involved in the concept of a law and that 
this concession must be made for any empirical science. (Davidson 1982 
p.xiv). He goes on to say in the relevant essay:
"A theory that passes the empirical tests is one that can in fact 
Pq projected to unobserved and counter!actual circumstances 
...The trouble is, the theory does not state that it  has the 
character it does.” (Davidson 1982b, p.174)
39. Although it is arguable that the particular cases which McDowell chooses 
are implicitly and (broadly) deontically modal insofar as explanations of the 
form:
(i) x had response of type R to C because C merited R
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can be characterized as standing in logical relations to claims of the 
form:
(ii) x ought to have had an R-response to C.
40. For this conception of quasi-realist success, see Blackburn 1986, p.138.
41. McDowell's ultimate objection appears to be that there is no question of 
our being able to stand back from the purported mechanism of projection 
in order to view,from a wholly naturalized perspective, its workings. See 
McDowell 1985, p.122.
42. Wiggins 1980a Ch.6 §7, et passim.
43. Blackburn 1986 §6.
APPENDIX A
1. It should be noted that the status and proper scope of that programme are 
far less matters of consensus than they once seemed to be. For example, 
the very idea of a systematic theory of meaning has come under pressure 
with the resurgence of interest in the rule-following problematic of 
Wittgenstein (see Wright 1980, Ch. XV pp. 279-92; Wright 1981 passim ) 
and the case for theorizing in a fashion that recognizes an intra-individual, 
subjective probability interpreted, dimension of meaning brings in it wake a 
diminished role for a theory of truth (See e.g. McGinn 1982c, Burge 1982, 
Fodor 1981b). Relatedly, the connection between the content of the axioms 
and theorems of a 'theory of meaning' and speakers' knowledge has also 
been subjected to intense scrutiny in the context of the more general 
question of whether a theory of truth is apt to play any role in the theory of 
speakers' understanding (See e.g. Dummett 1976b, Wright 1981a, 
Evans1981). There remains, however, the conviction that a theory of truth 
is a central plank in the project of the interpretation of the sayings and 
thoughts of the members of speech communities. For the "Davidsonian 
programme" see Davidson 1982 passim , Evans & McDowell (eds) 1976, 




5. For approving citations of Peacocke's truth theory see Davies 1978, p.422 
et passim ; Davies 1981 p.189; McGinn 1980b, p.165, 1981a, p.165; 
Forbes 1985, p.91.
6. Davies 1978.
7. Peacocke op cit., pp.476-7. Here I will deal only with the truth-theory
proposed for a modal propositional language. (Moreover I have departed
from the theory that Peacocke presents in stylistic detail.) While the issues 
of most obvious philosophical interest arise in connection with these 
relatively simple languages, it should be pointed out that Peacocke s 
development of a truth theory in the first-order case requires a substantial 
extension of technical apparatus - quasi-sequences inter alia. Since I do 
not consider myself competent to comment on the methodological or 
philosophical significance of this extension of apparatus I can only remark
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that it may raise difficulties beyond those which emerge in the case of the 
truth-theory for the propositional language.
8. The need for a logic of this strength is of broader interest. Davidson has 
argued that satisfaction of Convention T is a "criterion of theories" 
Davidson 1982j, p132. See also Davidson 1982i, passim ). Given that only 
a truth theory whose logic is at least as strong as S4 can satisfy 
Convention T this would suggest that we have, from a rather unexpected 
source, a consideration in favour of the stronger modal logics as being 
those which are genuinely truth-preserving. This, of course, cannot fail to 
bear on the otherwise bemusing debate as to which is the "right" modal 
logic.
9. The objection is articulated in Wallace 1969 & 1970. See esp. Wallace 
1970 p. 121 & pp. 138-40. The claim that necessitated T-theorems are 
false is made by Putnam and also attributed to Quine by Putnam in Putnam 
1988 (p.63 & p.65 n.7 respectively.)
10. Gupta 1978.
11. Peacocke op c it, pp. 477-8
12. ibid, p.478
13. See n.5 above.
14. The explicit claim that we should regard languages as abstract objects is 
made by authors whose conceptions of semantic theory differ considerably 
otherwise. See Blackburn 1984, pp 18-26; Lewis 1983b passim ; Katz 
1980 passim. Also, while Davies does not, as far as I know, explicitly 
endorse the conception of languages as abstract objects, he embraces 
modal and temporal inflexibility in his declaration that languages are 
"unchanging and unchangeable" (Davies 1983, p.6). For Peacocke's 
commitment to a methodology of temporal inflexibility see Peacocke 
1976b.
15. Gupta op cit, p.453. That we operate the concept T2 is supposed to be
established by our natural acceptance of such propositions as:
All contradictions are necessarily false . (loc c it).
16. loc cit.
17. ibid, p.454.
18. Dummett makes the point that most types of semantic theory offer a static 
account of language (i.e. an account of use at a given point in time) 
although their proponents are obviously aware that languages - in the 
everyday sense of the term - change and bifurcate. His ensuing discussion 
articulates well the dismal prospects of our contriving a theory that contains 
a dynamic account of language use and linguistic change. (Dummett 
1978d, pp. 410-6).
19. Peacocke 1976b.
20. Davidson 1982k, p.60.
21. Compare Wittgenstein's remark :
" The philosophy of logic speaks of ...... the spacial and
tem poral phenom enon of language, not about som e  
non-spacial, non-temporal phantasm. [Note in margin, only it
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is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of 
ways] But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess 
when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their 
physical properties Wittgenstein 1953, §.85.
22. Davidson 1982k, p.59.
23. For further development of these, essentially Wittgensteinian thoughts see 
McGinn 1984 pp.98-102 and Blackburn 1984, Ch 2. For a statement of the 
view that understanding is a matter of cognizing an object see Katz 1980, 
Ch 2 et passim .
24. For a conception of interpretation that is not aimed at characterizing 
speakers' knowledge see Wiggins 1980c.
25. Peacocke 1978, p.478.
26. Putnam 1988, Ch 4.
27. Tarski 1956a.
28. Putnam op c it, p.63.
29. ibid, p.64.
30. loc cit.
31. Proper names of languages then will be descriptive names in Evans' 
sense, (Evans 1982, p. 14 et passim) i.e they can be thought of as 
introduced with the intention that their referent should be the referent of 
the introducing description whatever that may be. Donnellan also claims 
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